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N.Y. Daily
SUNDAY NEWS, A[illegible] 1975

SECRETS OF THE CIA

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

Its clandestine operations now undergoing a sometimes painful official scrutiny, the Central Intelligence Agency maintains, as always, a tight lip. But from interviews with the agents who hired out to do the CIA's clock-and-dagger work, News reporter Paul Meskil tells here for the first time of the intrigue that surfaced in the Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that pushed the U.S. to the brink of war with the Soviet Union. First of a series.



Marie Lorenz spied on Fidel.

By PAUL MESKIL

A BEAUTIFUL German-American girl scored an intelligence coup for the CIA by stealing secret papers from the Havana hotel suite she had shared with Fidel Castro.

Among the papers, she told The News, were maps showing the sites selected for Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

[illegible], black-haired Marie Lorenz, who lives quietly in New York, was the Mata Hari of the Caribbean cold war. She was one of the most glamorous members of a spy ring recruited for the Central Intelligence Agency by Frank Fiorini, a onetime triple agent who later became known to the American public as Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis.

Ms. Lorenz, Sturgis, other former espionage agents, Caribbean conspirators, and Cuban freedom fighters were interviewed for this series on CIA operations in the Caribbean and the Americas. Some of their clandestine activities are told here for the first time, and some are being investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Vice President Rockefeller's Commission on CIA Activities.

According to sources, the CIA was, to one degree or another, involved in:

- Plots to assassinate foreign heads of state, including Castro of Cuba, Papa Doc Duvalier of Haiti and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.
- Smashing a Castroite attempt to invade Panama and sabotage the Panama Canal.
- The explosion of a munitions ship in Havana harbor.
- A fantastic scheme to seize a Soviet ship and use it to obtain the release of the captured American spy ship Pueblo.
- Secret deals with American mobsters who had lost their multimillion-dollar Cuban gambling casinos.
- Armed raids on Cuba and many shipments of guerrilla fighters, weapons, explosives and other war materials to the island before and after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Marie Lorenz played a small but important role in the labyrinth of Caribbean conspiracies.

Her Cuban adventures began on a balmy evening in February 1959, when a launch flying the Cuban revolutionary flag pulled alongside the gleaming white luxury liner Berlin, anchored in Havana harbor on the next-to-last stop of a Caribbean cruise.

In the launch were 20 or so heavily armed Cubans, all wearing beards and rumpled olive-green fatigues. The liner's accommodation ladder was

(Continued on page [illegible])

Box 441

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

(Continued from page 2)

lowered and the *barbudos* (bearded ones) swarmed aboard like pirates, grenades dangling from their belts and machine guns swinging from their shoulders.

Women in evening gowns screamed and ran for cover with their dinner-jacketed husbands, believing the ship was being raided by bandits. But other American tourists recognized the leader of the sinister-looking band as Fidel Castro, the new prime minister of Cuba, and they crowded around him for autographs.

"I'm a friend," he shouted, obviously enjoying the commotion he had caused. "I like Americans."

The Berlin's skipper, former German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, invited the *barbudos* to stay for cocktails and dinner, and he introduced Castro to his vivacious 18-year-old daughter, Marie.

"My father spoke Spanish and he got along well with Castro," Marie told this reporter. "He took Castro and his men on a tour of the ship, then asked them to please leave their guns outside the dining room before they sat down for dinner.

"Castro said they didn't feel safe without guns, so my father allowed them to keep their pistols, but he made them leave the machine guns, automatic rifles and grenades in the smoking room."

Castro sat at the captain's table, between Lorenz and Marie. During the meal, he smiled frequently at Marie, and she was as impressed as any normal teenage girl would be by compliments from the flamboyant hero of the Cuban revolution.

She spoke German and English, which she had learned from her American mother. Castro said he needed a secretary who could write letters in these languages. Before the meal was over, he offered the job to Marie.

Took Offer As Joke

"He asked me to stay in Havana and work for him," she said. "My father and I both laughed. My father said I was going back to Germany to finish my education."

Castro promised to write to her, so she gave him two addresses—her parents' home in Bremen, Germany, and her brother's apartment in New York, where she planned to stay when the Caribbean cruise ended. She never expected to see or hear from Fidel again.

About two weeks later, two Cuban officers called on Marie in New York. They carried a message from Castro, saying he was in desperate need of an English-German translator. He had sent a Cubana Airlines plane to bring her back to Havana.

"I made a big mistake," Marie said, "I got on that plane."

During the flight to Havana, she tried to imagine her life in Castroland. She thought she would have a desk in the premier's secretarial pool and a small apartment of her own. She may even have dreamed of a romance with the tall, charismatic dictator. But her airborne illusions were shattered soon after the plane landed.

"I was very idealistic then," she said. "I was going on an adventure and to my first job. I was going to help the new government. Instead, I became Castro's plaything.

"I was driven from the airport to the Havana Hilton, where Fidel had taken over the 24th floor. For the next four months, I hardly ever got out of the Hilton. When I did get out, I was under guard. If I wanted to go down to the pool or coffee shop, two *barbudos* would go with me."

'I Was His Prisoner'

Asked to define her relationship with Castro during this period, Marie said: "I was his prisoner. I was trapped."

"Were you ever in love with Fidel?"

"No; never. How can you be in love when you're afraid, when you're treated like a piece of furniture, when you're sleeping with a live bazooka under the bed, when you're living in a room with guns on every table and cigar butts all over the floor?"

"My way of thinking was German," she continued. "Everything in my life had been very orderly, very neat, and clean. I never realized anyone, especially a prime minister, could be so disorganized. I thought he would have several offices, with desks, chairs and telephones. All he had, at this point, was a suite of rooms at the Hilton, where he lived and worked. I was kept in one of the rooms. The door to the hall was locked from the outside. *Barbudos* and visitors were in the next room, but the door between the rooms was kept locked.

"All I could do was read books, study Spanish, walk back and forth, listen to the radio or go on the balcony and look out over Havana. I was miserable. My father tried to find out what had happened to me. He contacted the American Embassy in Havana (Marie was born an American citizen) but nothing happened.

"The only clothes I had were what I brought with me from New York. I couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel had me measured for a uniform so I would look like a member of the 26th of July Movement. An olive-green uniform with a lieutenant's star.

"That way, when I was allowed out under guard, he thought people would think I was of his officers. But almost every Havana housewife heard rumors that Castro was keeping a foreigner, an American girl, at the Hilton. I was becoming a problem to him.

"One day two *barbudos* came to the room while Fidel was out. They said they were there to help me. They took me on a 20-minute plane ride to the [illegible] showed me the beautiful black sand beach there and then drove me by jeep to this huge prison complex. They showed me a cell



A chance meeting in Havana harbor aboard a cruise ship captained by her father brought Marie Lorenz and Fidel Castro together. It began a liaison destined to have international repercussions.

where dictator Fulgencio Batista had imprisoned Fidel and Raul (Fidel's brother) years before. I went into the cell to look at a bronze plaque on the wall. They shut the door and locked me in the cell. Then they went away.

She Wasn't Pampered

"I spent a week there, eating the same food as the other prisoners—blacks beans, rice, stale bread and coffee. As far as I know, I was the only woman there.

"Every morning we would hear the firing squads. As soon as it got light, the birds would start singing. Then the guns would go off. Then marching and quiet. Then breakfast and cell checks. The guards would check to see if you'd hanged yourself during the night or if you'd done something wrong in there where there was hardly room to turn around. It was horrible.

"After seven days, I was taken out and flown back to Havana."

Marie was never told why she was jailed. She now believes Castro had her locked up to make sure she didn't escape while he was out of the country visiting the United States and South America.

One night she was with Castro and his bodyguards in the lobby of the Riviera Hotel when a handsome, wavy-haired man approached her. He wore the olive-green rebel uniform and the insignia of a captain in the Cuban air force.

While Castro was conferring with his aides on the other side of the lobby, the captain mingled with the *barbudos* around Marie and whispered to her in English: "I know about you."

"Can you help me?" she responded. "Can you get me out of here?"

"Yes. I'm with the American Embassy. I'll get you out."

This was her introduction to Comandante Frank Fiorini (later known as Frank Sturgis), Castro confidant and hired agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Agrees to Spy on Fidel

For the next few weeks Frank kept in contact with her in person and through Castro officers who were working for him. Marie agreed to spy on Castro. She filched secret documents and reported Castro's conversations with important visitors overheard through the hotel walls. By now, she could read and speak Spanish fairly well.

"The suite was full of guns and papers," she said. "Fidel had papers strewn all over the tables, the floor, the bed, the dresser. He had one filing cabinet that was never locked. It was full of money, papers, documents, maps. I took papers out and slipped them to Frank. Fidel never missed them.

"Frank said, 'Get all the data you can,' and I did. I was a regular Mata Hari."

Then Marie became sick, and Frank arranged her escape. Two Cuban officers took her out of the hotel while Castro was away and put her on a Cubana Airlines flight to New York.

About that time, Frank also set up the escapes of two top Cuban air force officers, a project that forced him to leave Cuba. He moved his base of operations to Miami, but he kept in touch with his agents on the island and his CIA contacts in Havana and Washington.

When she recovered from her illness, Marie joined him in Florida and volunteered for a mission that meant certain death if she were caught.

Early in 1960, Castro went to



Sturgis says Sal Garcia source of Tarabocchia memo

Discovery of missile sites in Cuba provoked a cold-war showdown between then President John F. Kennedy and then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a confrontation that had the world holding its breath.



CIA Sent Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

By PAUL MESKIL

The Central Intelligence Agency sent a shapely Mata Hari to Cuba in 1960 to kill her former lover, Fidel Castro.

Details of this case were uncovered by The News and a Senate Intelligence Committee investigator who learned that a mystery woman had been involved in an assassination plot against the Cuban dictator.

It was the first of several CIA-sponsored attempts to execute Castro.

The mystery woman has now been identified by the committee and The News as Marie Lorenz, an attractive German-American brunette who shared Castro's Havana hotel suite for several months in 1959. When a committee investigator confronted her with evidence linking her to the assassination plot, she admitted that she had been recruited for the attempted hit.

Exclusive Account

Then, last week, she gave this reporter an exclusive account of a mission so secret that she never mentioned it to anyone for 16 years.

Ms. Lorenz, who now lives in New York, is the daughter of the late German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz and his American wife. After World War II, Lorenz became skipper of the luxury liner Berlin. He took Marie along on a Caribbean cruise in February 1959, a month after Castro took over the Cuban government.

Castro boarded the Berlin in Havana harbor and dined with the captain and his vivacious teenage daughter. He later persuaded Marie to return to Havana to work as his personal interpreter. When she arrived she was installed in Castro's 24th-floor suite at the Havana Hilton. She soon realized she was a virtual prisoner.

Quizzed by FBI

Frank Fiorini, an American who had become a Cuban Revolutionary Army officer and a CIA agent, contacted her and persuaded her to photograph Castro's secret papers. He later helped her escape.

She left Havana in January

The Memo That Started It

On Dec. 11, 1959, Col. J. C. King, head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to CIA Director Allen Dulles, according to a Senate committee report. Noting that the "far left" regime in Cuba might encourage other Latin American countries to take action against U.S. interests he recommended that: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion, Che Guevara, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate a fall of the present government."

Dulles and Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell approved the recommendation and the CIA launched an assassination campaign against Castro that lasted at least five years. This is the exclusive story of the first try.

CIA Sent a Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

(Continued from page 3)

[illegible] York and [illegible] Hospital for [illegible] serious illness. [illegible] FBI agents questioned her [illegible] conditions in Cuba. She later took part in various CIA [illegible] operations with [illegible] and Alex Rorke, a [illegible] who worked for both the CIA and the FBI.

On one of these missions she [illegible] to Havana and stole secret papers and documents from Castro's suite while he was away. About two months later, Rorke told her he had an important assignment that would enable her to do a tremendous service for this country."

He took her to the FBI offices at 201 E. 69th St. for a conference with the two agents who had questioned her previously, and a CIA official.

"I was asked about my attitude toward Castro," she said, "and whether I was willing to work since I could get in and out (of Castro's suite). I said, 'What kind of work?'

Thought It Was a Joke

"Alex said, 'You could knock him off.' It would save everybody a lot of trouble.' I thought he was joking, but they kept coming back to it and I realized they were serious.

"Alex said, 'Why don't you kill him?' I said, 'I don't know how, with all those men around him, and I don't know if it's in me to kill him.'

"Once, out of jealousy, I pointed a gun at him and Fidel didn't even blink. He said, 'You can't kill me.' I said, 'I'm not planning to. I'm just cleaning the gun.'"

Ms. Lorenz said there were several more meetings at which various ways of killing Castro were discussed.

"Finally they decided on poison. They said it would be easy to put poison in his food or drink. I said, 'What are you trying to tell me? To go down and kill him?'

"Alex said, 'It would change history.' I said, "Well, I don't want to die.'

"They didn't tell me to do it or not to do it. They said if I went I'd be protected, but who could guarantee I'd get out?"

A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Fiorini gave her two capsules full of poison powder. She was told to sprinkle the powder in Castro's coffee.

"I guess the company (CIA) supplied them. Frank said it was a company operation."

Packing the olive-drab uniform that Castro had given her, designating her a lieutenant in the Revolutionary Army, Ms. Lorenz flew back to Havana on Cubana Airlines. Believing she might be searched at the airport, she hid the capsules in a jar of cold cream in her purse. When she arrived in Havana she checked into a tourist hotel, changed into her Fidelista uniform and went to the Hilton.

Cold-Cream Caper

"The lobby was full of reporters and other people trying to see Castro, but he wasn't there. One of his aides recognized me and took me up to Fidel's suite.

Entering the two-room suite, she saw that nothing had changed in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

She waited nervously in Castro's private room until he came in a few hours later. As soon as he smiled and hugged her, she knew he didn't suspect she had visited the suite a few months previously and stolen his secrets. And he certainly didn't suspect she had come back to kill him.

Do Not Disturb

"He asked why I left him and I said it was because I missed my mother and my home. He started talking about Cuba and the problems, the lack of money, the shortages. He talked a long time. He said he was expecting an important phone call, but he took the receiver off the hook and he shouted to the barbudos (bearded ones) in the next room: 'No me moleste (Don't bother me)'

"Finally he ordered food and coffee sent up. When it came, he fell asleep on the bed, in his fatigues and with a cigar in his mouth. I had no confidence left, but I knew this was the chance to do it.

"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

[illegible] I could get in and [illegible] suite). I said, 'W[illegible]k?'"

Thought It Was a Joke

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"They didn't tell me to do it or not to do it. They said if I went I'd be protected, but who could guarantee I'd get out?"

A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Rorke for a meeting with Fiorini, who "said he had a way to do it."

She said she spent three weeks in a CIA "safe house" in Miami, seeing no one but Fiorini and Rorke. "They kept talking me into it. They said, 'You can do it. You're the only one who can do it.'"

Asked if she now believes she was brainwashed, she replied: "I guess so." She said they appealed to her patriotism and told her she "would get thousands, enough to retire," if she succeeded.

When she finally agreed to accept the assignment, she said, [illegible]ed in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

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"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

"It was like an omen.

"I couldn't just dump a glob of cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went back to the bedroom and I watched him sleeping. Finally I lay down on the bed beside him.

"I thought, 'To hell with it. Let history take its course.'

"Stupid, Stupid"

Frank and Alex met me when I flew to Miami next morning. They asked me what happened and I said the capsules melted. Frank was very upset. He said, 'Stupid, stupid, stupid. Why did you put them in the cold cream?' I said, 'Where else? It was the only place to think of where no one would find them.'"

Ms. Lorenz was not asked to try again.

"Would you have killed him if the capsules hadn't melted," the interviewer asked. "No," she replied. "Probably not."

Alex Rorke later disappeared on a mystery flight to Nicaragua. Frank Fiorini, now known as Frank Sturgis, continued to perform odd jobs for the CIA until his arrest in 1972 as one of the Watergate burglars.

Informed of Ms. Lorenz' account of the assassination attempt, he verified her story.

Soon after her murder mission failed, the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters — including John Roselli of Las Vegas, Sam Giancana of Chicago and Santo Trafficante of Tampa, Fla. — to kill Castro. But they were no more successful than the sexy Mata Hari.

Aria Floors Opera Singer

London, June 12 (UPI) — Don Giovanni reached for a high note at the Royal Opera House in London last night and fell through the floor.

He stuck there, in the person of singer Ruggero Raimondi, trapped to his waist and singing for dear life. Sir Geraint Evans and his other co-performers, still singing, tugged and pulled. Eventually Raimondi climbed out, unhurt but shaken with his word bent into a curve.

"They were magnificent," said critic Hilton Tims, who was in the audience. "They carried on without letting the incident upset their vocal equilibrium."

WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
EDITION
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched. But when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

Related Story Page A5

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvania...

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Levien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there.

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.





Marie Lorenz says she was told that maps she took from Castro's headquarters were factor in locating and photographing missile sites (above). Under pressure from U.S., Khrushchev ordered missiles removed and shipped back to Soviet Union (right).

Cienaga de Zapata, a vast swamp that he intended to convert to rice fields. As soon as he left Havana with his usual entourage, Marie received orders to return to the Cuban capital immediately. She boarded a regular Cubana Airlines flight, posing as an American tourist and carrying her Castro uniform and a loaded revolver in her overnight bag.

She arrived in Havana a few hours after Castro left town. Americans were still welcome there in those days, and Cuban customs officers seldom searched tourists' luggage.

"There was no trouble at the airport," Marie said. "I checked into a sleazy little hotel in downtown Havana, changed into my lieutenant's uniform and went direct to the Havana Hilton. By this time, Castro had a home on the outskirts of Havana, Casa Cojimar, but it was more convenient for him to keep his papers at the Hilton.

"He had Suite 2408 and the adjoining suites. I had the key to 2408. Nobody recognized me when I came into the hotel. I had changed my hair style and made my complexion darker than it is naturally. And I wore dark glasses. They (Castro's people) all wore dark glasses, even at night.

"A lot of people were loitering in the lobby, *barbudos* and everything. I just walked right through. Passing the desk was the main thing that bothered me because the desk clerks knew me. I had a snub-nosed .38 caliber Detective Special clipped to the inside of my waistband. Nobody seemed to notice me. I walked to the elevators and went up to the 24th floor.

Saw Her Opportunity

"Nobody was around. When Fidel left, they all left with him; his bodyguards, his advisers, whatever. When I had lived there, I was either all alone and everything was dead quiet, or else Fidel was there and there was a lot of noise and cigar smoke.

"I unlocked the door to Suite 2408, went inside and double-locked the door behind me. I felt pretty confident because I knew Fidel was at Cienaga de Zapata. When he left the suite, no one was to go in. Those were the orders.

"As usual, the suite was littered with papers and the filing cabinet was open. I couldn't grab everything. I took as much as I could and stuffed papers and maps into my uniform pockets and [illegible] ten, went back to the other hotel, changed into a dress and caught the next flight to Miami.

"Frank met me at the airport and I gave him all the papers. I never knew exactly what information they contained. I was told the stuff was good, it was fantastic, 'the United States government is very happy.' "

Among the papers were topographical maps of Cuba on which several sections of undeveloped land, miles away from any population center, had been marked with hand-drawn circles. The maps also had handwritten notations that Marie couldn't read because "they were in a foreign language—Czech, I think."

Her Find Was Valuable

Three years later, another intelligence agent told her the maps were "the original groundwork plans" for Soviet missile sites. The circled areas were the spots where Soviet missile bases were built in 1962, setting off the historic showdown between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

From information supplied by agents inside Cuba and Cuban refugees, and from aerial photos snapped from U-2 spy planes, the CIA was able to pinpoint all the missile bases on the island. But Marie believes her solo mission to Castro's lair gave the CIA its first inkling of what the Russians were plotting. She also believes Castro suspected she was the burglar who swiped his secrets. (The CIA has declined to comment on Marie's involvement.)

In March 1960, soon after she had completed this dangerous assignment, Marie received a mysterious telegram from Havana. Delivered to her brother's apartment at 311 W. 84th St., it said, "CALL 28607 (Castro's private number) LATE AT NIGHT. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT."

It was signed "Yanez," meaning Capt. Jesus Yanez Pelletier, one of Castro's closest aides. Marie's first impulse was to ignore the message, but curiosity overcame common sense. Without mentioning the telegram to her brother, she left the apartment around midnight to place a collect call to Havana from a phone booth on the corner.

As she stepped into the small vestibule between the outer and inner front doors to the apartment house, two men grabbed her. One of them was Yanez.

"They had guns," Marie recalled. "They were going to take me back to Cuba. Yanez said a plane was waiting at Idlewild Airport. They hit me in the face and tried to drag me out to a car.

"A person who lived in the building opened the door and saw me screaming and fighting. This person ran down toward Riverside Drive. The interruption distracted the Cubans enough so that I broke loose and ran. I heard one of them yell, 'Shoot! Shoot!' but they didn't. I ran up to Broadway and found a cop there.

"The Cubans took off. My face was all bloody. Thank God for that cop. He took me to the [illegible] and I told the detectives an [illegible] story of intrigue and fear. I told them who Yanez was and I gave them the name of a West Side hotel where Castro people stayed when they were in New York. The detectives went there and found Yanez, but they couldn't arrest him because he had diplomatic immunity. He had a diplomatic passport saying he was with the prime minister's office. They told him to get on his plane and go back to Cuba."

When Yanez returned to Havana without Marie, Castro did what the New York cops couldn't do. Fidel sent him to prison.

Discussed Killing Castro

Asked if she and other members of Frank's spy ring had ever discussed killing Castro, Marie replied: "Sure. We all did. We were going to bomb him during one of his speeches. We were going to fly over and drop it right on top of him.

"We had the bomb, the plane. I was going to go along. Hit and run. We were all set, but it was called off. Somebody stopped it. That's all I know."

Marie said two American agents went to Cuba to assassinate Castro shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"I met them at a little white house we rented in the Cuban colony in Miami. I think it was on Flagler St. We would never stay in one place too long. We'd rent a house and move on. Anyway, it was at one of our meetings that they talked real heavy about going in and killing him.

"The two Americans went in, but they didn't get out. They grew beards, dressed like Castro soldiers. I heard they came very, very close to killing [illegible]

Marie said she made three boat trips to Cuba, delivering guns and supplies to anti-Castro guerrillas. She worked with Frank and Alex Rorke, both of whom were contract employees of the CIA, meaning they were not listed on any federal payroll.

"There's really no contract," she explained. "Nothing is put down on paper. You just say you're doing this for the good of your country. I didn't handle the money end of it. We were given what we needed."

'Eduardo' Supplied Cash

When cash was needed, it came from a CIA man she knew only as Eduardo. He would meet Frank and Alex from time to time at a "safe house" in Miami.

"Eduardo was [illegible] our thing," Marie said. "When we went to pick up the money, I [illegible] in the car. I saw him when he opened the door of this little white house we used."

Years later, while reading about the Watergate break-in, Marie saw a newspaper photo of former CIA man E. Howard Hunt and immediately recognized him as the elusive "Eduardo." She also recognized a picture of Sturgis, whom she had known as Frank Fiorini.

Sturgis was one of the five burglars caught in Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. Four of the five—Sturgis, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Rolando Martinez and James W. McCord, then security chief for the Nixon reelection campaign committee—were former CIA employes.

Sturgis, Barker and Martinez had been active in preparations for the Bay of Pigs landing. So was Hunt, the fiction-writing mastermind of the Watergate burglary. And he referred to Sturgis, Barker and Martinez in court testimony as "some of my old CIA contacts."

Sturgis returned to Washington this month, nearly three years after his arrest there, to testify at secret staff sessions of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities. He won't discuss his testimony, but other sources said he was asked about CIA operations ranging from domestic spying to political murders.

(Tomorrow: Frank Fiorini Sturgis.

How an Invasion of the Canal Zone Was Foiled

By PAUL MESKIL

Third of a series

SECRETS OF THE CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency once investigated Fidel Castro, ballerina Margot Fonteyn and actors John Wayne and Errol Flynn in connection with a bizarre invasion of Panama.

The colorful cast of this comic-opera conspiracy included three American adventurers, two of whom were working for the CIA. William Morgan and Alex Rorke, both former U.S. Army paratroopers, were on opposite sides of the Panama plot. And Frank Sturgis, a former Marine Raider, was in the middle.

Sturgis, born Frank Fiorini, was a gun runner and troop-trainer for Castro. Then he became security and intelligence chief of the Cuban Air Force, meanwhile serving as a secret agent of the CIA.

Morgan was a freelance conspirator, more interested in money than politics. A native of Toledo, Ohio, he went to Cuba in 1958 and became second in command of an independent rebel army in the Escambray Mountains. This non-Communist force helped Castro's guerrillas overthrow the Batista dictatorship and Castro made Morgan a major, highest rank in the revolutionary army.

The upset victory over Batista, and the spoils that went with it, encouraged Morgan to consider extending the revolution to other Latin lands. A few weeks after the Castro takeover in Havana, Morgan called at Capt. Frank Fiorini's office in Cuban Air Force headquarters.

Refused second spot

"Major Morgan spoke to me confidentially," Sturgis told The News. "He said he was preparing an invasion of Panama and the Canal Zone. He wanted me to be second-in command of the expedition. I told him I was interested, but not in a leadership position.

"I said, 'Bill, you've got to be crazy.' The American government's got a military force there. You're willing to go against your own country?' He said, 'Well, the U.S. never did anything for me.'"

The American military strength in the Canal Zone at that time in 1959 totaled about 4,000 men, compared to 65,000 in World War II. Morgan figured a surprise attack by a few hundred Cubans, assisted by Panamanian leftists staging riots and other disorders, would be sufficient to capture or at least sabotage the vital canal.

"The conspirators planned to overthrow the Panamanian government and grab the Canal for propaganda and extortion reasons," Sturgis said.

"They were going to send a ship, loaded with explosives, through the canal locks. They were going to blow up and sink the ship somewhere near the locks, so that the gates and locks would be damaged and ship traffic would be stopped in both directions.

"Morgan figured it would tie up the canal for at least two months. He was all set to go. He had the men, guns, ships, planes, everything.

Showed planes, named names

"I contacted the American Embassy in Havana and notified the (CIA) agent in charge. I took Col. Nichols (Erickson Nichols, air attache at the embassy) to the air base and showed him the camouflaged planes that were to be used for the invasion, and I named all the people who were involved in the conspiracy."

Those names reportedly included Margot Fonteyn, superstar of London's Royal Ballet and dame commander of the Order of the British Empire (the equivalent of knighthood), and her rich, aristocratic husband, Roberto Arias, former Panamanian ambassador to Britain and son of a former president of Panama.

Dame Margot and her husband were in Cuba at the time. So was Ruben Miro, head of the Panamanian revolutionary movement. They allegedly conferred with Morgan at Cienfuegos, where he was military commander.

According to intelligence reports, the invasion was to take place while Castro was visiting the United States and Canada. A spearhead force of Cubans and Panamanians would land on the Caribbean coast of Panama. A second force of Panamanians would strike inland from the Pacific coast. Then the main invasion army would sail in from Cuba.

Police and National Guard posts were to be attacked. Rebel bands were to [illegible] march on the Canal Zone and riot in Panama City to keep Panamanian police and U.S. troops occupied.



Photo by Rogelio Caparros

In Panama, part of the invasion team is quickly seized.

But Frank's reports to the CIA provided sufficient advance warning.

Castro left Cuba on April 14. Then Arias and his wife flew to Panama and rented the 42-foot motor launch Nola for $75 a day, saying they were going fishing. Five tough looking men accompanied them.

Cache of arms

They reportedly sailed directly to a spot where a cache of arms — semi-automatic rifles, revolvers, machine guns, grenades and ammunition in waterproof containers — had been dropped in the Pacific Ocean, 15 miles outside the Panama Canal entrance. The shrimp boat Elaine had been standing by for the arms drop. It retrieved the weapons from the water and later transferred them to the Nola.

The "fishermen" aboard the Nola came ashore on the Pacific coast, near Santa Clara, and buried the guns and ammo on the beach. Dame Margot and her husband then resumed their cruise.

On April 18, after receiving a CIA report that an invasion ship had sailed from the Cuban port of Batabano (part of Morgan's military district in Las Villas Province), the Panamanian government ordered Arias' arrest. He heard the news on the Nola's radio, returned to the Santa Clara area and went into hiding on his family's ranch.

Before dawn next day, the Nola slipped into the Panama Canal with only the skipper and Dame Margot aboard. She went to the home of her sister-in-law, Senora Chela Arias. A few hours later, she was arrested. After 24 hours in jail, the prima ballerina was booted back to Britain. Meanwhile, Arias had taken refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Panama City. He was later allowed to leave the country.

National guardsmen found the arms buried in the beach at Santa Clara. A second arms cache was discovered near a cottage owned by an American friend of the Arias family.

Late Friday night, April 24, a Cuban ship landed at Puerto Coronado on the Caribbean coast of Panama, about 60 miles northeast of the capital. In it were 85 armed men, Cubans and Panamanians, and a woman nurse.

Spearhead blunted

Three of the men drowned in the surf as they tried to beach the boat. The rest were quickly captured by Panama's National Guard. Three more Cuban ships had left the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos and Batabano with the main invasion force of about 400 men, mostly Cubans who had fought under Morgan. When Raul Castro learned that the spearhead had failed to penetrate Panama he called off the invasion and ordered the three follow-up ships back to Cuba.

Meanwhile, Panamanian officers discovered a blue canvas bag left behind by Dame Margot. Among the interesting items in it were a notebook containing a list of arms to be used in the two-pronged invasion, maps of Panama, a tide table and several letters which Panamanian authorities said proved Margot's involvement in the plot.

There was also a letter from film star John Wayne signed "Duke." It noted that Arias had received $5[illegible],000 from Wayne's account between Nov. 19, 1957, and April 5, 1959.

Questioned by American agents, Wayne explained that he and Arias were partners in a [illegible] import-export [illegible]. "I don't deal in politics," he said. [illegible] he knew nothing about the Panama plot.

Errol Flynn also was asked about his friendship with Arias. They had been seen together in Cuba, where Flynn was making a movie based on the Castro revolution. The screen swashbuckler said Arias wanted to hire Flynn's yacht, the ocean-going Zaca, for a trip to Panama. Suspecting what he had in mind, Flynn refused.

Some CIA agents believe Morgan would not have attempted the Panama invasion without Castro's consent. But Fidel insisted: "I had nothing to do with it."

When the spearhead force splashed ashore on a San Blas Indian reservation, the CIA had a man at the scene. He was Alexander Rorke Jr., a freelance journalist, photographer and intelligence agent.

Double doublecross

Son of a New York judge, Alex served as a paratrooper and intelligence specialist in World War II. In 1952, he married actress Jacqueline Billingsley, daughter of Stork Club owner Sherman Billingsley.

Frank Nelson, an American businessman in Cuba, was involved with Sturgis, Morgan and Rorke in various plots, including a double doublecross. Nelson, who now lives in New York and has just finished writing a book entitled "For a Million Dollars," told The News:

"I started the counter-revolution against Castro in 1959 because he arrested a close friend of mine. I went to see Frank Sturgis in Havana and asked if there was anything he could do to get my friend out of jail. He sent me to Morgan who was very close to Castro, but Morgan wasn't interested in anything but money.

"I found out that Castro was going to invade the Dominican Republic, so I went there and told Trujillo (Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo) about the invasion plans. I said he should beat Castro to the punch and invade Cuba, with Morgan's help.

"I told Trujillo, 'I think you can buy Morgan for a million dollars. Let him take his army back to the mountains and establish a base. Then you come in with your army and in a few days Castro is finished.'"

Trujillo approved the million-dollar deal and put up the cash to get it started. Nelson said he paid Morgan $400,000 down, plus $100,000 "for expenses." The remaining $500,000 was to be paid when the invasion of Cuba began.

Sturgis soon learned the details of this new plot and informed the CIA. When the agency pulled Sturgis out of Cuba in the summer of 1959, it sent Rorke in to find out what was happening.

Decoyed by Raul's wife

Nelson arranged a meeting between Rorke and Morgan. Soon after Rorke arrived in Havana, he phoned Morgan's home. A woman answered, identified herself as "Mrs. Morgan" and told Rorke to come on over. When he got there, he was arrested. The woman who answered the phone was Vilma Espin, Raul Castro's wife.

By this time, Morgan had told Fidel about the invasion plot. Without mentioning the million dollars, he said he had pretended to go along with Trujillo in order to set a trap.

In mid August, Morgan sent an urgent radio message to the chief of Dominican military intelligence. He said he had seized Trinidad, on the south coast of Cuba, as an invasion beachhead. When a planeload of Dominican soldiers [illegible] it was surrounded by 1,000 Cuban troops led by Fidel Castro himself.

The Dominicans were paraded before TV cameras on their way to jail. Castro denounced Trujillo and praised Morgan as a hero. Less than two years later, Morgan was executed by a Castro firing squad for a much less profitable plot.

What became of the $500,000 is not known. Neither Morgan's Cuban wife nor his American family ever saw a cent of it. Nor did Castro.

As soon as the Trujillo invasion collapsed, Alex Rorke was released from jail and deported from Cuba. But he returned many times by air and sea. For these clandestine trips, he used a twin engine Beechcraft plane, a B-25 bomber and a 36-foot speedboat, the Violynn III. Sturgis accompanied him on many mysterious missions.

Assassins failed

On one occasion, Rorke reportedly landed an execution squad that tried but failed to kill Castro. Early in 1963, the Violynn III was detained in the Bahamas when it stopped to refuel on a run between the U.S. and Cuba. British intelligence agents questioned Rorke and the 17 Cuban raiders who were with him. Rorke told them the CIA had financed many trips of the Violynn III and "the United States government, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had advance knowledge of these trips."

Former CIA agents told The News this statement was true.

On April 25, 1963, Rorke and three other CIA contract agents flew over Havana in the Beechcraft and tried to bomb two oil refineries. The bombs missed their targets and caused little damage.

Five months later, Rorke went on his last mission. The 36-year-old adventurer and his partner, Geoffrey Sullivan, 28, of Waterbury, Conn., took off from Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., in a rented twin engine Beechcraft on Sept. 24, 1963. Two Cubans accompanied them.

Rorke and Sullivan filed a flight plan indicating they were bound for Nicaragua, where they planned to start an air freight service. They made two fuel stops — at Cozumel Island off Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula and at Belize, British Honduras. When they left Belize, the plane disappeared.

That night, Sturgis received a report that the plane was overdue in Nicaragua. Frank immediately called the commander of naval intelligence in Miami. An air-sea search was launched by the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force. A private search party was organized later by Rorke's Miami lawyer and personal friend, Ellis Rubin. But no trace of the missing Americans or their plane was ever found.

Forced onto boat

Some investigators believe the plane was sabotaged by Castro agents. Frank Nelson has another theory.

"When they stopped to refuel at Stanley Field near Belize, [illegible] spoke to an American commercial pilot, Floyd Park of [illegible], Texas. Alex said they were headed for Tegucigalpa (capital of the Republic of Honduras). They took off in the direction of Tegucigalpa, but they never got there.

"Several months later, Park received information from a couple of [illegible] that two Americans answering the description of Rorke and Sullivan were forced to board a Cuban fishing boat that had pulled into shore in Honduras two weeks earlier with engine trouble. The fishing boat left immediately after the two Americans were put on board."

If these men were indeed Rorke and Sullivan, they never reached Cuba. Investigators are certain of that. The two Cubans who left Florida with Rorke and Sullivan were still with them when they made the two fuel stops. According to reports received by both Nelson and Sturgis, one of these men was [illegible] Molina, a Cuban officer who supposedly turned against Castro and fled to the United States.

"Molina was seen in Havana a few months after he disappeared with Rorke and Sullivan in [illegible] America," Nelson said. He believes Molina may have forced the Americans to land somewhere in Honduras, where they were delivered to Castro agents who kidnaped and killed them.

Our Havana Triple Spy Helped & Hurt Castro

By PAUL MESKIL *Second of a series*

SECRETS OF THE CIA

"I was a spy," Frank Sturgis admits.

"I was involved in assassination plots and conspiracies to overthrow several foreign governments, including Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

"I smuggled arms and men into Cuba — for Castro and against Castro. I broke into the intelligence files of the Cuban Army and Air Force. I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents.

"That's what spies do.

"I also broke into foreign consulates and business offices in Cuba, for the purpose of obtaining information, and into a import-export office in Caracas, Venezuela, that was a front for the KGB (Soviet Secret Service)."

Sturgis was a hired operative of the Central Intelligence Agency for at least a decade. Maybe he still is, though his cover was blown forever by the notoriety he received as a Watergate burglar. He constructed and controlled an espionage network in Cuba that is still functioning despite frantic efforts by Castro security forces and the KGB to destroy it.

Though [illegible] bit [illegible] in the Watergate drama, Sturgis is a real-life James Bond whose exploits rival those of any fictional spy. Interviewed at the office of his Miami lawyer, Ellis Rubin, and at other places in New York and Florida, he candidly revealed many details of his colorful career as a war hero, secrets-stealer, gun-runner, guerrilla fighter and professional plotter.

Changed the subject

Asked if he had also been an assassin, he politely changed the subject. Some things he will not talk about.

A stocky, iron-jawed man who looks much younger than his 50 years, he was born Frank Angelo Fiorini in Norfolk, Va. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps at the start of World War II and fought through the Pacific with the famed First Raider Battalion. After the war, he served in the Air Force, Army and Navy Reserve.

He had the perfect training for a secret agent. The Marine Corps taught him judo, knife-fighting and jungle warfare techniques. The Air Force taught him to fly a plane and the Navy Reserve trained him to handle small, fast ships.

The Army completed this education. During a hitch in Germany, he was assigned to a security unit that handled top-secret reports from Allied intelligence agents all over Europe. This was his introduction to the dark world of espionage and intrigue.

In Berlin during the chilliest part of the cold war, he met his first real spy. She was a beautiful actress who also was an agent of Haganah, the secret army formed to defend the new state of Israel.

When he returned to civilian life, Frank became a Haganah courier — perhaps the only Roman Catholic in this group. In the 1950s, he went to Miami to visit an uncle who had married a Cuban exile. Her family was close to Carlos Prio, the Cuban president who was ousted in 1952 by a military coup led by Fulgencio Batista. Frank met Prio and other wealthy Cubans whose Miami mansions were hotbeds of anti-Batista intrigue. Some of them supplied financial support for a fiery young rebel, Fidel Castro, who was then living in Mexico.

In 1957, Prio asked Frank to "go to Cuba, join Castro's army and let me know what he's doing." Frank accepted

(Continued on page 14)



OUR TRIPLE-AGENT IN HAVANA



Frank Sturgis in Cuba: "I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents."

A bit player in the Watergate drama, Sturgis was a real-life James Bond when he did his big jobs for the CIA

(Continued from page 3)

the assignment. He flew to Havana and with the help of a Cuban priest, he quickly located Castro's camp in the Sierra Maestra Mountains and volunteered his services.

"Fidel remembered me," he said. "We could understand each other. I spoke Italian, which is similar to Spanish, and he spoke some English. I offered to help train his troops, but he said, 'Frank, what I need is guns.'"

So Frank became a gun runner. With money supplied by the Castro underground in Florida, he purchased thousand of rifles and other weapons from International Armament Corp. (Interarmco) of Alexandria, Va., the world's largest dealer in surplus arms. He then set up an elaborate land-sea-air smuggling network to get the guns and ammunition into Cuba.

He Became Triple Agent

After several months as a double agent, working for Prio and Castro, Frank became a triple agent. This time, he was recruited for the game of intelligence by a major league scout, Park F. Woolam, the State Department official then in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Santiago de Cuba.

"We met at the Case Grande Hotel in Santiago," Frank recalls. "Woolam knew who I was and what I was doing. He approached me or someone introduced us. We had several other meetings and he discussed my patriotism and so forth. I agreed to work with him.

"Later, when the revolution was over, I received orders to go to Havana. Woolam told me who to contact in the American Embassy there." His new contacts, Frank said, were CIA agents, one of whom was the embassy's military attache.

Castro immediately placed his most trusted officers in command of the Cuban military services. Major Pedro Diaz Lanz, a close friend of Frank's, became commander in chief of the Air Force and his brother, Marcos Diaz Lanz, became inspector general of that service.

Frank helped the Diaz Lanz brothers reorganize the Air Force and they made him their security and intelligence chief. He also became the officer in charge of inspecting and supervising all Cuban gambling casinos, which were owned and operated by American mobsters.

Frank said his CIA advisers "asked me to recruit reliable people in the ... the military, in the presidential palace, in with Fidel. I recruited everyone I could, Americans and Cubans, to be undercover agents."

Max Gorman-Gonzales, a Miami businessman who took part in cloak-and-dagger operations against both Batista and Castro, has known and worked with Sturgis for many years. He says Sturgis "was a CIA employee from 1959 to 1968. The CIA asked him to participate in assassination plots in Cuba and elsewhere. Sturgis introduced top Cuban military and political leaders to American agents at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. During these visits, a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders developed.

"Two attempts against Castro's life were made in the early part of 1959. Both failed. The assassins then waited for a green light from Frank Fiorini Sturgis. A third attempt was made in 1960."

This reporter asked Sturgis when the agency first began thinking about assassinating Castro.

"The first discussion of assassination with my (CIA) contacts was in February 1960," he replied. "I was making reports on all the communist activity in the military. I suggested that this would be a good time to assassinate Fidel. I said I would organize it and follow it through.

"I would arrange an important conference at Campo Libertad (Camp Liberty, the combined army air force base and headquarters formerly known as Camp Columbia). All the top commanders would come to the base in their jeeps and cars. I was going to station gunners on the roofs, set up a cross-fire. I would have wiped out Fidel, his brother Raul and all the top (pro communist) military commanders in 30 seconds.

"I asked my contact in the Embassy to get a green light (official approval) on this. Whether this would have to come from the top level in Washington or a lower level, I don't know."

While they waited for the ...

Sturgis and his CIA contacts devised two alternate plots. One was to execute Castro in the second floor conference room at Air Force headquarters. As he and the other officers would not arrive at exactly the same time, it might be more practical to wait until they were all assembled around the conference table.

"The whole idea was to kill all of them at once. Unfortunately, if some of the anti-Communist officers were in there at the same time, they would have to go too. The lives of some of the anti-Communist commanders would have to be sacrificed in order to get Castro and his crew."

The third scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. "I had access to the prime minister's office," Sturgis said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy. I planned to go to Fidel's office with a briefcase full of explosives which I would leave there. When Fidel entered the office, a signal would be given and the bomb would be set off by an electronic device across the street."

The plotters waited several months for the green light from Washington, but it never came. "They couldn't make up their minds," Frank said of the unseen, unknown decision makers. "They couldn't decide what to do."

Asked for Green Light

But, according to former intelligence agents, the CIA later approved and bankrolled other plots to wipe out Castro. American adventurers, Cuban exiles, Mafia dons and high ranking Cuban officials played prominent parts in these conspiracies.

In June, 1959, Castro fired 25 top Air Force officers suspected of disloyalty, including the Diaz Lanz brothers. Pedro Diaz Lanz then resigned from the Air Force and denounced Castro as a ...

Almeida, ordered Pedro's arrest and the Diaz Lanz brothers went underground.

At this point, Frank was pulled out of Cuba. "I left Havana on June 30 and came to Miami to arrange the escapes of the Diaz Lanz brothers and their families. Pedro and his wife got out by sailboat; Marcos was picked up by a plane."

The brothers fled to Florida, told all they knew about the Castro regime and went to work for the CIA.

A few weeks after Frank's abrupt departure from Havana, he received word that Castro was sending an assassination team after him. Frank's informant supplied full descriptions of the three assassins, who were Mexican communists. The FBI posted a round-the-clock guard on Frank's Miami home and federal agents followed him wherever he went.

Tailed to Florida

Customs and Immigration officers were alerted. The Mexican gunmen were spotted when they crossed the border and were tailed to Florida, where they were arrested. Their car was confiscated and they were booted back to Mexico.

On Oct. 25, 1959, an American B-25 bomber swooped over Havana and dropped thousands of anti-Castro leaflets. Castro called this "bombing" raid a Cuban Pearl Harbor.

"Pedro Diaz Lanz was the pilot," Sturgis told the News. "I was the co-pilot. Marcos Diaz Lanz and another Cuban were with us. Cuban Air Force fighters came after us but they missed us and almost shot their own planes down. The big guns at the Navy station and the Cabana fortress opened up but the angle of the guns was such that they were firing from the heights into the city. At least 36 people were killed and wounded."

The leaflet bombardment was the first of many CIA-sponsored missions Sturgis made to Cuba by air and sea. "I made at least 125 air operations into Cuba," he said, "with the green light and without the green light (with and without official approval). And I made some 60 boat missions.

"I had four boats. They were financed by the agency. One was a converted Coast Guard cutter, 83 feet long, with twin 600 horsepower engines. It has a maximum speed of 20 knots. Another boat, the Cusa, was about the same size. I also had two 50-foot fiberglass boats with radar and other sophisticated equipment. They could carry 30 people and do 50 miles an hour.

A Mission to Cuba: Tale of the Doomed Raiders

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

By PAUL MESKIL 4/24/75

Fifth of a series

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to form a guerrilla army of Cuban refugees and invade Cuba. Shortly thereafter, the CIA dispatched agent Frank Sturgis to Guatemala to confer with President Miguel Ydigoras about setting up training bases in that country.

This "secret" mission was quickly discovered and reported by the Guatemalan news media.

"I had planned to break into the Cuban Embassy while I was in Guatemala City," Sturgis told this reporter recently, "but the president suggested I leave the country because of all the publicity. The newspapers and TV reported I was a CIA agent and was trying to obtain bases for the Cuban invasion."

Over the next year, the CIA trained Cuban recruits in Guatemala, Panama, Puerto Rico and the United States. Sturgis, a marine combat veteran of World War II, trained about 50 Cubans in the Florida Everglades.

Sturgis was part of the agency's super-secret Operation 40, an infiltration and intelligence-gathering group that was to go into Cuba before the Bay of Pigs assault.

Some former CIA agents describe Operation 40 as an "assassination squad." Sturgis won't go that far.

"It was a top CIA project," he says. "Most of the men in it were Cubans who had been trained by the U.S. Army. I am not saying that Operation 40 had an assassination squad. There are reports that there was one, but I'm not saying so.

To Infiltrate

"The prime purpose was infiltration, not assassination. They (group members) were to infiltrate Cuba and contact anti-Castro military leaders, political leaders and underground people. And they could kill—if they had to, if it was really necessary."

Chief of Operation 40 was Jose Joaquin Sanjenis, a former Castro aide who defected and became a CIA agent. Two of his cousins also worked for the agency.

Early in 1961, the CIA learned that a group of Cuban military officers was plotting to overthrow Castro. The leader of this plot was Major Humberto Sori Marin, a former Havana lawyer who drafted the Castro penal code which made firing squad executions legal. Sori Marin had been adjutant general of Castro's army, presiding judge at the 1959 "war crimes" trials that sent hundreds of Batista loyalists to the firing squads, and Castro's first minister of agriculture. But by 1961 he had turned against the Castro regime.

His partners in the anti-Castro conspiracy included other Cuban army, navy and air force commanders, the chief of Castro's secret police, the deputy finance minister and the head of the Cuban Sugar Institute. They planned a military uprising during which Castro and his Communist advisers would be killed.

As soon as the CIA learned what they were up to, Operation 40 went into action. Agents slipped into Cuba, contacted the conspirators and asked them to time the military revolt to coincide with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

A month before the coordinated revolt-invasion was to start, a militia patrol was sent to the Miramar section of Havana to arrest a woman who had been overheard complaining about food shortages. As the militia jeep pulled up to her house, she ran out the door and

(Continued on page 66)



News photo by Robert Rosamilio

Nelson: a veteran conspirator.

TALE OF THE DOOMED RAIDERS

(Continued from page 6)

fled to the nearby home of a retired engineer and his wife.

The militiamen charged after her, entered the engineer's house and burst into a room where ten leaders of the military conspiracy were seated around a table littered with Havana street maps pinpointing the locations of key installations that were to be seized.

The militiamen were outranked and outnumbered. They hesitated, not sure what to do. Then informed sources said Sori Marin pulled his pistol. A short burst from a Czech-made submachine gun wounded him in the leg and persuaded him and his co-conspirators to surrender. They were hauled off to La Cabana Fortress for questioning.

Around this time, in March 1961, a noisy party was held in a small white bungalow in Miami's Cuban section. The bungalow was a CIA "safe house" and the party was a sendoff celebration for an Operation 40 squad—five Cubans and an American—that was about to invade Cuba.

Contact underground

The squad's mission was to contact the anti-Castro underground and create a diversion on the north coast, to make Castro think a guerrilla force was landing there. The diversionary action was to begin shortly before the real invasion on the south coast.

Most of the people at the Miami party were Cuban refugees. Among the Americans there were Frank Nelson, a former Havana businessman and a veteran Caribbean conspirator, and CIA contractors Frank Sturgis and Alex Rorke.

Nelson fell into conversation with young Angus McNair, lone American member of the Cuba-bound squad. Asked why he was going on such a dangerous mission, McNair replied: "Because Castro killed an American soldier, Bill Morgan."

(Morgan, a former U.S. Army paratrooper who attained the rank of major in Castro's army, was executed by a Castro firing squad on March 11, 1961.)

"About 20 people were at the party," Nelson recalled recently. "I asked McNair 'Aren't you afraid of a leak, with all these people knowing about your mission?' He said they were all friends and relatives of the Cubans who were going with him. He trusted them all. That was a fatal mistake."

The CIA raiders set off the following night from the Florida Keys in the 42-foot motor launch Mercury, loaded with automatic rifles, tommyguns, pistols, grenades and boxes of ammo. Their destination was an inlet of Cabanas Bay in Pinar del Rio Province, about 50 miles from Havana.

Reputed CIA agent

McNair, 25, of Coral Gables, Fla., was [illegible] for Sturgis. His orders were to contact Howard Anderson, a [illegible] CIA agent who owned a [illegible] in [illegible] Havana and command [illegible] there.

Anderson had been in close touch with [illegible] military officers who were plotting an anti-Castro coup. After they were captured, he was instructed to determine if other Cuban officers were in on the plot and if they would attempt to carry it out. He was also to advise the CIA of the prospects of the diversionary action to be launched by Operation 40 in Pinar del Rio.

Shortly after midnight on March 19, the Mercury scraped the sandy bottom of a small, palm-fringed cove. McNair [illegible] Cuban [illegible] perfectly still [illegible]

In one CIA plot to kill Castro, the rifle failed to fire.

News photo

Super-secret Operation 40 was stymied so many times by the alert Cubans that it began to sound like Catch 22

Hearing none, they jumped into the waist deep water and started to unload the boat.

Searchlights were turned on, blinding the invaders. Armed men spilled onto the beach and surrounded them. More than 100 soldiers and militiamen had been waiting for them to land. Someone, perhaps a Castro agent who was a guest at their going-away party, had talked.

Anderson was arrested the same night on his way to rendezvous with McNair. The two Americans died at dawn before a firing squad on April 19, two days after the Bay of Pigs invasion began.

Seven Cubans were executed with them, including Gilberto [illegible] one of the leaders of a [illegible] sent from Cuba to invade Panama in [illegible] former Castro aide, he defected [illegible]

the Panama fiasco and went to work for the CIA.

Twelve more anti-Castro plotters were executed next day, April 20. Seven of them were shot in the bullet-pocked moat of La Cabana Fortress. Among them were Humberto Sori Marin, the man who legalized firing squads, and a mysterious American citizen who called himself Rafael Diaz Benson and was employed by CIA. He reportedly served as liaison between Sori Marin's group and the agency.

Although the Bay of Pigs adventure was a disaster, the CIA plots continued and many invasion veterans continued to work for the agency. Some of them were assigned to the "spook ship" Rex, a [illegible]-foot converted U.S. Navy patrol boat that made hundreds of clandestine voyages to Cuba.

Flying the Nicaraguan flag, the Rex

operated out of West Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. It carried the latest radar and sonar equipment, five cannons, several .30-caliber machineguns and two 20-foot speedboats.

Its skipper reportedly was Eugenio Rolando Martinez, a Miami real estate salesman and CIA agent who made more than 300 nocturnal runs to Cuba. (He was taken off the official CIA payroll in 1972, the day after he was caught in the Watergate break-in.)

On the night of July 21, 1963, one of the Rex speedboats deposited six men on a small island off Las Villas province. The invaders reportedly had been sent to kill Castro at a July 26 rally in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion, but they never got there. They were picked up by a military patrol soon after they landed.

Men captured

On the night of Oct. 21, 1963, the Rex sent its twin speedboats ashore at the western tip of Cuba. The landing was observed by a militia patrol and the six men in the first boat were captured as soon as they hit the beach. The second launch was sunk by a Cuban gunboat as it raced back to the Rex.

Cannon fire from the Rex drove off the Cuban vessel. The men in the water were hauled aboard the spy ship. Next morning, a U.S. Navy submarine surfaced near the Rex off the Bahamas. Five Cubans—four dead, one wounded—reportedly were transferred to the sub, which then submerged and headed for Florida.

One month after this incident, President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald, who had visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City shortly before the murder and had joined the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee. President Johnson later told an aide, Leo Janos, that he thought the Kennedy assassination might have been a "retaliation" for the CIA-backed efforts to kill Castro.

These efforts continued after Kennedy's death.

Leader of students

In the fall of 1964, CIA agents in Paris made contact with Cuban Army Major Rolando Cubelas, a hero of the Castro revolution and a leader of the Cuban student organization. Two Cuban-born CIA employees, Luis Enrique Trasanco and Carlos Tepedino, spoke with Cubelas and put him in touch with CIA agents working out of the American Embassy in Paris. The discussions continued a few days later in Madrid, where Cubelas met four more CIA agents. Cubelas had become disenchanted with the Castro regime and he eventually agreed to kill his former idol. On his return to Havana, he was given a high-powered sight.

Other plotters rented an apartment overlooking the building where the prime minister's office was located. Cubelas reportedly drew a bead on Castro one day in 1965. He lined up the cross hairs and squeezed the trigger, but the rifle failed to fire. Castro's secret police later got wind of the assassination attempt and arrested Cubelas and seven other plotters, all of whom were saved from the firing squad by a clemency appeal from Castro.

This may have been the last CIA-sponsored attempt to assassinate Castro. But other CIA activities kept the Caribbean cauldron boiling.

Next: The plot to free the U.S.S. Pueblo

How U.S. Made Unholy Alliance With the Mafia

By PAUL MESKIL 4/23/75

Fourth of a series

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

When Fidel Castro threw the American gangsters out of Cuba, they vowed to return—over his dead body.

Their determination to get rid of Castro was shared by many high-placed American officials and this common cause led eventually to an unholy alliance between the CIA and the mob. The strange story of CIA agents and Mafia mobsters plotting together against Castro was pieced together from interviews with police, federal agents, ex-agents and underworld sources.

Meyer Lansky, the crime syndicate's financial genius, and Santo Trafficante, Mafia boss of West Florida and Havana, got out of Cuba immediately after the hasty exit of their benefactor, dictator Fulgencio Batista. The overseers of their gambling casinos remained on the island, nervously waiting for the axe to fall.

"I was in touch with all the casino owners and operators in Havana," said Frank Sturgis, who was Castro's casino inspector during this period. "Fidel ordered me to close all the casinos for 10 days. The owners got the hint. They knew he was preparing to shut them down permanently, which he did.

"They were very, very mad. Those casinos were worth $100 million a year to the American crime syndicate. Every important mob boss in the United States had points (percentages) in the Cuban casinos. Each point was worth $30,000 to $100,000.

"Lansky and Trafficante were the top men in Cuban gambling. Lansky had direct business dealings with Batista. Trafficante had several casinos, including the Sans Souci."

Sans Souci partners

His Sans Souci partners included Norman Rothman of Miami Beach and the notorious Mannarino brothers, Gabriel and Sam, Mafia chiefs in Pittsburgh. Rothman and the Mannarinos tried to stop the Castro steamroller in 1958 by smuggling a planeload of arms — stolen from a National Guard armory in Ohio — to anti-Castro forces in Cuba.

According to police and federal sources, Rothman was high up in the Cuban crime syndicate and shared his rackets profits with Batista's brother-in-law, Gen. Robert Fernandez Miranda.

Rothman returned to Florida soon after the Castro coup and, with his Cuban partners, bought the [illegible] Hotel in Miami Beach, the [illegible] and [illegible]

The hotel's most elegant suite, on the top floor overlooking the ocean, was made ready for Batista, but he chose the cooler climes of the Dominican Republic, Portugal and Madeira.

Sturgis was on friendly terms with several gambling racketeers, including Hyman Levine, a Lansky mobster who ran Havana's Comodoro casino. One evening, during a casual conversation, Levine observed that it "would be worth a million" to the syndicate to get rid of Castro. Sturgis didn't rise to this bait and Levine changed the subject.

It popped up again a few weeks later while Castro was in New York during a whirlwind tour of North and South America.

Fidel and his entourage stayed at the Statler-Hilton, where Sturgis registered under his real name and Cuban military rank, Capt. Frank Fiorini.

Frank was in his room one evening when he received a phone call from a detective captain on duty in the lobby as part of a heavy security detail. No

(Continued on page 42)



AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: CIA AND THE MOB



Surrounded by his soldiers, Castro enters Havana in triumph after ousting the Batista government. UPI Photo

Deprived of its Havana casinos, U.S. mob joined CIA in series of plots to kill Castro, using everything from poison to dynamite

(Continued from page 6)

visitors were allowed on the Castro floor without special permission.

"There's a guy here to see you," the cop reported. "He says he's your uncle."

"Send him up," Frank replied.

The short, pot-bellied man who arrived a few minutes later looked more like a godfather than an uncle. Frank recognized him as a member of the Havana gambling mob. Coming straight to the point, the hood offered Frank $100,000 to kill Castro.

"I'm not for hire," Frank said, ending the conversation.

When he returned to Havana a few days later, he reported the offer to his CIA contacts at the American Embassy.

Sturgis had no further contact with the gangster who approached him in New York, but someone in the intelligence hierarchy decided that the CIA and the syndicate should join forces against Castro. The go-between picked for this project reportedly was Norman Rothman.

"Rothman was in touch with several CIA agents," a former agent told The News. "They had many meetings concerning assassination plots against Castro."

Rothman, in turn, discussed the matter with his peers. Among those who took part in these secret parleys, reliable sources said, were Santo Trafficante of Tampa; Sam Mannarino of Pittsburgh; Salvatore (Sally Burns) Granello and Charles (Charlie the Blade) Tourine, both of New York, and John (Don Giovanni) Roselli of Las Vegas.

Granello, a member of the Vito Genovese crime family, had run casinos in Cuba and bossed a major bookmaking operation on Manhattan's East Side. Tourine, an associate of New Jersey mob chieftains Ruggerio (Richie the Boot) Boiardo and Gerardo (Jerry) Catena, also had operated Havana casinos.

Several suggestions were made for Castro's demise. One was to send for Gaspare Magaddino, a one-man Murder Inc. who killed more than 50 people in various parts of the world before he was blown away by a shotgun blast in Brooklyn in 1970. A Sicilian Mafioso, Magaddino had lived in South America [illegible] for Trafficante prior to the Castro coup. He knew Havana well and was a perfect choice for the assassination assignment, but he either declined or wasn't offered the contract.

The mob and the CIA finally gave it to Roselli, reputed Mafia boss of Las Vegas, federal sources said.

A dapper, gray-haired man who calls himself a Hollywood movie producer and is a benevolent patron of Vegas showgirls, Roselli reportedly was introduced to CIA agents in 1960 by a Howard Hughes executive who formerly worked for the FBI. Then, federal sources said, Roselli agreed to recruit a death squad to go to Cuba hunting Castro.

Money from CIA

The CIA was to supply money, weapons, and transportation.

Roselli flew to Miami in March, 1961, and held separate conferences with CIA agents and Trafficante on the Castro project.

Roselli volunteered to accompany CIA financed missions to Cuba, the federal sources said. One of these expeditions reportedly landed an execution squad that attempted but failed to hit Castro. On another occasion, the crew of Roselli's launch fought a running gunfight with a Cuban patrol boat.

Columnist Jack Anderson reported that CIA agents gave Roselli some poison capsules which he passed along to a Cuban who was related to Castro's chef. The chef was to put the poison in Castro's food. The sources interviewed by the News confirmed that at least one attempt was made to poison Castro.

An American who was active in the anti-Castro underground in Cuba at the time said "enough poison to kill 10 people" was dumped in a glass of malted milk sent to Castro's suite in the Havana Hilton in 1961.

"Castro ordered a chocolate [illegible] every afternoon and the same waiter always brought it to his room," he said. "When the waiter came in with the poisoned malt, he was looking so [illegible] he almost dropped the tray.

"Castro said, [illegible] you?' The waiter said, 'I don't know; maybe I got a fever.' Castro had him arrested and had the drink analyzed. Chemists found the poison right away."

In early 1961, a more elaborate assassination attempt was directed by a well-financed American who arrived in Havana soon after the Castro takeover and lived there until security police accused him of working for the CIA and plotting to murder Castro.

Working with anti-Castro Cuban military officers, the American planted several sticks of dynamite under the garage floor of a 20-story apartment building where a number of Castro aides and Communist-bloc diplomats lived with their families.

"Castro came to the apartment house every two weeks to see one of his adjutants," one of the plotters said. "He always arrived in the afternoon, on the same day of the week.

"He would drive in with his bodyguards and park his car in the space reserved for him. We timed his visits. It always took at least five minutes for him to get into the garage, out of the car and into the freight elevator that took him upstairs where he wanted to go.

"We had a line of four men. One would signal from a nearby roof when Castro's car started into the garage. The signal would be passed on. Then a couple of guys would hit the plunger of an electronic detonating device. The detonator was in a hotel near the apartment house.

"We would have blown him to dust.

"The night before it was to happen, the guys (the Cuban plotters) had a final meeting to go over the details. Nobody outside our group knew about the dynamite, but a friend of theirs in G-2 (Castro's intelligence service) found out about the meeting and reported it. The G-2 came looking for them.

"They were in an apartment miles away from the place where the dynamite was. The G-2 raided the meeting and everybody started [illegible]

One of the plotters, a young military officer named Jesus Casas, shot it out with the raiders and killed two of them before he was slain by a motorcycle cop. Three other conspirators, all rebel officers who had fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra, were captured and taken to G-2 headquarters. They escaped a few hours later, with the help of friends in the intelligence service, and found refuge in the Uruguayan Embassy.

"Castro never found out about the dynamite," said the source who disclosed the plot to The News. "It's probably still there, under the garage floor."

Intelligence sources told this reporter that the CIA sent an execution squad into Oriente Province in November 1962 to ambush Castro near Santiago de Cuba as he drove to a memorial service for his fallen guerrillas.

Snipers hid along road

Snipers hid among trees and bushes lining the road to the cemetery where the service was to be held. On the morning of the scheduled ceremony, a motorcade of five jeeps approached the graveyard. The first jeep was full of soldiers. In the second jeep, a tall, bearded man sat next to the driver. He was wearing sunglasses and his fatigue cap was pulled down to his eyes.

Machineguns and rifles sprayed the second jeep with bullets, killing the driver and his passenger, who turned out to be Castro's [illegible] bodyguard, Capt. Alfredo [illegible]. The assassins escaped. So did Fidel, who had prudently taken another route to the cemetery.

The CIA [illegible] began in 1960, during the Eisenhower administration and continued through the Kennedy and Johnson years, causing President Johnson to [illegible] an aide that "we're running a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean."

In 1967, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [illegible] deportation proceedings against Don Giovanni Roselli, charging he was [illegible] to this country illegally from Italy.

In 1969, soon after President Nixon took office, government lawyers argued in court that Roselli should not be deported because he had performed unspecified "valuable services to the national security." Roselli was not deported.

'Frogmen' Blew Up a French Ship in Havana

By PAUL MESKIL

Last of 6 series

At 3:10 p.m. on March 4, 1960, a French munitions ship blew up in Havana harbor, killing at least 75 people and injuring more than 200.

The vessel, Le Couvre, exploded during the unloading of 76 tons of ammunition and grenades intended for Fidel Castro's military and police forces. Castro suspected sabotage, but couldn't prove it. The United States denied any involvement in the incident.

A former CIA agent told The News recently that Le Couvre was sabotaged by "CIA frogmen." He said an underwater demolition team slipped into the water at night and attached a bomb to the ship's hull, under the waterline. The bomb, a detonator and a timing device were in a waterproof container, he said.

The ex-agent added that the frogmen were Cubans working for the CIA. "It was definitely a CIA-connected thing," he said.

Another source said the bomb was supposed to go off around 3 a.m., when the waterfront was deserted, but something went wrong with the timer and the blast came 12 hours later, when the area was crowded with dock workers and harbor traffic.

Still another source, formerly connected with the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the Caribbean area, blamed the big blast on Gen. Rafael Trujillo, then dictator of the Dominican Republic.

Trujillo and his sinister intelligence chief, Johnny Abbes, had many conferences with CIA officials and secret agents. On one occasion in 1960, Trujillo offered CIA agents Frank Sturgis and Pedro Diaz Lanz, former chief of Castro's Air Force, $1 million to lead an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic. Diaz Lanz declined, telling his CIA bosses that he didn't want to work for another dictator.

Plotting to kill Trujillo

While in the Dominican Republic to confer with Trujillo in 1961, Sturgis also contacted Dominican military officers who were plotting to kill Trujillo. The CIA agreed to give the plotters guns and ammunition.

"The guns arrived in boxes sent to a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo (the Dominican capital, now called Santo Domingo)," said Frank Nelson, an American who worked with Trujillo in a plot to overthrow Castro. "The Dominican officers didn't need the guns. They already had enough stuff for a [illegible]. They needed the moral support of the U.S. government, and this was represented by the arms shipments."

The rebel officers assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. Whether [illegible] used the CIA guns has not been disclosed. But similar weapons figured in subsequent attempts to exterminate Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier, the voodoo Hitler of Haiti.

On the night of Aug. 26, 1963, a converted B-25 bomber left Florida with an arms shipment for Gen. Leon Cantava, a former Haitian Army commander who was planning to invade his homeland from the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. The CIA plane swooped over a flare-lit field near the Dominican military airport of Dajabon.

Wooden crates rained down on parachutes. They contained mortars, bazookas, M-1 rifles, .30-caliber machine guns, M-3 Tommy guns, .45-caliber pistols, grenades and ammunition.

The weapons were distributed among 210 Haitian exiles who comprised Cantava's invasion army. They crossed Massacre River, borderline between Dominican Republic and Haiti, on [illegible] of Sept. 22. Late the following day, after a bloody battle with Haitian troops, Cantava led the [illegible]

(Continued on page 54)

SECRETS OF THE CIA



Duvalier: [illegible] CIA

PLOT TO RELEASE THE PUEBLO

(Continued from page 4)

of [illegible] land back across the river to the Dominican sanctuary.

A week later, a small group of Haitian refugees entered a U.S. Army Special Forces camp in North Carolina for training in guerrilla warfare. Most of the Haitians were in their early 20s and had attended college in the United States after serving in the U.S. Army or Air Force. All of them lived in New York City.

They had been hand picked by the CIA for what became one of the bravest and most pitiful invasions in the history of Caribbean carnage.

The invasion force consisted of only 13 men, eight of whom had been trained by the Green Berets. They belonged to an anti-Duvalier group called Jeune Haiti (Young Haiti). Nearly all of the [illegible] 13 were the sons of Haitian military officers or officials who had been killed by Duvalier's thugs.

The leader, Gusle Villedrouin, was a former U.S. airman whose father, Haitian Army Col. Roger Villedrouin, was clubbed to death by Papa Doc's Ton Ton Macoutes.

They chartered a boat in Florida and landed in Haiti on Aug. 5, 1964, carrying a variety of weapons supplied by CIA agents. Although the invasion was doomed to failure before it began, the 13 young New Yorkers managed to hold off hundreds of Duvalier soldiers, militiamen and Ton Ton Macoutes.

They were killed one by one, and those who were left kept fighting. The last three invaders ran out of ammunition on Oct. 26, then threw stones at the troops who gunned them down. The heads of all 13 were cut off and sent to the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince.

Drops two gasoline drums

On May [illegible] 1968, a B-25 flew over Duvalier's palace and dropped two gasoline drums, one of which blew a hole in the street outside the Haitian White House. The other did not explode. The plane was piloted by an American who reportedly had done contract jobs for the CIA.

A much more imaginative, though no [illegible] CIA plot was simmering on another burner at this time. Its aim was the release of the USS Pueblo and her crew, captured by Communist North Korea in January 1968.

CIA [illegible] named the Pueblo [illegible] Operation Sword, but those [illegible] refer to it as "the Mexican [illegible]." It went from the planning stage to the recruiting stage in the summer of 1968, when a classified ad appeared in a Fort Lauderdale newspaper offering "adventure" and "high pay" to qualified applicants.

The ad was placed by Ray Sandstrom, a Fort Lauderdale lawyer who allegedly had served for the CIA as a [illegible]. About 60 men answered the ad, and [illegible] letters to Sturgis, who was in charge of the operation.

Sturgis [illegible] appointed Max Gonzalez, who had worked with him on previous missions, as security [illegible]. From the letters and personal interviews, Frank eventually [illegible] volunteers.

[illegible] had been in military service [illegible]. "Three had been in World War II, two others served in Korea and Vietnam. Most were young, but one was in his late 40s and had a [illegible] problem. He said he had never accomplished much in life and had always wanted to go on some kind of an adventure, so Frank said, 'Well, if you stay sober, we'll take you along.'

[illegible] were offered $10,000 for a completed assignment. They were told it was to be a commando raid into Cuba to free political prisoners from Castro's concentration camps."

To lend credence to this story, Sturgis displayed a map showing the locations of Cuban prisons and prison camps. He also had a list of prisoners who supposedly were to be freed.

None of the men, not even Gonzales, [illegible]

The operation was planned [illegible]



Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, offered $1 million for a Cuban invasion.

In the Caribbean, the CIA got involved in dozens of schemes, including blowing up a French ship and killing Trujillo

in advance," Sturgis said. "The CIA station in Miami was aware of it. So were several other federal agencies, including the FBI and Customs.

"The objective was not to raid Cuba but to rendezvous with another ship off the coast of Mexico and, with the assistance of this ship, seize a Russian vessel. We were to meet a Cuban vessel. I assume it was a Naval vessel, commanded by Cuban Navy officers who were disenchanted with Castro.

"The orders (for completing the operation) were aboard the Cuban ship. The captain also had a sailing schedule listing arrivals and departures of all Soviet and Communist bloc vessels in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. We hoped to grab a Soviet 'fishing trawler' that was actually a spy ship

stopped by the Cuban vessel. The skipper of the Soviet ship probably would not be suspicious of a boarding party wearing Cuban Navy uniforms.

"We would then capture the ship. We were to take it to a point off the coast of Venezuela. The orders were not to go into any port but to stay off the coast. Certain officials in the Venezuelan government were aware of the plan. They would participate in negotiations for the release of the captive ship and its crew. A statement would be issued to the effect that we wanted to exchange the ship and crew for certain political prisoners in Cuba.

"But this was a ruse. Then we would go into the second phase of the operation, to dicker with the [illegible] for the

U.S.S. Pueblo, its captain and crew, who were still in confinement at this time.

"We were going to threaten to sink the Communist ship and kill all the hostages if any ship of any country came close. It was supposed to look like a pirate operation, organized by American mercenaries and anti-Castro Cubans."

In preparation for the trip to Mexico, guns, camping equipment, medicine, bandages, uniforms and other supplies were hidden in door panels, seats and a false trunk of a 1963 Falcon that was outfitted by the mechanics of a Miami garage owned by two CIA employes.

The volunteers were to provide their own transportation to Mexico and their own weapons and camping gear.

"The men had to get to the meeting place, Guadalajara, at their own expense," Gonzales said. "The contract didn't go into effect until they got there. How they got there was their business."

Running out of money

One of the recruits, Robert Curtis, later testified in a court case resulting from the operation: "When we got to Guadalajara, the hotel we were supposed to go to was torn down. We went across the street to Los Americanos (another hotel). We left the car parked out front where he (Sturgis) could see it. We waited three weeks, and we were running out of money ... so we went to a gun shop and sold my Japanese Nambu (automatic pistol) for about $30."

Frank and the rest of the gang eventually arrived and proceeded to a training camp Gonzales had set up in the mountains near the Guatemala border. It rained much of the time they were there, and they called their base Camp Mud.

After two weeks there, they moved to Camp Sand on the beach near the Yucatan fishing village of Progreso. They chartered the [illegible]-long boat Amigo, smuggled guns and ammo aboard, and set off to meet the Cuban vessel. But the charts they had obtained to guide them through the Gulf and Caribbean were 10 years old and, therefore, not completely accurate.

They cruised south along the Yucatan coast for four days, entered Central American waters and then ran aground on a reef two miles off Belize, capital of British Honduras.

"We threw a lot of gear over the side," Gonzales said. "We waited until the tide came in. Then everybody jumped into the water to help get her off the reef although there were sharks around. We didn't intend to go into Belize, but the propeller and shaft were bent, and there was a small leak. We were taking on water and needed repairs."

When the Amigo limped into port, flying no flag, police and customs officers boarded her. British Honduran authorities at first thought it was an invasion from Guatemala. Sturgis and his dirty dozen were questioned by British intelligence agents. Then Sturgis spoke to the American consul, and, after a few phone calls to Mexico City and Washington, the consul told him not to worry. The Americans were released and flown back to Miami.

"We was supposed to get $1,500 a month plus a $10,000 bonus (on completion of the mission)," Curtis said later. "Well, all I seen was 40 or 50 bucks to get back home (from Miami)."

"Whatever it was, it was definitely a CIA operation," said Max Gonzales, a native New Yorker who is now in business in Miami. "Frank Sturgis was a CIA agent at the time and still may be. He was in contact with other CIA agents in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Frank never told me what our real mission [illegible]

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AS CARTER "INVADES" WASHINGTON

Cuban Extremists in U.S.

A GROWING TERROR THREAT



HOW NEW TAX LAW HITS BUSINESSMEN

SPECIAL REPORT

Cuban Extremists in U.S. A GROWING TERROR THREAT



Out from Miami spreads a wave of violence. Terrorists' aim is to topple Castro, free Cuba. Nearly all Cuban refugees share this dream. But the acts of a few zealots create trouble for fellow exiles and for the U.S.

Reported from
MIAMI and WASHINGTON

Terrorism by radical Cuban refugees has become a thorny problem in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and, in the view of some authorities, a potential threat to the lives of American leaders.

The terrorists' goal is to wrest control of Cuba away from its Communist dictator, Fidel Castro.

In pursuit of that goal, they have blazed a trail of violence from Miami across the Caribbean Sea, not only to Cuba but also to Mexico, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama—even across the South Atlantic to Argentina.

They have engaged in a series of bombings in the U.S. and abroad. They have carried out military-style attacks on Communist ships. They are strongly suspected of several killings.

A federal grand jury in Miami is investigating their activities and their leaders.

Now, as a new Administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is feared that the Cuban terrorists will step up their attacks in an effort to thwart any turn toward reconciliation with Castro.

Officials familiar with their operations warn that some of the Cuban extremists will stop at nothing, not even at assassinating members of the Carter Administration.

"The Cuban terrorists are the most highly trained assassins in the world today," says one U.S. official.

Many of the terrorists were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in the days when this country was trying to overthrow Castro, or kill him.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee recently held hearings on the Cuban-terrorist threat. It heard this testimony from Lt. Thomas Lyons, head of a special antiterrorist squad of the Dade County public-safety department in Miami, where Cuban refugees are concentrated:

"The overwhelming majority of the Cubans in Miami are strongly anti-Castro. That's why they came to Miami in the first place. They are also law-abiding citizens who, with minor exceptions, manifest their opposition to Castro in legal ways.

"However, there are a small number of individuals whose hatred of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and Communism has led them to engage in extralegal actions and to violate the laws of the country which gave them sanctuary. These individuals use Dade County as a base for international terrorism . . . against governments allied with Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terrorist-type attacks. . . .

Dr. Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro leader, is accused in plane bombing fatal to 73.

"Some Cuban groups purporting to be involved in terrorist-type attacks against the Cuban Government are no more or no less than outright criminals, feeding upon the Cuban population and diverting the collected funding for their own purposes."

Other investigators charge that the terrorists, to finance their crusade, have dealt in cocaine and prostitution and in extortion from wealthy fellow refugees.

The number of hard-core terrorists is small; officially estimated at fewer than 300. But their reach is wide. In this year alone they have either bragged about or been accused of such acts as:

- Machine-gun attacks on the high seas against vessels from Cuba and other Communist nations.
- Bombing a wide variety of targets in the United States, Latin America and Portugal.
- Planting a bomb that caused the crash of a Cubana Airlines plane near Barbados on October 6, with the loss of 73 lives.
- Possible involvement in the still-unsolved bomb death of

EXILES vs. CASTRO— *A Relentless Pursuit*

On Jan. 1, 1959, Fidel Castro took power and the first wave of refugees fled Cuba. A small number of the 600,000 exiles who settled in the U.S. have become extremists.

Highlights of events in those 18 years, some involving law-abiding exiles, others involving the extremists—

1961: A 1,300-man Cuban Brigade, armed and trained by the U.S. in Florida, Guatemala and Nicaragua, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south shore. The invasion was a failure.

1962: Survivors of the Bay of Pigs were released by Castro after payment of a 53-million-dollar ransom in drugs, food, medical equipment and other supplies from "private contributions." President John F. Kennedy, in Miami, pledged to the Cuban exiles that the Brigade flag would one day fly over a liberated Cuba.

U.S. launched its secret "Operation Mongoose"—a plan to use Cuban exiles in paramilitary war against Castro while U.S. maintained an economic blockade to shake the island's economy. The attacks generally failed.

1964: Cuban extremists in New York City fired a mortar shell at United Nations as Cuba's Ché Guevara addressed the General Assembly.

1967: Cuban exile specialists and U.S.-trained Bolivian troops trapped and killed Guevara and some of his Communist guerrillas in Bolivia.

1968-72: Cuban-exile extremists bombed ships of nations considered to be friendly to Castro, terrorized other exiles to keep them in line.

1972: Cuban exiles trained by Central Intelligence Agency took part in Watergate break-in, later testified that they thought it would help their anti-Castro campaign.

1973: U.S. and Cuba signed agreement aimed at controlling hijacking of aircraft and piracy of ships at sea.

1974-76: Cuban extremists exploded more than 100 bombs in Miami area in two-year period, hitting offices of the FBI, a State attorney and the Miami police department.

Exile terrorists attacked airline offices and consulates of governments that have diplomatic relations with Castro. Bombings took place in Jamaica, Mexico, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Panama, other countries.

Fishing boats based in Cuba and Soviet cargo ships were attacked by high-speed motor launches manned by exile extremists.

Terror reached its peak with the bomb sabotage of a Cuban airliner and the death of 73 passengers and crew last October 6 near Barbados. Police seized Cuban exiles in Caracas, Venezuela, on suspicion of involvement in the sabotage. Castro canceled U.S.-Cuba hijacking agreement.

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

a former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., on September 21.

- Kidnaping two Cuban officials in Argentina.
- Attempting to kidnap a Cuban consul in Mexico.

Who are these terrorists? What motivates them? How do they operate? And why are U.S. officials so concerned about what they may do in the future?

To answer such questions, Orr Kelly and Carl J. Migdail of the *U.S. News & World Report* staff dug deeply into the records, interviewed Cuban refugees who share the hopes though not the methods of the terrorists, and talked to law-enforcement officials who are trying to stem the violence.

BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM

After Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959 and it became apparent that he intended to establish a Communist state, 800,000 Cubans "voted with their feet" and fled their homeland. Some 600,000 of them settled in the United States. They and their children now total 750,000. Most of them live in the Miami area.

The majority of these immigrants are law abiding. But Miami's "Little Havana" provides a culture in which the virus of violence can grow.

"In Miami," explains one refugee leader, "the Cubans keep their national identity, their heritage, traditions, hatreds—and their hopes of going back to their homeland. And they know they can't go back until Castro is gone. So they dream of toppling Castro. What is clearly unrealistic in other places in the United States seems very possible in the atmosphere in Miami."

In the early 1960s, the overthrow of Castro seemed to the Cubans in exile to be not only possible but almost inevitable. It was U.S. policy to drive him from power. There was an attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 with an army of Cuban exiles recruited and trained in secret by the CIA. The invaders were not given the air cover necessary for a successful attack, and the operation was a disaster. Only 180 of about 1,300 invaders escaped death or capture. The Cubans felt betrayed.

Then came other American moves against Castro. There was a secret "Operation Mongoose," which included efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader. The United States backed an economic blockade of Cuba in an attempt to prevent Castro from obtaining sorely needed supplies and equipment from abroad. Later, Cuban refugees were used to carry out secret operations not only in the Caribbean but also in other parts of Latin America—and even in Africa.

To many Cuban refugees, attacking Castro and Communism became a way of life.

Since then, however, American policy has failed to match in intensity the fierce anti-Castro passion of the more militant refugees. In recent years, prominent members of the U.S. Senate have visited Cuba. In 1973, Cuba made an agreement with the United States to curb the airplane hijackers who had been using Cuba as asylum. There were moves on both sides toward normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S.

As their hopes of American action against Castro ebbed, some Cuban refugees turned to violence on their own. The box on this page gives the chronology of developments.

TERRORIST LEADERS AND TACTICS

Though their numbers are small, the 300 or fewer active terrorists have organized themselves into many groups. Slogans of one group chalked on the walls in "Little Havana" have barely begun to fade before they are replaced by the

slogans and initials of yet another group. Among groups named in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee are: Accion Cubana, or Cuban Action; Alpha 66, a name adopted when victory in 1966 seemed possible; FLNC, standing for Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba, which means Cuban National Liberation Front, and Pragmatistas, which means what it sounds like—pragmatists.

A group calling itself Zero issued a "death list" of people marked for killing and, according to officials, several persons on the list soon died violent deaths.

Dade County's antiterrorist head, Lieutenant Lyons, says he has stopped trying to keep track of the groups and instead concentrates on trying to solve the crimes that they are suspected of having committed. He has no shortage of business. Here is a sample of the violence attributed to terrorists in the last two years:

- Since February, 1975, there have been at least seven assassination attempts directed against refugee leaders who were viewed as opponents of the terrorists' tactics. Three men were shot to death. One was killed by a bomb. Three other attempted killings failed, but a prominent radio broadcaster lost both legs below the knees when a bomb ripped his car apart.
- On Dec. 3-4, 1975, bombs blasted the Miami office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Social Security office, a State unemployment office, two post offices, a bank, a State attorney's office and the Miami police-department headquarters. A man accused of those bombings, and also the bombing of the Miami International Airport two months earlier, was acquitted recently in a federal court. He is to be tried again in a State court.
- A number of bombs have been exploded in New York. One blew out the window of the Venezuelan consulate on Fifth Avenue, across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral.
- On Feb. 12, 1976, a Soviet freighter, the *Dzhordano Bruno*, was sitting motionless 35 miles off Cuba's north coast while its tanks were being cleaned. Suddenly a small boat raced close to the freighter and raked it with heavy machine-gun fire. No one was injured.
- On April 6, 1976, two Cuban fishing boats were attacked and a fisherman was killed.
- On Sept. 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., a bomb exploded in a car and killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. under the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Although the crime is officially unsolved, there have been persistent reports that the bomb was planted by Cuban terrorists as a "favor" to the secret police of the present anti-Communist Government in Chile.

NEW TERRORIST STRATEGY

Leaders of the terrorist bands are hard to identify. But one ...an has emerged as an apparent leader: Dr. Orlando Bosch, ...pediatrician. He was caught firing a bazooka at a Polish ...p in Miami harbor in 1968 and was sentenced to 10 years ...prison.

...r. Bosch was released on parole after four years, but he ...ortedly returned to the movement. He is now under ...st in Venezuela, charged along with three other men in ...nection with the Cuban airliner bombing. Dr. Bosch is ...ribed as the leader of the group calling itself Accion ...ana.

...June of this year, Dr. Bosch called a small group of his ...activists together in the Dominican Republic. They ...sharply divided on policy and strategy. ...e wanted to avoid the risks of further attacks in the ...l States and to concentrate their efforts against Castro ...this country. Others held out for continuing their ...ies both here and abroad.

...a heated argument, a shaky agreement was reached



Automobile bombing that killed a Cuban refugee in Miami is one of many unsolved crimes attributed to anti-Castro terrorists.

to focus their efforts outside the U.S. To direct the activities, a new group was formed with the initials CORU, which stand for Coordinacion de Organizaciones Revolucionaires Unidas in Spanish or Co-ordinating Committee of United Revolutionary Organizations in English.

American law-enforcement officials say that members of CORU have the backing of powerful forces, perhaps even the governments themselves, in some countries of Latin America. The terrorists are described as "at home" in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Chile. They are well armed for terroristic acts, as shown in the box on page 32.

Since the June meeting, a new wave of terrorism has swept across the Caribbean and beyond. Bombs have damaged Cuban airline facilities in Barbados, Jamaica and Panama. Two Cuban officials were kidnaped in Argentina.

On July 23, three men who had flown from Miami carrying three coffee cans filled with plastic explosive attempted to kidnap Cuban Consul Daniel Ferrer Fernandez in Mérida, Mexico. He escaped, but a Cuban fisheries expert was killed.

The most serious act of terrorism came on October 6, when a Cubana Airlines DC-8 exploded in flight shortly after taking off from Barbados. The plane fell into the sea, killing 73 persons including members of the Cuban national fencing team.

In messages to news media, both CORU and El Condor, a group unheard of previously, claimed responsibility for the crash of the plane.

Dr. Bosch, who has traveled freely on documents apparently provided by officials of Governments friendly to the anti-Castro movement, was picked up in Venezuela and on November 2 was charged with homicide in connection with the plane crash. Three other men are similarly charged.

The arrests of Dr. Bosch and his cohorts, instead of reducing terrorist violence, may actually stimulate more violence. El Condor, in a message to the United Press International on November 19, said the four men held by the Venezuelans are innocent and warned that, *if they are convicted*, planes of the Venezuelan International Airways will be attacked. On the same day, CORU sent a message saying it would join with the Honduran Anti-Communist Alliance in attacks on three airlines that plan excursion flights to Havana.

Roberto Carballo, a militant leader of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion, denounced the threatened attacks. "It aids Castro by making all Cuban exiles look like mad bombers," Carballo said.

CRACKDOWN BY LAW OFFICERS

Since last spring, there has been a sharp reduction in terroristic violence in the Miami area. That may be as much due to a successful counterattack by law-enforcement agencies as to the policy that was adopted by CORU last June.

Early this year, an antiterrorist task force was organized ...

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

includes representatives from Dade County and Miami police, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not formally a part of this task force, its agents work closely with it.

With co-operation from Cuban refugees who are sick of the terrorist violence, law officers have arrested a number of suspects. Police also have learned enough about other suspects so that their freedom to engage in new acts of violence can be limited even though there is not enough evidence to prosecute them.

A federal grand jury is interrogating witnesses who might have some knowledge of terror operations.

Efforts of law-enforcement officials to deal with the terrorist groups face formidable handicaps, however. The terrorists seem to know what police are doing. Lieutenant Lyons relates that one suspect "identified one of my officers who had never met him before, called him by name and told him what section he worked in and what his duties were."

Terrorists are protected by a web of old loyalties. Most of them worked at one time or another for the U.S. Government. Many have had several roles: members of the U.S. Army, CIA operatives and FBI informants. One refugee leader suggests that law-enforcement officials have not found the killers of Cubans "because they don't want to."

A further complication is the heavy infiltration of the terrorist movement by members of Castro's intelligence corps. They not only gather intelligence but sometimes act as *agents provocateurs*, instigating terrorist acts designed to discredit the refugees and influence American policy.

The Cuban Prime Minister has "surfaced" enough of such agents to reveal their pattern of operation. Early this year, for example, Manuel de Armas, a Cuban refugee who was named in Senate committee testimony as having been involved in terrorist activities in Miami, showed up in Havana. In an April 22 broadcast by Radio Havana, De Armas said that he had supplied the explosives used in the killing of a man named Rolando Masferrer and that a CIA agent had provided him with the explosives.

In a speech on October 15, Castro boasted of a double agent who Castro claimed had passed on coded instructions from the CIA. Said Castro: "From the very moment when he was recruited by the CIA and over a period of 10 years, the supposed agent has kept the Cuban Government fully informed of all his contacts with [the CIA] and of the equipment and instructions he has received."

Castro blamed the CIA for the airliner bombing and other acts of violence. "Who else but the CIA . . . can carry out these acts?" Castro asked.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has flatly denied U.S. involvement in the airliner bombing. He said: "I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible."

The CIA declines to discuss Cuban refugee terrorism. Officials of other Government agencies say they seriously doubt that the CIA, after all the criticism it has received for some of its earlier activities, is still involved in operations against the Castro regime. However, the agency is described as providing very little help in combatting the terrorist groups. "We have absolutely no contact with the CIA," says Lieutenant Lyons. "I'd like to, but they don't talk to us." One reason for that attitude may be that laws bar the CIA from domestic law-enforcement activities.

Other laws, or the lack of them, also complicate the fight against the terrorists. U.S. agencies cannot become involved in investigations of terrorism outside the United States unless the crime involves violations of neutrality laws making it illegal to conspire in this country to commit crimes abroad or to export arms without a license.

Although shocked by the October 6 airliner bombing, U.S. officials reluctantly decided there was no authorization for the FBI to enter that case.

With such handicaps as these, law-enforcement officials say they can look forward to only limited success against the terrorists. Any real solution to the problem must come from within the Cuban refugee community—and investigators state that the co-operation they get there does not extend to cases of violence committed outside the U.S.

WHAT HAVE TERRORISTS GAINED?

As officials size up the effects of the terrorist campaign: The only tangible accomplishment has been to push Castro into renouncing the antihijacking treaty, thus discouraging efforts toward a diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Cuba.

Despite all the terrorist plots and attacks, Castro remains firmly seated as head of a Communist regime in Cuba. And it appears to the refugees almost inevitable that the movement toward some kind of accommodation with Castro will be resumed by American policy makers. Throughout "Little Havana," the fear is widespread that Jimmy Carter, when he becomes President, will give new impetus to this movement, and that their homeland will never be liberated from Communist rule.

To both officials and Cuban refugee leaders, it seems inevitable that the terrorists will continue their attempts to keep the two countries apart by the only method they know—further acts of violence.

TERRORISTS' ARSENAL: PLANES TO CANNONS

One measure of the military equipment that is available to Cuban terrorists is provided by this partial inventory compiled by authorities:

- 10 or more high-speed motor launches about 30 feet long, with special fuel tanks for extra range
- A number of small, spotter aircraft
- Large-caliber recoilless rifles
- Missile-antitank weapons
- Wide assortment of smaller weapons
- Large quantities of C-4 explosives developed by the U.S. Army

A further measure comes from this tally of extremists' weapons confiscated by Miami law-enforcement officers so far in 1975-76:

- 1 20-mm cannon, with 100 rounds of explosive ammunition
- 498 submachine guns, 480 of them with silencers
- 82 explosive devices
- 3,265 pounds of dynamite and TNT
- 4 boxes of napalm
- 6 rifles
- 20 handguns
- Thousands of rounds of ammunition

Dat. Ch— Nelson Bunker Hunt file as part of Assassination [illegible] This goes there! —H

MEMORANDUM

TO: RECORD

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION OF JANUARY 19, 1977

I called Larry Callahan at 2:00 p.m. to advise him that the Commiteee desired to interview Mr. Gene A. Boren, of the IRS, at the earliest available opportunity and requested his advice and assistance to accomplish this. Callahan was nervous about the Committee's eagerness to proceed in response to the memorandum for fear that we would be interfering with an on-going criminal investigation. He noted the FBI was looking into this and he would have to check with the Bureau to ascertain the feasibility of proceeding unilaterally. I told Callahan we did not want to interfere with a criminal investigation and that I did not feel that our interview of the IRS employee would fall into that category. Callahan referred to a possible obstruction of justice on the part of that employee in that the information had been withheld for approximately five years.

At 2:30 p.m. I received a telephone call from Paul Daly urging Committee restraint in unilaterally investigating subject matter. Daly noted the Bureau had just received this information and was intending to interview the IRS employee

and other individuals in question today or tomorrow. Daly noted that he was disturbed that Callahan had brought the memo to the Committee's attention so promptly, as the Bureau had intended to brief the Committee at the conclusion of their investigation. Daly seemed most concerned that the IRS delay in bringing the matter to the Bureau's attention and assured us that the Bureau was desirous of cooperating fully. He noted the information had been furnished by Justice absent a specific inquiry from the Committee and that we were being unreasonable if we desired to pursue the matter further at this time. I asked Daly what information was available at the Bureau on Brading and Hunt. He said there was a large quantity of information available on both and that he felt he could pull that material which related to the assassination quickly, but would be reluctant to produce the information in its entirety. I told him to ascertain this afternoon what information could be produced immediately and he said that he would.

At 2:45 p.m. I talked again with Callahan who indicated that Daly would be calling. Callahan said he thought the Bureau was eager to redeem itself in this area and we should give them that opportunity. I told Callahan that I was concerned about the ~~utilization~~ mutilation of ~~leaks~~ leads, a position which Callahan thinks is ridiculous. Callahan, however, did state that this information was not as old as it looks at the Bureau, to-wit: While the Justice received the IRS memo on December 30, 1976,

considerable time went by before Attorney General Levi could address the issue of whether or not to entrust this matter to the Bureau. Approximately one week ago, Justice went to Jim Adams of the FBI with the request to look into the allegation and was surprised to find that Adams was already apprised of the situation and investigating, i.e., general indexes. Apparently, Adams had been in receipt of similar information in recent days.

Yesterday, in response to the Attorney General's request for information, Paul Daly hand carried to Callahan the Bureau's response (which is dated January 14) and today Callahan hand carried the package to us over Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann;s signature. Callahan advised that Daly was upset that the Committee had been so promptly advised for fear that we would interupt the Bureau's inquiry. Callahan apologized for the lack of responsiveness on the part of Justice and the Bureau but things are in disarray with Levi about to depart. I assured Callahan we did not desire to interfere in the investigation but desired to be promptly informed of any developments and that we would stay in touch with Paul Daly in that regard . Callahan promised to expedite any Committee requests as made.

Paul Daly called at 3:10 p.m. to advise that "the powers that be" at the Bureau were upset with the possibility that the Committee was considering going to Dallas and interfering with the investigation. He specifically that the Director be given an opportunity to talk with Inouye prior to any such action. I told Daly that it was merely the Committee's desire to go to Texas; I had heard no discussion of going regardless of the Bureau's position. Daly promised to pull together without the need for a written request, all available information on Brading for Committee review this afternoon, if at all possible.

HE NEW YORK TIMES,

Hunt Sons Charge C.I.A. Used Agents To Embezzle Funds

F CTI CO Hunt

DALLAS, July 22 (UPI)—Two sons of H. L. Hunt, the late billionaire contending they were discriminated against because of their conservative views, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the family oil empire and used secret agents to help embezzle more than $50-million from them.

The brothers, Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, said new Federal charges that they had tried to cover up a family wiretapping scheme were a further result of an attempt by the C.I.A. to discredit the Hunt oil empire. They said they held the C.I.A. responsible for earlier Federal charges that they had spied on aides of their father.

They said their refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use their overseas Hunt Oil Company affiliate for espionge had led to the Federal charges against them.

"After turning down the C.I.A., a massive embezzlement scheme involving loses of over $50-million from the Hunt Oil Company were uncovered," the brothers said in a news release. "An investigation disclosed that some of the Hunt employes involved in the scheme were secret Government agents."

who? why?

A spokesman at C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington said, "Since it appears such a complicated matter, the agency's legal people would like time to find out what it is all about."

Does CIA ever deny?

A Federal grand jury yesterday charged the Hunt brothers, Percy Foreman of Houston, a criminal lawyer, three other attorneys and a retired Texas industrialist with obstruction of justice for allegedly trying to thwart the wiretap investigation.

U.S. Accused of Refusing to Investigate $50-Million 'Theft' at H.L. Hunt Concern

Sep. 22 51:1

By MARTIN WALDRON

Special to The New York Times

LUBBOCK, Tex., Sept. 21 — A member of the Hunt oil family says that its widely advertised H. L. H. food company lost $50-million to $60-million between 1960 and 1970 because of "stealing" by key company employes and that the Justice Department has refused for five years to investigate.

Thomas M. Hunt, a nephew of H. L. Hunt, the eccentric late oil billionaire, who used the radio program "Life Line" to advertise his food and drug products, said that the Justice Department was under pressure from the Central Intelligence Agency not to investigate the alleged thefts, and to prosecute two members of the Hunt family for wiretapping.

Thomas Hunt is production manager for H.L.H.'s parent company, the Hunt Oil Company, which is family owned. Mr. Hunt is a cousin of Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, who are on trial in Federal District Court here on wiretapping charges. Testimony in the case begins tomorrow.

Bunker Hunt has said his refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use his Middle-Eastern oil operations as a cover is the possible reason behind the Government's insistence on trying him and his brother on six-year-old wiretapping charges.

Refused Request

A C.I.A. memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1965, indicated that Bunker Hunt would be asked to allow the agency to use his company as a cover in the Middle East. The Hunts had an oil concession in Libya. Bunker Hunt said such a request was made to him in 1966 by the C.I.A., but that he refused to allow it because he did not want to alienate the Libyans.

The intelligence agency has declined to allow the Hunts to see nine of 12 items it has in its files on Bunker Hunt, saying in a letter dated April 3, 1975, that to release these items would imperil "intelligence sources and methods."

One of these items if revealed, the C.I.A. said, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the individual volunteering information.

Thomas Hunt said that the family believed that this individual was one of the H.L.H. employes who organized the system under which the food company was stripped of huge sums of money.

The Justice Department refused to comment on the Hunt contentions.

However, department officials have signed affidavits that none of the evidence being presented in the wiretap trial came from the C.I.A.

Checking Losses

The Hunts say that the wiretap charges grew out of efforts by Herbert and Bunker Hunt to find out why H.L.H. was losing so much money. Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. losses in 1968 had reached $8-million a year, when a company projection had shown they should be making a profit.

Thomas Hunt's phone was one of those tapped by three private detectives hired by his cousins in November, 1969. The other phones were those of H. L. Hunt's private secretary, a Hunt oil company vice president and three lesser company officials.

Losses of H.L.H. were getting so massive in 1968 and 1969 that the Hunt Oil Company, which had been absorbing the losses, "was getting into a cash bind," Thomas Hunt said.

The wiretaps were discovered in January, 1970, and three private detectives were later convicted and sent to prison for short terms. The detectives, after being released, told a grand jury, under threats of contempt citations, that the Hunt brothers hired them, and the Hunts were indicted in February, 1973.

Thomas Hunt said that before his cousins resorted to hiring private detectives, they had become convinced that the company officials who ordinarily would have investigated thefts "were the chief thieves." An independent audit later proved this surmise to be correct, he said.

Every Operations

The thefts, he said, stretched from coast to coast and involved almost every operation of H.L.H.—purchases, sales and operations. Company payrolls were loaded with nonexistent employes and company officials got kickbacks on purchases and commissions on sales through dummy food brokerage companies, he said.

Thomas Whitaker, a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who now is chief security officer for the Hunt

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Oil Company, said that more than $5-million in thefts had been documented and many more were being investigated.

He and Thomas Hunt gave as an example of a typical operation the sale of an H.L.H. pecan crop from company groves near Tyler, Tex., and the subsequent purchase of a pecan processing plant at the same city.

"We had sold a pecan crop to a company in El Paso," Mr. Hunt said. "The we were told by one of the thieves that he had not realized that pecans were selling for so much and had agreed to sell them to somebody else for two cents a pound less."

Reports Commitment

Mr. Whitaker said that the same former employe negotiated the purchase of the pecan processing plant, committing H.L.H. to paying $180,000 for it.

"The plant had been shut down by the Food and Drug Administration, it was all rusty and has not been operated to this day," Mr. Whitaker said.

The previous owner of the pecan plant gave a deposition to Hunt Oil officials saying that he had paid cash kickbacks of more than $80,000 to three H.L.H. employes.

But the biggest source of income at H.L.H. expense, he said, was at least five dummy food brokerage corporations that were set up by H.L.H. employes to receive 3 per cent commissions on all H.L.H. sales.

After auditors had established the duplicity of H.L.H. executives in early 1970, "the whole scheme was laid out" to the F.B.I., Mr. Whitaker said.

In July, 1970, a claim of $442,873.19 was filed with the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York by Hunt Oil, detailing allegations of thefts by employes whose honesty had been insured by Fidelity.

Sought Eastland Aid

After the private detectives were indicted in 1970, the Hunts made efforts to have the prosecution dropped through political connections, asking Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to intercede with the Justice Department.

One Hunt attorney said that the Hunts had been led to believe that if they would drop damage suits against former employes and settle the company's claim against the bonding company for $100,000, the case "would blow over." The suits were dropped and the settlement made with the bonding company.

If such an agreement was reached in Washington, it did not hold.

The three detectives were convicted and sent to prison, and after they testified before a special grand jury in 1973 in Dallas, the Hunts were indicted on the wiretapping charge in February of that year.

After the Hunts were charged, one of their attorneys, Philip Hirschkop of Alexandria, Va., asked the Federal courts to require the Justice Department to investigate the thefts from H.L.H.

Warned of Dismissal

In response to a statement from Federal District Judge H. O. Woodward in 1973 that he would dismiss cases against the Hunts "if some agency does not investigate," Hunt officials "once again laid out the whole situation to the F.B.I." and other Justice Department officials, Mr. Whitaker said.

Two former employes of H.L.H., John Curington and John H. Brown, were later indicted and were convicted last year for using the mails to defraud H.L.H. They were fined and placed on probation. A third former employe, Paul M. Rothermel, who had been chief of security for Hunt Oil Company, was given immunity from prosecution by the Government, but he was never called to testify at any trial.

The three men said that H. L. Hunt had given them permission to act as food brokers to sell H. L. H. products, a statement denied by the late billionaire.

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In an effort to show that the Hunts were being prosecuted because they refused to cooperate with the C.I.A., Mr. Hirschkop asked both the agency and the F.B.I. for any C.I.A. information they had on his clients.

Three Items

The three of 13 items that the C.I.A. would release to Mr. Hirschkop were a biography of Bunker Hunt, a copy of a memorandum that recommended that Bunker Hunt be asked to be "operational" and copies of attacks made on Bunker Hunt by Tripoli Radio.

Bunker Hunt said that in 1966, the C.I.A. asked him to

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allow the agency to use his Libyan oil operations as a cover for C.I.A. agents in the Middle East, but that he refused.

The December, 1966, memorandum on Bunker Hunt said that the C.I.A. had "had good cooperation . . . on our routine requests but have no way of judging possible reaction to operational requests. Our estimate is that we see no reason we should not make a cautious approach."

In pretrial hearings, the Hunts asked Judge Woodward to order the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies to furnish information on the Hunts and on Mr. Curington, Mr. Rothermel and Mr. Brown.

Found No Relevance

Judge Woodward examined reports from the C.I.A. on Mr. Rothermel and on all three men from the National Security Council but ruled that they had no relevance to the wiretap case and he would not allow the Hunts to see the documents.

Thomas Hunt said that the State Department also had become involved, urging Bunker Hunt to pay $43-million still owed to the Libyan Government on the 1972 taxes. These taxes were withheld after Libya seized Mr. Hunt's oil interests in that nation in 1973.

Mr. Hunt said that this advice had been rejected.

Tripoli Radio said in June, 1973, that Bunker Hunt's half-share in an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil in a desert field in Libya had been seized because Mr. Hunt was "an adventurer and broker seeking gains and profits without carrying out any activity or bearing any risk."

"He did not even have a positive attitude toward the wishes of the people," the broadcast said.

Thomas Hunt said that the Hunt oil interests had been paying about $180-million in taxes to the Libyan Government before Mr. Hunt was ousted from the country.

Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. Food Products Division of Hunt Oil Company had been reorganized and was now showing a profit.

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Saigon Students Tested On Ideas From Hanoi

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sept. 21 (Agence France-Presse)—The first group of high school students to take final examinations since the Communists took over here had a choice yesterday of writing papers analyzing the thoughts of either Ho Chi Minh, the late North Vietnamese leader, or the current Premier, Pham Van Dong.

The first choice was an excerpt from Ho Chi Minh's "Call to the Nation" of July 17, 1966, when American bombers started attacking North Vietnam.

The other was a passage from Mr. Dong's speech when he presented his Government to the latest session of the North Vietnamese National Assembly.

osts down, deal with labor problems." Lamar's low-keyed personal style (Steadman says Lamar has never given him a direct order in the 15 years of their association) tends to make some people think of him as a sort of a Mr. Peepers with a yen to be a jock. "Actually," says Maxfield, "he's Clark Kent. He is a mild-mannered, meek, everyday guy. But when money needs to be committed, he goes into that little phone booth and comes out with an 'S' on his shirt."

Lucky 11 trusts

The bedrock of Lamar's personal fortune is the trust that his father set up for him in 1935 as part of a tax strategy planned with the aid of veteran Hunt attorney J. B. McEntire. At that time, a trust was established for each of the Hunt children. In 1958, the pattern was repeated when the elder Hunt established trusts for each of the second Mrs. Hunt's children, calling them Loyal Trusts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Except for Hunt Oil Co., which went entirely to Mrs. Hunt, H. L. Hunt left the bulk of his personal holdings to the Loyal Trusts, whose beneficiaries are Ray Hunt, Ruth Jane Hunt, Mrs. Randall A. (Helen LaKelley) Kreiling, and Mrs. Mark A. (Swanee Grace) Meeks.

The size of these trusts is unknown, but one of the problems facing the Hunt family is how to commingle 11 separate fortunes (those of the 10 children plus the Ruth Ray Hunt Trust) to maximum advantage. Dallas friends of son-in-law "Randy" Kreiling say the question is being debated warmly within the family. Although Kreiling's role in the Great Western United takeover was relatively minor, it did demonstrate a willingness between the two sibling groups to cooperate.

Lamar Hunt observes that, since the bulk of H. L. Hunt's estate was left to Mrs. Hunt, "it was a natural thing for Ray to be the person who looks after it." Lamar adds: "It does not mean that Ray will run the business. He will be making an orderly transition, a change to whatever happens. He will have the responsibility of making decisions in relationship to Dad's property, but Dad's operation was much simpler."

There will be no move to take Hunt Oil public, Lamar says. "Our philosophy is not one of promotion of stock and promotion to the public," he says. "Each of us has his own interests. All of us operate in the oil business, sometimes together, sometimes as an independent oil operator. Hunt Oil, which was my Dad's company, will be run basically by employees of the company. We all will continue to operate out of the Hunt Oil office."

Maxfield, who has been observing the Hunts for nine years as Lamar's partner, believes that Hunt Oil and Placid Oil will carry on the monolithic base of the family fortune. "It's like a tree trunk, with each brother having his own branch," he says. "Oil is not an expression of the personality of the sons as it was of the old man. The expression of the brothers will be in the branches—Ray in real estate; Lamar sports; Bunker horses, commodities, and agriculture; Herbert in real estate, residential development, and commodities." And while the brothers are branching out, Maxfield believes, "they will run the oil companies collectively with a professional staff."

Stormy weather closes in

Meanwhile, a threatening cloud looms on the family's horizon. Not only is an oft-delayed trial ahead for Bunker and Herbert Hunt on the wiretapping charges, but there is also the threat of more indictments against them by a federal grand jury that has been sitting in Dallas for more than a year. The Hunts claim their wiretapping activities were aimed at uncovering suspected embezzlements from their father's food concern. In their only statement on the matter, over a year ago, they cited "extensive, unexplained losses" suffered by the company. "We only sought to protect our father and his property, as any others would have done," they said.

But one of the wiretappers, Jon Joseph Kelly, says that the tapping was prompted by Bunker's and Herbert's suspicions that someone was trying to influence H. L. Hunt to leave the bulk of his estate to the second Mrs. Hunt and her children. Three of the wiretap victims back up Kelly's version.

Just two weeks ago, in their syndicated column, Jack Anderson and Les Whitten aired a recurring Dallas rumor that the grand jury is looking into an alleged "$50,000 to $60,000 payoff" from Bunker to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James O. Eastland of Mississippi, in return for Eastland's assistance in getting a parole for the other wiretapper, Houston private eye Patrick W. McCann III. Eastland wrote a letter on McCann's behalf, but Bunker has denied that there was any payoff.

The Dallas grand jury is said to be mulling the Eastland connection, as well as the circumstances surrounding the three-year lapse between the wiretappers' arrest and the indictment of Herbert and Bunker on Feb. 28, 1973. A Hunt family lawyer told *Dallas Morning News* investigative reporter Earl Golz that Bunker managed to strike a bargain with the Justice Dept. in which "there would be no prosecution of the Hunts if they performed certain actions; they performed the actions, but there was an indictment anyway."

The actions, reportedly made after 1972 meetings with former President Richard M. Nixon and former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, included Bunker's providing Justice with a list of Al Fatah agents in the U. S. He had secured the list privately because he feared he was on the Al Fatah death list because of his Libyan holdings.

For the Hunts, the wiretapping episode has proved disastrous. Bunker and Herbert could receive prison sentences. And, more than anything else in the family's history, it has torn the tightly woven curtain of secrecy behind which the family has lived and worked for more than four decades. ■

Shelly Katz

Ray Hunt (right) looks over his Dallas development.

NAMES & FACES

1975 №. 203-75- 03 1975

Film: Holmes Nostalgia

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'Hound' on Bill With First-Rate Keaton

By RICHARD EDER

The first bit in a program of Sherlock Holmes nostalgia at the D. W. Griffith Theater is an old filmed interview with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Stout, mustached and affable, the 68-year-old author made it clear what some people had always suspected: it was Watson who invented Holmes. In any case, Sir Arthur was mainly interested in talking about psychic research.

People wanted to know what happened to the generation of young Englishmen who died in World War II, he said. "Are they dissipated into nothing," he inquired, patting his dog, "or are they still the grand fellows we used to know?"

It wasn't Sir Arthur's ghosts that made a success of haunting: it was his stories. "Sherlock Holmes" is on Broadway, tourists still go on forlorn searches up Baker Street, Gene Wilder is filming Holmes's younger brother in London and Lord Olivier will tackle Moriarty this fall.

The centerpiece of the Holmes's film program is the 1939 Darryl F. Zanuck production of "The Hound of the Baskervilles." It isn't a great picture. It isn't even a great mediocre picture, but it is a good mediocre picture, and perhaps they made better mediocre pictures in those days than they do now.

Dartmoor, the funereal setting for "The Hound," may be partly painted backdrop but they roll in enough studio fog to do "Wuthering Heights" twice. Basil Rathbone and Nigel Bruce play Holmes and Watson with comic exaggeration. It is a serious kind of comic exaggeration. It lets you watch it. It doesn't spoof itself: it doesn't wink at you and tell you that it's really just as sophisticated as you are and knows it is making a fool of itself down there on the screen.

The hound is just a large ugly dog, but it manages to be quite as frightening as the mechanical floor waxer in a white shark suit that plays the lead in "Jaws," and a lot less gory.

And then there are the phrases. "Mr. Holmes, you're the only man in all England who can help me." "I'm in mortal fear Sir Henry's life will be snuffed out." "They were the footprints of a gigantic Hound." "Watson, keep your eye on that hansom." "That's what I hate about his moor, there's always something strange." And, of course: "Oh Watson, the needle."

It's like the tunes—singable with a life of their own—that pop out of Gilbert and Sullivan.

Some of the audiences leaves after "The Hound," and the usher urges them back to their seats. He's right: the last picture in the program is a 45-minute Buster Keaton classic.

"Sherlock Junior" is not really a Sherlock Holmes picture. It is about a movie projectionist (Keaton) who wants to be a detective, courts a girl, is thrown out after a rival steals her father's watch and lays the blame on him, falls asleep while projecting a picture and dreams himself into the picture. There he becomes Sherlock Holmes, frustrates the scoundrels and wins the girl.

If it's not quite the masterpiece that "The General" or "The Navigator" is, it is still first-rate Keaton. That is, it is both disciplined and wild. The major part of the picture, where in his dream he literally walks down the aisle, climbs into the screen and joins the girl as Holmes, is full of marvelous chases, escapes and battles with exploding billiard balls.

But the quieter bits are even better. For example, he sweeps out the theater and finds in the debris two or three dollar bills that will allow him to buy candy for his girl. The customers return one by one to claim them. One is an old woman who comes up weeping. With agony he yields up the dollar bill to her. She takes it and yields her handkerchief to him.

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The Casts

THE HOUND OF THE BASKERVILLES, directed by Sidney Lanfield; screenplay by Ernest Pascal, based on the story by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle; a 20th Century-Fox production; distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, 59th Street and Second Avenue. Running time: 80 minutes.
Sir Henry Baskerville ... Richard Greene
Sherlock Holmes ... Basil Rathbone
Beryl Stapleton ... Wendy Barrie
Dr. Watson ... Nigel Bruce
Dr. James Mortimer ... Lionel Atwill
Barryman ... John Carradine
John Stapleton ... Morton Lowry

and

SHERLOCK JR., directed by Buster Keaton; written by Jean Havez, Joseph Mitchell and Clyde Bruckman. Produced by Metro Pictures. Distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, Second Avenue and 59th Street. Running time: 45 minutes. With: Mr. Keaton, Kathryn McGuire, Ward Crane, Joseph Keaton, Horace Morgan, Jane Connelly, Erwin Connelly, Ford West, George Davis, John Patrick and Ruth Holley.

'Invasion' of Island Is Laid to France; She Denies Charge

Jul 22 0 2 4

KAMPALA, Uganda, July 21 (AP) — A spokesman for the Organization of African Unity said today that French troops were invading the Indian Ocean island of Mayotte that the 46-nation group recognizes as part of the newly independent Comoro Republic.

[In Paris, an official spokesman issued a denial, saying, according to Reuters, that "there are no French troop movements or naval movements around Mayotte, which in any case is French."]

Peter Onu of Nigeria, who is assistant secretary general of the African Unity group, said at a news conference here that French warships had surrounded the Comoro island of Mayotte, where "troops are landing."

On July 6, the Comoro leadership declared the entire island group including Mayotte independent of France on the basis of a referendum last December in which 95 per cent voted for an end to colonial rule. On Mayotte, however, a two-thirds majority voted to retain a link to France, and residents there appealed to Paris to be allowed to break away from the other islands.

2 HUNTS INDICTED WITH 5 IN DALLAS

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Foreman Among 7 Charged in Wiretap Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

DALLAS, July 21 — Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, sons of the late oil billionaire H. L. Hunt, the Houston lawyer Percy Foreman and four other men were indicted by a Federal grand jury tonight on charges of obstructing justice and impeding an investigation into a wiretape case involving the Hunts.

An 18-member grand jury handed up the nine-count indictment in the court of Federal District Judge Robert W. Porter, ending an 18-month investigation. No one named in the indictment was present.

Named along with the Hunts and Mr. Foreman were Ralph Shank, the Hunt family's personal attorney; B. H. Timmins Jr., a former assistant United States Attorney here who is now in private practice; Edward J. Hudson, a Houston oilfield machinery company owner and close friend of the Hunts, and Charles Tessmer, a Dallas criminal lawyer.

Obstruction Charged

All seven men were alleged to have conspired to obstruct the investigation of the wiretapping case and the Hunt indictments. The investigation subsequently resulted in the indictment of the Hunt brothers for violations of Federal wiretapping laws. The indictment said the group attempted to influence potential witnesses in the earlier case through bribes and veiled threats of physical harm and death.

The Hunts were named in all but two of the counts, while Mr. Foreman was named in three of the counts.

The wiretapping case stems from the 1970 arrests of two Houston men, Jim Kelly and Patrick McCann, in Richardson, a Dallas suburb, and seizure of wiretapping equipment from their car.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department entered the investigation and Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann, along with a third man, W. J. Everett, were indicted for wiretap violations. Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann were tried and found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison in 1972 for wiretapping the home phones of three Hunt employes. Mr. Everett pleaded nolo contendere and was placed on probation.

Trial in September

The Hunts were indicted last summer for their part in the wiretap case, and their trial is slated for September in Lubbock, Tex., where it was moved on a change of venue.

The indictments handed up today allege that the Hunts promised Mr. Kelly, Mr. McCann and Mr. Everett amounts ranging from $800 to $1,200 per month while in prison if they did not testify before a grand jury concerning the Hunts' involvement in the wiretapping.

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Two of the counts charge that Mr. Foreman accepted $100,000 in two $50,000 payments from Mr. Hudson to represent Mr. Kelly and Mr. Everett and to guarantee that neither man would testify before the Federal grand jury in Dallas in 1972.

Mr. Shank, the Hunt family attorney, was indicted on seven counts concerning the alleged bribes. Mr. Tessmer, a well-known Dallas lawyer, was indicted on four counts, including lying to the grand jury in August, 1974, and October, 1974, concerning the offer of a bribe to Mr. Kelly and whether or not he had ever been employed as a counsel for the Hunts. Mr. Hudson was named in three counts and Mr. Timmins in two counts, all involving transmittal of the bribe offers.

Judge Porter did not set any trial date, nor did he set any bail for any of the defendants.

20 Cambodians Gone From U.S. Navy Center

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NEWPORT, R.I., July 21 (AP) — Twenty Cambodian naval officers, who received political asylum in the United States when their Government fell this spring, have left the naval training center here to start new lives.

Most have found work in Rhode Island even though the state has a 16 per cent unemployment rate. Others have left the state to stay with relatives or try to return to Cambodia.

The 20 officers graduated in a private ceremony at the naval training center on May 19, several weeks after Khmer Rouge insurgents toppled the regime of President Lon Nol.

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to <u>Eugene Hale Brading</u>, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a business-man in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparently welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of <u>Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building</u> in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of <u>Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building</u>.

---

have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B"Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

— Michael Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

30 March 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 NW. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

We have received your request under the Freedom of Information Act for information pertaining to you. This is to advise you that as of 27 September 1975 the Privacy Act of 1974 took effect. This act and pertinent CIA regulations established requirements and procedures for access by individuals to information pertaining to them. CIA Regulations were published in the Federal Register on 28 August 1975 and may be found in Title 32 C.F.R. 1901.

Since the Privacy Act requires federal agencies to ensure that improper disclosure of personally identifiable information will not be made and further provides criminal penalties for improper disclosure, CIA Privacy Regulations, section 1901.13, sets forth the following requirements for identification of individuals making requests.

> An individual seeking access to or notification of the existence of records about himself shall provide in the letter of request his full name, address, date and place of birth together with a notarized statement swearing to or affirming his identity...If such individual is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, his or her alien registration number must be also provided.

Before we may begin processing your request, we must receive from you a notarized statement as explained above. The statement should verify that you are a U.S. citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence. It is also requested that you provide any additional information concerning yourself which might facilitate our search of records. Unless you identify specific records you may be looking for, we will conduct a search of all Agency records that might contain information that pertains to you.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
7 May 1976

Mr. Gene Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Pre-freedom of information request
notice of charges

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Before exercising my right to a freedom of information request for copies of any and all available (in accordance with the declassification processes stipulated in Executive Order 11652 and its amendment of January 1974) files of records and documents, both computerized and manual apposite of me and my activities under my present and former names and pseudonyms, I hereby request the complete and final estimate of charges for search and duplication services.

As regards the charges for these services, two matters may be worthy of consideration. The first of them is that, given the proper access codes, the execution of a computer search is neither difficult nor costly. And the second is that in light of the controversial nature of my past, a waiver or reduction of charges may conduce to the furtherance of the public interest. I therefore respectfully request that these factors be considered in the making of a decision as to the cost of services.

In compliance with your request for identity verification (pursuant to provisions of the 1974 Privacy Act, section 552, subsections b and d) I hereby swear before a notary public as to my name and former names, my present address, my date as well as place of birth, and my citizenship. Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Yours truly,
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

a.k.a.: Frank Angelo Fiorino
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A.Fiorini
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
Frank Bonnelli
Frank Campbell

code names: Federini
Barbarossa
Samson

born 9 December 1924
in Norfolk, Va.

United States of American citizenship

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Uedene Wilks

Notary Public, State of Florida at Large
My commission expires
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUG 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF RESIDENCES AND EMPLOYMENTS OF: Frank Sturgis
present address:
2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

also known as: Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Fiorini
Frank Angelo Fiorino

1924, Dec. 9	born in Norfolk, Va.
1930-1942	resided at 510 High Street , Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa.
1942-1945	U.S.Marine Corps Reserve (Paris Is., S.C.; Pacific theatre)
1945	honorable discharge -Klamouth Falls, Ore.
1945	Miami, Florida
c.1945-1948	Norfolk, Va. adrs: Bank St., etc. joined Norfolk Police Dept. attended William and Mary College also attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute c.1946-employed as manager of the Virginia Tavern on East Main Street c.1949-employed as owner and manager of The Whitehorse Tavern on East Main Street
c.1948	enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve at the Norfolk Naval Air Station
c.1949	honorable discharge
c.1949-1950	U.S. Merchant Marine travelling to and from Europe
c. 1950-1952	U.S. Army - stationed in Germany
c. 1952	honorable discharge
c. 1952-1954	owner-manager of Tophat Nightclub in Virginia, Beach, Va.
c. 1956-1961	Cuba(Sierra Maestra); Miami, Florida; Mexico; Venezuela; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Panama; Honduras; Bahama Is. 1958: contact with CIA at US Consulate-Santiago, Cuba 1959: contact with CIA at US Embassy-Havana,Cuba 1959: contact with FBI HQ - Washington,DC 1961:-1970: Bay of Pigs CIA control officer Sam Jenis

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH - cont'd

1963	contact with FBI and CIA
1968	travel and business (operation sword) Mexico and Honduras
1968-1972	mechanic and salesman for the Pan-American Aluminum Corp. 185th St., Miami, Florida
June 17, 1972	adventure: Watergate Office Building
June-July 1972	moved to Washington, D.C. jail
January 8, 1973	Watergate trial: U.S. v. G. Gordon Liddy et al.
January 15, 1973	plea of guilty entered
c. May 1973	moved to Federal Prison Inst. in Danbury, Conn. then moved to Eglin Air Force Base thence moved to Dade County Jail
January 1974	released on appeal bond
1974	salesman for Heavy Equipment Company, Miami, Florida
1974-1975	salesmanager for Dodge Is. Repairs, Miami, Florida
1975	salesmanager for Continental Egg Corp., Miami, Florida
1974-1975	salesmanager for Miami Book Mfg. Company 4460 N.W. 37th Avenue Miami, Florida

Thank you,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposed therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

My commission expires

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

26 MAY 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter, dated 7 May, requesting access under the Privacy Act for information pertaining to you. There is no charge for processing Privacy Act requests.

We are therefore processing your request and will provide you with the results under the Privacy Act as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 12, 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 Northwest 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This is to acknowledge receipt by the FBI on March 23, 1976, of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request dated March 13, 1976.

Based on the limited information you provided, it is not possible to make an accurate search of our records. To insure an accurate search of our records, please furnish your complete name, date and place of birth, prior addresses, employments and any specific data that would permit us to locate the documents you seek.

An exceedingly heavy volume of FOIPA requests has been received these past few months. Additionally, court deadlines involving certain historical cases of considerable scope have been imposed upon the FBI. Despite successive expansions of our staff responsible for FOIPA matters, substantial delays in processing requests continue.

Since January 1, 1975, the FBI has received a total of 17,204 FOIPA requests. Of these, our present backlog is 6,782. In an effort to deal fairly with any request requiring the retrieval, processing and duplication of documents, each request is being handled in chronological order based on the date of receipt. Please be assured that your request is being handled as equitably as possible and that all documents which can be released will be made available at the earliest possible date.

Mr. Frank Sturgis

Prior to the processing or release of any documents which may pertain to you, it will be necessary for you to submit your notarized signature. This procedure is designed to insure that information concerning an individual is released only to that person.

Your patience and cooperation will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

C M Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

FRANK STURGIS
2515 N.W. 122 STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33167

May 3, 1976

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Office of the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: Freedom of Information Request

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you requested more specific information to help in the search, collection and duplication of records indicated in my recent freedom of information request. I am sending a chronological sketch of my residences and employments prefaced by a list of names under which I have been known. I hope this profile will aid the Bureau in its search for my records. Notarization of this letter and the sketch will attest to the verification of my identity.

Considering the voluminous quantity of material that may have to be read and screened, I would be pleased in the interest of fairness to afford the Justice Department whatever reasonable extension of time is needed to comply with my freedom of information request.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis
Encl/
FS:s

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared FRANK STURGIS to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 6th day of May, A.D., 1976.

Udine Wilke

Notary Public
State of Florida at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

MEMORANDUM

October 29, 1976

TO : Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood, Mike Epstein

FROM : Rick Inderfurth

In case you missed the attached article on Russell Bufalino . . .

Attachment

The Washington Post

October 28, 1976

Reputed Crime Chief Accused of Extortion In Collecting a Debt

Associated Press

Russell Bufalino, a reputed organized crime leader, has been indicted on federal charges of conspiracy and extortion for using threats of violence in trying to collect a debt, the Justice Department announced yesterday.

Bufalino and three other men were named defendants in a sealed indictment returned by a federal grand jury in New York City Tuesday and unsealed yesterday.

Bufalino, 71, of Kingston, Pa., was identified by federal officials in 1973 as the head of one of five Cosa Nostra families operating in Pennsylvania. The Immigration Service has attempted for nearly 20 years to deport Bufalino to Sicily, saying he was born there and brought to the United States as an infant. He says he was born in this country.

Lieberwood

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI
RE: RAPHAEL GENER

October 26, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO #R 5080

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Attorney General Levi:

As you know, the Intelligence Committee has taken testimony with regard to John Rosselli and the assassination plots directed against Fidel Castro. As part of the Committee's inquiry in this area, testimony has been received regarding an individual by the name of Raphael Gener. Committee staff have participated in a review of this testimony with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are requesting that, upon the completion of this review of testimony, the Committee be provided access to all FBI materials relating to Mr. Gener.

We are hopeful that Committee staff and your representatives will be able to work out access to the appropriate files and materials in the same manner as we have in the past. We continue to appreciate your assistance in these matters.

Aloha,

Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice Chairman

MJM:mlh

Veciana/FBI notes
12/20/76

(1)

Memo SAC S Juan to Director 10/25/73
Informants on 4 occasions betw. ~~Sto~~ Aug and Oct, 73 advise SA Jerry Sellers AV severed Alpha 66 rel. several years earlier & was member of PRP but severed summer 1973 because lacked "revol. zeal."

Memo SAC Miami to Director 9/27/73 reference 3 inform. for LHM of 9/27/73 re the DR (Directorio Revolucionario) from Miami, Fla.

Veciana: DR planning terrorist activities in Paris in name of phony group "Accion Cuba". Jose Antonio Calatayud Rivera is Sec. Gen. - DR.

Aldo Serafin, Cristobal Mayo, Eulalia Armento resigned from DR Sept 16, 1973

Primivito Rodriguez-Rodriguez said attack on Paris Embassy initiated in office of Lesnik (Replica) + financed by Bosch + AV.

Alfred Soler Soler moving to Venz to plan kidnapping of Cuban officials for DR (in import export business.

LHM Aug 30, 1973 re Barres

Barres advises FBI that AV and Serafin planned + executed Paris bombing that killed Juan Felipe De La Cruz on Aug 2, 1973.

In July, 73, AV advised Barres that he obtained [illegible] 300 lbs of C-1 explosive in Texas (having been unable to obtain C-4) and stored it in the Everglades. AV said he had sent a man to Spain, France, Argentina & Peru to cause explosion at Cuban Embassies & create a "Black Sept." type organization

Spanish Trans. sent to Madrid to Miami (Aug 30, 73) "Moralitos"

Ricardo Morales Navarette - Asked by Bureau to Bosch. Accused of death of Cubans in U.S. Participated in terrorist acts. Bosch group has sentenced to death

Miami SAC to Director Memo (8/2/73)

AV possessed 15 Bolivian & Venezuelan passports belonging to numerous individuals of interest to (Third Ag.)

7/16/73 SAC Miami to Director Memo

Acknowledges FBI contact w/ AV in Miami & thru Legat in Caracas & La Paz. FBI in contact because AV in PRP. Rec. an opportunist w/ delusions of grandeur. Wants to be in limelight regardless of cause

Correlation
Veciana Summary - 3/15/73

(3)

Francisco Vicente Gonzalez Tuero says he ~~and AV robbed the~~ robbed the Banco ~~Financiero~~ Financerio in Cuba in March, 61. AV planned the robbery. AV then sent message to Zenaida (LNU) 1174 SW 12th St. Miami requesting rifle grenades.

12/27/61 Conf. source advised FBI that AV planned most recent attempt on Castro's life.

1/7/63 Craig T. Sheldon raising money for AV + Alpha 66.

AV heavily funded by Julio Lobo.

1/30/64 AV advised? he had no personal knowledge of ~~John Robert~~ Klinner, who was investigated re JFK assassination. Klinner is James Edgar Wethington - with long criminal record. Claimed association w/ Cuban Freedom Fighters. (See reports # 62-109060 and # 62-109060-3083, p. 6, 655.)

1/30/64 Veciana substantiated report of Eusebio Ojeda, Chief of Personnel SFNE

(4)

Veciana in Dallas in May 64 to visit Dallas SFNE Chapter

Vec. in contact w/ Somosa who promised him training bases in Nic.

The CIA advised that James G. Cogswell, who reportedly had high level contacts in society and US Navy in April, 1966, intro. AV to CIA reps. AV wanted 50,000 to organize group to assassinate CASTRO - CIA declined -

Veciana treasurer, administrator + Spokesman for the unity group of Alpha 66, SFNE & MRP.

2/24/69 AV signed Doc. presented this date to Nixon to free Orlando Bosch.

Veciana lived at Savoy Hotel in Caracas,

Quitteres Silva was detained questioned and released after trying to enter Soviet Embassy in La Paz. Silva had AV's wife's name + address in his book.

AV established liaison w/ Legat in Bolivia thru the minerals attache at the US Embassy. AV furnished info. from Bolivian National Police files

GRIMALDI

Apr 30, 68 info from Augusto Pineda Gonzalez - Pineda came over on boat w/ AV. AV visited Pineda in June 68 and asked Pineda to receive 3 57mm recoilless rifles in Flor. somewhere outside Miami & deliver them to unspecified SFNE people in Miami. Would be used to attack Soviet ships. AV disgusted w/ US policy. AV tried Pineda to organize demonstrations and armed attacks to annoy US & create probs. AV convinced US protecting Castro.
AV would fund Pineda @ $3,000 to $5,000 per mo. Pineda to call Sera when organized. She would provide the $.

Co-Ordinator of Cuban Affairs of the Dept of State - G. Harry ~~Sh~~ Shuman furnished FBI info. on Veciana ~~on 1968~~ based on his "~~personal~~ contacts w/ him" ~~the info was ... i.e. that AV no longer involved in anti~~ -Castro activity

Fresquet & Ray active in 1967 w/ Veciana

1974 - Enrique Nunez Alvarez and Elvio Rivera Limonta active in FLNC terrorist activities / Both in P. Rico.

MM 105-22094 at TAB Bufile #105-261797

NISO Charleston, SC
111th M.I. Group, Miami } receiving info dessimating re PPP.

AV on 11/27/72 had reportedly told source that the US Embassy in LaPaz helped him organize the Costa R. convention

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MRS. Frances R Grant
~~Frances~~ - Spec. invitee on C. Rica Convention

Tony Santiago - on initiating Committee for C Rica convention

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Felipe PAZOS - headed Banco Nacional in Cuba under Prio.

(7)

Israel Romero was Union City, N.J. repr. of MIRR during pd. Bosch involved in bombing activities. Romero once close to Bosch.

Arturo Villar - wealthy, San Juan, active

Ramon Font furnished explosive for French expl. Aug 3, 73 Hotel Oasis Avrainville, Fr.

Lesnick - longstanding Marxist. Attacked Batista in radio broadcasts Continued Broadcasts after Castro - invented "Cuba-Si-Yanqui No"

For a # ? years in contact w/ hoodlum elements during Batista regime. Took part in various assaults in Havanna during Batista.
Left Havanna year or two after Castro took power. Exile in Miami. Despite fact - close friend of Fidel's in college.
AV founded "Replica"

LIEBENGOOD ROUTH NOTES FROM U. S. V. VECIANA, ET AL

DATE: December 1, 1976

Veciana was represented by Barry L. Garber, 1040 City National Bank Building, 25 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130 (305-377-4963)

Veciana became implicated as the result of a drug bust of one Augustine Barres, a/k/a/ Emidigio Augustine Barres Fangul ("Gus Barres"). The bust resulted from an search warrant of 23 July 73 for Barres' attache case at the Taft Hotel in New York. The police were acting on an informant tip to an undercover agent who arranged for a buy from Barres of seven kilograms of Cocaine at the Taft. The police understood that Barres was to be with a "female" courier. Barres advised DEA task force representative, Eugene W. Flynn, a detective sgt. with the NYPD, that he purchased the seven kilos from Antonio Veciana in Miami on July 21, 1973.

Barres owns a home in Puerto Rico and travels to New York every two weeks on business.

A co-defendant of Veciana's in the case was Ariel Pomares who is the President of Occidental Investment, a real estate firm owned by Barres, located at 1186 J. T. Pinero Avenue, Miami. Pomares is also involved with FRECA Imports in Puerto Rico. This is also a Barres enterprise.

The DEA Miami regional office cables that Veciana is the subject of INS File No. A12-490987 and that he claims to be a public accountant.

According to the Miami Herald of July 25, 1973, Barres was Assistant Secretary of Communications under Castro and later the general manager of the Havana Health Department. He fled Cuba in 1961 for asylum in Puerto Rico. He became a United States citizen in 1970.

A cable from Ivan Wurms, the Chief Investigator of the DEA Task Force to Durkin at DEA headquarters, Washington, states that Veciana was arrested without incident on 7/24/73 and signed a "consent to search" form. Miscellaneous papers and numerous

Liebengood Rough Notes from <u>U. S. v. Veciana, et al</u> con't.

foreign passports belonging to several subjects were seized. Swiss bank account deposit slips were seized and are to be followed by IRS. Veciana claims to be an anti-Castro fund raiser. FBI confirms this.

A July, 1973 TWIX from DEA in New York to DEA headquarters Washington (attention: Daniel P. Casey, Acting Chief) referenced as subject: G1-73-X093 (presumably Veciana) and states "during debriefing of the defendant in New York on July 25, 1973, it was learned that Antonio Carlos Veciana, 811 North Southwest 30th Court, Miami is a member of an anti-Castro group which he has stated intends to blow up a number of Cuban properties and/or embassies in foreign nations, i.e., Spain, Mexico, Peru and France. Bombings originally scheduled for July now delayed until August."

Subpoena of August 14, 1973 exists for a telegram billed to Veciana at 649-1226 and sent to Barcelona, Spain on 5/26/73.

Barres implicates a Paraguyan diplomat formerly assigned to LaPaz, Bolivia and reassigned to Spain in the drug traffic. DEA is discretely checking his identity. A follow-up cable from DEA indicates that they have failed to identify the Paraguyan diplomat sent to Spain but do indicate that a Pedro P. Medina, a Paraguyan assigned to LaPaz, is believed to be involved in Cocaine smuggling.

Barres admitted that he was responsible for bringing Pomares, an employee of his, into illegal drug activity.

Veciana claimed to be without funds and destitute and was not fined. The U. S. Attorney was concerned that he posted a $100,000 bail immediately. However, after initial concern being shown in the file by the U. S. Attorney, the U. S. Attorney later writes the Judge that $80,000 of the $100,000 bond was furnished by Veciana's cousin, Dr. Pablo Zalduendo, a phycian from Detroit, Michigan. The remainder of the bail money was furnished by Veciana's uncle and other family members and friends who cashed insurance policies, closed children's savings accounts, etc. U. S. Attorney concluded that Veciana was possibly telling the truth when he advised the Court that he was destitute.

One ~~Hosea~~ Jose Lopez is a character reference for Barres on appeal.

Liebengood Rough Notes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.

Barres says he requested the government to give immunity to Veciana in order to destroy the traffic of Cocaine from Bolivia.

Barres studied at Columbia Military Academy in Columbia, Tennessee in 1951.

A taped transcript of Barres' debriefing by detectives Flynn and Scamardella on July 25, 1973 reveals the following: Barres got involved in drugs through his friend Veciana who was an officer of the International Development Bank in the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia. Some people think Veciana is with the CIA but Barres does not know. Barres dealt with Veciana regarding an attempt to kill Castro in Chile. He says Veciana did a good job of transferring everything into Chile (1970-1971). Barres gave Veciana $2,000 in support of this assassination effort. About this time Veciana said that drugs could be smuggled out of Bolivia through diplomatic pouch. Barres thought this was how Veciana had sent weapons into Chile. Barres advised that the head of Interpol in Bolivia gets a cut of drug money for protection on the Bolivian end and that a Secret Service Agent and two Paraguyan diplomats were also involved. They handled the transfer to Veciana in Miami Beach of the drugs from Bolivia.

Barres thought that the individual he was selling the drugs to in New York was a mafia type. It appears this is the individual who informed the police. He is known only as Tony in the transcript. The police were aware of his identity but did not desire Barres to discuss it.

Pomares' counsel, Gustavo Del Toro, urged the DEA in San Juan at the time of the arrest of Pomares to consider immunity for Pomares because Pomares possessed valuable information regarding international narcotic trafficing, including the implication of diplomats in places such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua.

The file contains cancelled Veciana checks drawn on the account of Antonio Sira Veciana at the Fidelity National Bank, 5880 Byrd Road, Miami, Florida, in May and June, 1972, for $1,000 each, payable to the Swiss Bank Corporation for account EF558230. These checks were obtained through subpoena on Catherine Hune, Vice President and Cashier of the Fidelity National Bank in Miami.

Liebengood Rough Notes on U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.

In Veciana's appellate brief he references transfers of drugs through the government's "APO System". He indicates that the first transaction he was involved in took place in April, 1972.

Also involved is someone known as "the midget".

To Veciana file

MEMORANDUM TO: File

RE: Antonio Veciana

FROM: Tom Moore

DATE: Jan. 3, 1977

Telephoned Veciana to ask if he recalled any attempts on his life in late 1962 or 1963. He answered that there were three attempts on his life, but none in 1962 or 1963. The first attempt, he said, occurred in a stadium in Puerto Rico in 1967 when a bomb exploded approximately 20 meters away. He said he believed Puerto Rican communists were responsible for this attempt. The second attempt occurred in Bolivia in approximately 1970 when some men with weapons appeared at a home where he was supposed to be. He said a woman who owned the home called him to warn him. He said he thought this attempt was related to a revolution which was taking place at that time. The third attempt, he said, occurred in Caracas, Venezuela in 1971. He added that he had received information within the past three months that Castro wanted to kidnap him.

The only relevant incident in late 1962 or 1963 was that an Isobel Zarate began making inquiries about him in Miami. He said many people in the Cuban community informed the FBI she was a Castro spy and that she subsequently escaped to Cuba via Mexico.

[illegible] [illegible]

✓ Maheu	[illegible] CASTRO	KENNEDYS
Rosselli	[illegible] Karamessines	ROWAN
HARVEY	Helms	HOOVER
O'Connell	Hunt	LBJ

Warren Commission
- Commission hold
  news contacts
-

Lines of Inquiry

- What Castro doing in retaliatory vein.
- what was Castro intelligence capability
- Look anti-Castro community – who replaced CIA in funding & co-ord & why?
- Addit Mafia relationships w/ Exiles – pressure on mafia from Kennedys' Justice Department

(CI)

➤ CIA Evaluation of McGovern Information

Conf. Tom Moore

Ed Gr. – M.M. – H.K. – R.T. (M.E.)

Need full picture on Hunt

Cuban – Bahamas switch by mob after Castro (TRADEWINDS)

Miami trip ↗ Vanesia / Sturgis

December

Get Hunt, Sturgis, Barker, Martinez material

miami police < organized crime section / cuban exile section

Organizing our material > – Castro – Kennedy / assassination

district: Outline common related material – New register + file system / formalize files

Name: Card Index – name + reference →

Omit all but Impt. References

- MAHEU
- ROSSELLI
- HARVEY
- O'Connell
- CASTRO
- KARAMESSINES
- HELMS
- HUNT
- KENNEDY
- ROWAN
- HOOVER
- LBJ
- ~~BUNDY~~
- ~~[illegible]~~
- ALL ADMIN. OFFICIALS
- KENNEDY'S
- HUNT

– Hughes / – Watergate material

~~Sources – Acquaintances – Police [illegible] – Briefing – [illegible] – Procedure~~

Marita

Mark Smdu
431 — Kennedy office
4:00 PM

~~Jim Sisson~~

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

Johnson City — Ramsey Coleman
February — ~~Justice Dept. Invst.~~ — 10 weeks
E. Tenn. State
~~BS - Cr. Justice~~
Masters - Sociology.

Perez Jiminez — Kill Kennedy
El Gato despises Frank Sturgis

Allen Altman - Lawyer
<$2,600> — wants
150 BROADWAY

— represents Hank Mesick

MARITA GAVE TO MESICK

"The Cat"
"EL GATO" — Code name
- Pretense buying Nazi book.
- Assassinated Castro's double.
- 39-40 years old.
[5'11"/Blonde / German Soldier of Fortune]
(Very wealthy collector antiques)
Told Tonzi.

Rolando Masferrer
Orlando Bosch
Rolando Martinez

Last person
Mickey/Rosselli — alive.
Shelly ~~[illegible]~~ Abend
[in bus. in N.Y. He brought El Gato to Marita — theatrical agency cover]

Son - 4 wks ago after Fag. threat
hospitalized

> no longer wants

> Father - double Nazi for US (FBI) — Married Delaware mother
(submarine)

> Derry Davis = State Dept.
or
Dept. Justice

>

> Gerstein bugged.

> Sturgis - HK theory

> FBI down on Martin because of publication of citation by Meskill.

Soviets didn't react adversely to

plane tickets to Germany

CIA Super Spy — Frank Sturgis
STAR
Sept 7, 1976

2 Israeli's targeted
Uncle Al - 1970

List
FBI
Mat.

> Eduardo -

A Situational Report
on Surveillance + Control
in Modern Democratic
Society —
— Robert Yaffee —

Univ. of Waterloo Student Mag
June 16, 1972

— anti-personnel radar. fled to Canada. accused of being agent

(Lynn Kirkpatrick)

Mike Ackerman — CIA / Miami > lecturing.

CRC — Artime

Frank } $ from EHH
Alex R. } White house.

60-61 - Miami
✓
Frank assigned to General.

ph! { Frank O'Brien / Frank Lundquist } with Alex R. and F. St. when proposed Castro kill.

David W. Walters — Miami lawyer for
Perez Jiminez
— Marita

Hrs me B.

$50,800.00
to JFK in cash

Sturgis Call 12/3/76

Hank Mesnik - writer

won't

Marita Lorenz.

Atty: Allan Altman, Esq.

150 Broadway

NYC, NYC.

Has materiel

Tapes & documents - Louis Somosa. KGB

- Bobby Baker

- Hoffa

- Sapid - threatens killing Kennedy

Jiminez -

Call Marita

gave him everything

Pepe Alleman

trouble — Trafficante.

I. Carry-over from Church report

A. Relationship between agencies and Warren Commission

1. Warren Comm. staff has never been interviewed in depth. Many have not been interviewed at all. The Commission had particular staff assigned to (a) Cuba and (b) organized crime. They, especially, should be fully debriefed about everything that happened in their contacts with the agencies, their frustrations, unfulfilled leads, inability to get access, questionmarks, and what they knew, heard, or suspected about contacts at high-level between Commission members and top agency officials. This would include leads to additional documents, memoranda and people, and is especially important in the time-frame just before the Commission issued its report, i.e. as final drafts being written, when staff learned for the first time about Castro's threat. (Willens, staff director, said there were staff pushing hard to re-open this subject, but pressure of getting the report out prevailed.)

2. Look for all other memoranda of contacts between McCone and CIA re how to structure questions, etc.

3. We now know that Ruby was contacted svereal times by FBI to inform on ~~organized crime in Dallas area~~ "criminal element" in Dallas area. All we've seen is the cummary memo in which Wareen Commission was so informed. Get each memorandum of contact between FBI agents and Ruby, i.e. underlying materials which "support" the summary memo.

B. The inter-agency committee which met to develop contineqncy plans in the wake of Castro's threat.

1. Numerous documents were sought from FBI, CIA, Defense, State, etc., but never received by Church Committee before our final report was issued. Must follow-through, and then go deeper into it.

2. What else was known besides Castro's retaliation threat? What facts went into the assessment that Castro might retaliate against U.S. leaders in Latin America, but not U.S. leaders in the U.S.? Precisely what accounted for the original inclusion of a concern about retaliation in the U.S., but the subsequent deletion of that prospect? Who was responsible for the deletion, and what impact, if any, did that have on the later withholding of info from the Warren Commission and on the agencies' failure to investigate retaliation?

3. We must find out exactly who was on this Committee at each meeting, get all back-up materials, and interview.

C. FBI involvement in Z Bay of Pigs, Lansdale planning, etc.

1. As Church report was being completed, we were just beginning to learn about how deeply the FBI was apparently involved in U.S. anti-Castro action. Possibility here that ~~t~~ this could provide another clue in re FBI's original reluctance to investigate retaliation more fully. For instance we now know that FBI had learned about CIA's interest in using organized crime to kill Castro long before RFK toldxHxxxxx Hoover about it (Hoover had professed surprise in 1963, but there's some indication he may have already known). One FBI witness even told us that a high FBI official had even proposed the plot idea "in jest". At a minimum, the paper record shows FBI wasxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx informed about idea of using org. crime figures to provide Cuban intelligence and that, according to the paper record, FBI recommended against it. Trafficante has now claimed that FBI agents came to him seeking Cuban intelligence. This must be followed up, agents interviewed, and FBI memo's, etc., examined.

D. CIA files

I always had the impression that Jim Johnston felt there were more CIA documents which he hadn't seen. We must go over the itmes, one by one, with Johnston, to find out just where we stand on the question of whether or not weve seen everything. Do any of us really fully understand the entire CIA filing system so as to know whether we've been shown everything, or indeed , whether they have even g-ne looking for everything.? And how about the field office files, i.e. JMWAVE files in Miami, New Orleans and Mexico Coty files, DC local CIA station files, and FBI field office files?

II. Rosselli-organized crime-Trafficante-Cuba

A. Organized crime files

1. A full assessment of all travel, contacts, relationships, etc. of all major organized crime figures in and around the time of the assassination of JFK. This would include a review (with appropriate xxxxxxxx system for pritecting privacy interests) of all microphone surveillance logs on organized crime figures during key months in 1963, e.g. Fred Black. Trafficante, Rosselli, Giancana, Las Vegas xxxxxxx casinos, etc. (Rosselli was xxxxxx very defensive in his testimony about some comment he says he made on the phone to someone upon first learning that JFK had been killed; he indicated that he had been "coming out of a deep sleep and said someting about communists did it." Of c orse he now knows that that call may have been xx tapped and is trying to explain. No one had ever asked for

that log.

2. A new analysis of all the long distance toll calls of Jack Ruby in the days around Nov. 22. Warren Comm. records show he made calls to Chicago O.C. figure Barney Baker, and Teamster heavy Dusty Miller, plus others. Does the explanation for these calls really wash (i.e. Ruby's union troubles in re his nightclub). Has this whole subject been exhausted by Warren Comm. or not. Is there more (interviews, etc.) that should be done here?

3. Someone should literally live in Miami area for a month, immerse in the community, get to know the whole scorecard, (maybe hire a local Spanish-speaking cop with good local contacts). More fully debrief Trafficante for his version of events and people. Follow up with contacts with all the Cubans involved. Has Miami pulled all the significant toll records for period of time around Rosselli's death (Cubans, O.C. figures, garage owner, etc.) and followed up.

4. A full tracking of what happened when Church reports were released, reactions, contacts, concerns, who were the key figures who actually got the reports and who did they speak to about the contents. Review our own mailing records, if exist, showing who asked for reports. Local news media for leads in re reactions of the community. Travel records of O.C. and Cuban leaders in and around that time, as well as in and around time of Rosselli's death.

5. McWillie. Trafficante associate who invited Ruby to Cuba in 1959. McWillie later manages Las Vegas casino's & his contact with Ruby continues. Warren Comm. investigate inadequate on this subject.

5986

Marita file

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ

Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which frightened her. She claims to want her information in responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday, January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we have little to lose if we have time to listen to her.

H —

I think we should set up an interview at a time which won't conflict w/ hearings — may not be until later now. M

HSL/dr

5986

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BILL MILLER
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Howard: I have no objections [redacted] to her coming down, but would be personally hesitant to invest any more of my own time unless she [redacted] can provide at least a specific adjenda of new information she will discuss.

One possible tactic is to tell her that we are extremely pressed for time and cannot subpena her until late February unless she give us specific areas that would allow us to show "our superiors" that talking to her should be given a hghm higher pxa priority [redacted] over other committee business.

HSL/dr

Tom TOM

5986

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BILL MILLER

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

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HSL/dr

MEMORANDUM

To: Mike Madigan

From: Ed Greissing

Date: Sept. 16, 1976

Subject: Review of CIA documents presented the SCI by Jack Anderson

The documents recently received by this Committee, from Jack Anderson, had previously been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The documents appear to be a few of those requested for FOIA review by David Belin. It is my understanding, after these documents were declassified, David Belin furnished copies to both David Martin(AP) and Jack Anderson.

The Church Committee was permitted to review the entire Oswald 201 file, the AMLASH file, Garrison files and selected Office of Security files. The Committee primarily concerned itself with the early period of the investigation(November 1963 - October 1964), as it believed the information to be received from this time period to be more relevant in evaluating the performance of the intelligence agencies with respect to their investigation.

Dan Niescher, the Church Committee contact at the CIA,was the individual responsible for the declassification of documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. During this declassification process, Dan Niescher consulted the Committee staff to make sure that we were aware of certain documents.In addition, Mr. Kaleras had given the staff unlimited access to all files we believed necessary to conduct our investigation.

Yet, the possibility still remains that the staff was not shown everything. The CIA has maintained throughout that the Oswald 201 file was a complete compilation of the material related to the assassination of President Kennedy. However, information relating to who Lee Harvey Oswald was, and what he was doing are not included.in their files. The Oswald 201 does not attempt to question Oswald's connection with both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups or any of the AMLASH information. The most notable subject missing was information relating to CIA/U.S. Government attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Dot To Rosselli file

H. L. Jonecon w/
LaBrecque
12/22/76

. . . .

No, I can't either confirm or deny it. We are prohibited at staff level from discussing any Committee business. I apologize for not being able to help you. You know the ground rules and they haven't changed. Right.

. . . .

I can't say! I don't know. You indicated that you . . .

. . . .

Are you still working Rosselli? You getting anywhere?

. . . .

You got a pretty good source on that? On the fact that they were having dinner together on many occasions before he was murdered?

. . . .

I just can't help you because of the ground rules. I'd like to have a copy of your piece, or two, for me and Inderfurth here. Just drop a copy in the mail and I'll appreciate it.

. . . .

You mean people like . . . Well, I think . . . people like Trafficante?

. . . .

Well, I can't discuss whether or not such a meeting took place. I can't tell you whether you're right or wrong.

. . . .

Now when you talk about Trafficante you don't need to be

cautioned. You know them as well as I do.

. . . .

Well, as far as our rules are concerned, it wouldn't make any difference if Trafficante was here. It wouldn't make any difference in our ability to confirm or deny that.

. . . .

Miami Herald Dec. 24

Trafficante Made Secret Appearance At Senate Investigation, Sources Say

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Florida's reputed organized crime boss, Santos Trafficante of Tampa and Miami, made a secret, four-hour October appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee to answer questions about his role in a CIA assassination plot, investigation sources have disclosed.

Trafficante, 62, had not previously been questioned by the committee or its staff in the two-year-old investigation of CIA activities.

Of the three Mafia figures involved in the early 1960s plot to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, only Trafficante is still alive. Both Sam Giancana and John Rosselli were murdered within the last 16 months.

The murders are unsolved.

John Rosselli
... dined with Trafficante

INVESTIGATORS ALSO said that Trafficante had dinner with Rosselli at The Landings, a Fort Lauderdale restaurant, in mid-July, less than two weeks before Rosselli disappeared. Rosselli's body, stuffed in an oil drum, floated to the surface of Dumfoundling Bay the first week of August.

Trafficante reportedly has told police that the July dinner with Rosselli — as well as several other meetings previously at the Cordoba Restaurant in Miami, formerly owned by the husband of Rosselli's niece, according to police — were "friendly, social events with no business."

Investigators in recent weeks have centered their efforts on tracing the whereabouts of Trafficante's associates at the time of Rosselli's disappearance, a source said.

Trafficante, who for about four years has maintained a home at 740 NE 155th St. in North Dade, could not be reached for comment.

Trafficante was identified as the head of a South Florida Mafia family in testimony in 1963 before a U.S. Senate subcommittee.

HIS ATTORNEY, Henry Gonzalez of Tampa, who accompanied Trafficante when he went to Washington, according to sources, would not comment on either the Senate appearance or Trafficante's past activities. When first asked about the Senate appearance, he said, "You realize you're treading on dangerous ground."

A committee source said that Trafficante had not been questioned previously by the committee because his role in the plot had been considered "secondary."

Interest was renewed in the plot after Rosselli's death. Investigators sought to determine whether the murders of the two men were connected in any way with their testimony or potential testimony before the committee.

GIANCANA, WHO was a Mafia boss in Chicago for many years, was killed in June 1975, at the same time Senate investigators were preparing to contact him. The gun used to kill Giancana, found discarded on a roadside several miles from Giancana's house a month after the murder, was traced to a Miami gunshop, but the trail stopped there.

Investigators said the gun was part of a shipment purchased in 1965 by the Tamiami Gun Shop, but there are no records to indicate where it went from there, according to investigators and gunshop owners.

Rosselli, whose most powerful Mafia days were reportedly in the 1950s and early 1960s in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, did appear before the committee at least three times in the 12 months before his death.

In Washington, the committee has kept a tight clamp on comment about the investigation, and only one member, Robert T. Stafford (R., Vt.), acknowledged the Trafficante session, saying "I was not present when the witness you speak of was in front of the committee."

Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii), the committee chairman who, along with Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) pressured for Justice Department and FBI involvement in the Rosselli murder case, said "I have never met Mr. Trafficante. That's as far as I'll go."

A PRIME interest of the committee has been possible links between the CIA Castro plotting and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Revelations of the Senate committee were a key factor in the creation of the new House of Representative investigation, which is taking a new look at the JFK murder.

Trafficante reportedly has told investigators that he first met Rosselli about 1956. It was in the early 1950s that Florida law-enforcement officials estimated that a Bolita opertion run by Trafficante and his brother netted $2 million annually.

Trafficante was a major gambling figure in pre-Castro Havana, where he ran a casino. In 1959, it was estimated that $1 million or $2 million was bet nightly in all the Mafia-run casinos in Havana. The gambling stopped when Castro took over in 1959.

Rosselli was the first of the three Mafia figures to be recruited by the CIA in 1960 in its plot to assassinate Castro.

IN A CIA memo quoted in an interim report of the committee a year ago, it was said that Trafficante's role was to "serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there."

Rosselli told his CIA liaison that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination." An internal CIA investigation in 1967 "suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing 'gambling, prostitution and dope monopolies' in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro."

Roselli's Body Found in Floating Drum

By LARRY ROHTER

(MIAMI, Fla.) — The body of [illegible] figure who [illegible] Senate [illegible] in a CIA [illegible] assassinate Fidel Castro [illegible] found in [illegible] floating in [illegible] of Biscayne Bay.

[illegible] County officials said [illegible] had been asphyxiated.

[illegible] Wright, chief deputy examiner would not say if Roselli died before or after his body was stuffed into the [illegible] gallon drum.

[illegible] Roselli, whose body was found Sunday and identified yesterday, had been [illegible]. Wright would only confirm that there was a circular [illegible] on the lower abdomen.

Wright said Roselli, 71, had probably been dead since July [illegible] the day he reportedly left [illegible] sister's home in nearby Broward County to play golf. He said Roselli's killers tried hard to keep the disappearance [illegible] mystery.

"THOSE GUYS went to incredible amount of trouble trying to make sure the body was never found," Wright said. "The lengths to which they went to insure that the body would not be found clearly earmarks this as a true gangland-style killing."

Roselli testified last year before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he and Giancana had been recruited in 1960 by the CIA as part of a plot to [illegible] Castro [illegible] the effort. [illegible] Giancana were [illegible] paid $150,000 [illegible]. According to the Senate report on the scheme, Roselli was the contact man between Giancana and Cuban dissidents who [illegible] to carry out the [illegible].

Giancana was also supposed to [illegible] on June 19, 1975, several days [illegible] his scheduled appearance, someone pumped [illegible] caliber bullets into him [illegible]

THE ACTUAL contact man for the Castro operation turned out to be Robert Maheu, onetime top aide to the late industrialist Howard Hughes, who served as a liaison between the CIA and the mobsters. Maheu, who has partially acknowledged his role in the affair, had split with Hughes long before the latter's death earlier this year.

Roselli and Giancana were also reported to have been linked with Judith Campbell Exner, who said last year she had "a relationship" with the late President John F. Kennedy. The names of Roselli and Giancana [illegible] in FBI reports [illegible]

IN THE [illegible] Roselli's Washington attorney, Tom Wadden, became concerned about his client's life and contacted Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. in an effort to secure more investigation of the case.

Baker was a member of the committee before which Roselli testified.

Wadden told Baker he felt certain Roselli had met with [illegible]

IN TURN, [illegible] to what Wadden told [illegible] Baker telephoned Committee Chairman Daniel Inouye D-Hawaii, and [illegible] Director Clarence Kelley and urged that Roselli's disappearance be investigated.

Baker could not be reached for comment last night on the conversations with the attorney.

Two fishermen found the drum floating in Dumbfounding Bay, an arm of Biscayne Bay between North Miami and Miami Beach. Police said the fishermen, not publicly identified, called them after they spotted human limbs through the holes chopped in the barrel.

Authorities said that because of the currents, it was not known where the drum was thrown in the bay.

[illegible] holes had been chopped in the barrel [illegible]

[illegible] weights [illegible]

In Washington, [illegible] Inouye, chairman of the [illegible] Senate Intelligence Committee, said yesterday that it would be premature to decide on a congressional investigation until more facts of the killing are known.

"[illegible] as soon as [illegible] the facts available, I will [illegible] to decide whether to investigate," he said.

ROSELLI WAS reported missing by his sister, with whom he had recently been living in Plantation, north of Miami. She said she last saw [illegible]

[illegible] said in Washington that the [illegible]

Roselli was sent to Las Vegas, Nev., in the 1950s to operate the mob's interests there but stayed under the control of the Chicago organization.

HE WENT to Los Angeles in the early 1960s and was [illegible]

[illegible] Castro [illegible]

Maheu has told reporters that he recruited Roselli and Giancana at the request of CIA official James O'Connell. He said the two were chosen because of contacts they had made in Cuba during the pre-Castro years.

MAHEU SAID the plot was timed to coincide with the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and was "always subject to a 'go' signal which, to my knowledge, never came."

Roselli told the Senate committee that he made several trips to Cuba in high-powered boats furnished by the CIA. He said the scheme included various plans to try to kill Castro by sniper fire, explosives and poison capsules.

Washington sources said last year that the CIA offered as much as $150,000 for the job. Roselli told the Senate panel that he turned any payment down for patriotic reasons, the [illegible]

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6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

1975 Jack Anderson news release

Four and a half years ago, I broke a story that now is belatedly rocking Washington. I reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited two Mafia figures, John Roselli and Sam Giancana, to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

I tracked down Roselli and questioned him about the story. He had nothing to say. He promised me, however, that he would give me his exclusive story if he should ever be free to talk.

Yesterday, John Roselli told his story -- first, to the Senate Intelligence Committee in secret session, then to me as he had promised four and a half years ago.

Roselli is a dapper, hawk-faced man with a thatch of white hair. He has been disciplined all his life to keep his mouth shut. His Mafia partner, Sam Giancana, was slain before Senate investigators could serve him with a subpoena.

So it was obviously painful for Roselli to talk. I promised I would make clear that he revealed no names, except for the CIA contacts whose identities the Senate already knew.

So here is Roselli's own account of a real-life "Mission Impossible" -- the attempt to kill Castro. It is a story of cash payments, poison pellets, high-powered rifles and powerboat dashes to Cuba.

The plot against Castro, Roselli said, began in 1960 -- when Dwight Eisenhower was President, Richard Nixon was Vice President and Allen Dulles was the CIA chief.

Roselli was recruited in Los Angeles, he said, by Robert Maheu, then an aide to billionaire Howard Hughes. Previously, Maheu had operated a CIA front in Washington.

According to Roselli, the murdered mobster, Sam Giancana, never became involved in the assassination plot. He knew about it; he may even have suggested a Cuban contact; nothing more.

Roselli identified the CIA project officer, in charge of the Castro assassination, as "Big Jim" O'Connell. Maheu put Roselli in contact with O'Connell, as Roselli remembers it, in New York City on September 14, 1960.

Thereafter, Roselli flew to Miami and recruited the assassination squads. At first, they plotted to poison Castro. Poison pellets were supplied by the CIA. They were delivered to the plotters in a Miami hotel room, according to Roselli, by Maheu. He dramatically opened his briefcase, revealing $10,000 in cash and the fatal pellets.

The money was distributed tothe Cuban plotters. Roselli swore he never took any money from the CIA, except for some incidental expenses. He paid the big expenses, he said, out of his own pocket.

The poison pills were supposed to take three days to work. Supposedly, this would give the poison time to work its way out of Castro's system before he died, and his death would be attributed to natural causes.

Roselli never found out what happened to the plotters or the pellets. But they tried again later with a stronger dose of poison. Not long afterward, reports reached them that Castro was desperately ill. Roselli doesn't know whether the illness was caused by the poison or a virus. But Castro survived, and the plotters apparently did not.

Toselli said he also picked up intelligence, which he submitted to the CIA both during the Bay of Pigs planning and the later Cuban missile crisis. After the Bay of Pigs, Roselli said, Maheu was cut out of the plot. Thereafter, Roselli reported to a CIA agent named William Harvey.

There were four more assassination attempts, the plotters were smuggled into Cuba with high-powered rifles. The last assassination squad, Roselli heard, made it to a Havana rooftop before they were caught.

This was around March 1, 1963. Then the project was abandoned. Roselli saw Harvey for the last time in June, 1963. Five months later, Lee Harvey Oswa gunned down President Kennedy in Dallas. Oswald had been active in the pro-Castro movement. Shortly before that dreadful day in Dallas, Oswald had made a mysterious trip to Mexico where he visited the Cuban embassy. The Warren Commission found no evidence, however, that Oswald was in the hire of Havana.

Yesterday, Roselli made no apology for his CIA role. U.S. authorities call him a mobster. He regards himself as a patriot.

THE WASHINGTON POST
L1 Sunday, September 12, 1976

Roselli file



The Calculated Rise And Abrupt Descent Of Johnny Roselli

By Rudy Maxa

Until last month, Johnny Roselli lived comfortably with his sister and brother-in-law in a Miami suburb. A friend estimated he earned about $25,000 annually from a gift shop he owned in the lobby of Las Vegas' Frontier Hotel.

He shrugged last year when his attorney suggested he hire a bodyguard, after the murder of Chicago mobster Sam Giancana, his partner in CIA plots to kill Fidel Castro. If anybody wants to kill me at my age, the 71-year-old Roselli said, what difference does it make? So he played golf several times a week, sipped white wine with dinner, and—until somebody decided Johnny Roselli should wind up in an oil barrel in Miami's Dumfoundling Bay—considered employment in the new gambling casinos beginning to open in the oil-rich Middle East.

In the late 1920s Al Capone and his friends chose Miami as the chic spot for organized crime figures to buy a winter home. Just across a strip of ocean was Cuba, a gambling and vice mecca. The mobsters from the north were treated like visiting celebrities by Florida press and society, while some members of the local police force began developing a taste for the finer things in life.

In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000. One of the sheriff's deputies said he collected $50,000 in bribes in nine months spent as a bagman for Miami Beach gambling concessions. In 1948 a bookmaker's operation in Miami grossed $26 million. It was the kind of place that made a racketeer feel at home.

For the last two years, Johnny Roselli felt at home in Plantation, a bedroom suburb north of Miami that Roselli made his retirement haven because he had family there. His brother-in-law, a government missile expert, lives in a sprawling white home that at first glance, resembles every othe house in the neighborhood.

But it is different: the carefully cur tained windows, the extra lock on th front door, and spotlights on all side of the house give it the look of a subu ban fortress. Inside, the furniture i pale blue Mediterranean, the carpet i thick white.

Roselli's killers did not ambush th house; Roselli went to them. He lef Plantation at 1 p.m. on July 28 wearin a golf shirt, his golf clubs in his ca trunk. He told his sister he would b home for dinner. That afternoon o evening he was killed, probably by su focation, perhaps after being torture —early reports said his legs were br ken. Heavily chained, Roselli wa stuffed in a 55-gallon oildrum an dumped into the ocean.

His brother-in-law found Roselli's si ver-colored 1975 Chevrolet Impala se eral days later, parked at the Miami I ternational Airport.

Ten days after Roselli's disappea ance something went wrong. The o drum that was meant to keep his deat a secret floated to the surface of Dun foundling Bay, buoyed by the gases Roselli's decaying body.

The holes in the side of the dru and the placing of his Chevrolet at th airport convinced investigators h corpse was meant never to be disco ered; history was supposed to recor that dapper Johnny Roselli, facing d portation proceedings that the gover ment had threatened off and on f years, decided to disappear on an ai plane flight to who-knows-where.

"Cutting up and disposing of bodi is not necessarily new to our depa ment," says the man who is directi the search for Roselli's killers. Lt. Ga Minnium, head of the Dade Coun homicide squad, is a well-muscled m with an aquiline nose that separates pair of hard blue eyes. On the pa green wall of his bare office is a sm card that reads "DYNAMITE—DON SHAKE ME UP."

He and another police officer r count the solving of some of Da County's more brutal murders wi

See ROSELLI, L4, Col. 1

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ROSELLI, From L1

the enthusiasm of two football players recalling their favorite bowl games. The headless, handless body that floated into a Miami canal last month reminded Minnium of that other, similarly mutilated body that turned up last December. And who can forget the man who got angry with his roommate, sliced him up and tossed the parts along a highway?

As it turned out, Roselli's wasn't the first body to float into the annals of Miami crime in a drum, Minnium says. Ten years ago a lovers' quarrel resulted in a man stuffing his girl friend into a drum, filling it with cement and Aqua Velva shave lotion. The drum was found resting against a dike and justice was eventually done.

Minnium is not pleased by such violent antics.

"We don't appreciate people committing murder and dumping a body in our county, regardless of who the people are, but especially if it's organized crime," Minnium says.

His department handled 168 homicides last year and boasted an 85 per cent "clearance record." As of July, 1976, the percentage was even higher, standing at about 92 per cent.

If Charles Zatrepalek and Julio Ojeda have anything to say about it, Roselli's killing is not going to diminish those percentages. Both men are 28-year-old homicide detectives who vow with a schoolboy's sincerity tha they won't rest until Roselli's murdei is solved. In the last four weeks, with the help of Washington agencies, Zatrepalek and Ojeda have reconstructed Roselli's life in hopes of understanding his death. For the third time in eight years of marriage, Zatrepalek worked out of town on his wedding anniversary; because of the "awesomeness" of this case, Ojeda spent his Labor Day holiday at work.

"Maybe 10 years from now," Ojeda says, "I want someone to look at my file and say, 'Hey, he talked to everybody.' And maybe he'll hear something and BANG! that's the arrest!"

That Johnny Roselli was destined to walk on the dark side of life never seemed in doubt. As a teen-ager in Boston, when his name was Filippo Sacco, Roselli was a runner for the numbers racket. He helped his stepfather burn down his home for the insurance money. He was arrested at age 22 for stealing about $25 from someone. Then he changed his name and left for Chicago.

It would be 40 years until, in the late 1960s, Johnny Roselli would see his mother again, though he sent money to his family through an intermediary in Chicago so his sisters could attend college.

By the late 1920s Al Capone was well established in Chicago. Newspapermen, politicians and cops were on the Capone payroll and a young man with Roselli's street savvy had little trouble finding suitable employment; he hired on as a rumrunner with the Capone gang. At age 26 Roselli was arrested for selling morphine to an undercover agent. He was acquitted because, after Roselli's arrest, no one could seem to find the arresting officer or informant in the case. They still haven't been found.

In the mid-1930s Roselli, by now a mature and charming man, lucky with

(3)

"In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000."

women, friendly with men of money, moved to Los Angeles. He wore hand-tailored suits and, by all accounts, was easygoing, mild-mannered. He was married for a time to an actress, but they had no children. He became a close friend of Harry Cohn, the legendary head of Columbia Pictures. The two men sometimes vacationed together and Roselli always seemed to know how to place a bet should Cohn care to wager on a horse.

According to Bob Thomas' biography of Cohn, "King Cohn," the movie mogul once offered Roselli a job as a producer. (In his book, Thomas disguised Roselli's identity at Roselli's request.)

"What would you pay me?" Roselli asked Cohn.

"Five hundred dollars a week," Cohn said.

"I get that much from waitresses who take bets for me," Roselli is said to have replied.

Besides being a handy man with the placing of bets, Roselli purchased a 26 per cent interest in a Tijuana racetrack with $25,000 Cohn loaned him. Roselli paid him back promptly and included a check for 6 per cent interest; Cohn magnanimously tore up the interest check.

Roselli bought twin star rubies, had them set in rings and gave one to Cohn, who considered it a good luck charm until his death. Once, when Chicago mobster Willie Bioff moved to Hollywood and began making life miserable for movie studios by shaking down executives in return for labor peace, Roselli stepped in and saved Cohn from a lengthy strike.

When Cohn refused to pay tribute to Bioff and his union, Bioff tried to halt production at Columbia by calling a sudden strike. Desperate, Cohn called Roselli who marched into Bioff's office and confronted the hoodlum who sat behind his desk wearing a hat and coat, chomping on a cigar, a gun resting on the desk in front of him.

"Listen, Willie, I don't know what you're trying to prove but it isn't going to work," Roselli told him. "This is a spite thing and you're not going to get away with it. You meet with Cohn and get it settled."

Bioff backed down and called off his pickets. After he was sent to jail for extortion, Bioff cut a deal with the government and named Roselli as a Chicago mobster who had helped him shake down movie studios. Cohn testified on Roselli's behalf, but in 1943 Roselli was sentenced to 10 years in prison. When he got out he returned to Hollywood to make pictures of prison and gangster life. But publicity about a secret appearance before the Kefauver crime committee ruined his relationship with most studios. Even Cohn re fused to hire him—"The stockholders would scalp me," Cohn told a bitter Roselli.

It was during his years in the Los Angeles and Las Vegas areas that Roselli met the man who would make him a household name later in life. Robert Maheu, the ex-FBI agent who parlayed a Washington private eye business into a stormy career as Howard Hughes' man in Las Vegas, approached Roselli on behalf of the CIA in 1960.

(Another person Roselli met in that era who would later surface to talk of Roselli, Giancana and John F. Kennedy was a young party girl named Judith Campbell.)

Maheu and Roselli would later tell Frank Church's Senate Intelligence Committee the details of their plots to kill Castro. Maheu told investigators he had known Roselli since the late 1950s and, while he didn't know of his underworld connections, "it was certainly evident to me that (Roselli) was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention."

Over dinner at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills 16 years ago, Maheu explained to Roselli that his government needed his services. Roselli, who was born on July 4, 1905, was nothing if not patriotic. (Sam Giancana once said, "Just wave a flag and Johnny'll follow you to any canal.") Maheu recalled that

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

Johnny Roselli 1975. upper ri[ght] and. countercl[ock]wise from upper l[eft] Fidel Castro in Sam Giancana in President John Kennedy in Dade County Po[lice] Lt. Gary Minni and the Flor[ida] home where Ros[elli] lived before death.

Photos by The Washington P[ost], The Chicago Daily News, AP

pealed to Harvey for help and Harvey recommended to the CIA that it try to prevent prosecution, but Roselli was convicted of violating interstate gambling laws. He went to jail, returning in 1974 to Plantation to do battle against government efforts to deport him.

In 1971 the CIA asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with the CIA" that might occur if deportation proceedings were pursued. The INS agreed to keep the CIA informed, but at his death, Roselli and his lawyers were still fighting deportation.

"Bob Maheu must be running scared—I thought about that just the other day: 'Jesus, what's Maheu thinking?' " said another of Roselli's brothers-in-law, Peter Cardillo of New Jersey.

The public doesn't know what Maheu is thinking, whether he worries if pro-Castro Cubans are exacting retribution for sins of 16 years ago. Maheu's secretary in Las Vegas says she doesn't know where her boss is or when he'll be returning to his office. He reportedly has some business interest in Egypt, a part of the world that seems to hold some fascination for the Castro plotters; Giancana kept an apartment in Beirut and, just before his death, told a friend he had some sort of deal brewing there. And Roselli longingly eyed the opening of gambling casinos in the land of the new oil millionaires.

In Tampa, Santos Trafficante, another of the original Maheu group, also refuses to talk with the press. But unlike the others, he did not testify before the Church committee so the public has no inkling of his thoughts on the Castro assassination attempts.

Whether Roselli's killing was one of retribution for a public or a private matter, Johnny Roselli was a testament to an era that has passed. His life, which would have remained largely unnoticed save for the Senate's CIA hearings, seemed straight from the pages of a Mafia novel: allegedly brought into the United States illegally at the turn of the century, Roselli clawed his way from the mean streets of Boston and Chicago to the relative glamor of Hollywood, Las Vegas and, finally, Miami. Along the way, a simple strain of patriotism—which impressed the CIA enough to mention it to the Church committee—put him in a ropedancer's position of sometimes receiving, sometimes taking advantage of his knowledge of the darkest side of government.

While some have speculated that he was killed for talking too much to government investigators, Roselli was hardly a loudmouth in the league of a Joe Valachi, who sang for televised Senate hearings on the Mafia in 1963. Fourteen years ago Roselli confided in his lawyer, Washington attorney Edward Morgan, that he had been told by Cuban sources in Miami that John Kennedy's killing was ordered and arranged by Castro, but he lived with his secret.

The day after Roselli's body was scooped from its crude coffin, his brother-in-law in New Jersey, Peter Cardillo, told me: "Down deep, in a way, I probably hope it was connected with (the Castro affair). At least then Johnny, he would have died for a cause."

Roselli Probe

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure that federal agencies cooperate with local police.

The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.

"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and his testimony before the Committee."

HART SAID he also hoped to meet with local officials of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service, a[illegible]

Roselli, 71, organized crime figure who testified three times before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the past year about his recruitment by the CIA in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, was found dead two weeks ago, stuffed in an oil drum floating in Dumfoundling Bay.

Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no evidence indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

"I know of no plans whatsoever to have him come back," Hart said "but that's not to say we wouldn't have called him back if some new facts arose."

"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication . . . he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

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Herald Staff Writer

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MEMORANDUM

To: Rick Inderfurth

From: Mike Madigan

Date: August 13, 1976

Re: Miami Interviews

I spoke with Senator Hart today about setting up interviews in Miami for Friday, August 20, in the Rosselli matter. He will be calling you about these arrangements.

I will try to have a subpoena for Santos Trafficante signed by Senator Baker before he leaves for the convention. We, however must obtain the approval of all or a majority of the members of the Committee (under the Rules) to issue the subpoena. Therefore, I have asked Martha to poll members on two questions:

(1) Authority to issue a subpoena for Trafficante;

(2) Authority for Senator Hart to disclose to the Miami police investigators in the Rosselli case those portions of the classified Rosselli related transcripts which he deems relevant to the murder investigation.

In case we miss connections, the relevant people involved are:

(1) Bill Lynch -- head of the Justice Organized Crime Section, telephone number 739-3516 (he should help us locate Trafficante and perhaps have a

suggestion as to how best to serve him with a subpoena);

(2) Detectives Wolf and Zatrepallek -- Dade County Sheriff's Office, telephone number 305-547-7456 (they are the detectives investigating the Rosselli murder for the locals). (I have been putting them off about whether they can have access to the transcripts -- you need to talk to Bill Miller and Gary about this);

(3) Paul Daly -- you may have to go through him if we need the FBI to locate Trafficante.

By the time you return I will have taken preparatory steps to set up interviews with the Miami police people as well as begun an effort to locate Trafficante. After talking with Gary you will need to follow up and confirm all these next week as I will be in Kansas City from Monday through Thursday. I will be flying from Kansas City to Miami on Thursday night for the interviews on Friday. You can reach me through the numbers that either Bill Miller or Marie has. We need to talk at some point next week to confirm all this.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Who Killed John Roselli?

WE'RE GOING TO tell you a little story now. Once there was a President who was murdered. His brother was murdered too. A long time after they died some very strange facts came to light. It turned out that while they were running the government, the government was trying to get two Mafia mobsters to arrange the murder of someone else—the head of a small, hostile neighbor state. It also turned out that one brother—the one who was President—apparently had a girlfriend who was the girlfriend as well of the mobsters. And one of the mobsters, whose nickname was Momo, was prominent on the list of criminals the President's brother was trying to put in jail. The story may sound complicated, but life is complicated, and the complications in this case got even more so. For when a committee of the Congress wanted the two mobsters to come and tell them something about all this, only one of them—the one named Johnny— came. The other one, Momo, was murdered in his house a week before they wanted him to testify. Johnny, however, told his story to one committee in the Congress and then came back—quietly—to tell some more things to another committee which was in fact looking into the murder of the President. Then Johnny went to Florida. Then no one could find him. Then some fishermen found him. Dead. In an oil drum.

But we haven't told you the strangest part of all yet, the part you're really not going to believe. It is that when the great national political community of solons, scribes, policemen, spies and managers of the general wellbeing heard about poor Johnny, they said: "Oh, my goodness." Some of them went farther, of course. They said: "Fancy that!" But most of them didn't say anything at all except: "Yawn."

Forgive us for lapsing into storybookese. We do it for a reason which is that the simple unadorned facts of the John and Robert Kennedy-Fidel Castro-CIA-Mafia-Momo Giancana-Johnny Roselli-Judith Exner-Church Committee-Schweiker Committee saga need to be put forward in stark outline for their magnitude to be understood. Is it really, as the sophisticated wisdom goes, "paranoid" on our part to brood about the suggestive and possibly monstrous interconnections between all these facts and to wonder why they are not the object of intense press and government scrutiny? What accounts for the general indifference in high places? What accounts for the eagerness with which we all seem to accept that familiar tipoff that we shall be hearing no more about the latest crime—i.e., the pronouncement that Mr. Roselli's dispatch to an oil drum and Beyond had "all the earmarks of a gangland slaying." Those are the good old "earmarks" we only hear about when it is next to certain that we shall hear nothing more.

The supposition of course is that the Gang which runs gangland has its reasons and its methods and that, disagreeable as these may be, they really lie outside the proper realm of public concern because they amount to a system of justice which 1) only affects those dumb enough to get involved in it in the first place and 2) tends only to punish those who have committed what the rest of us would regard as heinous crimes anyway. Not that these are things people say—they're things people can be expected to assume. But we think in this case the assumptions have even less validity than they would have on a clear day, which isn't much. And that is because if we know anything, we know that the Mafia operations in which Messers. Giancana and Roselli figured had become intertwined with the operations of the United States government. Never mind that the decisions of the early 1960s which made this so may rank among the most abominable decisions ever taken in the U.S. government. The plain fact is that, given the provocative and suggestive history of the two men, it is not possible for either Congress or the Executive Branch to look the other way or to complaisantly accept the earmarks-of-a-gangland-slaying bromide.

After Mr. Giancana was killed, the Church Committee inquired of the FBI whether its proposed meeting with him had figured in his murder. The FBI reported that it had no evidence to this effect. The then-director of the CIA, William Colby, felt obliged to state that the CIA had had nothing to do with the murder—and Mr. Colby likewise pronounced the other day that he was certain the CIA had not done in Mr. Roselli. The mere fact that the questions, to which these were meant to be the answers, had been raised tells us, anyway, that much more in the way of inquiry is wanted. The newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now asked the Justice Department to make an investigation of Mr. Roselli's death. We think the Department should comply and that the investigation, despite FBI Director Clarence Kelley's disclaimer of jurisdiction, should have the Attorney General's personal attention. Such attention is needed because of the elaborate and not entirely reassuring history of relationships between the FBI and the CIA and the various participants in the whole sorry saga. We are not suggesting that any agency of government—or even any of those agency's fringe retainers —were the murderers. We are suggesting that there is an overlay of potentially embarrassing information sufficiently pervasive to keep an awful lot of people from wanting to have this thing aired. We also think that the Select Committee should reserve the right to pursue the matter. Congress, after all, can hardly be expected to sit idly by while its witnesses are being done in. Nor do we see how the public in general and the political establishment in particular can turn their attention away until we are all satisfied that a much greater effort has been made by the government—which means both the Executive Branch and the Congress—to discover what elements were at play in this series of appalling crimes and scandals.

The Data From M

DR. HAROLD KLEIN, one of the scientists work- ... and our best theories

ROSSELLI CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1955 Meets Maheu at insurance friend's home.

1960 Late July/early August. Maheu calls. Working for government. Recruit Rosselli only. Meet Brown Derby, L.A., for lunch. Long talk about project in Cuba. Rosselli wants verification.

2nd meeting, L.A., discuss further details, no discussion of specific techniques. Plan to meet in N.Y. for verification.

Sept. 14, 1960. First meeting in N.Y. at old Plaza Hotel. Rosselli introduced by Maheu to O'Connell. Rosselli "knew" O'Connell worked for the CIA. Rosselli agrees to work on Cuban project.

Sept. 25, 1960. Maheu and Rosselli travel to Miami to begin making contact with Cubans to be recruited for mission.

(Between Sept. 25 and the Bay of Pigs, a series of recruitments, meetings, and arrangements were made. The following is an outline of events that is not necessarily in chronological order.)

-- Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Trafficante. Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Giancana. Giancana was, according to Rosselli, to only be a "back up man." Rosselli states Giancana had nothing to do with the actual operation. Trafficante was used, according to Rosselli, as a translator.

-- Meeting with O'Connell, Maheu, Rosselli, [redacted] discuss the Cuban project.

-- Rosselli, in his contact with the Cubans, "invents" the cover story that he represents some Wall Street business interests who want to see Castro eliminated. Rosselli trusts Cubans he has recruited because they are part of the Bay of Pigs operation.

-- 1st attempt at assassination involved the use of pills. Maheu and Rosselli met with Cuban #1 and #2 (?). Maheu opened up his briefcase and gave the pills with instructions for their use to Cuban #1. Maheu also had $10,000 he gave the Cubans for doing the project. Rosselli did not know of the money. Rosselli states he received no remuneration for his work on the project, in fact, he paid out $800 for gas for a speed boat to deliver two or three man parties for guerrilla raids into Cuba.

-- Prior to Bay of Pigs there was no discussion of using guns to assassinate Castro.

-- Rosselli's cover name was "John Ralston."

-- At different times, Cuban #1, #2, or #3 would propose different projects. These would range from using plastic explosives to booby trapping Castro's desk. Rosselli would relay these on to Maheu, who, in turn, would contact the CIA. Most projects were vetoed, but the CIA did supply a short wave radio to the Cubans in Florida, to try and make contact with their people in Havana.

-- Eventually, Rosselli felt the project had failed. There was no specific point when it was announced. But, at sometime Rosselli assumed the project, for whatever reason, had not succeeded.

C H R O N O L O G Y
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)

DATE	EVENT OR ITEM	SOURCE (Where Necessary)
1959	Richard Bissel becomes DDP (head of Plans Directorate)	
October 1960	Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor to Giancana, and (b) done by Rosselli)	Date and Rosselli role from Government Opposition paper to Rosselli motion for reduction in sentence, 1971
1961 Feb.	Lumumba mysteriously killed during Congolese strife.	Wash.Post & Star contemporaneous accounts
	News reports of CIA consideration of Lumumba plot, but claim it was done by others,e.g. Belgians?	Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by Lardener and Greider Tab A
Early 1961	Attempts to kill Castro before Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli team	Jack Anderson 1967, 1971 and 1975 columns; Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961	Bay of Pigs Landing	
May 31, 1961	Trujillo assassinated; charge of U.S. involvement	Jack Anderson column (1/19/71) on Smathers coversation with JFK. Agee book (obviously suspect in some respects)
Rest of 1961 and 1962	Possibly ongoing efforts to Kill Castro by Rosselli team	last attempt by Rosselli team in 1963,infra.
Sometime in early 1960's	RFK quashes prosecution of Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap	Watergate memcons on Keeney and Wilson interviews
October 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for background reference)	
Early 1963	Rosselli training a team in Miami area	Wash. Post Greider/Lardener story,supra., states Army Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963	Rosselli's last effort to kill Castro	J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in 1963	RFK stopped further efforts	J. Anderson 1971 columns
November 1963	Diem killed in Saigon coup JFK told Smathers later he thought CIA involved	J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
	Colby head of DDP Far East Division at the time	articles on Colby
Early 1964	Howard Hunt and others from Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on another Castro assassination	reported by Tad Szulc in book on Howard Hunt (1974)

(more on Hunt Castro project)

	Assassination alleged to have been planned as part of a smaller invasion effortand preparations were allegedly made in Costa Rica	Szulc, supra
May 1965	Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when Dominican Republic strife broke out (scheme also allegedly involved McCord, Barker and Sturgis)	" "
May 1965 (or later)	As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ asked Helms if CIA had ever been involved in assassination (of a leader) and Helms said "no".	Katzenbach testimony to Senate Select Committ
1966	CIA poisoning plot agl Haitian Pres. Duvalier; bombing palace in '68	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1967	Rosselli indicted for alien law and interstate gambling crimes (Friars Club card game rigging)	Government Opposition to sentence reduction, supra.
March 3 1967	First Anderson column on Rosselli	We dont have, but Andersc referred to in Hersh NY Times story 3/10/75
	In response to Anderson story, RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman he shut it off;	Hersh story, supra
1968	CIA bombing Haitian palace	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1968	Rosselli sentenced to 5 years	Government Opposition,
Early 1969	Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for Justice Dept. Rosselli file	Keeney Watergate memcon
1970	Rosselli goes before grand jury under immunity re:Giancana	Government Opposition, sup
1971 Jan.18	First of three Anderson columns	
Jan.19	Maheu [redacted] (scheduled to go before grand jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls AG John Mitchell	Lenzner memo to SenErvin on Rosselli (and phone l
	Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties	" "
Jan. 27	Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson on Rosselli matter	" "
Feb.1	Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was involved in covert activity for CIA in early 1960's	" "
	Rosselli files motion for reduction in sentence, citing Anderson stories and presenting memorandum to Court	

C H R O N O L O G Y
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)

DATE	EVENT OR ITEM	SOURCE (Where Necessary)
1959	Richard Bissel becomes DDP (head of Plans Directorate)	
October 1960	Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor to Giancana, and (b) done by Rosselli)	Date and Rosselli role from Government Opposition paper to Rosselli motion for reduction in sentence, 1971
1961 Feb.	Lumumba mysteriously killed during Congolese strife.	Wash.Post & Star contemporaneous accounts
	News reports of CIA consideration of Lumumba plot, but claim it was done by others,e.g. Belgians?	Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by Lardener and Greider Tab A
Early 1961	Attempts to kill Castro before Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli team	Jack Anderson 1967, 1971 and 1975 columns; Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961	Bay of Pigs Landing	
May 31, 1961	Trujillo assassinated; charge of U.S. involvement	Jack Anderson column (1/19/71) on Smathers coversation with JFK. Agee book (obviously suspect in some respects)
Rest of 1961 and 1962	Possibly ongoing efforts to Kill Castro by Rosselli team	last attempt by Rosselli team in 1963,infra.
Sometime in early 1960's	RFK quashes prosecution of Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap	Watergate memcons on Keeney and Wilson interviews
October 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for background reference)	
Early 1963	Rosselli training a team in Miami area	Wash. Post Greider/Lardener story,supra., states Army Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963	Rosselli's last effort to kill Castro	J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in 1963	RFK stopped further efforts	J. Anderson 1971 columns
November 1963	Diem killed in Saigon coup JFK told Smathers later he thought CIA involved	J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
	Colby head of DDP Far East Division at the time	articles on Colby
Early 1964	Howard Hunt and others from Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on another Castro assassination	reported by Tad Szulc in book on Howard Hunt (1974)

(more on Hunt Castro project)

	Assassination alleged to have beenplanned as part of a smaller invasion effortand preparations were allegedly made in Costa Rica	Szulc,<u>supra</u>
May 1965	Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when Dominican Republic strife broke out (scheme also allegedly involved McCord, Barker and Sturgis)	" "
May 1965 (or later)	As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ asked Helms if CIA had ever been involved in assassination (of a leader) and Helms said "no"	Katzenbach testimony to Senate Select Committ
1967	Rosselli indicted for alien law and interstate gambling crimes (Friars Club card game rigging)	Government Opposition to sentence reduction, <u>supra</u>.
March 3 1967	First Anderson column on Rosselli	We dont have, but Anderso referred to in Hersh NY Times story 3/10/75
	In response to Anderson story, RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman he shut it off;	Hersh story,<u>supra</u>
1968	Rosselli sentenced to 5 years	Government Opposition,
Early 1969	Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for Justice Dept. Rosselli file	Keeney Watergate memcon
1970	Rosselli goes before grand jury under immunity re:Giancana	Government Opposition,<u>supr</u>
1971 Jan.18	First of three Anderson columns	
Jan.19	Mayhu (scheduled to go before grand jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls AG John Mitchell	Lenzner memo to SenErvin on Rosselli (and phone lc
	Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties	" "
Jan. 27	Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson on Rosselli matter	" "
Feb.1	Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was involved in covert activity for CIA in early 1960's	" "
	Rosselli files motion for reduction in sentence, citing Anderson stories and presenting memorandum to Court	

1961 After the Bay of Pigs (April 1961)

Rosselli felt "sorry for the poor bastards left on the beach." ~~Rosselli felt indirectly responsible for their deaths since he had encouraged many of them to participate in the invasion.~~ Two or three weeks after the invasion, Rosselli was contacted in Los Angeles by O'Connell, a meeting was arranged for at the airport hotel in Miami. Rosselli went there and was introduced to Harvey. O'Connell said Harvey was now in charge of the Cuban project. Harvey told Rosselli he was to cease all contact with Maheu and Giancana. Further, Harvey stated that the government was still interested in using Rosselli for intelligence-gathering operations. Rosselli would report information from the Cubans to Harvey about personalities and events in Cuba. Rosselli would also relay on to his Cuban contacts requests for specific information from the CIA.

Sometime between the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey gave Rosselli six poison capsules. Rosselli, in turn, gave them to his Cuban contacts who were to take them to Cuba, where another Cuban or Cubans would use them to assassinate Castro. Rosselli never learned the details of what happened, but the project obviously failed. At one point, Rosselli remembers hearing over the radio that Castro was very ill. A short time later, he recovered.

Sometime before the missile crisis, Rosselli arranged, pursuant to Cuban #1 request, for a van loaded with rifles and ammunition to be delivered in Florida. O'Connell and Rosselli watched the Cuban contact pick up the van and return it empty. Rosselli assumed that these guns were going to be used by the two or three-man raiding parties in Cuba to assassinate Castro and overthrow the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

Rowan Tap

Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there was a real intelligence value in that Maheu was afraid that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were mad that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet and transfer the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers. Rosselli knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

Howard
See [illegible]

MEMORANDUM

To: Gary

From: Rick

Date: August 10, 1976

Subject: Roselli

First, some background information. Yesterday, August 9, Senators Inouye and Baker met with Directors Kelley and Bush to discuss Roselli's death. The FBI doesn't want to touch this with a ten-foot pole. At the meeting, Jim Adams told Inouye and Baker that the FBI had been told by Justice (Richard Thornburg) that it had no jurisdiction in this case. Levi had, apparently, not been consulted. Senators Baker and Inouye (especially Baker) requested Kelley to take this up directly with Levi. Today, a letter was sent to Levi, signed by Baker and Inouye, urging Justice to authorize FBI involvement. A copy of that letter is attached.

One other point about the meeting. George Bush was extremely upset about this case and the allegations that the CIA was involved in Roselli's death. He said that he would personally contact Levi to request that the Department grant jurisdiction to the FBI to investigate.

For your information, Roselli appeared before the Committee on four separate occasions to testify on three

matters. He appeared on June 25 to discuss the plots against Castro; on September 20 and 22 to discuss the Campbell affair; and on April 25 to discuss the retaliation theory.

Now for current events. First, the two detectives in Miami handling the Roselli case are Detectives Zatrefralek and Wolf. They are with Dade County Homicide. Their numbers are 305-547-7456 and 547-7923. Madigan has already talked with Detective Wolf. Second, in light of the Inouye/Baker letter to Levi I did not ask the FBI about the current whereabouts of Santo Trafficante. I did, however, ask CIA. They have no information. Third, Baker and Liebengood are putting together a packet of information on Roselli, which will include CIA and Select Committee information and will get this to you tomorrow.

I think you already know this, but Senator Baker does want to launch an informal investigation into this matter. Roselli told him, when he appeared before the Committee, that he thought his life was in danger for testifying. Baker feels a moral obligation, therefore, to look into this.

I have attached the most recent articles on the Roselli death for you.

P.S. A couple of grizzly facts: Over the past few years there have been quite a few anti-Castro deaths in the Miami area. Car bombs and shootings have been the usual means of death. Second, we received a report today that another body was pulled up in the Hudson River. Another gangland slaying, complete with cement and chains.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: TO THE FILES

FROM: PATRICK SHEA AND MICHAEL MADIGAN

DATE: JUNE 21, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF A MEEETING WITH MR. JOHN ROSSELLI
BEGAN AT 111:35 a.m., JUNE 21, 1975, IN ROOM 711 of the WATERGATE HOTEL

PRESENT AT THE SESSION: MR. MICHAEL MADIGAN, MR. PATRICK SHEA OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF, MR. ROSSELLI, MR. THOMAS WADDEN, MR. JAMES CANTILLON, MR. LESLIE SCHERR.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Madigan asked Mr. Rosselli if he felt a need for any protection. He stated, emphatically, "No," that he was able to take care of himself. Mr. Madigan made it clear that the Senate Select Committee could provide U.S. Marshalls for Mr. Rosselli during his stay in Washington. This offer was rejected.

Mr. Rosselli stated that Giancana had no involvement, to his knowledge, with any of the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro. Maheu did deal with higher authorities in government but stated that Rosselli was only the contact, Giancana has a backup man. Rosselli was very concerned about the adverse publicity in recent times, about the CIA and he thought it was unfortunate from the Agency's point of view that the Giancana name had been linked to the Agency.

Rosselli was upset by the harassment he had been under by the FBI. He pointed to the 1966 Frier Club incident as an example. He said in 1966 he had been approached by the FBI to provide information on inside basis about organized crime and when he had refused 18 months later he was indicted. Again, the first week in June of 1970, the FBI had offered him cooperation but he refused.

Rosselli first met Maheu twenty years ago. He was introduced through a life long friend who is dead now, named Spitzle, who was in the insurance business. This first meeting happened in Los Angeles, in 1955. Maheu, at the time, was running Maheu Associates in Washington, D.C. The meeting was only a social gathering. There was nothing specifically discussed about activities of the CIA.

At the meeting In July or August (1960), Maheu called Rosselli and stated that he was working for the government and had been specifically asked to recruit Rosselli. Maheu ~~xxx~~ stressed that it was to be Rosselli and no one else. They agreed to meet for lunch at the Brown Derby in Los Angeles. Maheu described the project as an intelligence operation involving Cuba. Maheu mentioned specifically Castro, Che Guevara, and Raoul Castro. It was Rosselli's feeling that Maheu had recruited him because of his known Cuban connections in Florida. These connections were unrelated to gambling. There was no money mentioned by Maheu to Rosselli for payment for services.

The alleged support of Wall Street business men had not been mentioned and was a cover invented by Rosselli later. At the end of their first meeting, they agreed to meet again at which time Maheu would verify to Rosselli that he was working for the government. This verification would be by introducing a government official ~~of higher authority~~ to Rosselli.

The second meeting occurred a week or ten days later. At this point, Rosselli was instructed to proceed to New York for an introduction to the government official. At both the first and second meetings for an hour or more various aspects of the proposed projects, were discussed but nothing was mentioned of specific techniques.

[Khrushchev] Rosselli remembered his arrival in New York: coinciding with a visit by Eisenhower, Castro, Nasser, and perhaps Krushev. He said it was noteworthy because New York was crawling with officials from all over the world. Rosselli paid his own fare from Los Angeles to New York and stayed at the old Plaza Hotel on Fifth Avenue and 57th Street. He was given the cover name, John Ralston.

The meeting in New York took place in a hotel room. In attendance were Maheu, Rosselli and "big" Jim O'Connell, and two or three other people who did not explain why they were there. Jim O'Connell was introduced as a CIA official. Rosselli was unclear as to whether this was stated explicitly or whether through the whole context of discussions it became clear that he worked for the CIA. At this point, Rosselli was satisfied that Maheu was working for the government and,therefore, agreed to work on the Cuban mission described at their first meeting. Rosselli was not sure as to the length of his stay in New York at this time. He did remember going to lunch with Maheu a number of times and talking about the particular projects.

After his stay in New York, he traveled to either Washington, D. C. or Florida. He was uncertain as to the exact location but he did remember there were series of meetings between himself and Maheu to discuss further plans about the attempted assassination. There was only one further meeting with O'Connell, involving these preliminary stages. At this point,he only discussed techniques of assassination with Maheu. Rosselli remembered staying in Maheu's Falls Church home(it had a tennis court)during his stays in Washington. There still had been no discussion of the cover story(that Rosselli was a private citizen representing a group of private businessmen from New York.)

When Rosselli reached Florida, he made his contacts with the Cubans and then arranged for the Cubans to meet with Maheu. He trusted the Cubans he came in contact with because they, according to themselves, were working on the Bay of Pigs operation, which had not occurred as of yet. There were times when they would stay at Arthur Godfrey's hotel, the Kenilworth Hotel, in Florida. At times he registered under the name Rollins. This was to allow him to maintain his cover while Maheu, still working for Hughes, was able to register under his own name, so that Hughes believed that he was doing his work. The operation went on in terms of Rosselli arranging meetings with his Cuban contacts and then having further discussions about specifics with Maheu. At times, O'Connell, from the CIA, would visit with Maheu and Rosselli. One time, before the 1960 election, O'Connell brought with him two Admirals, one of whom, Rosselli thinks, was retired.

At this point, Rosselli ~~also~~ was telling his Cuban contacts the cover story, namely that he represented private business interests in New York who were interested in seeing Castro done away with. The Cubans, at this point, had not met withJim O'Connell, but had met with Maheu. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs, Maheu left and Rosselli only met once more with O'Connell. Then he also left for the West Coast.

The two attempts at assassination, both involved the use of pills. One attempt was before the Bay of Pigs and the other was sometime after. The first means was to use a capsule filled with a special poison that could be spilled into the food of Castro and cause him to die of poisoning that was not traceable and made his death

look like a heart attack or by natural causes. Rosselli contacted a little Cuban whose relative was a chef for Castro. At this time, Cubans could still travel between Florida and Cuba. It was agreed that the CIA would manufacture the poison capsule. It would be turned over to O'Connell, to Maheu, to Rosselli, and from Rosselli to the Cubans. Maheu brought the capsule to Florida to the Fontainebleu Hotel. The Cubans came up to the room, Maheu opened up his brief case, with Rosselli and the Cubans present, and gave them capsule, plus $10,000 dollars. The money had come from the CIA and was considered partial payment for the job of assassinating Castro. At this meeting, Maheu described the method of using these capsules, making sure the Cubans understood the Cubans understood they could not be put in food that was boiled, or other aspects of using these pills. There was no discussions with the Cubans, at this meeting, about $250,000 dollars. That figure was used by Maheu after his first meeting with the Cubans, described what the x CIA might put up to help the families of men injured or killed in this attempted assassination. Rosselli thinks that the meeting with the money and capsules was after the election. The number one Cuban contact that Rosselli had would from time to time, make requests of Rosselli to be relayed on to the CIA for equipment. The CIA did provide, for instance, a short wave radio, which was supposed to be used by the Cubans in Florida to contact Cubans in Cuba about the success or failure of the poison pill mission. Rosselli was sure that the pills were sent to Cuba but he has received no explanation as to what happened.

Another project was for the Cubans to receive plastic explosives from the CIA and give them to frogmen on their side that in turn would place them on ships in Havana harbor and blow them up. The CIA refused to do this because of the ease with which plastic explosives could be traced back to the government agencies such as the CIA. Maheu did dixxxxxx discuss the use of cigars that would make Castro's hair drop off, According to Rosselli, lose his ability to govern the country. Another proposal was that there be a booby trapped desk. Each of these latter two projects were proposed by Cuban refugees who said they had people in positions vis a vis Castro who could achieve the assassination.

Prior to the Bay of Pigs, there was no discussion of guns. Rosselli claimed to have a better idea than Maheu, namely that with far fewer men than were involved in the Bay of Pigs, perhaps a hundred, they could land in Cuba and do the job successfully. Rosselli's Cuban contact at the time was traveling to New York and New Orleans for meetings. Rosselli was not sure about what the meetings were about but said that they were related to the overthrow of Castro. Another proposal put forward was to purchase a speed boat and use some type of exploding seashell to kill Castro.

The night before the Bay of Pigs Rosselli went to his number one Cuban's house and spoke with him. The Cuban contact said, "See you in Havana." Rosselli expressed serious reservation about the possibility of success for the operation. Rosselli left Florida right after the Bay of Pigs. His total time on this particular attempt at assassination in Florida was three or four months.

Rosselli felt sorry for "the poor bastards left on the beach." He felt indirectly responsible for having encouraged them many of them to participate in the operation. He went home and stayed in Las Vegas and Los Angeles for awhile. A few weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Rosselli was contacted by Maheu or O'Connell, he's not sure. He did meet with Jim O'Connell in Florida a few weeks later. They had arranged to have rooms at the Airport Hotel. Rosselli was not sure as to what his name, what name he registered under, but at this meeting in Florida he met a new CIA man, named Harvey. The first time he Xxxxxx met Harvey, Rosselli was told

2d Phase

Harvey wanted to know all that Rosselli knew about Cuba ~~is~~ on an intelligence line. Harvey told him at ~~thextime~~ this meeting to have no further contact with ~~xxx~~ Maheu and that he should not talk further with Giancana. He also said that he, Harvey, was in charge of the operation and ~~that Maheu should take, or~~ that Rosselli should take his orders from Harvey. At this point the original project, using pills, was considered defunct.

After this first meeting with Harvey, Rosselli again contacted his Cuban people. ~~He made several trips, that is,~~ Rosselli made several trips with Harvey in Florida, some down in the Keys to see what type of operations were continuing. One of the projects Harvey had Rosselli doing was verifying CIA reports by using Rosselli's own people who were in frequent contact with Cuba. The intelligence reports dealt both with personalities with in the Cuban hierarchy, as well as differentongoing operations. Rosselli paid his own bills ~~xxx~~ before the Bay of Pigs but after, Harvey would usually pick up the tab.

Harvey approached Rosselli with the proposed mission to try ~~it~~ for a second time to assassinate ~~Cuba[?]~~ Castro. Harvey said that the new ~~x~~pills would really work and were much stronger. Harvey gave Rosselli six pills, then Rosselli gave those six pills to his Cuban contact. There were no special instructions on how to handle the pills and his Cuban contact said that they would be passed into Cuba and used.

re-inforce →

At this time, Rosselli had no ongoing contact with Maheu, but may have run into him in Los Angeles. Maheu knew that Rosselli was still working on the Cuban project and that he, Maheu, was out. Rosselli never got any report back on what happened to the six pills but he assumed that they had been unsuccessful. He did hear a ~~xxxxx~~ report over a radio or TV station, that Fidel Castro was deathly ill, but then, shortly thereafter, he recovered.

but

Rosselli arranged for the CIA to supply a panel truck loaded with carbines for use by his Cuban contacts to make two or three-manned party raids into Cuba, hopefully assassinating Castro and overturning the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

OK w/ '67 Rept

The only money that Rosselli ever put up was $800 to buy gas for the speedboat that would deliver the two or three-man teams to Cuba to do guerrilla operations. He stressed throughout the interview that he had never received any money and that besides this $800 he had never given any money for. His last contact with Harvey was in June of ~~196~~ 1963 ~~or shortly there before,~~ when Rosselli found out that Harvey was being transfered to Rome and he made a special trip to Washington to say goodby to him.

date of last trip — April? June? } details

The Rowan tap; Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on ~~Rowan~~ Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there was a real intelligence value in that ~~he was~~. Maheu was afraid, that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were pissed off ~~at the~~ that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Mr. Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet with "Mr. Doakes" for a transfer of the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers and he knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

before or after the tap-details?

During his early contacts with Maheu in 1959 and '60, in setting up the Cuban operation, Maheu was setting up a guard system for different Hughes' operations, such as Hughes Aircraft or other corporate interests.

Rosselli can't remember whether he ever introduced Giancana as Mr. Sam Gold. He claims to have no business relationship with Giancana. Rosselli's only business interests was the ice machines in Las Vegas. He ran those by himself and had no contact with Giancana. When asked about Joe Santa ~~Trafficante~~, Trafficanto, Rosselli stated that he used him only as an interpreter but not as a contact for recruiting other Cubans for his mission.

Mr. Thomas Wadden, stated that he was receiving no fees ~~for his counsel,~~ for his representing Rosselli, now. The status of Mr. Cantillon or Mr. Scherr was not ~~un~~clear. There was discussion as to the Committee paying the expenses of Mr. Rosselli's transportation from Los Angeles and there was discussion as to the limits, if any, to be placed on the Committee's inquiry of Mr. Rosselli's contacts with the Cubans, how they had been developed, and what other operations did go on.

The informant was told that his offer is outside our jurisdiction, which he acknowledged. No commitments were made to him. At this time, we do not plan to further pursue the matter. Our relationship with him has been most carefully guarded and we would feel obligated to handle any recontact of him concerning this matter if such is desired.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

Book V, p. 12-13

The cast of characters surrounding the seizure of anti-Castro hardware as outlined on these pages is particularly interesting. The raw material cited in the footnote is attached. Note reference to Briniuer and Oswald. Below that McLaney brothers and Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis. Not attached is a critical New Orleans field office memo to FBI headquarters linking Briniuer to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.

sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate. When he saw the guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me, "Well, listen, Carlos, don't try to do an invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an old one and that will be a failure." That was his joke in that moment.

After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have to go inside that, because that is subjective, not objective. You have the objective, and that is the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on the tape last night over at the television station too.

Mr. BRINGUIER. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.

Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4——

Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right. [Indicating photograph.] This is the spy who was inside the training camp. The Christian Democratic Movement turned him over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami. The Christian Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In that letter the spy, Fernando Fernandez, was warning Lechuga that they have to be alert from that date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my organization was on August 5. This sounds for me strange in all this matter.

[Indicating.] Here is another interview from Fernandez here 3 days later.

Mr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same newspaper but for the date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which——

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Indicating.] Here. "Fernando Fernandez is in favor of coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the title in Spanish.

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. You say that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.

Mr. LIEBELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had infiltrated the training camp in Louisiana?

Mr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is—what? Pro-Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.

Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a commando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy inside the training camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with him, and they turn him over to the FBI. I think that after that the leader for the Christian Democratic Movement—or that the FBI didn't found nothing, because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization. It was against the law to spy inside the U.S. Government but not inside the anti-Castro organization. And my feeling—and this is the question that I am asking myself—in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami. In Miami is where the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups. I could not find any reason for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp. That for me is—because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go directly to Miami and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in New Orleans where it is not publicly known tha. .here was something going on at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that

there was something like that, and it was a coincidence. And there is another coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was intercepted here was to Mexico too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate in Mexico, and the Fernandez letter was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.

Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the United Press International office, and I gave a press release. If you want a copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.

The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said, "Write to your Congressman asking for a full investigation of Mr. Lee H. Oswald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that was 3 months before the assassination.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you have another copy of this?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I have the original of that. You can have that.

Mr. LIEBELER. I have marked a copy of the press release distributed to the various communications media here in New Orleans, on August 16, 1963——

Mr. BRINGUIER. No, August 21.

Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 21, the night of the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have initialed it. Would you initial it?

[The witness complied.]

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me go over some of this testimony that you have just given to see if I understand. Mr. Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter in which Fernandez said that we—meaning the Castro people?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes.

Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Of 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices on August 5, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training of Cubans?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New Orleans——

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for military action against Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the possibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And did know about the existence of this training camp, because Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Excuse me.

Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez had told directly to Oswald. What I believe is that Fernandez had informed some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and had gave to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New Orleans.

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernanc
aware of approximately the time
fore, indicated to Lechuga that
discovered as an attempted infiltr
Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon?
Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand
lates to the fact that Fernandez
will be in danger,"—up until abo
anything to do with Oswald?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I thi
on August 5 Oswald came to me
same period of time. Somethin
Orleans, that there was a secret
of the Fair Play for Cuba Comn
New Orleans. Those are the fact
not sure about. I just want to s
connection.
Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't see
handing out literature in the stre
to infiltrate the anti-Castro moven
Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that
after I told him that I don't hav
that here there is nothing, and th
went openly to do that before
he went openly to do that after he w
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of
in the pro-Castro movement and
information to Oswald—conducted
Mr. BRINGUIER. No.
Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have a
as a result of your anti-Castro ac
person as this, do you think you
Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon
Mr. LIEBELER. If there were suc
Castro movement who had been w
would have had access to that in
find out about it?
Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is
have a lot of persons. There ar
who are anti-Castro. Even amon
agents here in the city and you c
But there is something else: Th
is located in 117 Decatur Street, j
the owner of the Havana Bar is
over there, gave the information
before—that Oswald went to the
lemonade. He was with one Mexi
drinking the lemonade, he start to
to be a Cuban capitalistic, and tha
He was telling that that was too n
moment, Oswald feel bad at that
out to the sidewalk to vomit outsid
the Havana Bar told me that the g
the same one that one time the FBI
immediately because that was a pr
August 15 and August 30 was th
because I start to find out all these
before, because before I did not
nothing of this before to me. Be
the owner of the Havana Bar cam
cause he already saw one automob
one of them the one who had be

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was aware of approximately the time Oswald would make this attempt, and, therefore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being discovered as an attempted infiltrator?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon? I don't understand the words.

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, relates to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga, "We must be careful, or we will be in danger,"—up until about August 8. Now does that statement have anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I think is this: He send that letter to Lechuga, and on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the same period of time. Something that never was happening here in New Orleans, that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group here in New Orleans. Those are the facts. I don't want to tell something that I am not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around handing out literature in the streets like he did if he was actually attempting to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him. He didn't went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp; he went openly to do that after he was turned down.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of information to Oswald—conducted the orders to him?

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts? If there were such a person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you would have had access to that information or you would have been likely to find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you have a lot of persons. There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many who are anti-Castro. Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.

But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar—the Havana Bar is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store—the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban, and he and one of the employees over there, gave the information to me after Kennedy's assassination—not before—that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time. He asked for some lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was drinking the lemonade, he start to say that, sure, the owner of that place had to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade. He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment—he had some vomits and he went out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk. These persons here from the Havana Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was the same one that one time the FBI told them that if they will see him, call them immediately because that was a pro-Communist. I remember that was between August 15 and August 30 was that period of time. I could not locate that because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not before, because before I did not found any connection. They did not told nothing of this before to me. Between the 15th and the 30th the brother of the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, because he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans, one of them the one who had been with Oswald in the bar, and he told me

Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful occasion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6-24, 1963,[316] Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Orleans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in large letters "Hands Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[317] He first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the vicinity of the U.S.S. *Wasp*, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.[318] He distributed literature in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August 16, 1963.[319] Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and at his own request, by an agent of the FBI.[320] On August 17, 1963, he appeared briefly on a radio program [321] and on August 21, 1963, he debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Bringuier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on August 9.[322] Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was associated.[323]

While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above, his "organization" was a product of his imagination.[324] The imaginary president of the nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,[325] the name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon.[326] Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because it rhymed with "Fidel," [327] to her husband's membership card in the New Orleans chapter. She testified that he threatened to beat her if she did not do so.[328] The chapter had never been chartered by the national FPCC organization.[329] It appears to have been a solitary operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present at meetings which were held once a month.[330]

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and sometime untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1, 1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to have rented for FPCC activities had been "promply closed 3 days later for some obsure reasons by the renters, they said something about remodeling ect., I'm sure you understand." [331] He wrote that "thousands of circulars were distrubed" [332] and that he continued to receive inquiries through his post office box which he endeavored "to keep answering to the best of my ability." [333] In his letter to V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban

exiles in a street demonstration and being "officialy cautioned" by the police, events which "robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone." [334]

In spite of those claims, the Commission has not been able to uncover any evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration in which Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident mentioned above, which occurred 8 days after Oswald wrote the above letter to V. T. Lee.[335] Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, was not aware of any such incident.[336] Police reports also fail to reflect any activity on Oswald's part prior to August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of literature at the Dumaine Street wharf in June.[337] Furthermore, the general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he supported his report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges made against him and a newspaper clipping reporting the event, suggests that his previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least greatly exaggerated.[338] While the legend "FPCC 544 Camp St. NEW ORLEANS, LA." was stamped on some literature that Oswald had in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, although it did develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had maintained offices there for a period ending early in 1962.[339] The Commission has not been able to find any other indication that Oswald had rented an office in New Orleans. In view of the limited amount of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1963, there also seems to be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands" of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000 and actually had only 1,000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence that he received any substantial amount of materials from the national headquarters.[340]

In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote that he had appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result of which he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect. as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans branch." [341] WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin American Focus." [342] Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on August 17, 1963.[343] It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to all of his FPCC activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to learn more about the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in New Orleans.[344]

Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers and invitations to debate. This would have made him a real center of attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States. The limited notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street fracas and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough to satisfy him. He exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in an appar-

OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR
ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963 --
BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A

GARNER DE

730-900 O-64—28

TO: NAME

1. Mr. [illegible] D.O.J.

2.

3.

4.

- [ ] SIGNATURE
- [ ] APPROVAL
- [ ] SEE ME
- [ ] RECOMMENDATION
- [ ] ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE ______
- [ ] PREPARE REPLY FOR THE SIGNATURE OF ______
- [ ] COMMENT
- [ ] NECESSARY ACTION
- [ ] NOTE AND RETURN
- [ ] CALL ME
- [ ] PER CONVERSATION
- [ ] AS REQUESTED
- [ ] NOTE AND FILE
- [ ] YOUR INFORMATION

REMARKS

Can you help us identify these loose pgs 35-37, pls.

Thank You

FROM: NAME	BUILDING, ROOM, EXT.	DATE
Geo. Racyn [illegible] for		
B D Bennett	6330 Main Justice	

RECEIVED FROM

MAY 2 1978

DOJ

10/3/63
Robt J. Dwyer
Report

information concerning the Comandos Mambises or their spokesman, RAFAEL MARTINEZ PUPO, who made a statement in Guatemala claiming credit for the August 17, 1963 attack.

BOSCH stated that the MIRR will promote other attacks in the future, as opportunities and availability of equipment permit, without compromising the United States.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

On June 14, 1963, information was received that a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba.

On June 19, 1963, United States Customs Agents seized a twin Beechcraft airplane on the outskirts of Miami, Florida, along with a quantity of explosives.

MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA, VICTOR ESPINOSA and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, along with American SAM BENTON, were involved and detained, but not arrested, by United States Customs Agents. It was ascertained that MICHAEL MC LANEY supplied the money and explosives for this operation. MC LANEY is well known as a former gambling concession operator in Havana, Cuba, and presently resides at Miami Beach, Florida.

On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana.

On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a

search warrant and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and 20 bomb casings near Lacombe, Louisiana. This material was located on the property of WILLIAM J. MC LANEY, brother of MICHAEL J. MC LANEY, a Miami Beach gambler and former operator of a casino in the Nacional Hotel, Havana, Cuba.

Investigation determined that this dynamite was purchased at Collinsville, Illinois, by RICH LAUCHLI for VICTOR ESPINOSA, who was involved in the June 14, 1963 seizures at Miami. ESPINOSA transported the dynamite to New Orleans in a rented trailer. Also involved in this bomb plot were CARLOS HERNANDEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAM BENTON, a Miami, Florida private detective.

MM T-3, who is personally acquainted with SAM BENTON and RICH LAUCHLI, advised that SAM BENTON has been involved, in the past, with Cuban revolutionary groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance, arms deals and collection of funds for personal use.

MM T-3 advised on June 14, 1963, RICH ALBERT LAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in Miami, Florida in a Ford station wagon with a load of arms for sale. American adventurers and mercenaries, GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, JR., and FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, took LAUCHLI around to meet the different Cuban exile leaders in Miami. LAUCHLI subsequently sold a .57 mm recoilless rifle to the SNFE, a Japanese machine gun to American mercenary BILL CARMAN, two automatic rifles and two French guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and miscellaneous other equipment to other organizations.

MM T-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in Miami in June of 1963, his station wagon contained .50 caliber

machine guns, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles and a number of foreign-made weapons. LAUCHLI sold nearly all of these arms, and at reasonable prices.

MM T-3 explained that LAUCHLI is more interested in arms sales as a gun dealer, and has no emotional feeling about the Cuban exile cause of trying to overthrow the present Government in Cuba.

Book V, P. 5

There was no indication that the Castro assassination plots were brought to the Warren Commission's attention in anyway. "The subordinate officers at the FBI and the CIA who acted as liaison with the Warren Commission did not know of the CIA assassination attempts."

Book V, p. 5-6

The CIA investigation of the assassination did not divulge the AMLASH operation although these investigators, in retrospect, think this knowledge vital. "There is also evidence that CIA investigators requested name traces which should have made them aware of the AMLASH operation, but for some reason, they did not learn of that operation."

Book V, p. 10	FBI informant during missile crisis suggested that Castro could be assassinated through underworld channels inside Cuba and that the informant would fund this if U.S. government would assure such endeavor would not adversely effect the national security. See attached Hoover memo. We need to identify and interview informant.

TO : The Attorney General DATE: October 29, 1962

FROM : Director, FBI

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1962

SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

We have an informant who furnishes data concerning criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlum and gambling elements throughout the United States. He is most concerned that his relationship with the FBI not be revealed since he feels certain that, if his cooperation becomes known, he will be killed immediately.

On October 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated. He explained that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as Meyer Lansky, in the past have had close connections in Cuba whereby they were able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba. He believes some of these underworld figures still have channels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be successfully arranged.

[redacted] COULD IDENTIFY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE [redacted] He said that, in the event the United States Government is interested in having the attempt made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing from the Government except assurance that such an undertaking would in no way adversely affect the national security. He expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission without any additional contact with Government representatives and with a minimum of contacts with private individuals.

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
22 JAN 2 1963 RECORD
RECORDS BRANCH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Book V, p. 13 Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting series of meetings among major leaders of anti-Castro movement. Such a report is attached. Attention to the cast of characters: i.e., Artime, Maceo, Somoza, Carlos Prio.

On August 23, 1963, ALFREDO BORJAS, Intelligence Chief of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) anti-CASTRO organization of MANUEL ARTIME, advised that the MRR-Comandos of CARLOS BANDIN is a dissident group. BORJAS said that through his contacts in the latter organization, he had ascertained that only about five members of BANDIN's organization landed in Cuba at the time of the June 20, 1963 invasion hoax.

BORJAS said the CRC press releases were a publicity stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and activity the CRC may have had up to that time. When the press found out it was a hoax, ANTONIO MACEO and CARLOS BANDIN resigned, blaming the CRC for the scandal which they both helped to create.

II. THE SOMOZA PLAN

On July 16, 1963, MIGUEL GARCIA, in charge of public relations for the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA, former President of Nicaragua, had recently been in Washington, D. C.; reportedly conferred with United States Government officials, and about ten days ago arrived in Miami, Florida.

GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted a series of meetings, in which nearly all of the well-known Cuban exile political and action group leaders attended. At these meetings, SOMOZA claimed he had talked to all the Presidents of the Central American Republics, and these Presidents are willing to help Cuban exiles in the form of training camps, military equipment, and bases of operation from which to attack the present government of Cuba. SOMOZA indicated that his meetings with the

Presidents of the several Central American Republics and the leading figures among the Cuban exiles in Miami, New York and Washington, were known to have the sanction of the United States Government. On July 16, 1963, SOMOZA left Miami and returned to Nicaragua.

On July 15, 1963, the "Miami News" contained an article stating that there is growing speculation in Miami that Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY is quietly backing certain Cuban exiles, such as MANUEL ARTIME BUESA and the so-called SOMOZA Plan. It is noted that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA is the head of the MRR, an anti-CASTRO organization.

On July 15, 1963, MM T-3, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, advised that the below-listed persons are some of the better-known Cuban exile leaders who met with SOMOZA during his recent visit to the United States:

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Comandos L

LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC)

ANTONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66

SIXTO MESA, MRR

JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba

MANUEL ARTIME, MRR

EUSEBIO MUJAL, labor leader

JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist

On July 26, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised he had talked with LUIS SOMOZA about four hours while SOMOZA was in Miami during the middle of July, 1963. ALVAREZ said that it is his opinion SOMOZA was acting as an intermediary between the United States Government and the Cuban exiles.

On August 20, 1963, ALVAREZ advised that nothing has yet developed concerning the SOMOZA plan; it is now not clear what SOMOZA is offering, or what the United States Government's position or attitude is in this matter. ALVAREZ said it is obvious SOMOZA cannot afford, either as a private individual or a representative of the Nicaraguan Government, to back such a military program by Cuban exiles, and will have to have the backing and support of the United States Government to go on with his plan.

On July 30, 1963, FERMIN FLEITES, member of the Executive Committee of the MDC, advised that about a week ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the MDC Headquarters, and in the name of SOMOZA, offered camps, military equipment and bases in Nicaragua. This individual also offered to pay the expenses of moving the MDC operations to Nicaragua.

FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a "wait and see" policy to ascertain what attitude the United States Government would take concerning this matter.

On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CANAL, Executive Secretary of Rescate Democratico Revolucionario, advised that when SOMOZA was in the United States during July of 1963, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA, head of the Rescate Democratico Revolucionario (RDR), conferred with SOMOZA in Miami and New York. At the invitation of SOMOZA, VARONA left for Nicaragua on August 1, 1963, to again confer with SOMOZA, and is expected to return to Miami in about a week.

On September 10, 1963, CANAL advised that nothing definite had been established as a result of VARONA's visit to Nicaragua, and that the future of the proposed SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.

On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, military leader of the MDC, advised that he had recently returned from Nicaragua, where he had conferred with SOMOZA, who made no commitments or indicated any definite plan existed. SOMOZA showed great interest in the Cuban problem, but offered no positive help or aid in the way of arms or training camps.

BATISTA FALLA said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua at the same time, conferred with SOMOZA, but did not receive any offers of positive aid. BATISTA explained that PRIO had just previously returned from the Dominican Republic (DR), and although PRIO and JUAN BOSCH, President of the DR, had been friends for many years, PRIO was unable to obtain any military bases in the DR.

On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cuban Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator of the anti-CASTRO

organization Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile, stated that about a month ago, LUIS SOMOZA told EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, former Cuban delegate to the United Nations (UN), that he (SOMOZA) had talked to United States Attorney General (AG) ROBERT KENNEDY.

AG KENNEDY reportedly said it was necessary for SOMOZA to work out the Cuban problem and to unite Cuban exiles. SOMOZA recommended that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA be designated as the leader of the Cuban exiles.

DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in Miami at the home of Nicaraguan Army Captain JOSE ALEGRETT between SOMOZA and a number of Cuban exile leaders. At this meeting, SOMOZA said there was a possibility of Nicaraguan support for the Cuban exile anti-CASTRO movement, but first the exiles would have to accept ARTIME as their leader. There was considerable opposition to this suggestion by the exile leaders attending the meeting.

On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA MARTINEZ, former attorney and textile mill operator in Cuba, advised he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with LUIS SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles.

SIERRA said there are no training camps in Nicaragua or Central America for Cuban exiles, and all the proposed aid and backing has progressed no further than the talking stage. SIERRA said it seems to him that everyone is waiting for the United States Government to give the "green light".

On September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that nearly all top political leaders among Cuban exiles have conferred with SOMOZA and now agree that the SOMOZA Plan is too big for

SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put into effect without United States military and political support.

MM T-3 said that the different Cuban military and political leaders now feel that SOMOZA has not yet obtained a positive commitment from the United States Government, because after two and a half months of conferences, there are not any Cuban exile military training camps in Central America, and the SOMOZA Plan has not progressed beyond the talking stage.

III. ORGANIZATIONS

Comandos L

MM T-3 advised that Comandos L is one of the leading anti-CASTRO organizations and action groups. It is headed by SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESTA and RAMON FONT. The organization maintains no office as such, but continues to use Post Office Box 66, Riverside Station, Miami, Florida, to collect money donations.

On July 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised the organization has had no military activity since March of 1963. The leadership is now building the organization to increase membership, establish different sections, such as a Women's Section, a Publicity Section, and committees to raise funds. The organization recently put out a thirty-page booklet, setting forth the aims and purposes of the organization, along with information concerning previous military operations of the organization.

ALVAREZ admitted his group has two boats in the Miami River, which will be used in the future for military

Book V, p. 25 Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.

Book V, p. 25	On November 23, 1963, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico Station to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia Duran. Karamessinis speculated that this was because CIA feared Cuba responsible for assassination.
p. 29	Headquarters equally concerned with Duran on November 27 and warned Mexico City station chief that U.S. Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too hard.

Book V, p. 27 AMLASH's case officer omitted reference to the poison pen in his November 25 contact report of his November 22 AMLASH meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.

Book V, p. 28 "D" tells his story in Mexico City on November 25. On November 26, Mexico City cables details of "D" interrogation to CIA Headquarters. On December 1, CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that the White House has been told that D's story is a fabrication.

Book V, p. 30

On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a sensitive source (   ) has advised that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana was delayed in Mexico City on November 22 to pick up a passenger who rode in the cockpit without going through customs. This cable was found in Mexico City file with no CIA headquarters record of follow-up being found.

Book V, p. 35 In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a memo for Hoover's aid in briefing the President that stated that no evidence had been developed which would indicate Oswald's assassination was inspired or directed by Pro Castro organizations or by any foreign country.

Book V, p. 40-41	FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled FBI Headquarters on November 24 that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans participated in assassination effort. "Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in US in effort to confirm or refute this theory." FBI Headquarter's supervisor determined this was not desirable and would only promote rumors.

Book V, P. 58 The CIA investigation reflected a Soviet orientation, with exhaustive studies of Oswald's activities in re Soviet Union. There is no corresponding CIA analysis of Oswald's contacts with pro and anti Castro groups in U.S.

Book V, p. 61-63

In December, 1963, the CIA learned that a Cuban American had crossed the border from Texas into Mexico, on November 23 and arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight to Havana using a Cuban courtesy visa and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on the flight. In March, 1964 the Agency received a report from a source which alleged that the same Cuban American had received a permit to enter Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa, Florida. The same source said the Cuban American was somehow involved in the assassination.

The Agency did not follow up on this report other than to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban American's activities. The FBI did investigate the reported unusual travel but did not fully report the results of their investigation to their Warren Commission. Their investigation showed that this individual had lived in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro. He had traveled to Cuba in May of 1962 and had a brother in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union. On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This was the same Fair Play for Cuba Committee that Oswald had possibly contacted in May of 1963.

Book V, p. 63-64

In March of 1964, the Warren Commission requested from Director Hoover information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations which were active in the U.S. including the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and Alpha 66, among others. The Bureau furnished less than a full and satisfactory response and did not disclose the fact that the CIA had operational interests in certain of the entities inquired about.

Book V, p. 65 The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished the Warren Commission noted the attack on the Soviet vessel in March of 1963 but did not detail that group's continued activity in planning and carrying out their military operations against Cuba. The FBI reports did not show that Alpha 66 had been involved with the New Orleans anti-Castro training camp.

Book V, p. 65 It is known that the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee with which Oswald was associated. According to Bureau documents, the Agency advised the Bureau that they were considering the use of disinformation that might embarass the Committee in areas where the Committee had support.

Book V, p. 72 In late July 1964, an FBI informant reported that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating Castro. Informant also reported that AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan but that the plan had not been completely put to rest. This information was not disseminated outside the Bureau at the request of the informant. But the Bureau notations indicate that the Bureau was looking into an underworld plot against Castro that might be coincidental with the AMLASH plan. The Bureau had first been informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in October 1963. That information did not indicate assassination involvement.

Book V, p. 74-75

The AMLASH operation was insecure prior to the Fitzgerald meeting with AMLASH, a meeting that Fitzgerald was urged not to undertake by several in the Agency.

AMLASH

Book V, pp. 77-78

Individuals outside the CIA had been brought into the operation, and the Agency learned that one of these individuals was in clandestine contact with Cuban intelligence (Cable from European station to CIA Headquarters, 3/18/65).

Book V, p. 78 Victor Espinosa, a Cuban exile, involved in the transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963, contacted INS with information about the AMLASH operation. This information was turned over to the FBI which informed the CIA. Both agencies interrogated Espinosa in June of 1965 and found that he knew that AMLASH and others were planning a coup which involved the assassination of Castro and that the CIA had been involved with AMLASH and others in the planning.

Espinosa and AMLASH were life-long friends but during the interrogation he gave no indication that he was aware of the 1963 AMLASH-CIA meetings. Espinosa's information noted in the 1967 IG Report suggests a link between the AMLASH operation and the CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. Therefore, Espinosa's information raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the Harvey plots may have been aware of the AMLASH operation. CIA reaction to this interrogation was to terminate the operation immediately.

Book V, p. 79	CIA had FBI files on Espinosa detailing his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and underworld figures who were operating the guerrilla training camps in New Orleans in July 1963.

Book V, p. 79 In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino, New York jeweler, who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the beginning. The report concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas. Tepedino lied in response to questions dealing with AMLASH's and his ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino stated that AMLASH had no plan to overthrow Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH never mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers; Teledino stated that AMLASH had mentioned them to him and almost everyone else he had met.

Book V, p. 79	The FBI made the connection between Espinosa's 1963 activities and the fact that in 1965 he was knowledgeable of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate Castro. However, there is no evidence that either the CIA or FBI investigated this connection until 1967.

Book V, p. 79 Although the CIA had received information that AMLASH was a provocation there is no evidence that the CIA investigated the possibility of a connection between its fall 1963 meetings with AMLASH and the assassination of President Kennedy.

Book V, P. 80 A client of Morgan's had informed him that the United States had attempted to assassinate Castro in the early 1960's and that Castro had decided to retaliate. This information was passed to Drew Pearson who in turn attempted to have Chief Justice Warren look into it but he declined.

Book V, P. 81 Supervisory personnel assigned to the assassination investigation have uniformly testified they do not recall ever discussing or reviewing memoranda which touch upon Cuban involvement in the assassination or of Cuban retaliation for the CIA assassination plots.

Book V, p. 81 According to Secretary of State Rusk in his testimony before the Warren Commission, 6/10/64, he stated there was "very considerable concern" in Cuba immediately following the assassination as to whether Cuba would be held responsible for the assassination and what effect the assassination might have on Cuba's position and security.

Book V, p. 84 On March 21, 1967, WFO send Headquarters 10 copies of a blind memorandum which stated Castro employed assassination teams for the purpose of removing President Kennedy. Morgan's clients were also aware of the identity of individuals sent to the United States for that purpose. He understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey. The transmittal slip is attached to this memorandum.
Neither the President nor the Attorney General ordered a follow-up investigation after receiving this memo.

Book V, p. 92	In October, 1963, Soviet experts at FBI Headquarters were informed that Oswald had met with Vice Counsel Kostikov at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Kostikov was a member of the KGB and believed to be with the KGB department that carried out assassinations and sabotage.

I, Frank Sturgis, have today personally delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the following materials:

1 Envelope - 2 cassettes

1 lg. manila envelope - secret codes

Date: 9-3-76

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

RECEIVED:

Pamela Crupi

For the Committee

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No, That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly / towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need

protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nick-names...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nick-named the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by her-self or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with

them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know,"

FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were ________ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just, the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics

peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged

medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And

they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything,

put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to

their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants

diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington,D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on

a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up, Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you

realize what a bomb this is? This top KGB spy wants you?" And I said, "Well", I say "he's not really my type.", I said but again, the best interests of the country, but how far do you want me to go? And he said "all the way". I said what is all the way? He said, "You start with a Christmas card." Well the Christmas card was answered by Oleg going to Louis and saying, "I got Ilonka's Christmas card. Where is she living, Louis?" You know, so John talked me into calling the mission. I call up the mission, across from 19th precinct, and I said, "Oleg, this is Ilonka Marischa. Hello darling", you know, and this, this and this. And I said oh boy everything is wired and everything from the mission anyway. But he's top dog there. He is top dog in the mission. He has the say. He's a very important person in the Soviet mission. Anyway, John okays a telephone coil pickup that I have on my phone to a Soni tape recorder. We make a tape of this because John Kotter is sitting on pins and needles waiting for me to replay that tape on what Oleg tells me, you know? Oleg doubletalks but we get a message that we want to meet, you know? So they had some kind of a security council and we made a date and it was postponed. Oleg called up and apologized which I also have on tape. And each time the Bureau was very happy. We're gonna start a blossoming relationship here, you know, and end up with photographs and better something, which I don't think I would have gone all the way. But that's what their idea was so they can exchange at a later date.

FS: Blackmail?

ML: Well...

FS: Blackmail him / into giving them information (unintelligible).

ML: Say like they get one of our, one of our pilots, right? And if we don't get our pilot back they expose Oleg, right? Or make him...

FS: Be a double agent. Blackmail him...

ML: Be a double...

FS: into being a double agent.

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you,

and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

Transcript of tapes provided the Select Committee on Intelligence by Frank Sturgis on September 3, 1976

Marita Lorenze (ML) -- Interviewed by Frank Sturgis on 9/2/76

Frank Sturgis (FS)

ML: Marita Lorenze

FS: You an American citizen?

ML: Yes.

FS: Were you born here?

ML: Born in Braemen, Germany on August 18, 1939 and my mother registered me at birth with the Consulate because she was stuck in the war over there, but I am an American citizen, not naturalized or anything. I was registered as an American citizen.

FS: How old were you when you came to the United States?

ML: I was about 12, came over on the U.S.S. Henry Gibbons, American troop transport, because my mother worked for the United States Army.

FS: Okay, now we're going to go ahead and jump. You went to Cuba what month and what year and on what ship?

ML: I met, I went, I took several trips with my father who was Commander of the oceanliner Berlin. I met Fidel...

FS: What was your father's full name?

ML: Commander Heinrich Frederick Lorenz.

FS: And how old was he?

ML: Approximately 50-something, 55, when I first, I went on several trips to Cuba before I met Fidel with, but I was a little girl.

FS: When's the first time you went to Cuba after Fidel took over the government on January 1, 1959?

ML: I met Fidel February 28, 1959, on one of my father's cruises where Fidel came aboard with several of his men. He said he saw the oceanliner from the Havana Hilton balcony and he took a launch with his Chief of the Navy, what's his name, I forgot, Castagna...

FS: Forget it, forget about it, we can go ahead. Who else was there besides the chief of the Cuban navy.

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No, That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly / towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need

protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nick-names...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nick-named the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by her-self or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with

them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know,"

FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were _______ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just,the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics

peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged

medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And

they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything,

put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to

their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants

diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington, D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on

a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up, Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you,

and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
United States Senate
442 Russell Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Inouye:

Enclosed you will find a copy of a letter from this office to Senator Mansfield expressing our concern over the rush of the Central Intelligence Agency to destroy large quantities of secret government documents. We believe the Select Committee on Intelligence should review with CIA Director Bush what specifically the Agency intends to destroy before doing so. It is likely that there are numerous memoranda and other documents which are of extreme importance to the committee, which are central to the committee's executing the Senate's mandate of comprehensive and complete oversight of executive intelligence agencies.

We urge that the Senators serving on the Intelligence Committee take whatever steps necessary to stop the destruction of materials by the Central Intelligence Agency until such time as the Committee can review the content and importance of that data.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

GC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

22 June 1976

JUN 23 11 26 AM '76

Honorable Daniel Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am sending you a copy of my letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott extending the moratorium on the destruction of certain records until 10 December 1976. I do hope that this action and the procedures outlined in my letters are fully responsive to the interests of your Committee.

Sincerely,

GB

George Bush
Director

orig → WGM for Chair + return to files
✓ cy → MJM + return to Research for files
cy → Blue/index
cy → Chron

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any records. The same will be done with respect to those routine administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21, were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution. I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select Committee.

It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Scott:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

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It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

June 7, 1976

Honorable Michael J. Mansfield
United States Senate
133 Russell Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

George Bush's letter to Senator Hugh Scott, with a copy to you, of the 2nd of June is disturbingly ambiguous. In stating that the CIA now believes itself relieved of the responsibility of maintaining data "which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee," the Agency failed to make any effort to identify what materials were targeted for destruction and which weren't. Further, the next to last sentence of Mr. Bush's letter, "I trust you (Senator Scott) agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding," has led some observers in the Senate to conclude no destruction will take place until such confirmation has been given. This does not appear to be true. Neither the press office nor the legislative consultant would confirm that destruction of data has not already occurred, or would not occur without acquisence from the Senate leadership. To the contrary, the legislative counsel's office informed this group that the "process" of destruction has already begun.

The action of the Central Intelligence Agency is wrong. The new Select Committee on Intelligence should have been consulted prior to the destruction of any materials which might be vital to the proper functioning of that committee and which in any case are within the legislative and oversight domain of that committee. Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Baker, along with the membership of the Intelligence Committee should have the opportunity to review the data selected for destruction and to determine, in conjunction with the CIA, the propriety of destroying or maintaining such data.

Hon. Michael Mansfield
Page Two
June 7, 1976

We urge you, Senator Mansfield, to take whatever steps necessary to immediately halt the unilateral act undertaken by the CIA of destroying possibly critical and irreplaceable government documents.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

Copy for Senator Baker ✓

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We have received a letter from the Honorable George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, relative to the destruction of papers and material which he has held for sometime relative to our request. Our action was taken to facilitate the inquiry being undertaken by your predecessor committee under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church.

In view of the fact, as we assume, that all of Senator Church's committee records have been turned over to your permanent Select Committee, we would appreciate your advising us as to whether or not you want our original letter to stand and the papers and other materials to still be held. Could you give us the judgment of you and your Committee on this matter?

With best wishes, we are

Hugh Scott
HUGH SCOTT
REPUBLICAN LEADER

Mike Mansfield
MIKE MANSFIELD
MAJORITY LEADER

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 June 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

On 27 January 1975, following adoption of S. Res. 21 creating the Select Committee on Intelligence, you and Senator Hugh Scott requested that the Central Intelligence Agency "not destroy, remove from [its] possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21."

In response to this request, the Agency placed in effect a complete moratorium on the destruction of records, including normal administrative records scheduled for routine destruction.

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that it is our intention to proceed with destruction of records, now that the Select Committee has completed its investigation and issued its final report. We have so advised Senator Church.

Along with the backlog of routine administrative records, the Agency will destroy records which were collected and maintained by the Agency and which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee. The Agency is required to destroy much of this latter material by the Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579) and by Executive Order 11905. Of course, all records destruction will be fully consistent with other applicable laws, Presidential directives, and the requirements of pending litigation and Justice Department investigations.

I trust you agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding.

I am sending a duplicate of this letter to Senator Hugh Scott.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 11, 1976

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Senator Mansfield has informed me that you did not receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing a copy for your information.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Pfeiffer

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11: 25
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

Long → Miller
Cy → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

January 8, 1976

Senator Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

Thank you for your letter of December 15th in which you state that you would contact Mr. Miller and ask him to respond to my request. I am sorry to bother you again but I have had no word from Mr. Miller. As you know, I feel that the matter is of sufficient importance that it deserves a reply or at least an acknowledgement of a receipt of my letter from Mr. Miller.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:kcm

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

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Missoula, Montana 59801

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COPY

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Missoula, Montana 59801

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

bc: Senator Mike Mansfield

check w/ Ted Ralston

WM:mm

4. (- JMM) Met with Senator Frank Church regarding a letter he had written to Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana, stating that Senator Church had reliable information that Air America was responsible for defoliation operations in Cambodia. A copy of Senator Church's letter had been sent to the Director for comment by Professor Arthur H. Westing, Windham College in Vermont. I explained to the Senator we were much concerned over this allegation and the Director authorized me to deny it categorically. I added that while we were not prying into the identity of the Senator's source, we were curious as to whether this source's allegations were based on honest mistake or malice. If the former, I suggested the Senator might wish to straighten him out. Senator Church said he couldn't remember off hand where he learned this information but would check his files. He said he fully accepted our denial.

INTEL[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SEL COMM
File:

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

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I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Kall

Review Staff: 76-0229/2
27 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510 Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to requests about Agency involvement in Cambodia, the attached statement is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder

Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
Denial of CIA involvement in the resistance and dissident activities which occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to Communists

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 27 1976
CIA

UNCLASSIFIED

The Central Intelligence Agency has not been involved in any way in the resistance and dissident activities which have occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to the Communists.

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0229/1
23 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510 Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to your recent request about allegations of Agency involvement in Cambodia, please be advised that Mr. Ralston was given a copy of a 1971 letter from Senator Church to Professor Pfeiffer and a copy of a memorandum for the record reflecting a conversation between Senator Church and our Legislative Counsel about the specific allegation concerning the use of herbicides in Cambodia in 1969.

These memoranda were furnished Professor Pfeiffer in response to his FOIA request.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder

Walter Elder
Review Staff

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 24 1976
CIA

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

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DMc

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:bcm

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11:25
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

DMC

orig → Miller
copy → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

United States Senate

Washington, D. C., December 15, *19*75

Respectfully referred to

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee
  on Intelligence Activities
U. S. Senate

Correspondence from Professor E. W. Pfeiffer

I would appreciate your replying to Professor Pfeiffer directly.

M. M.

Mike Mansfield — *U. S. S.*

Form No. 3 — 16—45102-3 GPO

MISSOULIAN

THE MISSOULIAN P. O. BOX 1535 500 N. HIGGINS AVE. MISSOULA, MONTANA 59801 TEL. (406) 542-0311

Oct. 23, 1975

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 607, Capitol Hill Hotel
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Recently I discussed with Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, University of Montana zoologist, an incident in which he has had an abiding concern: the herbicide attack that occurred in eastern Cambodia in the spring of 1969.

As I understand it, from my talks with Dr. Pfeiffer and from my review of the correspondence he has received from various agencies, there is no doubt that the attack actually occurred, that it was large and significant, and that the nature of the chemicals and aircraft involved indicate that the U.S. had a direct role in carrying it out.

Yet it seems the State and Defense departments, the CIA and the "private" CIA-affiliate Air America have all denied in one way or another that they conducted the attack.

The obvious question is who did make the attack? Who ordered it, why was it ordered and under what authority? Dr. Pfeiffer has indicated your committee is looking into this matter and that the affair may ultimately be discussed in the course of Select Committee hearings at some point.

Is it possible for you to tell me the status of your inquiry? Would it be appropriate at this time for our newspaper to interview Dr. Pfeiffer and write a news story on the documents he has received, or would such a study benefit from new information your committee efforts may resurrect within the near future?

Thanks in advance for your interest. We have followed with great interest the Select Committee efforts to date.

orig → For TF
cy → Blue
cy → Chron

Sincerely,

xref Pfeiffer

Don Schwennesen

Don Schwennesen
Environmental Writer

E

Western Montana's Leading Newspaper

100% Recycled Paper

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

1975 OCT 30 PM 2:22
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Oct. 27, 1975

Mr. William Miller
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Rm G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Miller:

Through the good offices of Senator Mansfield, we met some weeks ago to discuss certain problems related to possible CIA activity in Cambodia. As you know, I am particularly interested in why the CIA cannot or will not find out who carried out the massive herbicide attack against Cambodia in the spring of 1969. The CIA has under the Freedom of Information Act provided me with some documents from my file which bear directly upon this strange episode and Senator Church's efforts to find out information for me. When we met you indicated that CIA activities in Indochina were to be investigated by the Select Committee. I would greatly appreciate knowing about when you think this subject will come up. I would also very much like to submit some of the documents I have received from the CIA and my personal testimony to the Committee. I believe that Professor A. Westing and myself were the last official guests of the Sihanouk regime before it was temporarily deposed.

I look forward to hearing from you on these matters.

Sincerely yours,

E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor

orig → WGM
cy → blue
cy → Cl Chron
cy → For. T. F. attn Cambodia expert

E

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

Aug. 6, 1975

Mr. Paul Wallach
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Room G 308 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Wallach:

As decided in our phone conversation today, I am writing to you about a conversation I had last week in Paris with an official of the Royal Government of Cambodia. He informed me that CIA-directed activities hostile to his government are presently occurring in his country, and that these activities are being launched from bases in Thailand. I would greatly appreciate your assistance in finding out for me whether any agency of the U.S. Government is presently carrying out activities against the Royal Government of Cambodia.

I greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk with you in person recently, and thank you for your interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology

orig → Wallach
cy → Blue chron

EM

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 26, 1971

E. W. Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive my delay in replying to your last letter of March 29, 1971. Although the Department of State has offered to make the Seventh Air Force Study available to me at the Department, I frankly have not had the chance to get down and study it.

I have been told, however, that Air America was responsible for the Cambodian defoliation. My source was not the State Department, but rather an individual who is in a position to know the facts in this matter.

It would be most useful to have a full study of the extent and the effects of our defoliation program in Southeast Asia. Perhaps you and Arthur Westing and others could get together to make a proposal for a study of this nature.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

Memorandum MM 2/14/74

To: Terry Lenzner

From : Jim Moore

Subject: Robert Maheu - John Roselli -

Hereis a summary of what I have done on the Roselli-Maheu connection.

Yesterday I spoke with David Nissen, who prosecuted Roselli in 1968 for being an unregistered alien and for being involved with hidden owners in the Friar's Club case. Nissen never met Maheu or spoke with him. However, he did remember that stories about Maheu and Roselli being involved in anti-Castro plots did come to his attention when he was investigating and prosecuting Roselli. He couldn't remember the source of those stories, saying that his information came from many people, including Justice Department lawyers in Washington and the FBI. One story he heard was that Maheu tried to intervene in Washington, either through direct contacts in the FBI or at Justice or through Edward P. Morgan, to kill the Roselli prosecution on the basis that Roselli had helped the United States in Cuba. Maheu was reportedly an old CIA agent,. Nissen remembers hearing at some point that Roselli had gone to Cuba in an attempt to assasinate Castro.

Nissen said that there are extensive files on Roselli maintained by the FBI or the Department. Nissen had a vague recollection that the files contained a story about Maheu somehow being involved in a wiretap on Sam Giancona, for whom Roselli worked. Nissen also remembered information about a meeting between Maheu and Giancona regarding Cuba, but he couldn't remember any of the specifics.

When Roselli came up for sentencing, he was represented by Tom Wadden, who had been associated in some capacity with Edward Bennett Williams. Wadden filed a motion to reduce sentence and included with it two columns by Jack Anderson that recounted the story of Roselli and Maheu trying to assasinate Castro. Nissen thought the motion might also have included an affidavit from Edward P. Morgan. The government successfully resisted the motion on the grounds of fraud, since Wadden produced no witnesses or documentation to support his claim. I called the Federal Court in Los Angeles, and they have sent the motion for reduction of sentence, and attached papers to us. The Clerk there told me that in addition to the Anderson columns, the motion included affidavits from Anderson and Les Whitten vouching for the unnamed source of the columns.

Roselli is now in Florida so he can be reached, but, according to Nissen, Giancona is in exile somewhere in Mexico.

FRONTIER CASE

Nissen never heard about Maheu being questioned in Washington in lieu of the Grand Jury appearance. Nissen did not try the Frontier case, because he had been promoted to supervisory capacity. However, he seemed surprised that he had never heard of such a meeting. He gave me the names of three lawyers who handled the case after he gave up direct responsibility for it. My phone interview with the first of them, Jerry Ullman, is written up as a separate interview. The second Lawyer, John Hornbeck, has not yet returned my phone call. The third, Tom Kotoski, actually tried the case. He is now an assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles and about to become head of the San Francisco Strike Force. He will be in Washington Thursday and Friday, February 14 and 15, and I have asked him to call me as soon as possible.

One final note - Nissen said that the Roselli file in the Justice Department contains many references to Maheu. He never, however, saw or heard about a file kept on Maheu himself.

Richard Crane, head of the Organized Crime office in Los Angeles, is also in town until the end of this week. He may know something about Maheu and Roselli, as well as about Dalitz coming back to the Desert Inn. He should call me this evening or tomorrow morning. Also, Mike DeFeo, head of the Kansas City Strike Force, will be in town tomorrow and Friday. He, according to Crane, might know something about the Dunes. In addition, Will Wilson mentioned the strike force man from Kansas City as the one who set up the Maheu interview at the Justice Department. I spoke with DeFeo today, and he will call me tomorrow to arrange a meeting time before he leaves town.



NAME	: Sam GIANCANA
ALIASES	: Sam Mooney, Sam Malone
DESCRIPTION	: Born 7-16-08, Chicago, Ill.; 5'9", 175 lbs., hazel eyes, dark chestnut hair, fair complexion and medium build.
LOCALITIES FREQUENTED	: Resides at 1147 Wenonah Ave. Oak Park, Ill. Frequents the Army Lounge, Norwood House, Villa Venice, all of Chicago, Illinois.
FAMILY BACKGROUND	: Wife, Angeline DeTolve, died in 1954. Has three daughters, Annette, Bonita Lou and Francine. Mother deceased, father is Tony Giancana, and sisters are Mary, Josephine and Victoria. Sam's consort is Ladana Collins, 20 E. Delaware, Chicago, Illinois.
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES	: Tony Accardo, Paul Ricco, Willie Baddone, Nicholas D'Amico, Sam Battaglia and Leonard Gianola, all of Chicago, Illinois.
CRIMINAL HISTORY	: FBI #58437, Chicago PD #E-27465. Subject has record of 13 arrests dating from Sept. 1925, on such charges as murder, grand larceny, auto theft, burglary and liquor law violations with two felony convictions.
BUSINESS	: Owns the Forest Lounge, the R & S Liquor Co., the Lohmar Dist. Co., Chicago, Ill., and has gambling interests and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba.
MODUS OPERANDI	: A top ranking member of the Mafia in the State of Ill. and a director of the organization's activities in Chicago and vicinity.

NAME : Giovanni ROSELLI

ALIASES : John Roselli, John Russelli, John Kasselle, John Passelli

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-4-04 Chicago, Ill, 5'8", 171 lbs, brown-grey hair, blue eyes.

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED : Resides 1251 No. Crescent Hts., Hollywood, Cal. Frequents gambling casinos at Las Vegas where he has room at Tropicana Hotel. Travels frequently all parts U.S.

FAMILY BACKGROUND : Divorced from movie actress June Lang; father: Vincenzo; mother: Maria Russo (both deceased); cousin: Joseph Evangelista.

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES : Dragna family, Philip Kastel, Harold Meltzer, Francisco Costiglia, Charles Fischetti, Louis Piscopo.

CRIMINAL HISTORY : FBI #3339986. L.A. Sheriff's Office #51247. Record dating from 1926 includes arrests for suspicion of robbery, vagrancy, interfering with trade, mail fraud & violation of parole.

BUSINESS : Vice-President Monte Prosser Productions and varied other interests.

MODUS OPERANDI : A top Mafia figure at Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Active in labor racketeering and control of gambling.

SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C., CHAIRMAN
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, N. MEX.

SAMUEL DASH
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
FRED D. THOMPSON
MINORITY COUNSEL
RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
DEPUTY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 60, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Senator Ervin

From: Terry Lenzner and Marc Lackritz

Subject: Relevance to S. Res. 60 of John Rosselli's testimony about his CIA activities

Summary:

John Rosselli and his attorney, Tom Wadden, object to testifying about Rosselli's involvement with Robert Maheu in a CIA-financed plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960's. The objection is based upon national security grounds as well as an assertion by Mr. Wadden that the material is not relevant to our inquiry under S. Res. 60.

Testimony of Mr. Rosselli about this matter is relevant and necessary to our investigation for a variety of reasons.

Facts:

During the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA apparently financed and organized a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. Among the participants in this plot were Robert Maheu and John Rosselli. Maheu had a public relations business at the time, and Rosselli was associated with some alleged organized crime figures (e.g. Sam Giancana) who had lost substantial gambling investments when Castro came to power. Apparently, the plot continued into the early 1960's even after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, but it failed in attaining its objective of killing Castro.

Only a few officials in the government knew of the existence of the plot at that time.

Justice Department officials stumbled across this information about the plot as a result of their investigation into an illegal wiretap by Sam Giancana in the early 1960's.

The sensitive information was brought to the attention of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and either he or then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy ordered the prosecution of Giancana dropped in order not to compromise national security considerations.

The information about the alleged assassination plot then lay dormant in a secret file in the Department of Justice until early 1969, when Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson requested the file from the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Section. The file was returned to Central Files shortly after it was taken out.

Assistant Attorney General Wilson next requested the secret Justice file in early 1971 in connection with his interview of Robert Maheu on January 27, 1971 (see attached chronology). This interview at the Department of Justice, in lieu of a grand jury appearance, was arranged by a telephone call to Attorney General Mitchell on January 19, 1971, only one day after Jack Anderson published his first column linking both Maheu and Rosselli to the CIA plot to kill Castro. (see attached)

However, the significance of Anderson's column on January 18, 1971, was that <u>on the same day</u>, Haldeman requested Dean to find out what he could about the Hughes - Maheu - O'Brien relationship.

In the follow-up memos from Caulfield to Dean on the Maheu-O'Brien link, Caulfield notes Maheu's prior "covert activities" for the CIA and advises Dean that a check into CIA, FBI, and IRS files on Robert Maheu is advisable to avoid a "counter-scandal."

In addition, Assistant Attorney General Wilson showed the sensitive "Castro file" to Attorney General Mitchell, in January, 1971, and discussed with him the political implications of the information. Following the on-the-record interview of Maheu on January 27, 1971, by Lynch, Wilson and Petersen, Maheu was interviewed privately by Wilson concerning his prior CIA activities with John Rosselli. Maheu was <u>not</u> forthcoming with information about the plot at that time. Attorney General Mitchell discussed the contents of the sensitive file with President Nixon, according to Wilson, who had advised him to do so.

<u>Conclusion:</u>

Therefore, the obsession of the Administration in keeping tabs on Larry O'Brien in 1971 and 1972 was in part motivated by a fear that Maheu would impart some of this sensitive information about the plot

gedly handsome gambler with contacts Roselli, Harvey said he had a high

to O'Brien. Alternatively the objective was to discover if there was any information about the plot that might be damaging to the Democrats that O'Brien might possess from Maheu. And these concerns could have been a possible motivation for the break-in to the offices of the DNC and Larry O'Brien by four Cuban-Americans on June 17, 1972, especially since their directions were to photograph any documents relating to Cuban contributions or Cuban involvement in the 1972 Democratic campaign.

It is for these reasons that we wish to question John Rosselli about the nature and scope of his activities with Robert Maheu in the early 1960's.

gedly handsome gambler with contacts

Roselli, Harvey said he had a high

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<u>CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS</u>

Thanksgiving, 1970	Hughes leaves Las Vegas.
December 4, 1970	Maheu is fired.
January 18, 1971	Jack Anderson column published linking Mal and Rosselli to plot to kill Castro.
January 18, 1971	Haldeman sends memo to Dean requesting i mation on O'Brien-Maheu-Hughes relations
January 19, 1971	Jack Anderson column appears with more det on Maheu's involvement in plot to assassin Castro.
January 19, 1971	<u>Attorney General John Mitchell called Robert Maheu</u> in Las Vegas at 5:12 p.m. and talked
January 25, 1971	<u>Caulfield to Dean memo</u> discussing Danner relationship with Maheu, O'Brien relationsh with Maheu, and request for investigation i CIA, FBI, IRS files for information to avoid a "counter-scandal."
January 25, 1971	John Rosselli enters prison.
January 26, 1971	Dean to Haldeman memo on Maheu-O'Brien-Hughes relationship
January 27, 1971	Maheu interviewed at Department of Justice A.A.G. Will Wilson, Henry Petersen and Bill Lynch, in lieu of an appearance before the Grand Jury. Interview is about "skimming" i Las Vegas.
January 27, 1971	A.A.G. Wilson and Petersen meet with Mahe privately to discuss Maheu's prior CIA activi
February 1, 1971	<u>Caulfield to Dean</u> memo noting that Maheu wa involved in "covert activities" for the CIA in early 1960's.
February 12, 1971	Rosselli's attorney files a Motion to Reduce Sentence based on Rosselli's prior CIA activi

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban un-

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high regard for him.

equality —B of "inc

(VERIFICATION — 446, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF } ss.

I am the ______________________________

____

in the above entitled action; I have read the foregoing ______________________________

____

and know the contents thereof; and I certify that the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true.

____

____

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on ______________ (date) *at* ______________ (place), *California*

____
Signature

(PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL -- 1013a, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF Los Angeles } ss.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is:

9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400, Beverly Hills, California 90210

On June 25, *19*71, *I served the within* Notice of Motion For Reduction of Sentence (Rule 35 FRCP); Points and Authorities; Affidavits in Support Thereof

on the Plaintiff

in said action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Beverly Hills, California

addressed as follows:

DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring St.
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on June 25, 1971 (date) *at* Beverly Hills (place), *California*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of June, 1971.

[signature]

OFFICIAL SEAL
KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Commission Expires August 29, 1972

KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL

[signature]
Signature
Myrna J. Weinstein

**Both the verification and proof of service by mail forms, being signed under penalty of perjury, do not require notarization.*

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service

To all to [illegible]om these presents shall come, Greeting:

By v[illegible]u[illegible] of the authority vested in me by the Administrator of General Services, I certify o[illegible] his behalf, under the seal of the United States General Services Administration, that the [illegible]ach[illegible] reproduction(s) is a true and correct copy of documents in his custody.

GSA [illegible] 68-13478

SIGNATURE (signed)	
NAME GILBERT DORAME	DATE FEB 12 1974
TITLE Center Manager	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEPOSITORY General Services Administration (9NC-L) Federal Records Center, NARS 4747 Eastern Avenue Bell, CA 90201	

R9 Overprint 33 (4-72) GSA FORM APR 68 6791E

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U. S. Courthouse Building
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Tel: 688-2406

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

FILED
FEB 17 4 46 PM '71
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.
BY [signature]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, Defendant.	No. 1175-PH-CD GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

Plaintiff, United States of America, strongly opposes defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence based upon the files and records in the case and the attached Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney

[signature: David R. Nissen]
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

DRN:jt

FPI-LPC-5-67-150M-3124

MEMORANDUM

John Rosselli is actually Filippo Sacco, born July 4, 1905, in Italy of parents Vincenzo and Maria Sacco. Vincenzo Sacco came to the United States after the birth of Filippo, his oldest child, and in 1911, Mrs. Sacco and Filippo joined Vincenzo in the United States where they resided as aliens in East Boston.

Filippo Sacco completed the sixth grade in the public schools of East Boston and was discharged from school in 1917. By this time Filippo had two younger brothers and two younger sisters. In 1918, Vincenzo Sacco died. His wife Maria and the five children moved into the residence of Liberato Cianciulli and a daughter was born in 1920. In 1922, Maria and Cianciulli were married.

In 1922, Filippo had a job driving a horse-drawn milk wagon and was nicknamed "Milky". However, in addition to his legitimate occupation, Filippo had made connections with the criminal element in East Boston and was engaged in narcotic traffic with his headquarters in and around Maverick Square. On September 14, 1922, Filippo sold morphine to a government informant named Fisher while under surveillance by a narcotic agent. On September 19, 1922, Filippo arranged for a large sale from his "source" and was present and under agent surveillance when the morphine was delivered. On September 29, 1922, Filippo Sacco and his "source" were arrested by Federal narcotics agents. On October 18, 1922, the Federal Grand Jury in Boston indicted Sacco for the sale of narcotic drugs and two days later he was released on bail. While awaiting trial in the narcotics case, in Federal Court, Sacco was arrested and indicted in Massachusetts State Court for grand larceny and was released on bail on July 2, 1923.

In 1923, while he was on bail awaiting trial in the narcotics and larceny cases, Filippo Sacco jumped bail in both cases and disappeared from East Boston. The Government narcotics informant, Fisher, disappeared about the same time and Government sources believe that he may have been killed to prevent him from testifying. Because of his fugitive status, both indictments against Sacco were dropped.

After Sacco's flight from his home in 1923, he spent some time in New York and Chicago, and finally made his appearance in Los Angeles in 1924 under the fictitious name "John Roselli." Sources indicate that Sacco engaged in bootlegging and hijacking during this period and police records show he was frequently arrested on such charges as carrying concealed weapons, and suspicion of robbery.

After 1930, Sacco became associated with the Al Capone gang in Chicago and was also closely associated with organized crime in Los Angeles. Reliable sources relate that he was an executioner for the criminal organizations in both cities. In 1936, by demands and threats, Sacco forced his way into part ownership of "Nationwide News Service," a horseracing information service used by bookmakers across the country.

After prohibition was repealed, Sacco left the bootlegging business and associated himself with Columbia Picture Studios. As a close friend of Los Angeles underworld leader Jack Dragna, Sacco soon became known as a labor muscleman and racketeer for the movie studios. In 1943, Sacco was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to extort millions of dollars from movie producers and a labor union. Also indicted were union officials Browne and Bioff, and the following ranking members of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra family: Frank Nitto (aka Nitti), Louis Campagna, Paul DeLucia (aka Paul "the waiter" Ricia), Phil D'Andrea, Francis Manitote (aka Frank Diamond), and Charles "Cherry Nose"

FPI-LPC-5-67-150M-3124

Gioe. In 1944, Sacco and the Chicago defendants were convicted and all were sentenced to ten years in prison.

In 1947, Sacco and all his co-defendants were paroled immediately upon their becoming eligible therefor. There were indications that their release had been secured by bribery but admissible evidence sufficient for prosecution was not obtained. In July 1948, Sacco's parole was revoked because of his continued association with known criminals and he was imprisoned until November 1948, when his parole was reinstated. Shortly after Sacco's parole terminated in March 1954, William Bioff, a key Government witness at the extortion trial was murdered by the bombing of his vehicle. (The trial judge reportedly had warned the defendants that if anything happened to Bioff while they were on parole he would hold them responsible.) Two other co-defendants of Sacco have also been victims of gang slayings.

Upon his release from prison, Sacco returned to Los Angeles and again associated himself with a movie studio. Reliable sources report that this was a front and in fact, through his close association with Sam Giancana of Chicago, Sacco received the responsibility of overseeing the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld. Sacco immediately became a powerful figure in Las Vegas. He travels back and forth between Las Vegas and Los Angeles extensively and associates with the known Cosa Nostra members and major gamblers.

Rosselli appeared before the Kefauver Committee investigating organized crime and falsely testified concerning his association with underworld figures and even his own personal background.

During the period 1956-1958, Sacco was very active in the construction and pre-opening operation of the Tropicana Hotel, and Sacco received the lease to operate the gift shop. The

FPI-LPC-5-67-150M-3124

Nevada Gaming Control Board refused to allow the Tropicana to open as long as Sacco was associated with its operation, whereupon the hotel owners were forced to buy back the gift shop lease at a cost of $180,000, reportedly about thirty times the amount paid for the lease.

During the above period, Sacco also involved himself in the production of shows for the Tropicana, but again the Gaming Control Board refused to allow him to participate in any capacity and he sold his interest. Following his ouster from the Tropicana, Sacco sold ice machines to most of the Las Vegas hotels at prices far in excess of prices on the open market. Sacco has also received numerous "finders fees" from various Las Vegas hotels and casinos for which few if any services were performed.

In October 1960, Sacco and T. W. Richardson were involved in placing a wire tap on the telephone of comedian Dan Rowan in Las Vegas at the request of Chicago gangster Sam Giancana.

In May 1968, Sacco was convicted of failing to register as an alien and report his address annually. In the course of that trial, it was shown that birth records in Chicago, Illinois, had been forged in an effort to make it appear that Sacco had been born there as John Rosselli. Sacco has long been a close friend of Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk, Cook County, Illinois, in whose office the birth records for Chicago were kept.

Among Sacco's underworld associates are the following:

Al Capone - head of the Chicago underworld gang;

Charles F. Fischetti - a Capone lieutenant;

Micky Cohen - gambler and racketeer;

Jack Dragna - leader of the Cosa Nostra, Los Angeles, now deceased;

Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel - member of Murder, Inc., murdered June 20, 1947;

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Allen Smiley - gambler, bookmaker, racketeer;
Tony Accardo - ranking Cosa Nostra figure;
Momo Adams - ranking Cosa Nostra figure; and
Frank Costello - ranking Cosa Nostra figure.

Numerous prospective witnesses in the course of investigations concerning Sacco's criminal activities have expressed or displayed fear at the prospect of being called to testify against him, and a number of witnesses have refused to testify.

In the Friars Club trial, it was apparent that a number of witnesses deliberately perjured themselves in order to exonerate Sacco, including Friedman, Vinnie Donato, Lee Deer, and Nat Ross.

Defendant Sacco was convicted in the Friars Club case in December 1968 of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained securities. He was also convicted of making a false statement in his income tax return. Sacco has had a long practice of concealing the source and nature of his income. He was sentenced to five years in prison.

In view of Sacco's extensive criminal record extending back more than 40 years, as well as his membership and participation in the organized criminal syndicate known as Cosa Nostra, we strongly urge that defendant Sacco's sentence not be reduced for any reason whatsoever. He is a genuine menace to society and, in particular, to those witnesses who have testified against him.

FPI-LPC-8-67-150M-3134

<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL</u>

I, JUNE S. TOKUYAMA, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by mail described in this Certificate was made; that on February 17, 1971, I deposited in the United States mails in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles, California, in the above-entitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO REDUCE SENTENCE

addressed to Adrian Marshall, Esq.
Attorney at Law
9601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

at his last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by United States mail.

This Certificate is executed on February 17, 1971, at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

June S. Tokuyama
JUNE S. TOKUYAMA

USA-12c-240
(Rev. 10/19/67)

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden, 888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any informatior about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify about the matter. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's involvement with Maheu in 1960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to interview Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.)

John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't

want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantive discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Perry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

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John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't

want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantive discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor,ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

This is cover page of a 25 count indictment arising from Δ's use of the FRIAR'S Club in Beverly Hills for illegal gambling activities.

FILED

DEC 21 1967

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY [signature] DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN; MANUEL JACOBS (aka RICKY JACOBS); VICTOR G. LANDS; T. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (aka JOHN ROSSELLI); BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, Defendants.	NO. 1432 INDICTMENT [18 U.S.C. §371: Conspiracy; 18 U.S.C. §1952: Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering; 18 U.S.C. §2314: Interstate Transportation of Funds Obtained by Fraud; 47 U.S.C. §502: Operating Uncertified Communication Device; 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1) Subscribing False Tax Return.]

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

[18 USC §371]

Commencing prior to June 15, 1962, and continuing to the date of the return of this indictment, defendants MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN, MANUEL JACOBS (also known as RICKY JACOBS), VICTOR G. LANDS, T. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (also known as JOHN ROSSELLI), BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, and their unindicted co-conspirators Ernest S. Allen, Vernall Furlong (also known as William G. Douglas), Edwin Nathaniel Gebhard (also known as Pete Kelly, Pete Peterson, and George McFarland), Alfred Mathes, George E. Seach, and Albert Snyder agreed, confederated and conspired together to commit offenses against the United States as follows:

(a) To travel in interstate commerce and use facilities

DRN:mlm:mt

FPI-LPC-8-67-150M-3124

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272-9211

Attorneys for Defendant
Filippo Sacco, also known as
John Rosselli

FILED

JUN 28 9 31 AM '71

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.
BY [signature]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7-6-71
2PM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FILIPPO SACCO, also known as
JOHN ROSSELLI, et al,
Defendants

NO. 1432 - Criminal (WPG)

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE (RULE 35 FRCP); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO DAVID R. NISSEN, Chief, Criminal Division, United States Attorneys Office, Los Angeles, California:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that On July 6, 1971, at 2:00 o'clock P.M., or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, at the Courtroom of the Honorable William P. Gray, defendant, Filippo Sacco, also known as John Rosselli, will move the Court for a reduction of sentence entered in this case. Said motion will be based upon the grounds stated herein, the affidavits attached hereto, additional affidavits defendant proposes to file before the date of the hearing, oral testimony to be presented at the hearing, and all of the files, records, pleadings and other documents in this case.

Defendant was convicted of one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §371, one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952, three counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. §2314 and one count of violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1).

Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00 on Count One, two years to run consecutively to Count One and

a fine of $10,000.00 for Count Six, and two years imprisonment to run concurrently with Count Six and a fine of $10,000.00 for each of Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the Indictment, and one year imprisonment to run concurrently with Count One and a fine of $5,000.00 for Count Twenty-Two. The total imprisonment was five years and the total fine was $55,000.00.

On January 18th and 19th, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles by columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Government as set forth in said articles. The affidavits of Jack Anderson and his assistant, Les Whitten, are attached hereto and included therewith are copies of the columns, set forth as Exhibits A and B. Exhibits A and B were published on the 18th and 19th of January, 1971. Attached as Exhibit C is a follow-up column which appeared on February 24, 1971, and Exhibits D and E which are copies of the office records of columnist Jack Anderson, which were released and published on April 18th and April 27th, 1971.

The undersigned is informed that at no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters set forth in Exhibits A and B of the attached affidavits brought to the Court's attention. It is the belief of the undersigned that had these matters been brought to the Court's attention they would have materially affected the sentence handed down by the Court in this case.

Defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion and to present the testimony of at least one witness at the hearing on July 6, 1971. The additional affidavits and/or testimony to be produced at the hearing may relate to the financial ability of defendant to pay the fine of $55,000.00 as well as the condition of defendant's health.

/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /
/ / / / / /

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. United States v. Ellenbogen (2nd Cir.) 390 F. 2d 537.

DATED: June 25, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall
ADRIAN MARSHALL

Attorneys for Defendant,
Filippo Sacco, also known
as John Rosselli

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

JACK ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am a nationally syndicated columnist writing under my own by-line. For many years prior to the death of Mr. Drew Pearson, he and I wrote a column known as the "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I wrote the articles attached hereto as Exhibits A and B pertaining to certain activities performed by John Rosselli, the Defendant herein, on behalf of the United States Government.

3. The information contained in said articles was made available to me by persons employed by the United States Government who, in the past, have supplied me with accurate and truthful information as pertains to other subjects.

4. After receiving said basic information, my staff and I conducted an impartial and independent investigation regarding John Rosselli's activities as described in Exhibit A, which were performed at the behest of Agents of the United States Government.

5. The aforementioned investigation satisfied me that the facts set forth in Exhibit A are a truthful account of Mr. Rosselli's activities as described therein.

JACK ANDERSON

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

LESLIE WHITTEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am employed as principal associate of nationally-syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, writer of "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I worked on certain articles relating to John Rosselli, and services performed by him on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Federal Government.

3. As part of my investigation, I twice called William K. Harvey, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official, now of Indianapolis.

4. On my first call, in January, I asked Harvey if it were not true that he had personally intervened with the Justice Department in order to mitigate the government's prosecution of Rosselli on the basis that Rosselli had done a formidable service for his country. Harvey said "this is a long story . . . I don't think it ought to be printed." I asked him whether it was not true that he had a high regard for Rosselli. "I still do," he earnestly replied.

5. In pursuing the story further, I called Harvey again in Indianapolis in February and asked him whether he could comment on our story about Rosselli which by now has been published widely in the United States. He declined to comment. But

he twice reaffirmed his "high regard" for Rosselli. I advised him I was making an affidavit on Rosselli's behalf and he expressed concern for Rosselli, asked his present status and said he would "follow up" on Rosselli's behalf from his end.

6. Based on my part of the investigation, I am satisfied that the facts set down in Exhibit A, appended to the Affidavit of Jack Anderson, are a truthful account of Rosselli's activities on behalf of the United States.

Leslie Whitten

LESLIE WHITTEN

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Jane P. Jones

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

STATE OF CALIFORNIA }
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

being by me first duly sworn, deposes and says: that he is the

in the above entitled action; that he has read the foregoing

and knows the contents thereof; and that the same is true of own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated upon information or belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______

day of ______, 19___

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

Received copy of the within Notice of Motion, Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof. 12th day of February 1971

RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT Attorney for Plaintiff

Received copy of the within THIS 12th DAY OF Feb. 1971 day of ______ 19___

U. S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
BY E. Gomez Attorney for

(AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL — 1013a, C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA }
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

______ being first duly sworn says: That affiant is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; that affiant is over the age of eighteen years and is not a party to the within above entitled action; that affiant's business residence address is: ______

that on the ______ day of ______, 19___, affiant served the within ______

on the ______ in said action, by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the attorney___ of record for said ______ at the residence office address of said attorney___, as follows: *

and by then sealing said envelope and depositing the same, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at the city where is located the office of the attorney___ for the person___ by and for whom said service was made.

That there is a delivery service by United States mail at the place so addressed or ** there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed. and

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______

day of ______, 19___

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

*Here quote from envelope name and address of addressee.
**When the letter is addressed to a post office other than where mailed from, strike out "and"; when addressed to the same city where mailed from, strike out "or."

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272 9211

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, Defendant.	NO. 1175- PH MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Defendant FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, by his attorneys, ADRIAN MARSHALL and WADDEN, WALL & RUDY, requests this Court to grant a hearing for the presentation of oral testimony and other evidence in support of defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence entered in this case. As grounds therefor defendant alleges:

1. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violation of Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1302 and 1306 (a) and Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1305 and 1306 (b) and sentenced to six months on Count 1 and thirty days on Counts 2 through 6, all to run concurrently.

2. On January 18, 1971, the mandate was spread and defendant was ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal at noon on January 25, 1971, for direct delivery of defendant to Terminal Island for service of his sentence.

3. On January 18 and 19, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles of columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency in an

assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Attached hereto as Exhibits A and B are Xerox copies of said publications.

4. At no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters referred to in Exhibits A and B brought to the Court's attention.

5. At an evidentiary hearing, defendant will present oral testimony and other evidence in support of this motion related to the matters set forth in Jack Anderson's column which defendant feels will materially affect the Court's reconsideration of the sentence entered in this case.

6. On or before February 19, 1971, defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion.

Dated: February 12, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall

ADRIAN MARSHALL
Attorneys for Defendant.

Security Clearance information on Allen Spence

Date of application: 8/24/76
(10 working day delay —)
Date submitted to the Bureau: 9/8/76

5 people - none yet cleared

Expect summary report this week (will be told by Dick Taylor this P.M.)

Tyler Abel has custody of personnel records

– in alien history
only Clf int ras
use of pills
unknown source – 4 mo. before.
New Orleans.
p67

Bob Miller
Physical Measurements
V

R4297

June 24, 1975 Testimony of John Rosselli before Committee
Senator Church presiding

p. 7-8 Los Angeles

Rosselli first met Maheu in approximately July, 1960, pursuant to a telephone call from Maheu. At their first meeting, Maheu told Rosselli that a high government official had requested that Maheu recruit Rosselli to "fight Communism 90 miles away from Florida" -- to recruit Cubans to assassinate Castro.

New York

p. 10-11 Rosselli had second meeting with Maheu and went to New York in September under the alias of John Rawlston [Castro was in New York at this time]. Rosselli met Jim O'Connell of CIA, plus "three others."

Florida

p. 12-15 O'Connell, Maheu and Rosselli met in Florida hotel approximately one week after New York. Rosselli introduced Giancana to Maheu. Also introduced X (Trafficante) to Maheu. Obtained permission from Maheu to bring Giancanainto project.

p. 17 Rosselli recruits Cuban #1, Rosselli's cover was as Wall Street businessman. Rosselli and Maheu agree on a $250,000 price tag for the job.

p. 20 O'Connell never met Cubans. Trafficante, Cubans and Maheu met. Maheu brought $10,000 and poison capsules.

p. 26 Rosselli told Giancana about CIA involvement to keep his mouth shut. Rosselli only had one discussion with Giancana.

p. 27 O'Connell called Rosselli after Bay of Pigs. Met in Florida not long after Bay of Pigs with William Harvey, O'Connell and Rosselli. Harvey told Rosselli that he wanted Rosselli to have nothing to do with Maheu and not to use Giancana connections.

p. 35 Rosselli indicates that pro-Castro people in Florida probably had inkling of assassination attempts.

p. 44 During Missle Crisis, Harvey asked Rosselli to see if "they" had any intelligence on us, on the missiles.

TOP SECRET

p. 68-70 FBI agents Hill and Dodge met with Rosselli and his lawyer, Cantillon. At this time Dodge informed Rosselli that the FBI was aware that he was not a U.S. citizen. Dodge indicated something about Nevada and some other secret organizations.

p. 71-75 Rosselli met with Sheffield Edwards in 1966 for some drinks and discussed his problems with the FBI.

p. 76-78 Rosselli received a telephone call from an FBI agent, Jack Barron in June of 1970. The agent informed Rosselli that his appeals can be reversed. He was told that his lawyers and friends can't do anything for him in Washington.

p. 79-80 Rosselli talked with Bill Harvey prior to his testimony before the Select Committee to see if Harvey had objections and Harvey only suggested that Rosselli protect those people whose lives and whose families might be jeopardized by his testimony.

p. 81 Rosselli stated he did not know the five so-called Watergate burglars -- Hunt, McCord, Barker, Martinez or Sturgis.

p. 82 Roselli had no doubt that the Cuban operation was on behalf of the CIA and not Mr. Hughes.

p. 84 Rosselli stated that his Cuban contacts were never informed that this was a CIA project, but that he represented a Wall Street business.

In the period 1967-1968, Rosselli failed to register as an alien and faced criminal charges.

p. 85-87 Rosselli describes how he is brought into the operation -- Maheu's contact and O'Connell's satisfying him that they were government representatives.

p. 88 Rosselli stated that Sheffield Edwards was not overly concerned with the FBI's contacting Rosselli.

p. 89 Rossell's reason for not informing his sources that it was a CIA operation was because he believed he would be more successful doing what he was doing by representing big business.

p. 90 When the FBI contacted Rosselli in both 1966 and 1970 they hinted that they wanted Rosselli to provide information about United States gambling interests.

TOP SECRET

p. 44 After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the whole operation came to a halt and Rosselli said he was never in contact with the Cubans again.

p. 45-46 Rosselli met Harvey at Dulles Airport in Washington after the Missile Crisis, in June 1963, and had dinner with him in Washington that night.

p. 47 Rosselli mentions FBI had him under surveillance for several years.

p. 47 Roselli has two stories re Rowan wiretap from Maheu. Maheu told him he wanted Rosselli to get some bail money for two guys in Las Vegas who were in trouble and he had placed some taps in Rowan's room because 1) Maheu was doing Giancana a favor, and 2) Maheu had the authority to see if Giancana was leaking to his girlfriend.

p. 52 Rosselli arranged bail money for the two men who were caught tapping Rowan's room.

p. 52 Giancana laughed when Rosselli discussed tapping incident with him, but gave no clues to the reason for the tap.

p. 54-55 Rosselli met in New York with O'Connell and Harvey in April 1962.

p. 58 Rosselli states to the Committee that he felt the CIA came to him because he has contacts in Cuba.

p. 59 Rosselli states he took on "project" because it was the government; he was patriotic.

p. 61 Rosselli knew Trafficante before "operation" started.

p. 62 Rosselli maintained some contact with Maheu after Harvey took over.

p. 64 Rosselli still is social friends with Harvey.

p. 66 In April or May of 1966, Rosselli was stopped in the street by two FBI agents with note saying to meet him later. Rosselli referred them to his attorney, Mr. Cantillon

TOP SECRET

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Howard--

In re your "battle plan" memo to Hart and Garn, I think you should consider possible wisdom of our Committee making some kind of very low-key anouncement that we're doing something. Purpose would be two-fold--to prevent getting wholly co-opted by new House Committee (and agencies making a claim that since House is doing it, they can ignore us---also to put House on notice there is specific area we have carved and will continue to carve out for ourselves). Most important, we must do something affirmative to insure that the sources out there come to <u>us</u>. If we say nothing, potentials which just go to House under assumption that that's the only thing going on.

Attached is the type of low-key someone could say in response to an inquiry (which I assume Spencer gets lots of).

Mike

JFK assassination study

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is also ~~seeking to determine~~ continuing to explore the question of whether or Mr. Roselli's murder was related in any way to his ~~testimony~~ appearances before the Church Committee.

Items Interest re Review of R 4881 documents (requested by Rick)

> Need unsanitized copy 3 May 74 memo re Records Search by Logistics & access to all 2nd element [illegible] to the IG.

> Why did Houston tell Lyle Miller (per Miller's 14 Mar 74 memo) that only himself, Edw, Osb, Angleton & Rocca aware of details of Maheu, Giancana matter.

SECRET (1)

- 1 file

SECRET - Cable 24 July 74

while not directly involved + admittedly unaware of all facts + ramifications ref a exposure to Atlanta base of opinion / termination at this stage, even if only temporary expedient, will have adverse effect on his loyalty to CIA. He might resent termination by CIA for something he not respons. for.

(Response to Mason identifying Mehringer as a CIA officer w/ Los Vegas Sun: in July 1974)

March '76 OS memos to IG on Maheu + Hughes

June-1974

Security Officer Special Staff Projects asked OS to check records on James R. Phelan + Wallace Turner, both of interest in connection w/ a sensitive SPS activity. OS records show Phelan to be a witness in Clay Shaw trial. Phelan wrote several articles re Maheu's defamation suit w/ Hughes. Maheu thought to be source. Duckett recalled

2 receiving call from RAM in Dec 1970 complaining that CIA embarked on a new Hughes project + had not gone thru him. (Maheu - Hughes fight reason for termin w/ RAMA)

Non OS/Sec. Doc's in Mehringer OS File

1 Feb 71 Memo from Eric I to DDP - discusses efforts to work out a satis. plan to terminate RRM from RAMA cover in a manner that avoids the need for a meeting w/ RAMA officers

X

Non OIS Docs) in RAM's file SECRET (2)

21 June 66 Houston to DDCI re Long Subcommittee and RAM: John Leon testified before Long Subcom. on Onassis case + subcom. staff undoubtedly knew Maheu used audio device.

Lyle Miller Memo For Record 14 March 1974
par. B Notes contact w/ L. Houston re Maheu/Giancana
Houston said the only Agency officials "aware of details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and himself."

Lyle Miller MFR 10 Oct 73
re meeting w/ Scott Armst. re his interview of 3 10/3/73 + interest in RAM assoc. w/ CIA.
"New Years Eve Party" - Wilkinson report critical of CIA.

5 page PELTIER memo 11/18/68 re "OBservations on Cover Company Personnel + Activities" (RAMA).

4 page 2 Apr 71 MFR of O'CONNELL + ? (CCS/LPGLOBE) meeting w/ Ed Mullen (Intertel) re RAMA/MM/CIA. (Juan Duran) [J. Duran Arias] $10,000 withdrawn

Rodriak cut 7 - Mullen/Intertel SECRET (5)

14 MAY 62 TOP SECRET Edwards MFR - re Batteli.
memo prepared for RFK following oral briefing.
"Rosselli and Maheu spent consid.
time in Miami talking with the
Courier. Giancanni also present.
Giancanni put them in touch w/ a
"Courier" who went back & forth to Havanna.
Courier said op. feasible

Edw. put in quotes

Jan 71 — All CIA contact w/ RAM cut off.
because Hughes battle + unfav. publ.
However - Osb. notes that Helms had
directed termin. of Maheu relat. as
early as 1966. "flags" ignored

O'Connell MFR 1/5/71 - re: RAM
On 17 Nov. 70 - Maheu called O'Connell
to say that Rosselli's lawyer advised
that unless someone interceded on his
behalf re deportation - Ros. was going
to make complete expose of his activities
w/ CIA"

4 Jan 71 - Maheu advised O'C - that his
past affilia. w/ CIA had no bearing on
Hughes power struggle situation.

SECRET

(4)

Review STAFF FILE - EA Property

7/15/72 OS memo to Colby re Rosselli

DCI ignored Rosselli exposure threat, taking calcul. risk as to exposure. [Sanitizes CIA officer's name for unknown reason]

5 June 75 — Subm. to Schwartz from Knoche - Elder for

Typewritten - fragmentary resume - Cubela.

SECRET (5)

Bill Angeloni - used for dirty work - Surveil. by Maheu

Maheu file "Gaps".

Vol. 1 Nov 63 - Dec. 73 - CCS 12419

3 June 71

Eric I to Sam Halpern

"The attached 2 memoranda contain the latest development in the Robert A. Maheu Associates (RAMA) "thriller". The second memorandum is self explanatory except you should know that Robert ~~A. Mah~~ Mullen Assoc. is a longtime cooperator in the cover field, and Howard Hunt is now one of its Vice Presidents."

(No Attach.)

13 Apr 71 MFR by 5 (CCS / LPGLOBE)

re / meeting - / wondering how his name came up in Hughes Tool investig. of RAMA. Heinonen meeting w/ Mullen of interest to det. their

[illegible] poisoned than it would have been had that decision been left to those who were profiting personally, psychologically, and politically from the Watergate [illegible].

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

HON. DAWSON MATHIS

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 3, 1976

Mr. MATHIS. Mr. Speaker, I note with great interest the news reports concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination material which my colleague from Virginia, Mr. DOWNING, made public yesterday. I ask unanimous consent that this article from this morning's Washington Post be inserted at this point in the RECORD. I agree fully with my colleague from Virginia that this information should be investigated properly, by a select committee of the House. If certain Cuban elements were in any way responsible for President Kennedy's death, let us determine that. If former President Nixon had been associated with such groups, and if the "White House tapes" do, in fact, refer to such an association, let us determine that. If the material released yesterday is not true, let us determine that.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come to settle these and many other disturbing questions about the Kennedy assassination. We have waited long enough. I am confident a majority of my colleagues would support the resolution to establish an investigating committee, if it came to the floor for a vote. I strongly urge the Committee on Rules to allow the House that opportunity.

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

Rep. Thomas Downing (D-Va.) released sworn statements yesterday quoting an anti-Castro Cuban exile leader as claiming he had an agreement with then-Vice President Nixon in 1960 for "elimination" of leftist Cuban exiles after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Downing said he had no way of validating the information and was in no position to vouch for its authenticity.

He said he released the statements only because they are sworn and part of a package of documents raising the possibility that President Kennedy was assassinated by right-wing Cuban exiles who felt betrayed because promises that they thought they had from Nixon had not been kept in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The two sworn statements were made this month by Mario Kohly Jr., son of the late Cuban leader who claimed the agreement with Nixon, and Robert Morrow, an author who says he was a Central Intelligence Agency contract employee.

Morrow's statement says that the elder Kohly said the agreement was made on his pledge to have his 42,000 underground forces inside Cuba, as well as 300 to 400 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains, support an invasion by CIA-trained Cuban exiles.

Kohly Jr. says in his sworn statement, "I was told that Vice President Nixon had agreed to the elimination of the leftist approved Cuban Revolutionary Front leaders at a time when the island would be invaded by the exile troops trained under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency."

[illegible] the Bay of Pigs invasion [illegible] U.S. air [illegible] from [illegible] Kennedy stood in the way of a [illegible] anti-Castro Cuban leaders were prepared [illegible] the fall of 1963 for [illegible] invasion, Morrow said.

DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

HON. [illegible]

IN THE [illegible]

Mr. FRA[illegible] pean Com[illegible] toric polit[illegible] nate with[illegible] ment in [illegible] made last [illegible] Council o[illegible] years of [illegible] European [illegible] the explic[illegible] pean Com[illegible] to elect di[illegible]

The sig[illegible] not only [illegible] democracy [illegible] a major [illegible] system of [illegible] European [illegible] tional parl[illegible] portant re[illegible] the devel[illegible] political [illegible]

Until no[illegible] operated [illegible] into effect [illegible] lack of su[illegible] that which [illegible] during the [illegible] obvious diff[illegible] units repres[illegible] original St[illegible] the Revolu[illegible] therefore, [illegible] unity and [illegible] countries [illegible] Parliament [illegible] for many [illegible] strong elem[illegible] the goals of [illegible] their resp[illegible] pledged the[illegible]

The pres[illegible] made impo[illegible] ing a Europ[illegible] munity For[illegible] of the Parli[illegible] Democrats, [illegible] sive Democr[illegible] munists—[illegible] Parliament. [illegible] groups for [illegible] egy. But es[illegible] diverse mem[illegible] spective nat[illegible] important [illegible] pation in [illegible]

Under th[illegible] month by [illegible] nine memb[illegible] nity will vo[illegible] ably over 3[illegible] national di[illegible] electorates [illegible] choose from [illegible]

Oct 12 mtg

Cast char. { MOB —
CIA —
FBI —
Cuban Exiles & Soldiers of Fortune
Hughes

Chron Plots
#1	#2	AMLASH	mob

Ruby Connection >
Oswald Connection >

Allegations – catalogue

LBJ/JFK Library

1. Inventory – Review = Tom/Ed.
2. Digesting
3. Timing & Nature of Public Statement
4. House areas of Interest

– Someone to work
– file system

Hot leads
instant interviews

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to all the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of the President. This shows how garrulous McCone is. H

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a figment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we were still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either insane or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this.
When will we ever learn? H *

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" and has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

ACTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.

* SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 [illegible]

RL
Well handled
FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: December 12, 1963

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

Mohr, Callahan, Conrad, DeLoach, Evans, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford (R. - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was his attempt to establish a "one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren Olney, that was his own protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, at their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently. Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know more about Olney prior to giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined w[...] Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable and that he (Boggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiff argument but a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned. Warren stated he knew Rankin and could work with him.

Ford told me that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to the Commission dated 12-9-63. In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority of one that did not want to give out any press release until the Commission had had a thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noted that the report was on his desk at the time of our meeting.)

This is my view point too.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Jones

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

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CDD:saj

XEROX

DEC 30 1963

DEC 27 1963

JAN 3 1964

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RL Well handled [illegible]

FBI

My Turn

Donald E. Schulz



Kennedy and the Cuban Connection

Conspiracy theories are fashionable, sometimes even fruitful, as in the case of Watergate. So it is not surprising that recent revelations of the Senate Intelligence Committee have resurrected an old question: what connection, if any, did the Castro government have with the assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Current speculation is that the Cuban dictator, having learned of CIA plots against his life, decided to strike back, returning violence for violence, with consequences that are now history. Indeed, the recent report of the Schweiker-Hart task force, while finding no hard evidence to support this theory, did uncover some interesting new leads. More than that, it established that a CIA-FBI "cover-up" had deprived the Warren commission of vital information that prevented it from seriously exploring the possibility of Castro's involvement and that consequently "there is no longer any reason to have faith in its picture of the Kennedy assassination."

And so we may well have a reopening of the investigation. At last.

Given all this, it seems appropriate to examine the record of the period. A small but interesting body of published testimony and reminiscences describes and amply documents a little-known campaign of accommodation launched by Washington and Havana in the weeks preceding that fateful day in November 1963. Actually, the origins of this tentative and ultimately ill-fated rapprochement may be traced to the previous spring, when Castro, increasingly dependent on his Soviet sponsors, found himself obliged to embrace the banner of "peaceful coexistence" in order to obtain economic and military agreements needed to assure the continued development of his revolution. In practical terms, this meant the normalization of relations with the United States.

A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO

It was not until September 1963, however, that this campaign began to show results. At that time, William Attwood, an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, told his superiors he had word that Castro wanted an accommodation. John Kennedy got the message and approved a "discreet contact" with the Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Lechuga. Subsequently, communications were established and meetings held to discuss the prospect of negotiations.

By early November, Kennedy had decided to push toward an opening with Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the Soviet fold and erasing the memory of the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a meeting to draw up an agenda for later discussions. On Nov. 18, this message was transmitted to Havana. Shortly thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set forth such a plan for U.S. consideration.

Even as these developments were unfolding, a second dialogue was taking place through an unofficial envoy—the French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct. 24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the White House. The President, it seems, had learned of the Frenchman's forthcoming visit to Cuba and had decided to seize the occasion to send Castro a message. The essence of this communication was a strong hint that the United States would be willing to normalize relations *providing* certain conditions were met. What were those conditions? One, clearly, was an end to Castroite subversion. The U.S. had a special responsibility to contain Communist expansionism. As long as Havana continued to export revolution, the economic "blockade" of the island would remain in effect.

ACCOMMODATIONS

Beyond this, not much was definite. The American negotiating position had not yet been worked out. Even so, hints of possible Cuban participation in the Alliance for Progress and of the desire of the United States to see a decline in Soviet influence on the island suggested further avenues for discussion.

Bearing this message and an invitation to revisit the White House upon his return, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he found a remarkably receptive Fidel Castro. Indeed, during the course of a six-hour interview the *líder máximo* found occasion to praise the American President for his sincerity, realism and "good ideas": Kennedy might yet understand that there could be "coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas." Castro was convinced that normal relations could be restored "on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty." His country needed peace in order to concentrate on the socio-economic tasks of the revolution. The issue of subversion would not be an obstacle. Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity" with their revolutionary brethren in other lands. But ultimately, each nation would have to determine its own destiny, and "if they choose regimes other than ours, this is not our business."

This was two days prior to President Kennedy's death.

I mention these developments because they provide an important—and perhaps crucial—frame of reference for Congressional investigators and the public alike. They are not, of course, proof of innocence. But they are suggestive: would Castro have been so intent on coming to terms with a man he was conspiring to kill? One may seriously doubt it. In point of fact, the assassination would bring a quick end to Washington's interest in accommodation.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Still, this is not to rule out the possibility of a "Cuban connection." Governments often behave in inconsistent and self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the Kennedy Administration was taking these first covert steps toward rapprochement, the CIA was engaged in an attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack of political control and a prevailing atmosphere of cold-war hostility, U.S agents could be conducting such activities in direct conflict with Presidential policy, it is not difficult to imagine similar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly denounced U.S.-sponsored assassinations and even threatened retaliation. Might not some overzealous security officials have taken this for tacit authority to set up a "program of elimination"?

But all this remains speculation. It is possible to envision any number of scenarios that *might* have led to the fatal events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evidence, however, it seems only fair to give Castro the same benefit of the doubt that Kennedy has been accorded—namely, that he be considered innocent until proved guilty. It is hoped that the investigations to come will proceed on the basis of that assumption.

Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, is writing a book on the Cuban revolution.

Fonzi Mtg. Notes
9/20/76

photos

Gaylen [illegible] 305-861-7651

Al Tarabochia memo | Ltr. Ruby-Castro / FBI got guest.

Ruby 62/63 in Havana to see antique dealer

Manolo Ray: Cubela — Artime — someone in Artime circle tipped on Cubela

Cuba — Alleman/Trafficante —

CUSA — Conservatism
Black bordered ads

DEA
Sturgis / Jerry B. involved in case against Bernstein.

Larry Craford — lived Carousel — Myers knew & [illegible] "How Hollywood makes movies" Ruby — Called Wilson to get people out of movies

Hemming too. (Keyes operation)

Marita Lorenz — puts Hunt w/ Sturgis early. Shortly after she got here. Knew Hunt as Eduardo.

Bernstein
Werbell
(Baird) Flood/Cuba

DEA

Paul Meskill — NY Daily News — 1975 — Series of Sturgis Lorenz pieces

Gibson
Traffic

Sylvia Odio — sure it was Oswald in Dallas late Sept when supposed to be in Mex.
then Duran — asset.

imposter

Norman Rothman — Ruby's Rabbi — (McQuilty Strawman)

Oswald
Ferrie - Lawrence Myers - Ruby — Sturgis McLaney Hemming
Shaw

Ruby Mob

vol 19 p. 477

Lorenz –

Sam Benton – offered crown deal to assassinate Castro at Jiminez house. Alex Roark / Sturgis /

– mining –

Naval Intell

Shamma –

Arg. G. Source

Artime
Trafficante

Norady Quality Foods

(Gaillot) – Cocaine
mel Kessler – Atty

(Gill) [Trossy]
Lee Shannon Jewelry
Eduard Batam

Trice Co. Realtors
(Rebozo)

Eduardo (Buttari) – Cuban for

Artime:

Carlos Martin >
Dr Modesto Mora > Gerstein politics

McQuilley working for Rothman when Ruby in contact.

Trafficante
Sam Mannarino } Stolen
(Norm Rothman } Bonds

Norman Rothman – first approached Fiorini on assass.

mistake

Rolando Martinez – Joe Merola (Gun runner)
pirate boat

1 1965 – Hunt straightening out Cubela compromise in Spain.

~~Jack Whitten~~ 2. McLaney

-Lansky- 3. Fitz alias

4. Nosenko.

> Jack Whitten

Sanchez → transcript.

AMLASH file

5. -Alvarrado.

6. sensitive/reliable source

To Assassination file

CONFIDENTIAL

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparently has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission <u>Hearing</u>'s Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparently welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

Braden was then commuting between New Orleans and Beverly Hills, with the approval of his Parole Board. Braden was working as a representative of his Mafia friend Roger Bauman, the oil speculator. Braden worked out of Room 1701, which was the office of his associate, Victor Main, Jr., an oil geologist. This was just a short way down the hall from David Ferrie in Room 1707.

Interestingly, in one visit to his Parole Office, Braden "mistakenly" told his Parole Officer that he was working out of Room 1706 - which would have been the room next door to Ferrie - instead of Room 1701.

Thus a possible Braden-Ferrie connection in the weeks just before the assassination does indeed arise in addition to the possible Braden-Ruby connection. Both connections definitely do seem to fall outside of or beyond the area which could reasonably be attributed to coincidence, chance, or circumstance.

Beyond several sets of information which tend to indicate that David Ferrie had some contact with Lee Oswald at various times, the critics of the Warren Commission have particularly focused on Ferrie's ties to Carlos Marcello and the Marcello Mafia empire.

In fact, in his interviews with the FBI and Secret Service after the assassination, Ferrie claimed that he was with Marcello at the very time of the assassination. Ferrie stated that he was in court with Marcello on the afternoon of November 22, which does appear to be true.

Carlos Marcello, along with Meyer Lansky, had become the central targets of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Division in the early 1960's, under the vigorous direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Marcello, known as "The Little Man," became one of Attorney General Kennedy's most fierce enemies during that period. Marcello once claimed that he had been kidnapped under orders of Robert Kennedy and the Justice Department.

Ed Reid, author of The Greenfelt Jungle and widely recognized as one of the most respected experts on the Mafia in the nation, has written that Carlos Marcello once threatened to have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B" Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

(Braden is now living in Atlanta)

– Mike Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

RICHARD L. THORNBURGH
RE: JKF ASSASSINATION

January 21, 1977

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R~~6250~~

Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Thornburgh:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would most appreciate prompt access to Federal Bureau of Investigation material relating to Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt and Mr. Eugene Brading, a/k/a Jim Braden.

Your assistance and cooperation with the Select Committee is most appreciated.

Aloha,

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Chairman

HSL/dr

cc: 1 - author file
1 - subject matter file
1 - William G. Miller
1 - Michael J. Madigan

DONALD F. MASSEY
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

December 8, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R#5785

Mr. Donald F. Massey
Assistant Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Don:

As I mentioned briefly this afternoon, the Select Committee has expressed an interest in recent press accounts suggesting the existence of transcripts of Lee Harvey Oswald conversations in Mexico City. I would be pleased if you would advise as to the existence of such transcripts and their availability for review by the Senate Select Committee.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
Minority Staff Director

HSL:dr

cc: 1 - Author File
1 - Subject File
1 - Minority Counsel
1 - Staff Director

I. Schulz

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission, to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot.

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post





GASOLINE ALLEY

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence

agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

Howard Washington

THE WASHINGTON POST

September 12, 1976

Alton Frye

The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana

An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be reopened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban factor in the murder.

Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commission investigation. The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for supporting the work of the Warren Commission. As a result, there was no special effort to explore the possible involvement of either the Cuban government or Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plausible—and a new inquiry imperative.

The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories and who have been prepared—even eager —to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an adequate prop for their predilections. The commission did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a ranking Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and recently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the murder of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French reporter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Castro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed by President Kennedy in a brief interview at the White House on Oct. 24, persuading Castro that Kennedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only on two tracks but in opposite directions, and movement on either track could have provoked violent response by one or another Cuban faction.

The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Perceptions inside the Cuban government responded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA eventually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "insecure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit both the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these facts are significant or merely coincidental, one cannot tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at Havana.

Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AMLASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cuban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an unexpected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban policy as it was then evolving.

For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he was interested in an opening to Washington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Kennedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early September the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport, spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and comments as hinting of American interest in a possible accommodation, much as they were later to interpret the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.

Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Kennedy has been a compound of political antipathy and personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate regard for the President's courage and realism. They

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profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with whom they could have done business.

With this frame of reference, Cuban officials speculate that the real origin of the assassination lies in anti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch. They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the previous Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.

Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "counter-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American relations, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that ... Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. "... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee, all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting

some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power; according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

Oswald 201 - 57 file folders - chron arranged. Ballen for access.

→ Ck. CIA files on John Wilson - Hudson.

CIA's first case officer allegedly compromised by "the Cuban girl" - Williamson (in 1967 IG report on assass.)

Stan Hunt - not in Security report which Rocca requested in 1967 when Rocca requested the Espinosa file, as result of Garrison investig.

June 65 - Swenson to Spain.

1961 - Jack Stewart - (1967 IG Report) first recruited AMLASH in Mexico City.

FBI, Paul Daly, says the FBI informant who told them of AMLASH plot was not Tepedino. Bureau refuses to say who their source was. CIA says the informant was Tepedino.

Espinosa tied into dynamite via Sturgis
New Orleans / Miami.

Apr 6, 1965 → first date AMLASH compromised per knowl. of CIA.

Questions to be answered + notes of future from reading 1967 IG Report —

1) Who is QJWIN? what does he do? What are names of other principal agents and sub-agents required for ZRRifle activities?

— Dr. Edward "Manny Gunn" involved in technical aspects of Operational planning. (asked to treat cigars w/ lethal material).

— Jake Esterline was head of Cuba task force in pre Bay of Pigs days.

Cornelius Roosevelt - Chief, TSD, during early plots.

Giancana nixed gangland slaying because use of weapons rendered escape and survival negligible.

The disaffected Cuban official Trafficante in touch w/ was Juan Orta, who had access to Castro.

Sid Gottlieb involved as Special Asst. to DDP ~~in TSD~~ during relevant time frame.

Orta lost position in Cuban govt. on 26 Jan. 1961 + took refuge in Venezuelan embassy on April 11, 1961 and became the responsibility of the Mexican Embassy when Venz. broke relations w/ Cuba in Nov. 1961. Castro refused a safe conduct pass until Oct. 1964 when allowed him to go to Mexico City. Orta arrived in Miami in Feb, 1965 (Orta. fell from favor r/t cold feet killed first gangster attempt)

Orta suggested a successor — who made several unsuccessful attempts.

2) Who was successor?

Trafficante – suggested Tony Varona (high in exile movement) – head of Democratic Revolutionary Front group, supported by CIA as part of larger Cuban opn.

Varona not satisfied w/ degree of CIA assistance.

2) Dec 60 – FBI gave CIA a memo on racketeers efforts to finance anti-Castro activities.

18 Jan 61 – Varona associated w/ above scheme. Hired Edw. Moss, D.C. public relations man as fund raiser and public relations advisor. Moss's mistress Julia Cellini, whose brothers owned 2 large Havana gambling casinos. Moss had been given Covert Security – Clearance by CIA.

3.) Where are the orig. FBI report?

4.) Edward K. Moss file

Esterline supposedly took "ineffective steps" to thwart Varona's involv. in mobster plan as he was one of five key figures in the Revolutionary Front & heavily involved in the approaching BofP plan.

5.) Who were other 4 leaders? What steps take take? Why ineffective?

Pill delivery: Roselli → O'Connell → Varona → ?

6). Who is Varona's son-in-law – closely involved w/ him during relevant time frame?

p.35

ZRRifle was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers).

7) Names of those in FI/D involved w/ ZRRifle.

QJWIN terminated by Luxembourg station – Apr. 1964

46 Gunn delivered poison pills to Harvey

47 Harvey says Rosselli in touch w/ Varona when Harvey arrived in Fla. O'Connell does not remember when Varona was re-activated for phase 2 efforts.

48 Giancana and Trafficante apparently not involved in phase 2. Rosselli dealing w/ a Cuban who spoke Italian named MACEO who went by the names Garcia-Gomez + Godoy / Varona + Varona's son-in-law.

50 – Shackley was never told who pills deliv. to or why. Only told surveillance in support of a HQ opn.

49 Harvey and Shackley deliv. arms + equip. to Rosselli for Varona.

52 Jan 63 – Rosselli agreed w/ Harvey that not much ~~would~~ was going to happen

52. Feb 63. Harvey left word for MACEO that it looked like the effort was over. Rosselli met w. Harvey in LA and agreed to close opn off "but that it would be unwise to attempt to precipitate a break between Rosselli + Varona" with Rosselli agreeing to reduce frequency of contact until there was none.

53 June 63 – Roselli visited Harvey in DC + went out to dinner – While dining Papich called Harvey + asked if he knew who his dinner guest was. Roselli under intensive surveillance. Papich said have to tell Hoover

Edwds.
pls Why did Agency tell RFK that opns ceased w/ mob when in fact they still underway w/ mob at that moment

70 FBI interviewed Ed Morgan

72 Maheu met at least once w/ Vice-Pres. Nixon in effort to aid Niarchos vis-a-vis Onassis.

73 Maheu hired someone to do tech. surveil. on Onassis

73 Gen. Cusl w/ Maheu's counsel, Ed Morgan, persuaded Sen. Long not to call him.

73 Sam Halpern was in on the contaminated diving suit scheme after Des Fitzgerald took over Cuban Task Force from Harvey in Jan. 63. Gottlieb of counsel also involved.

TMB A no CI files reviewed by IG in preparing report

78 March 61 - Jack Stewart met w/ Cubela in Mexico City. Stew. assigned to Mex. City knew Cubela casually from Havana days. Tepedino (AMWHIP-1) long time friend Cubela, arranged meeting to sound Cubela out on his views on Cuban situation. This meeting though inconclusive led to AMLASH.

80 March 61 - Miami assoc. reported that Cubela and Juan Orta (gangster's man in Cuba) wanted to defect. CIA found 3 name links betw. Cubela and persons involved in gambling syndicate episodes — All nebulous

81 Aug. 61 Cubela sent message to Tepedino that Cubela wanted to talk with friend of Stewart's in Paris if possible. Sent thru Cubela's girl friend - airline hostess. Paris given OK to approach — no indic. he was ever contacted.

82 June 62 - Tepedino told FBI of Cubela's desire to defect. Bureau said would refer Cubela to CIA in Paris if he contacted Bureau's legal attache.

Tepedino contacted FBI because he upset w/ way CIA handled Cubela "defection" attempt in Paris in 1961.

p 83 Aug '62 Wainwright from HQ met w/ Tep. + went to Helsinki for series of meetings w/ Cubela where defection plan turned to recruiting Cubela in place.

84 Aug 62 – Cubela met w/ Spanish speaking case officer in Paris later in Aug. after meeting in Stockholm on Aug 7-9. In Paris it was learned that Cubela told 4 Cubans of his meeting in Helsinki.

85 14–23 Aug 62 – Earle Williamson, Spanish speaking case officer from Madrid, met in Paris w/ Cubela, Tep., + Wainwright. On 18 Aug. HQ. strongly agreed Cubela not to be given physical elimination mission.

Sept 63 Sanchez from HQ joins Wainwright, Tep. + Cubela in Brazil + becomes Cubela's case officer

16 Sept 63 Cubela (Paris) writes Tep. (NY) don't intend to see ~~Sanchez~~ your friend again

3 Oct 63 Sanchez arrives in Paris ANYWAY. Learned that French keeping Cubela under surveillance.

11 Oct 63 – Sanchez cables Cubela insistent on meeting senior US official, pref. RFK, for assurances.

29 Oct 63 Des using James Clark alias meets Cubela in Paris at home of Red Stent. Sanchez interp. F.1z. said U.S. wanted no part in attempt on Castro's life.

14 Nov 63 Wainwright meets Tepedino in NY – Says Cubela pleased w/ Des meeting from policy standpoint but very unhappy at not being given tech. assistance.

19 Nov 63 Des approved telling Cubela he would be furnished cache inside Cuba.

p91.92 Docs of record in AMLASH file ~~and~~ has gap here

Sam Halpern + ~~Gunn~~ Sanchez asked Gunn for assist. re ~~hi high~~ means of assassination that would allow Cubela escape ~~powered rifle~~

20 Nov. Halp + Sanchez asked Gunn to rig poison pen for Sanchez next day. Done

22 Nov Sanchez arrives Paris + mets Cubela late AM. Cubela accepts pen but doesn't think much of device.

Fitz called Sanchez after JFK ass. saying everything off. The cable not in file.

30 Aug 64 – Artime rec. info thru Madrid that dissidents in Castro regime wanted direct Artime contact

Why ✗ On 7 Oct 64 an Artime assoc. went to France to serve as intermediary w/ dissident group.

1964 – Agency conspiring to put Cubela + Artime together w/o each other knowing it.
Cubela ↓ wants weapon
Artime ↓ wants man inside Cuba

~~27~~ Dec 64 – Artime meets Cubela in Madrid

Feb 65 – Cubela gets silenced weapon from Artime's Secty in Madrid

March 65 – Madrid cable that lawyer Garcia-Bango arrived in Madrid w/ news that he was in contact w/ Cubela, long a close friend. G-B was jailed in 1962 for defending Santos Traffecante.

~~May~~ June/65 Espinosa reported full knowledge of Cubela plans and of CIA complicity.

106 June 23 65 HQ sent cable to all stations directing termin. of contact w/ Cubela group.

March 66. Cubela arrested for counterrevol. activ. involving CIA. Cubela trial brought out
p108 - contact w/ James Noel in Madrid.

p115 - July/Aug 1964 - CIA memos refer to a gangland effort to pay 150,000 to kill Castro & refer to FBI interv. of partic.

p120 - O'Connell met w/ Maheu post Drew P. article. He reported:

Rosselli steered to Morgan (separately from Maheu) by Greenspun.

Jim Garrison, Morgan & Roselli & perhaps Greenspun in touch w/ each other in Las Veg. in March

p127 Ref to a Puerto Rican in Phillipine custody who says he participated in Castro inspired assas. plot in Dallas. Bureau expected to bring him dry.

128 Varona became very embittered by B of P failure. Among most critical. Agency failure to support his exile group led to loss of income

Last known to be living hand to mouth as part time auto salesman.

130 "Maheu has good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative clt., Howd. Hughes."

7 Mar 66 – Cable to Rusk – Lies about ass. involv

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE: 12-10-64

1-Mr. Sullivan (O.H. Bartlett)
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Malley
1-Mr. Shroder
1-Mr. Rogge

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

PURPOSE:

To advise you that an Agent of the Secret Service, when testifying before the President's Commission, denied making certain statements to FBI Agents which were subsequently reported to the Commission.

DETAILS:

In Volume II of the hearings before the President's Commission commencing on page 61 there appears the testimony of Roy H. Kellerman, Assistant Special Agent*, White House Detail, U. S. Secret Service on 3-9-64. *In Charge

Under questioning by a Commission member, Kellerman was asked about certain statements reportedly made by him on 11-22-63, to SA's Francis X. O Neill, Jr. and James W. Sibert, of our Baltimore Office, which appear in the 12-10-63 Dallas report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling (page 3, paragraph 4). SA's O'Neill and Sibert were under orders to be observers during the autopsy of President Kennedy at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, which commenced on the evening of 11-22-63, to be of assistance to the Secret Service, and to look after the Bureau's interests.

Our Agents, in conversation with Kellerman, sometime during the evening of 11-22-63, learned of certain information, portions of which were reported as follows:

> "He advised he heard a shot and immediately turned around, looking past Governor Connally, who was seated directly in back of him, to the President. He observed the President slumped forward and heard him say, 'Get me to a hospital.' Mr. Kellerman then heard Mrs. Kennedy say, 'Oh, no!', as the President leaned towards her. He immediately advised the driver to take the President to the nearest hospital."

REC

FEB 10 1976

FBI

RDR:tmt
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

The Commission in questioning Kellerman made specific reference to the underscored portions of the above paragraph as it contradicts some of Kellerman's testimony. Kellerman claims he did not hear the President nor Mrs. Kennedy say these things and had never told our Agents that he had. In part of Kellerman's denial he stated "I don't know where they got those quotes."

OBSERVATIONS:

Kellerman is claiming our Agents furnished inaccurate accounts of a conversation with him. It is to be remembered that at the time this conversation with our Agents reportedly took place 11-22-63, Kellerman had been a security guard in the President's car and more than likely was upset and feeling remorse over the days episode. In his testimony before the Commission he endeavored to give the impression that he acted calmly and immediately took command, issuing logical instructions after the President was hit. The conversation reported by our Agents made it appear Kellerman reacted normally to the tragedy and not dramatically as indicated in his testimony, as he didn't order the driver to the hospital until after the President had so directed.

It is felt our Agents reported accurately what Kellerman told them on 11-22-63, and that Kellerman's testimony 3½ months later is the result of considered deliberation, on his part, to paint the most favorable picture possible, under the circumstances, for the Secret Service.

Consideration has been given to discussing this matter with Chief Rowley of Secret Service, however, since it is the word of our Agents against Kellerman's, it is not felt any good purpose would be served by this course of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

Affidavits are being obtained from our Agents Sibert and O'Neill attesting to the accuracy of their report and refuting Kellerman so that we will be in a position to show any future inquirer that we recognized this contradiction and did something about it.

OK ... FBI

Research

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0298/1
11 March 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Johnston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to a request dated 9 March 1976 about the Oswald file held by the Agency, the attached is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
As stated

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

Attachment to:
Review Staff: 76-0070/1

1. The following CIA Staff Employees, all of whom are now retired, participated in the preparation of DIR 86054 on 30 November 1963:

Originator: Mr. Louis Armstrong

Coordinators: Mr. John M. Whitten, Mr. William B. Tyng, Ms. Sue L. Darling

Authenticator: Mr. William B. Tyng ("for" Desmond FitzGerald)

Releasor: Mr. John M. Whitten ("for" J. C. King)

2. We believe that the Italian diplomat on the Cubana flight No. 465 on 22 November 1963 from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba, was Mario MAURI who was accompanied by his wife, Maria Antonieta MAURI. We have been unable to determine who transmitted the information contained in DIR 86054 to CIA and we have not been able to locate any documents relating to this matter in Latin America Division files or the Oswald files.

3. We have been unable to locate any documents which would indicate that there was a response to DIR 86054 from Mexico City.

4. Assuming there was no response to DIR 86054, the originating Headquarters component should have initiated follow-up action if a response was not received.

5. We have been unable to find any further information relating to DIR 86054 in Latin America Division files.

6. We do not have a copy of the Cubana manifest for the 22 November 1963 flight from Mexico City to Havana, but we have determined that the following persons were on that flight:

NAME	NATIONALITY	OCCUPATION
Jakob ETT	Swiss	Diplomat
Hector LEMIEUX	Canadian	Unknown
Joseph POULIOT	Canadian	Unknown
Donald George CAMERON	Canadian	Unknown
William POULIS	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas Clark OSULD	Canadian	Unknown
Dungan MCPHERSON	Canadian	Unknown
Leo John DEST	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas MURPHY	Canadian	Unknown
Arthur EDMONDS	British	Unknown
James DISINOP	British	Unknown
Venancio OLIVAREZ Villaverde	Spanish	Unknown
Jose Luis CACHO y Barcha	Spanish	Unknown
David FLOR Lechago	Spanish	Unknown
Maria Antonieta MAURI	Italian	Unknown
Mario MAURI	Italian	Diplomat
Maarten Van DERPLAAT	Dutch	Diplomat

Attachment F

[illegible] [illegible]
. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

[illegible]

27 Nov 63

85471

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: REARREST OF SILVIA DURAN

THIS AGENCY'S STATION IN MEXICO WAS ADVISED ON 27 NOVEMBER THAT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES HAD REARRESTED SILVIA DURAN, MEXICAN NATIONAL EMPLOYEE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO, WHO HAD TALKED TO LEE OSWALD AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1963. THE REASON FOR THE REARREST WAS THAT SILVIA DURAN WAS TRYING TO LEAVE MEXICO FOR CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON

Document Number 134-595
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

See follow documents

in on this

subject.

I don't know what

FBI did in Nov 64, but

the have been

~~talking about this for~~

a long time & she is

said to be extremely bright.

~~Legal Attache~~

1. LA Memo said they checked

info and found it

unsubstantiated.

2. asked me to

send this cable.

3. We will try to confirm

or refute

info and follow up.

She is also ... [illegible]

Document Number 12-528

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

openly Communists not mentioned in press reports of Warren Commission investigation

RECORD COPY

October 5, 1964

Mexican Communists who had contact with Oswald, as has not appeared in Warren Commission write-ups in press

---

sat around recalling details of their having been in a group with Oswald here last fall during the daysthat he was in Mexico.- The write-ups of the Warren Commission report in the newspapers sparked this discussion, and they apparently had never really s&t around determind to piece it all together, although all three were deeply affected by Kennedy's assassination, seemed literally to adore the Kennedy family image, still follow Robert Kennedy career with great interest and admiration.

The main points:

Horacio is the husband of SYLVIA DURAN, the Mexican girl who was arrested for questioning about Oswald because she had been in touch with him at the Cu embassy when he went there looking for a visa. (She is or w also a ringleader at the Cuban-Mexican Institute on Tokio, I remember).

While Oswald was here last fall the Duran cousins invited the to a "twist party" at the

Source home of Ruben Duran mid-week. A few Communists they knew

and a number of people who struck th as very peculiar at the time, were there. AND OSWALD WASTHERE WITH TWO OTHERS BEATNIK LOOKING BOYS, ONE OF ~~THEM~~ WHOM WAS VERY TALL AND ALL THREE OF WHOM THEY REMEMBER QUITE WELL. When they began asking questions about the Americans, who were standing together all evening and didn't dance at all, they were shifted to another room. . However said he didn't know they were intrigued because who they were, except that Sylvia Duran had brought them, and none of the other guests made any attempt to approach them. Also, when the *Source was* so insistent about meeting them, ~~xxxxxx~~ the Durans replied that the boys were leaving town early the next morning. The next day, well along in the day, , saw all thre

Source boys together on Insurgentes. In other words, they had not le town. At the time, they remarked about ~~xxx~~ it.

As soon as Oswald's picture was printed in the newspapers

Source clearly rememb red him. And of course the arrest of Sylvia Duran almost immediately afterward, underlined their certainty.

They were so sickened) that they broke off their relations with theDurans.

Source says that Lynn Duran and one of the Duran boys have made trips to Texas. And that most conspicuously they have all prospered this last year. Always poor before, they now have an expansive car each.

~~[illegible]~~ Horacio Duran works at El Dia newspaper.

His employment, finally

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CS COPY

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

XXX

TO FLASH INFO CITE DIR 84916

1. ARREST OF SILIVA DURAN IS EXTREMELY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD PREJUDICE U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION ON ENTIRE QUESTION OF CUBAN RESPONSIBILITY. WITH FULL REGARD FOR MEXICAN INTERESTS, REQUEST YOU ENSURE THAT HER ARREST IS KEPT ABSOLUTELY SECRET, THAT NO INFORMATION FROM HER IS PUBLISHED OR LEAKED, THAT ALL SUCH INFO IS CABLED TO US, AND THAT FACT OF HER ARREST AND HER STATEMENTS ARE NOT SPREAD TO LEFTIST OR DISLOYAL CIRCLES IN THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WE ARE TRYING TO GET MORE INFO ON OSWALD FROM FBI AND WILL ADVISE DIRECT OR THROUGH FBI MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Document Number 37-[redacted]-529

for FOIA Review on APR 1975

23 Nov 63

CS COPY

THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

DATE: 27 NOV 1963   [ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

27 Nov 63 20 12z

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

FLASH

TO   FLASH

CITE DIR 85318

RE: (IN-69048)

1. THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH   AND

2. MEXICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD INTERROGATE SILVIA DURAN TO EXTENT NECESSARY CLARIFY OUTSTANDING POINTS WHICH BEEN RAISED YOUR CABLES LAST 48 HOURS. YOU MAY PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO MEXICAN INTERROGATORS BUT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT ANY AMERICANS TO CONFRONT SILVIA DURAN OR BE IN CONTACT WITH HER.

Document Number 158-610

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

3. ADVISE ASAP RESULTS INTERROGATION.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: Silvia Duran rearrested because she was attempting to leave Mexico for Cuba.

CS COPY

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 OCT. 1963

2		5	
3		6	

27 Nov 63 21 59 z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 85371

FURTHER TO DIR 85318.* TO BE CERTAIN THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US, WE WANT TO INSURE THAT NEITHER SILVIA DURAN NOR CUBANS GET IMPRESSION THAT AMERICANS BEHIND HER REARREST. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHOLE AFFAIR.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: *Mexican authorities should interrogate Silvia Duran to extent necessary to clarify outstanding points which have been raised. MEXI may provide questions to Mexican interrogators, but Hqs. does not want any Americans to confront Duran or be in contact with her

Document Number 177-618

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

7 - APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT : Actions of Silvia DURAN after her First Interrogation passed to the Warren Commission

1. Reference is made to the attachments to my memoranda dated 31 January 1964 and 21 February 1964, both of which report information on Silvia DURAN, a Mexican citizen employed at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Information on the actions of Silvia DURAN on her return to work at the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, following her first interrogation by the Mexican authorities, is attached to this memorandum. This item may be useful to the Commission in the evaluation of Mrs. DURAN's story.

2. The information contained in this attachment was obtained from sensitive sources. It therefore bears an appropriate sensitivity indicator.

(Signed) Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Document Number 643-273
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

RECORD COPY

7 Apr 64

Attachment

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN, Mexican Citizen Employed by the Cuban Consulate, Following Her First Interrogation by the Mexican Authorities

1. A reliable and sensitive source, well informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, had stated that on her return to the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, Silvia DURAN told her colleagues essentially the same story about her official acquaintance with Lee Harvey OSWALD that was published in the Mexico City press. This information, which seems to have been surreptitiously given to the press by certain Mexican authorities, indicated that according to DURAN, OSWALD had visited the Cuban and Soviet Consulates to obtain visas in order to visit these countries, and she had handled his case at the Cuban Consulate.

2. The only new item in the account that Silvia DURAN gave her colleagues was her claim that the Mexican police had threatened to extradite her to the United States for a confrontation with OSWALD. According to the source, Silvia DURAN, an intelligent and quick-witted woman, did not fear such a confrontation.

3. It should be noted that CIA does not know the precise origin of the suggested confrontation. The idea originated, in all probability, with the Mexican authorities involved in the interrogation of DURAN.

4. According to the same source, immediately after and since the assassination the personnel of the Cuban Embassy was shocked and puzzled - no expressions of pleasure at the assassination were heard, and there was little discussion of it. The gossip and official conversations in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate tend to confirm the impression that OSWALD visited the Embassy only to get a visa to visit or to transit the country.

Original & -3 - Addressee
2 - DDP
1
1
1
1

7 April 1964

Based on DIR 85670 dated 29 November 1963

Attachment D

ACTION

AMEND | CLOSE

block letters.

luding maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the iden-
tate ... must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable

SECTION III

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE	201 NO.	1. SOURCE DOCUMENT
NON-SENSITIVE		

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)	SEX
OSWALD,	LEE	HENRY		M

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2 (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

N/B: HARVEY !

29/11/75

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION
YES ✓ NO	D 18 M 10 Y 39	USA	New Orleans, La.	AGE 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Radar operator, U.S. Marine Corps, ex 1960

OCC/POS. CODE: NAVY

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
USSR			

Document Number 1-15
for FOIA Review on APR ...

COMMENTS: cit; ?

Defected to the USSR in October 1959

201-

CS Copy

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES ✓ NO	✓ YES	

RECORD COPY

FORM 831a
C-57

(38)

OSWALD, LEE HENRY

201

SEX M DOB 18 OCT 39
NEW ORLEANS, LA., USA
CIT ?
REF:
Δ USSR
RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AS OF 60.
DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 59.

Document Number 2-524
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

10 Oct 1963 ☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM: [illegible] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CS COPY

CONF:

INFO :

XX

1	4
2	5
3	6

0 Oct 63 2[illegible]

R. ROUTINE

TO

INFO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
~~[illegible]~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CITE DIR 748[illegible]

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, IDENTIFIED AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR

[illegible] recall this description of individual in HSCA affidavit [illegible] Aug not Oswald!

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

10 Oct 63
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CON

INFO

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR

CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATE TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATIC RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATIC IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASED ON (IN 36017)

RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

10 Oct 1963 [ ] NO INDEX [ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO

FROM: DIRECTOR

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ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 74830

REF: (IN 36017)*

who contacted Soviet Embassy

1. LEE OSWALD 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL LEE HENRY OSWALD BORN 18 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR, BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW, INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 8 JULY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT

(CONTINUED)

10 Oct

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING STATE HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

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CITE DIR 748

4. SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE LOCALLY. INFO PARAS TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH 5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED PLS KEEP HDQS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

CMT: According to REF ON 1 Oct, an American male stated he name Lee Oswald spoke with Consul. He at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

16 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Ambassador

FROM :

SUBJECT : Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy

Ambassador notified

1. The following information was received

On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U. S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received.

Document Number 9-5

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

Orig - The Ambassador
The Minister
Counselor for Political Affairs
Regional Security Officer
cc - Legal Attache
cc - Naval Attache
cc - I & N S

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

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24 OCT 63 19 10z

24 Oct 63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DEF

ROUTINE

ONE:

INFO:

XX

date drawn - 23 Oct on run should be 24 Oct

INFO

CITE DIR 77973

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

REFERENCE IS MADE TO CIA OUT TELETYPE NO. 74673, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1963, REGARDING POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SUBJECT IN MEXICO CITY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TWO COPIES OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPH YOU HAVE OF SUBJECT. WE WILL FORWARD THEM TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THE LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO CITY AND SUBJECT ARE THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: (IN 40357)

24 Oct 63

Document Number 10-6

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Copy No.

6 Copies of photo of Oswald
Reproduced for use of legal
Attache with Mexican police

Document Number 11-64

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

We made fifty (50)
copies of each of these
(which we got from
Legal Attache) for Leg.
Attache to use with
Mexican Police

RECORD COPY



Lee Harvey Oswald

Race White
Sex Male
DOB 18 October 1939
POB New Orleans, Louisiana
Height 5'.9"
Weight 140 Pounds
Hair Medium Brown
Eyes Blue Gray

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 9, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C. 20002

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Your letter of June 1, 1964, requesting summaries of FBI reports with regard to ten named persons and certain information regarding the contact by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn with Jack L. Ruby on March 11, 1959, is herewith acknowledged.

As you were advised by my letter of February 27, 1964, Jack Ruby was contacted by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn of the Dallas Office on March 11, 1959, in view of his position as a night club operator who might have knowledge of the criminal element in Dallas. The purpose of this contact was to determine whether or not Ruby did have such knowledge, and if so, if he would be willing to furnish information to this Bureau. Ruby was advised of the FBI's jurisdiction in criminal matters, and he expressed a willingness to furnish information. A personal description of Ruby was obtained by Special Agent Flynn on the occasion of this contact on March 11, 1959, but no information or other results were obtained. Between March 11, 1959, and October 2, 1959, Ruby was contacted on eight other occasions, but he furnished no information whatever and further contacts with him were discontinued.

Honorable J. Lee Rankin

The personal description of Ruby as obtained by Special Agent Flynn on March 11, 1959, did not in itself contain the remark "known Dallas criminal." This remark was added to the description by Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at the time when he was assisting in the preparation of the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963. Enclosed herewith is the affidavit of Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at Little Rock, Arkansas, dated June 4, 1964, setting forth his basis for adding the remark "known Dallas area criminal" to the description of Ruby as it appears in the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963, and in the enclosure to my letter to you of April 7, 1964.

The summaries concerning the ten named individuals in your letter of June 1, 1964, are currently being prepared and will be forwarded to you promptly upon completion.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

Little Rock, Arkansas
June 4, 1964

I, Louis M. Kelley, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, after being duly sworn, depose as follows:

I arrived at Dallas, Texas, November 23, 1963, to assist in the investigation of the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and related matters. On or about November 24, 1963, I was assigned to review all previously existing files and current information as to Jack L. Ruby and to prepare an insert based on such file review for inclusion in an investigative report. This insert was to include such physical description and biographical data as were available from the file review and from information developed on November 24, 1963. I had before me at the time I dictated the insert information which had been obtained on November 24, 1963, by other Special Agents of the FBI and from the Identification Division files of the Dallas Police Department. The Dallas Police Department records, under Dallas Police Department No. 22255, included information concerning arrests of Ruby dating from February 4, 1949, to March 14, 1963.

In dictating the physical description and biographical data concerning Ruby, I possibly included under the heading "Remarks," "Known Dallas area criminal," based on the fact I had before me Ruby's identification record from the Dallas Police Department, which listed several arrests in the Dallas area. This would have been the only thing on which such an observation could have been based.

LOUIS M. KELLEY

Sworn and subscribed to before me this ___ day of June 1964.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 22, 1965

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

FBI Withheld Data on JFK Slaying

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

W POST 10/27/75

The FBI withheld from the Warren Commission hundreds of documents about the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are raw FBI files, which the commission requested but never received. They contain no startling information that will overturn the commission's verdict, but they reveal intimately how the FBI handled its most important case.

In the margins of some suppressed memos, the late FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover, scribbled caustic comments in blue ink. He was critical of almost everyone involved in the investigation, from Dallas police chief Jesse Curry to President Lyndon Johnson.

Confidential notes kept by one top FBI official, for example, quote Hoover as warning: "Johnson may become very dictatorial. We must keep our guard up."

Sources familiar with the suppressed documents say the contents were summarized and submitted to the Warren Commission. But there were some subtle, perhaps deliberate, omissions.

The documents show that Hoover brought pressure on his subordinates to rush out a preliminary report on the FBI investigation before the murdered President's brother, Robert F. Kennedy, returned to his desk as Attorney General.

The confidential notes quote Hoover as instructing his subordinates to get the report out of the Justice Department "before Bobby gets back."

Apparently, the FBI chief also feared Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach might tamper with the report before forwarding it to the Warren Commission. Hoover told his aides to alert President Johnson's majordomo, Walter Jenkins.

"Let Jenkins know after report is out of our hands," Hoover directed. "Let Jenkins know what Katzenbach is doing. Might cause long delay. Must not consider any alteration."

Thirteen days after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Hoover delivered a detailed report to Katzenbach naming Lee Harvey Oswald as the assassin. Katzenbach kept it four days before submitting it to the commission.

The crusty old G-man was furious at the Dallas police chief, meanwhile, for leaking the story that the FBI had investigated Oswald but had failed to alert the Secret Service.

"This is the lowest level in history of Bureau since I have been director," Hoover lamented, according to the confidential notes.

He contended that Oswald had never been seen with firearms, had written no hate letters against U.S. leaders. As a former defector, he also knew he was a marked man whom the FBI was watching.

"With that background," grumbled Hoover, "how could he be security risk? No indication of violence so far as our records show . . . Oswald could have hollered false arrest if we had arrested him."

The FBI chief commented that Chief Justice Earl Warren, who headed the commission, "would have been first one to holler" about Oswald's rights. Citing the criticism of the FBI, Hoover commented: "This is one of the rough ones."

He felt, therefore, that President Johnson should have endorsed the FBI report. "President should have backed up report," complained Hoover, "based on evidence gathered by the FBI."

In private remarks that were never intended to be repeated outside his inner circle, he made deprecating remarks not only about President Johnson but about Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who was then preparing to run against LBJ for the presidency.

"Goldwater has no sound advisers around him," Hoover noted. But his comment on Johnson was more deadly: "LBJ's speeches are dull."

The Warren Commission adopted a resolution, meanwhile, calling for "the raw materials upon which any reports given to the commission are based, together with all raw materials and reports relating to the work of the commission since the date of any and all earlier reports."

J. Lee Rankin, the general counsel, followed up with a "Dear Edgar" letter to the FBI chief requesting the full files "as promptly as possible." But they were never delivered.

A commission lawyer, remembering those days more than a decade ago, told us: "Nobody ever got the FBI's own files." In 1963-64, another staff member pointed out, the FBI "could do no wrong," so no one pressed too hard for their internal records.

Now 12 years after the Kennedy assassination, a fascinating story is still locked in FBI files awaiting a public reopening. We will tell part of the story in future columns. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), chairman of the Senate intelligence subcommittee investigating the assassination, is seeking the full story from the FBI.

Footnote: FBI spokesmen stoutly defended the FBI's findings and the thoroughness of the investigation. They conceded that "informative" and "deliberative" memos were not given to the commission. But "everything they needed was given them. They had all they wanted to make their findings."

Oswald-Agent Contact Covered Up

W Post 10/28/88

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The late J. Edgar Hoover, in his zeal to protect his beloved FBI, engineered a cover-up 12 years ago to keep the Warren Commission from learning about the ties between FBI agent James Hosty and assassin Lee Harvey Oswald.

The formidable Hoover, whose bulldog visage had become a national symbol of law and order, intervened personally when the Warren Commission began to zero in on Hosty.

Now, 12 years later, Hosty has admitted destroying a threatening note, which Oswald delivered to the FBI office in Dallas a few days before shooting President John F. Kennedy in November, 1963. The note threatened to blow up the FBI office and Dallas police headquarters if Hosty didn't stop bothering his wife.

The FBI should have notified the Secret Service that Oswald, a misfit who had threatened violence, was in the Dallas area. The Secret Service routinely would have checked his whereabouts during the presidential visit. This might have saved President Kennedy's life.

When the FBI learned that a suspect named Lee Harvey Oswald had been picked up, Hosty reminded his boss, Gordon Shanklin, that he had been handling the Oswald case. Shanklin telephoned the Dallas police and asked whether Hosty could participate in the interrogation.

Hosty later questioned Oswald at police headquarters. Oswald, who had been outwardly calm, suddenly became agitated. "I know you!" he shouted. "I know you! You're the one who accosted my wife twice!"

The incident passed, however, without any mention of the threatening letter. Hosty also confided to a friend on the Dallas police force, Lt. Jack Revill, that the FBI had a file on Oswald. Revill repeated the conversation to a superior who ordered him to put it in writing.

"Special Agent Hosty related to this officer..." Revill wrote, "that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was aware of the subject (Oswald) and that they had information that this subject was capable of committing the assassination of President Kennedy."

Hoover was furious when he learned of Hosty's loose talk. According to confidential notes taken at the time, the grizzled FBI chief complained that Hosty had "diarrhea of words." But the old man, nevertheless, sought to cover up the FBI's embarrassment.

On Dec. 23, 1963, the FBI gave the Warren Commission a summary of Oswald's notebook. The summary conveniently omitted the fact that Hosty's name, telephone and license tag had been in the notebook.

The commission found out about the omission and demanded an explanation. On Jan. 27, 1964, Hoover acknowledged that Hosty's name had been in the notebook.

The G-man also gave what purported to be a full account of the FBI's contacts with Oswald. The last contact, he reported, had been on Aug. 10, 1963. "We did not interview Oswald in Dallas, Texas, or in Irving, Texas, prior to the assassination of President Kennedy," Hoover added.

Interestingly, he used the word "our" to describe the last contact with the FBI. But on Feb. 6, in a sworn affidavit, Hoover changed the wording in a curious way. He swore that Oswald had no contact with FBI "agents" after Aug. 10, 1963.

It is now known, of course, that Oswald appeared at the FBI office in Dallas a few days before the assassination. At that time, just as Hoover said, he did not speak with any FBI "agents." But he spoke with an FBI receptionist, who passed on his threatening note to the agents.

It is imposisible to know whether the late FBI chief subtly switched the word "our" to "agents" in order to hide his knowledge of Oswald's violent threat.

But in a later letter to the Warren Commission, dated April 6, 1964, Hoover stated categorically: "I wish to emphasize that the facts available to the FBI concerning Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination did not indicate in any way that he was or would be a threat to President Kennedy."

The truth is, of course, that the FBI had received dramatic evidence less than a week before the assassination that Oswald was violence-prone.

On April 24, the Dallas Morning News reported Hosty had told the Dallas police lieutenant, Jack Revill, that the FBI knew Oswald was "capable" of assassinating the President.

Hoover immediately sent word to the Warren Commission that the story was "false" and followed up three days later with a personal letter delivered by courier.

"Special Agent Hosty unequivocally denies ever having made the statement as quoted in this article..." declared the FBI director.

"Special Agent Hosty points out that prior to the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, he never had any information indicating potential violence on the part of Lee Harvey Oswald."

There's more to Hoover's great cover-up, which we'll report in a future column.

Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON — President Johnson is sitting on a political H-bomb — an unconfirmed report that Sen. Robert Kennedy, D-N.Y., may have approved an assassination plot which then possibly backfired ...s his late brother.

Top officials, queried by this ...lumn, agreed that a plot to ...ssassinate Cuban dictator ...del Castro was considered ... the highest levels of the ...ntral Intelligence Agency at ...a time Bobby was riding ...rd on the agency. The ...icials disagreed, however, ...er whether the plan was ...proved and implemented.

...ne version claims that ...erworld figures actually ...re recruited to carry out ... plot. Another rumor has it ... three hired assassins ...re caught in Havana where ... survivor is still ...posed to be languishing in ...on. These stories have ... investigated and dis... by the FBI.

...et the rumor persists, ...spered by people in a ...tion to know, that Castro ...became aware of an ...rican plot upon his life ... decided to retaliate ...nst President Kennedy.

...is report may have start... New Orleans's flamboyant ...ict Attorney Jim Garri... on his investigation of the ...edy assassination, but ...rs believe he is following ...wrong trails.

For weeks after the tragedy, this column was told, Bobby was morose and refused to see people. Could he have been plagued by the terrible thought that he had helped put into motion forces that indirectly may have brought about his brother's martyrdom? Some insiders think so.

Blow for Blow

Note: Those who may be shocked that the CIA would consider stooping to a political assassination should be reminded of the ugly nature of what Secretary of State Dean Rusk has called "the back-alley struggle."

He has described it as "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world ... a never ending war ... no quarter asked and none given ... It's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side."

The blunt truth is that the subterranean world of espionage is harsh almost beyond belief. There have been times that the CIA has been forced to resort to the most extreme measures to protect the national security.

Some of the CIA's best operatives also have suddenly and mysteriously disappeared. No word will be heard of them for months, then a few grim details will leak out.

"We will learn that these people have been subjected to the most skillful, most fiendish tortures that man can possibly devise and that they have been reduced to animals or vegetables," Clark Clifford, head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Committee, told this column. "When they no longer can really be called ... information has ... ed from them, th... disposed of. It is ... picture, but that ... the game is played."

We also play rough. The New York Times, in an exhaustive report on the CIA, quoted "one of the best-informed men in Washington on this subject" as saying: "When we catch one of them (a Soviet or other agent), it becomes ... everything out ... we do it wi... barred."

This much can be verified:

1. President Kennedy was so disillusioned with the [illegible] after the Bay of Pigs [illegible] that he swore to [illegible] he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He ordered a [illegible] tion by a group [illegible] Gen. Maxwell [illegible] President's [illegible] his brother [illegible] up calling the [illegible] CIA.

2. During [illegible] the CIA [illegible] Castro [illegible] the [illegible] insiders, [illegible] up with the [illegible] Bobby, eager to avenge the Bay of Pigs fiasco, played a key role in the [illegible]. Whether the assassination plot was ever actually put into effect is disputed.

Castro Reacts

3. Some insiders are convinced Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. With characteristic fury, he is reported to have cooked up a counterplot against President Kennedy.

4. Shortly after Kennedy was gunned down, the FBI handed President Johnson a memo reporting that Cuban leaders had hoped for Kennedy's death. The President showed it to Kennedy's top aide, Ted Sorensen, who thought the details were so ambiguous that he called the memo "meaningless."

5. It is also known, of course, that Lee Oswald, the assassin, was active in the pro-Castro movement and traveled to Mexico seeking a Cuban visa a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Some sources consider Robert Kennedy's behavior after the assassination to be significant. He seemed to be tormented, they say, by more than the natural grief over the murder of his brother.

Author William Manchester, who got his information chiefly from Kennedy-controlled sources, portrays Bobby as a character of granite during those tragic days. But others had a different impression.

McGeorge Bundy, then a top White House [illegible]

00779

Jack Anderson

WPost 7/27

Did the Castro Plot Backfire?

The late Robert Kennedy was tormented by the terrible thought, according to intimates, that he may have helped trigger the assassination of his brother.

We raised this possibility in January 1971, when we first revealed that the CIA had plotted to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. It has taken us 4½ years to get the rest of the story.

Loyal associates of Robert Kennedy, rushing to defend his memory, have sworn that he knew nothing about the assassination attempts and, contradictorily, that he put a stop to them. Both accounts are incorrect, according to sources with an intimate knowledge of the events.

"Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert Kennedy was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother."

Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother.

The preparations to knock off Castro began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs planning. President Kennedy, who inherited the fiasco, swore to friends afterward that he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

Instead, he appointed his brother, Robert, to oversee the CIA, with instructions to shake it up. Characteristically, Robert began investigating the undercover operations from top to bottom. His purpose was to prevent another Bay of Pigs.

He became fascinated, say our sources, with the CIA's covert activities. Eagerly, he pursued the details down through the lower-levels. As one source put it, "He was like a wide-eyed schoolboy."

In the process, he learned about the continuing effort to eliminate Castro, an operation known inside the CIA as the "executive action plan." In fact, Robert took a special interest in the activities against Castro. One insider, former Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, told us the focus "on the Cuban situation" was intensified in 1961 at Robert Kennedy's "insistence."

The President eventually put Robert in charge of a counter-insurgency committee, called the Special Group, which concentrated upon harassing Castro. One member, former CIA chief John McCone, acknowledged that the group had "directed mischievous things against Castro like infiltrating saboteurs, blowing up bridges and carrying on general confusion."

McCone insisted, however, that "the group at no time gave any consideration to any assassination plot." We have established that the "executive action plan" was directed by William Harvey, the CIA operative whom we linked to the assassination plot in our original 1971 story. We have also learned that he reported to the late Desmond Fitzgerald in CIA headquarters. We have been unable, however, to identify the next link in the chain of command.

Nevertheless, wholly reliable sources insist that Robert Kennedy knew about the plot against Castro and did nothing to stop it. The intended target, Fidel Castro, also knew about it. One assassination squad reportedly was apprehended on a Havana roof top within range of Castro's movements, about March 1, 1963.

The Cuban premier, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Daniel Harker the following September, warned that U.S. leaders would find themselves in danger if they attempted to do away with Cuban leaders.

"United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe," Castro told Harker.

Two months later, President Kennedy was shot down in the streets of Dallas. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban embassy a few weeks earlier.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA director John McCone, who remained alone with Robert at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours. All others, including Robert's priest, were turned away. But McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the agonizing three hours.

Other sources say that Robert, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion for the next few days. Although he bottled up his feelings, they knew him and understood the circumstances well enough to realize he blamed himself for his brother's death. There was little doubt, they say, that he believed the CIA's attempts against Castro put into motion the forces that brought about his brother's martyrdom.

On January 18, 1971, we reported: "Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy."

It has now been disclosed that the Warren Commission was told nothing about the CIA's plot to kill Castro even though the late Allen Dulles, the CIA chief who initiated the plot, sat on the commission.

According to the final report, the commission investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and the Cuban government" but found no substance to any of them.

The Cuban premier himself, in an interview with Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, emphatically denied having anything to do with the Kennedy assassination.

"It is . . . very interesting that this man Oswald, who was involved in the assassination, traveled to Mexico a few months prior to the assassination and applied for a permit at the Cuban embassy to travel to Cuba, and he was not given the permit," said Castro.

"But I ask myself why would a man who commits such an act try to come here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if someone did not wish to involve Cuba in this, because I am under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States and that it was all a result of a conspiracy . . . We have never believed in carrying out this type of activity of assassination of adversaries."

The Washington Post, 9/9/76

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot. ??

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his backed-up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators, he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination, according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.

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DROPOUTS By Howard Post



GASOLINE ALLEY By Moores



THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, August 27, 1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Smudge Only Clue in Rosselli Case

It was a grisly end for John Rosselli, the dapper, debonair mobster about town, who had been a familiar figure in the glittering night spots of Hollywood, Las Vegas and Havana.

His killers shot or stabbed him in the stomach. The autopsy indicates they may have shot him and then dug out the bullet with a knife. Then they brutally hacked off his legs. It is possible that he was still alive when they stuffed his body into a 55-gallon drum.

They wrapped chains around the drum to weight it down and tossed it into Biscayne Bay. The autopsy suggests he may have died of asphyxiation inside the drum before it hit the water. The gases from the decomposing body floated the heavy container to the surface. It was discovered, with its nightmarish contents, 10 days after Rosselli had disappeared from his sister's home in Plantation, Fla.

The police withheld the gruesome details of his death while they searched for his killers. We began our own investigation, meanwhile, after an appeal from his associates.

We first encountered Johnny Rosselli more than five years ago. We were investigating his role in the Central Intelligence Agency's plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

The CIA case officer, William Harvey, told us that Rosselli had been the hero of the abortive adventure. Harvey broke his oath of secrecy because he thought it might help Rosselli, who was in trouble with the law. The CIA agent had nothing but praise for Rosselli's daring.

In the strictest of confidence, Rosselli himself confirmed that he had directed six assassination attempts against Castro. We protected his confidence, so he came to trust us. We were the only reporters he would talk to.

So when he vanished last month his associates came to us for help. We were suspicious, of course, that his disappearance was linked to the Castro caper. But our investigation has now produced evidence to the contrary.

We have learned, for example, that Rosselli was not the amiable, retired old duffer he pretended to be. He began in the big time as a bookkeeper for Chicago's notorious Al Capone and became a specialist in white-collar crimes. It's a profession, apparently, that he never gave up.

Competent sources say that, between rounds on the Florida golf courses, Rosselli was involved in stolen securities and financial swindles. His operations reportedly were resented by Santo Trafficante, who has been identified in Senate testimony as the Mafia chief in Florida.

Rosselli came to Florida from Las Vegas, where he allegedly represented the Chicago mob. Our sources say that he handled millions in illegal gambling money, which he forwarded to the Chicago underworld. There are reports that Chicago crime lord Tony Accardo felt he had been short-changed by Rosselli.

Still earlier, Rosselli spent time in the slammer, first, for extortion and, later, for a card swindle. Those who know him say he had developed a taste for the good life. He dressed in the latest styles, dined at the best restaurants and dated beautiful women. The thought of going back to prison, friends say, horrified him.

To avoid prison, he began to talk to the government as early as 1970. He gave information, according to our sources, which resulted in a grand jury confrontation for Tony Accardo. The surly mobster took the fifth. But Accardo grumbled to associates that he would pay back Rosselli some day.

Rosselli was also blamed for passing information to the government, which led to the conviction of Detroit mobster Anthony Zerilli. He is now serving a four-year sentence at Sandstone federal penitentiary for racketeering.

Perhaps the last straw was Rosselli's testimony in the Castro case. He identified two mobsters, the late Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, as being involved in the assassination attempts. It's no secret in the underworld that Trafficante detests publicity.

Our sources believe that the Mafia bosses finally became fed up with Rosselli. His execution would have required the approval of the top leaders, our sources say, because it was almost certain to bring the federal government into the case.

Who were the vicious killers? The only clue is a smudge spot on the window of Rosselli's car. One of his assailants probably had used a greasy hair pomade.

Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been laid up in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County jail.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1961. As part of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and leave Cuba leaderless.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the job by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused, however, to discuss the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination teams on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once, he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the bottom and sank the boat. Roselli was fished out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chef to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1963. Throughout this period, Roselli worked under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has tried to pump Roselli for information. But he was sworn to silence by the CIA, and up to this moment, he hasn't broken it.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department, as part of its crackdown on organized crime, tried to nail Roselli. The FBI discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

Of Roselli's two CIA associates, Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell is still on the CIA payroll. Both admitted to us a friendship with Roselli but refused to discuss their CIA activities. Harvey said he had a "high regard" for Roselli and called the Friar's Club case a "bum rap." Said Harvey: "The Friar's Club indictment is phony. Roselli had no more to do with that than I had."

Roselli's lawyers are now trying to get clemency for their client, citing our stories about his secret CIA service.

Firearms Fiasco

Under pressure from the firearms lobby, the Treasury Department has failed to enforce a vital section of the 1968 federal firearms act.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require full reports of all firearms and ammunition sales.

For the two years that the law has been in force, the Treasury Department has ignored this key provision. The gun industry has complained it would be a bookkeeping nightmare.

The federal government, which would have to compile all the sales data, has also been reluctant to spend the $100 million it would cost for computers and staff to maintain the firearms files.

PN US B

Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Anderson

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horrified" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous.

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was — it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November, 1963, coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

PN 45 B

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

3/10/75

BY JACK ANDERSON
with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON—Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.

Anderson

Actually, we reported as far back as Jan. 18, 1971, that the CIA had arranged six assassination attempts against Castro in the early 1960s. Now that the story has been revived, it might be useful to recount the details.

The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

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Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life thereafter, using assassination teams equipped with high-powered rifles, explosives and two-way radios. Roselli personally made midnight powerboat dashes to deliver the teams at secret landing spots on the Cuban coast.

The assassination teams never got a shot at Castro, although the CIA learned that the last group reached a rooftop within range. This occurred around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had paid a mysterious call upon the Cuban embassy in Mexico City a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Sources familiar with the CIA conspiracy can't shake a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro may have become aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and, therefore, may have recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

CBS [illegible] FILE COPY

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, March 10, 1975

CIA Plots Against Castro Recounte

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

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The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island. Without the charismatic Castro, it was thought, the defenders would become demoralized and disorganized.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli's CIA contacts were William Harvey and James O'Connell, who accompanied him on hush-hush trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams. No one else was told, however, of the CIA's role in the murder mission.

Roselli represented himself as an oilman seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings. The assassination weapons were also carefully selected from foreign makes, mostly Belgian, to prevent any link to the United States.

Each attempt to kill Castro was meticulously planned, like an episode from the TV drama "Mission Impossible." For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food.

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Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again. Therefore, the CIA, unsure whether the plotters had failed or the poison hadn't been strong enough, decided to try again with a more powerful dose.

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Sources familiar with the conspiracy can't shake a [nag]ging suspicion—unsupporte[d by] the Warren Commission's f[ind]ings—that Castro may have [be]come aware of the U.S. [attempts] upon his life and, theref[ore,] may have recruited Oswal[d to] retaliate against President K[en]nedy.

Footnote: Sources fam[iliar] with the secret review of [the] CIA's activities have now [ac]knowledged that Castro, as [we] reported four years ago, [was] marked for assassination by [the] CIA. A CIA spokesman refu[sed] to comment.

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

By Russell Baker

8/24/76
N. York Times

The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been murdered after discussing their C.I.A. enterprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced the incidents "gangland-style killings."

The phrase "gangland-style killing" has the cozy resonance of "home-style cooking," perhaps because both suggest the intimacy of hearth and fire with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack. These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm.

This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-style killings" has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that incessant failure may have dulled their appetite for the hunt.

Or, it may be because policemen believe the subjects of "gangland-style killings" aren't worth working overtime for. I don't know, and I certainly don't mean to impute either languor, timidity or indifference to America's homicide squads. I simply point out that once a murder has been called "gangland-style," apprehension of the perpetrator almost invariably fails to occur.

This raises the question whether "gangland-style" murders might possibly be catching among people who don't come from gangland. Consider the Roselli case. The body is found in the customary barrel, with the customary weights, in the customary water. It bears the customary bullet holes. Roselli's publicized standing in gangland seems to leave an open-and-shut case, which the police will quietly shut as soon as possible.

If you and I know this, reader, does it not follow that it is also known by, let us say, some hot-tempered waiter whom Roselli has been consistently undertipping for years?

If that waiter wanted to take his revenge and get away with it, is it not logical that he would do it "gangland-style," so the police could forget it, rather than by scalding Roselli to death in public with a tureen of lobster bisque?

This is not to suggest that the police ought to be giving Roselli's waiters the third degree, but merely to point out that gangland can have no monopoly on "gangland-style killing." Anybody with a barrel, some concrete and a capacious expanse of water can engage in it, just as readily as your corner greasy spoon can engage in "home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a victim who is a bona fide citizen of gangland. Obviously, a philandering husband cannot do in a loyal wife of 40 years "gangland-style" and expect the police not to lift an eyebrow. Unless the subject is the real gangland thing, it won't work.

The corollary of this fact is that gangland people are peculiarly vulnerable to "gangland-style" murder by devious non-ganglanders, who have no right to get away with it.

This must be infuriating to them. Imagine that you are an eminent statesman of gangland, and the vexation becomes manifest. You are entirely prepared to be sent off "gangland-style" by your colleagues. Those are the rules of the land.

Moreover, if they complete the job, you wouldn't dream of telling the police who did it, even if you could. That would violate the rules of the sportsmanship governing gangland. In gangland, good sports don't tell.

But to have some alien from the outer world—some straight-Jake cousin who wants his share of your will

OBSERVER

prematurely, some barber who hates your sideburns—to have somebody like this do the job on you and get away with it because it's done "gangland-style"—Ah, my friend, that must seem a cruel injustice.

Such a bad egg as that you would surely betray to the cops. How infuriating it would be if they looked at the barrel, the concrete, the water, the bullet holes and closed the case with a quietly murmured, "Just another gangland-style killing."

You will have been the victim, not only of murder, but also of discrimination, for it is only your membership in gangland that prevents the police from extending themselves to bring your persecutor to justice.

I do not know how policemen feel about nonmembers of gangland killing gangland members "gangland-style," but my hunch is that they take a sterner view of it than they do of gangland men bumping off each other. The average cop probably thinks it is not the kind of thing decent people ought to be doing.

I know very well that gangland folks don't approve of it, and to make sure that there is no misunderstanding, I want to assure them that I haven't the heart to swat a fly, myself, and, what's more, I've never been any good with concrete.

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

8/24/76
N. York
Times

By Russell Baker

The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been murdered after discussing their C.I.A. enterprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced the incidents "gangland-style killings."

The phrase "gangland-style killing" has the cozy resonance of "home-style cooking," perhaps because both suggest the intimacy of hearth and fire with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack. These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm.

This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-style killings" has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that incessant failure may have dulled their appetite for the hunt.

Or, it may be because policemen believe the subjects of "gangland-style killings" aren't worth working overtime for. I don't know, and I certainly don't mean to impute either languor, timidity or indifference to America's homicide squads. I simply point out that once a murder has been called "gangland-style," apprehension of the perpetrator almost invariably fails to occur.

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New York Times 8/23/76

Terrorist Activities Charged to Cubans By Police in Miami

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI)—Militant pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the Miami area are engaged in terrorist activities both in and outside the United States, according to testimony given before a Senate subcommittee and released today.

The testimony came last May before a Judiciary subcommittee on internal security headed by Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi. It said that as many as 50 Cuban groups of various shadings had been operating in Miami at any one time, many of them engaged in violent plots involving local actions and activities in Mexico, Central and South America and Cuba itself.

Lieut. Thomas Lyons, who has been with the Dade County Public Safety Department for more than nine years, and Raul J. Diaz, of the department's organized crime, terrorist and security unit, told of efforts to track down terrorist elements in the greater Miami area.

Lieutenant Lyons said most Cubans in the area were hard-working and industrious; but some individuals "use Dade County as a base for international terrorism against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics."

During the last two years, Lieutenant Lyons said, there have been four homicides "with strong indicators on each that the motivations were political in nature and terroristic by design."

Mr. Diaz said that some Castro groups had infiltrated exile organizations and that there were plans to assassinate Latin-American diplomats and foreign ministers.

Lieutenant Lyons said his unit received information from a confidential source early this year that there would be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his February visit to Costa Rica.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service were notified, he said. A well-known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There no incidents during the Kissinger visit.

He did not mention the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and American gangsters to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Two weeks ago, the body of an underworld figure, John Roselli was found stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in a bay near Miami. Mr. Roselli had testified last year before the Senate Select Committee on Intellegence Activities that he and a Chicago gangster, Sam Giancana, were hired by the C.I.A. to recruit Cubans to kill Mr. Castro. Mr. Giancana was shot and killed by unknown persons last year just before he was testify before the Washington panel.

JACK ANDERSON

Plot to kill Kissinger blocked

WASHINGTON — A reported plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four days before it was supposed to be carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence sources.

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was reported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on the Secretary's life was expected, according to underground reports, during his visit to Costa Rica last February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into Costa Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and Secret Service had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and notified the Costa Rican authorities. The suspected assassin was arrested and clapped into a tiny jail cell four days before Kissinger got to town.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his overtures to improve relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro back in 1972. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist band, known as Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story two years later after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Nov. 12, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists planned an "assassination ... against American congressmen and businessmen who supported a ... thaw." We noted that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger, himself, was one of the targets came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's little Havana. But he later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said, "(about) the plan to assassinate the US Secretary of State." He said the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been "actualized" by 1974.

Then, in a reference to our 1974 columns, he added: "This fact which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro l[e]ers who had conspired to kill US and other leaders pron[ot]ing a Cuban-American detente. Bosch already had b[een] convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a [ba]zooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped Fede[ral] parole and fled to Venezuela in 1974.

Months later, he was reported to be in Curacao, pr[o]tected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to t[he] reports, of his "money, friends and protection."

Florida's Dade County Public Safety Department, be[]cause of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellen[t] ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county's terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electrifying news.

He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in secret testimony. "We received information from confidential sources," he swore, "that there was going to be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ... We passed the information on to the FBI, and they had also received the information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Costa Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is now at large somewhere in Latin America.

8/22/76
Washington
1 of 3

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappear-

See ROSSELLI, A8, Col. 1

ROSSELLI, From A1

ance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

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principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsiility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

[illegible] FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counter-espionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic

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3 of 3

... a pure invention, a serious risk ... established Washington lawyer.

... committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 24, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to certain material and delivery of other material maintained by the FBI.

Pursuant to request item numbered 17, we currently have one abstract covering the areas of inquiry available for review at FBI Headquarters by approved personnel of the Committee.

Pursuant to request item numbered 18, we were not able to locate a copy of a cable dated on or about November 28, 1963, from Director, FBI, to Director, CIA, regarding interrogation of witnesses concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City. We are, however, furnishing a copy of an FBI to CIA teletype dated November 27, 1963, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which advises that the interrogation of Oswald between his arrest and murder had not extended to his travel to Mexico or his contacts with Soviet establishments. The teletype, classified "Secret," also contains details from an Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which were obtained from a highly sensitive source.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

We are also furnishing 3 Bureau memoranda in response to the latter part of request item 18 asking for all memoranda prepared between November 22, 1963, and December 30, 1963, which relate to the interrogation of witnesses concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, including his visits to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 26 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

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FROM : MEXICO CITY

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ACCORDING LIFIRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFT MEXI FOR CUBA 12 NOV VIA CUBANA 465, RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV VIA CUBANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY, THEY PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOV VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. ANANYEV (PHONETIC) OF SOV CONSULATE NEW YORK PHONED SOVEMB 23 NOV ASKING FOR INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING. COMMENT: THIS ONLY INFREQUENTLY OCCURS. ASST CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE CALL FROM NEW YORK.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * ALEKSEY PAPKOV AND VALENTIN PONOMAREV, SOV DIP COURIERS ARRIVED MEXI 10 NOV.

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-6-5

12-62

ROUTING

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2		5	
3		6	

29 Nov 63 15 23z

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR 85678

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE OF 8 NOVEMBER 1963 CONCERNING THE TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS VALENTI GERMANOVICH PONOMAREV AND ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPKOV.

2. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY, PONOMAREV AND POPKOV LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CUBA ON 12 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465 AND RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY ON 18 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA.

3. A USUALLY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THEY PROBABLY LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOVEMBER VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE "ANANYEV" (PHONETIC) OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORK CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXI CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE COURIERS WERE TAKING. ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKO PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CI

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
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ROUTING			
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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

See Sanitized File Number 14 47 For sterile copy of this document.

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85076

4. "ANANYEV" IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH ANANYEV OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: MEXI 7060 (IN 67682)

IDEN 58

SR/CI/K [redacted]

C/WH/3 IDEN 4 [redacted]

REC'D FROM IDEN 13

[redacted]

CI/LIA JAN 23 1976

RELEASING OFFICER CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IDEN 14

[redacted]

C/WH/R

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Cuba

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

(1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;

(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and

(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

SECRET - EYES ONLY

but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

Tab 4

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator Schweiker

FROM: Jim Johnston
Dan Dwyer
Ed Greissing

DATE: January 27, 1976

SUBJ: Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation of JFK Assassination

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January 9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to review the file on January 23 and 26.

Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruction in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Amlash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 48198* to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that Amwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was "reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre.

Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session. CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR of 7 September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S. forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was an "inside job." Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

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* DIRs are messages sent from Langley. SECRET

At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.)

On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intelligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775 appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.

> "Mary: I don't want to imagine things but this thing of Amlash.
>
> Moreno: It is either a tremendous secret or a top secret matter (unreadable) then the word "treason" or "reason").
>
> Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in contact with Amwhip. Paris station apparently was picking up responsibility for Amlash at this time, since Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19 September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.

Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris 0934 to DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5 October. Case officer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)"" "With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash con-

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* The files do not accurately identify these case officers. [redacted] and [redacted], however, were the principal case officers.

siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job.'"

On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October. Although the case officer had been forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's request for a high level meeting. "Amlash convinced that if such meet does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's role. DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S. to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S. support could come only after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel, the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting. His reactions are summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 November. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S. government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastinate. Amlash talked about going to the French terrorist organization, the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with what apparently is the author's conclusion: "It is hoped that he does realize that Havana must first be taken . . . or failing that, a truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which could be true rallying point."

SECRET

In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash was to be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup. He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18 and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash operation be kept to a minimum."

Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting." The CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morning of November 22 for this meeting.

Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash.**

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon. The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a typewriter with an old ribbon. It made no mention of the passing of a poison pen to Amlash.

On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source complained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a concealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash as one of these visitors.

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* Desmond Fitzgerald

** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent but could not be found.

On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S. support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime." He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted "major top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis for decision."

JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8 December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher authority but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be delayed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority" even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. "This procedure will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirmation needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted." Headquarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal assets."

By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December 1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office on Nestor's (Sanchez) orders." followed by initials that appear to be "GM."

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That document, a rough draft of a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found) appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez.

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report information received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intelligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important operations. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one report rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash, and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.

Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA files to determine what other operations Castro might have been referring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.

Scenario for B-9

This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support.

2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolution, vote against the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed to 5. below.

4. If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan

arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.

7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full recognition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines.

The above scenario should not be commenced unless it is recognized that, although these actions are primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.

Advantages

a. Probably feasible within OAS.

b. Surveillance completely legal and low noise level.

Disadvantages

a. Does not attack principal problem of Castro's subversion in Latin America.

b. Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms.

c. Probably will not result in apprehending arms carriers.

d. Expensive.

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting "autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns.

Advantages

a. Some economic advantages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro sentiment.

b. Deniability by U.S. as U.S. soil and personnel not used.

Disadvantages

a. Results commensurate with limited skills of exile groups.

b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway.

c. Some noise level.

7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals.

Advantages

a. More professional operations that are targetted and controlled.

Disadvantages

a. Constant danger of proof of U.S. involvement.

Advantages	Disadvantages
b. Improvement of morale among internal anti-Castro elements. Better domestic political position as result of increased noise level.	b. Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a mortal blow.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7. above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from U.S. territory.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.	a. General ineffectiveness against targets.
	b. Obvious employment of U.S. soil.
	c. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)

1. Engage in CIA-controlled as well as "autonomous" covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery, Matanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel only.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. This essentially minimum plan evolved June 1963, but never permitted to develop, having some chance to overthrow Castro.	a. High risk of capture and exposure.
b. Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.	b. High noise level.
	c. Possibility of some Soviet response.

2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports.	a. Multiplication of U.S. problems with major allies including possible loss of allies' support of U.S. dollar.
b. U.S. obviously "doing something about Castro."	b. Loss of trade.
	c. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.1. above using not only Cuban but other nationalities including U.S. soldier of fortune teams.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improved operations and greater economic damage.	a. Technical deniability only and very high noise level.
	b. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Much more effective operations and real economic damage.	a. No deniability.
	b. Very high noise level.
	c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.

5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of humiliating and degrading Castro.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Proof of U.S. intention to stop Castro.	a. Will probably not catch contraband.
	b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response.
	c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.

6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into and out of Cuba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will at least for a period disrupt Cuba's diplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.	a. Considerable outcry from Europe and Latin America.
	b. Not fatal to Fidel.

7. A Presidential public declaration making clear that the U.S. considers the continued presence of the Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin America.	Must be followed by some form of effective action.

8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

Advantages

a. May force Castro to stop his subversive actions.

b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required or not, it will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.

Disadvantages

a. May provoke Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.

b. Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut violations by Castro.

c. Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union through high level diplomatic channels that further subversion by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A.

Advantages

a. Proper basis for future actions.

b. Possible deterrence of Castro.

c. Best method of minimizing Soviet reaction.

Disadvantages

a. Difficulty of clear proof.

b. Possible Soviet reactions.

10. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.

Advantages

The most effective method of bringing down Castro.

Disadvantages

Possible Soviet reactions.

11. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba.

Advantages		Disadvantages
Will bring down Castro.	a.	Possible Soviet reaction.
	b.	Probable heavy casualties on both sides.
	c.	Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba.

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

to a mimeo machine to prepare public material if you are going to operate. A good typewriter is essential and above all people that will carry out the million and one mechanical functions necessary to make it a going operation.

Note: when you contact people by mail we recommend that only first class be used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope. You will notice how we work our's here on the national level. Many people will respond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and over curious postmen. These may sound like small things to you, but I can assure you that we have gone through thi a thousand and more time the length and breadth of the country and have learned a great deal over the last three years through some bitter experience.

Naturally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning yourself so that we can get to know you and possibly be of some assistence to you as we get more information.

We hope to hear from you very soon in this regard and are looking forward to a good working relationship for the future. Please fell free to discuss this matter quite thoroughly with me.

Fraternally,

V. T. Lee

V. T. Lee,
National Director.

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

4

21 February 1964

SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of acceptability of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro commitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic.

No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compatible with our relations with a neutral power.

Advantages

If the plan works, this would represent a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence could thereby be eliminated.

Disadvantages

a. As plan almost sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious domestic political repercussions.

b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America.

2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satisfactory detente.

Advantages

As in 1. above.

Disadvantages

a. As in 1. above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.

b. Even less chance of success.

3. The present level of intelligence operations, including U-2 overflights would be continued. Black maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development.

Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries.

Advantages

We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies.

Disadvantages

a. Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American countries and would further demoralize the exile community.

b. We would be in effect helping Castro to consolidate his position at home and establish his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and the cooperation of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage against selected Cuban imports (e.g. contamination of lubricant additives).

Advantages

A carefully targetted denial program with effective subtle sabotage is capable of at least disrupting the timing of Castro's economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugar.

Disadvantages

We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade. We may delay but not prevent Castro's progress.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries in Latin America, such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in national waters.

SECRET

Exhibit No. 3 to deposition of V.T. Lee 4/17/64 at New York, N.Y. (Substituted for copy on 5/14/64) WJC

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

May 29, 1963

Lee H. Oswald
4907 L/C Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, along with our thanks and welcome.

Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans is gratefully received. I shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have a better picture of what this entails.

For one thing, I am enclosing a copy of our Constitution and By-Laws for all Chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonomy for an organization our size. We try and let all Chapters operate according to the local requirements. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be met.

(All Chapters can receive literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at the retail price and use the proceeds for further Chapter activities.) Credit is extended and payment is not required with the order. We do expect payment within a reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation.

It would be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Lousiana seems somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. However, with what is there perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined responsibility of concrete organizational work.

We certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a legal executive board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable we could readily issue a charter for

V.T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3

No. 3 To
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...for New York
(Substituted
copy on 5/14/64)
W.L.C.
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...y 29, 1963

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FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

a New Orleans Chapter of FPCC. In fact, we would be very, very pleased to see this take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about. We feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida which I originally organized before coming up to work in the National Office.

I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but know from experience that it is quite a problem and requires some sacrifice on the part of those involved.

You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner which is conventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public. The national office here in New York is the only one in the country today and the New York City Chapter uses our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have discovered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.O. Box for all mailings and public notices. ((A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an individual should move or drop out.)) We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prospective supporters. I definitely would not recommend an office, at least not one that will be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can operate in the community through several public experiences.

We will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much. It is up to the local Chapters to handle their own affairs. You shaould have at least access

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Deputy Director (Plans)
Cost of Cuban Operations
Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Fiscal Year	Support a/	Covert Collection b/	Covert Action c/			Total
			PA/Prop d/	Paramilitary e/	Post-Invasion Brigade Support f/	
1960	$319,534	$131,063	$1,677,161	$318,409	-	$2,446,167
1961	6,293,580	457,633	5,168,584	30,164,698	$1,627,824	43,712,319
1962	3,599,274	793,824 g/	6,444,098	2,975,635	4,176,000	17,988,831
1963	5,343,973	1,738,977 g/	5,786,797	5,038,880	3,899,830	21,808,457
1964 (est.)	5,030,000	1,767,500	3,520,000	9,317,500 h/	565,000	20,200,000
Total	20,586,361	4,888,997	22,596,640	47,815,122	10,268,654	106,155,774

a/ Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of administrative equipment and supplies, rental of administrative properties and facilities, etc.

b/ Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

c/ Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412.

d/ PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

e/ Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

f/ Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade members, etc.

g/ Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.

h/ Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.

15 December 1963

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA

I. - The Current Situation in Cuba

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological

lift

lift. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about $20 million to almost $100 million during the year.

2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchev assurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices. The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.

3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear.

4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.

5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

These

These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

II - Current U. S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world

1. Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba: We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to

its

economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. <u>The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade</u>: We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended). To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.

3. <u>The reduction of free world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba</u>: We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.

4. <u>The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba</u>: As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.

5. <u>Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image</u>: By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

B.

B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion

1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.

2. Outside Cuba:

a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and inshore surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.

b. Bilateral: Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.

c. Unilateral: In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.

C.

C. The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.

D. The collection of intelligence

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

E. Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

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As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.

By

By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measureable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

CIA's

CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. Covert collection of intelligence to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.

2. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.

3. Economic denial actions in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.

4. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA is identifying, contacting and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.

5. General sabotage and harassment as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe that the

that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.;

Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;

Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

Both are Cuban and employ Cuban nationals exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation.

The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba.

The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.

Of

Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below.

IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted.[1] All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

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1. Annex I contains a brief review of these operations.

The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low ebb" of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale."

In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that the "most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition." Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months

ago,

ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the Maximum Leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture." Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevarra had indicated concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announcement of the raids, the average man on the street seemed apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy, and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S. shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January 1964 that the 23 December Siguanea raid which destroyed a P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban government officials and in the Western community in Havana has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight continues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very successful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguanea had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered which depress the people, they are anxious for something to happen."

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The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine military training but also with work on construction and agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.

In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network from 46 observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the end of October. These posts have radio communications and are manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort to seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations have been established since June, and we have evidence tentatively identifying 7 more.

Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency is reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psychological or economic repercussions inside Cuba. He has conducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving units of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force elements have been put on special alert, either on a local or island-wide basis, on at least 36 occasions during 1963 as a result of rumored or actual maritime operations. Residents in areas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation in suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal security force, the Lucha Contra Piratas, was formed to attempt to cope with off-shore raiding parties. In September new training courses were initiated for command cadres of "popular defense units." The purpose of these units is to organize the people to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers and installations from sabotage.

Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive capability against raids, we have continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate

Cuba's

Cuba's defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of this sort, however, always present risk and we must assume that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they have done in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, although Khrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon a U.S. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted.

If Castro is to be brought down without overt military action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to reach a point where it can become self-sustained.

V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S/Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however, disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

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As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

VI

VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

B. OAS ACTION

B. OAS Action

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

1. A break in diplomatic relations

The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

2. A break in economic relations

Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

3. A break in air and surface communications

Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.

4.

4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in connection with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such one was estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. Condemnation of the Castro regime

This would be a pro forma action, with only limited psychological force.

6. Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

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In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. Increased efforts against subversion

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be guaranteed

guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

Annex I

The five sabotage raids run by CIA:

1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked using 4.2 mortars. One tank car was destroyed and one storage tank breached, causing considerable fire damage.

2. On 19 August the sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked. There was considerable fire damage and fuel lines were broken. We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines as a result of the raid causing additional damage.

3. On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia de Maravi, Oriente Province, a minor installation of local economic importance, was 70 per cent destroyed by a raiding party.

4. On 21 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabela, Las Villas Province. The vessel was sunk.

5. On 23 December an underwater demolition team attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 18 others injured in the explosion.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

tive." Second question: What does the American government expect to gain from the blockade? Is the economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political maneuver?

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the political effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: "The continuation of the blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to suggest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague – an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this interview – and to the editor of *The New Republic*. Both my confidants, who knew the President a thousand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed himself so specifically and with such feeling on his understanding of the first phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic characteristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a decision, and because of this, his decisions were unpredictable. At that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

Night Session

TAB M

In the "Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still lying about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farmers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revolutionaries, ministers and ambassadors – but Fidel remained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my departure date (the capricious plane which links Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my interview with the President. We went up to my room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks.

Fidel listened with devouring and passionate interest: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand malicious sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though I myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is possible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain remarks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Kennedy showed his impatience with the comments attributed to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humorous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know whether Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons caricaturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. I only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judgments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba.

"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance. I'll explain what I mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at

invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above everything, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation; I don't think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also think he is a realist; he is now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, to disappear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you new information right away. I have refrained from doing this until now; but today an attempt is being made to frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile emplacement.

"Six months before these missiles were installed in Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information warning us that a new invasion of the island was being prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world and berated in US government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of the President. There were those among our informants who even thought it would suffice to alert the President and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Executive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the United States, that the American government *had decided it would not tolerate it any longer;* he had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his statement by pronouncing each syllable separately] *Kennedy reminded the Russians that the United States had not intervened in Hungary,* which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word 'invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the time, lacking any background information, could not draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to Khrushchev all our previous information, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the *definite conviction* that an invasion might take place from one moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied: *do whatever is needed to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union.* And how to realize this objective? All our thinking and discussions revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolution (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world), and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conventional military aid was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this would inevitably touch off a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. Moreover, since then we have had every proof of the immense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is something else, specifically apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several examples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me – and I believe him – that Stalin would never have emplaced missiles in Cuba.

"It is true that it was said then by other factions that the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain internal problems were driving the Russians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not today want war. One only need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their economic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers' standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (because of their commitments and their position in the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the attempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplacement of the missiles. And I might add here that for us Cubans it didn't really make so much difference whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, we were not gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months . . . in other words, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progress

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Progress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint . . . despite all that I am willing to agree that the idea in itself constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in the papers this morning – did you see the news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argentine government! Do you realize what that means? This will cause more commotion on the New York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely linked with American interests! There is talk of nationalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there . . . well and good! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it's not doing so badly; all these things are consonant with the aspirations of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore which broke out when the United States and Cuba together decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy – not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon – has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking place all over the South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think the Venezuelans need us to understand what's going on in their country? Do you think we don't have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country's economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to

educate our young *compañeros*. This doesn't mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business."

"We Have Always Lived with Danger"

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, *it still remains true that you have chosen Communism*, that your economy and your security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior motives in this association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of influence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absolutely everything, and we are still alive and getting better day by day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to celebrate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the *fifth anniversary* of the Cuban Revolution! The United States' policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increasing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmosphere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends one discovers in the world when one is persecuted by the United States. No, truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don't think about the US. When I think of the problems which diplomatic relations with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the US at present. I prefer to do business with him than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Kennedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act as they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assistance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men -- nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin American countries will choose what they want. All the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be impossible to make the Americans understand that socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to coexistence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba's subversive activities, this is just attributing to others one's own desire to dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involvement. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speaking from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty."

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be."

All this was said two days before President Kennedy's death.

January 19, 1964

MEMO to Boonstra, cc to COS from LEGAT; Subject: OSWALD - It is to be noted that the White House was in receipt of a paper entitled "Possible Psychological Motivations in the Assassination of Pres. Kennedy" written by Jose I. LASAGA of Miami, Fla. This speculative paper attempted to establish that the motivation of OSWALD in the assassination of Pres K was Fidel CASTRO or a CASTRO agent and that OSWALD was motivated during his trip to Mexi between 27 Sept and 2 Oct 63. The paper alleged that OSWALD held an extended interview with the Cuban Amb in Mexi whom he met in a restaurant on the outskirts of Mexi from which restaurant they both later left in the Amb's car for a talk without being overheard./ Source of this latter info was alleged to be Salvador DIAZ Verson. This individual was interviewed at Miami. He stated that while in Mexi 29-29 Nov 63 attending the Congress of the International Federation of Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at the offices of the newspaper Excelsior on the night of 25 Nov 63. There he learned through the Mexi press that the Mexi gov had arrested one Silvia DURAN; that DURAN allegedly had OSWALD as a guest in her house during his visit to Mexi; and that DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of the Cub Emb in Mexi. / DIAZ Verson went on to claim that he was d told by Dr. BORRELL Navarros, an exiled Cuban newspaperman employed by Excelsior, that OSWALD and DURAN on the day following OSWALD's arrival in Mexi went to a restaurant called the Caballo Blanco or possibly the Caballo Bayo where they met an official of the Cub Emb. DIAZ Verson claimed that he knows nothing about OSWALD and the Cub official leaving the restaurant together in a car. / It was ascertained that Dr. Eduardo BORRELL Navarro, a former Cuban Cabinet Minister who on occasion writes feature articles for the Mexi City Excelsior, currently resides at 1303 Homero St., Apart [illegible], Mexi. BORRELL Navarro was interviewed on 11 Jan at which time he furnished the following info: Salvador DIAZ Verson was in Mexi as claimed and discussed OSWALD with BORRELL and other Cuban exiles. DIAZ Verson also visited BORRELL in BORRELL's home. / BORRELL did not tell the story credited to him by DIAZ Verson concerning the visit to a Mexi City restaurant by OSWALD and Silvia DURAN. BORRELL had never heard this story or any similar story before. / BORRELL knew of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Emb officials other than the meetings which occurred at the time OSWALD visited the Cub Con in Mexi. / BORRELL knew nothing concerning any visit by OSWALD to the home of DURAN. / It is to be noted that DURAN was questioned by Mexi authorities on 23 Nov 63. At that time she confirmed that OSWALD visited the Cub Emb in Mexi during the time he was in Mexi from 27 Sept to 2 Oct. She alleged that the purpose of his visits to the Cuban Emb was to obtain a Cuban visa. She stated she had given him a telephone number to use in calling her concerning the visa, but denied that he had ever visited in her home. / On 17 Jan 64 a source... advised that he had been unable to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant in Mexi, but stated there is a Caballo Bayo restaurant located on outskirts of Mexi. Source went to restaurant, showed photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, who was in charge of Cub Con at the time of OSWALD's visit there, of Cub Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvia DURAN and of OSWALD to employees of restaurant and conducted extensive interviews of these employees. He was unable to find anyone among the employees who could recall any of the persons as having been at restaurant.

CIA

From CIA prepared chronology

BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined.

MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS,
WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412 Committee plus Robert Kennedy.

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project - General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General - included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor operations apparently in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's are discovered in Cuba:

> "McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans <u>and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime.</u>" (emphasis added)

01599

File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

(97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy: McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]
[According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission]
[DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following:

> "I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]

<u>File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963</u>

Nothing Relevant

<u>File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963</u>

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, Tom Ross of <u>Chicago Sun Times</u> [MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group" [MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about Kennedy assassination [MISSING]

(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING]

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: "Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations.

01512

File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassination attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations.

File: July 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press." [MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI "reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

File: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.

(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose. (Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action.
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss "Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same notation appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to "explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)

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*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba. Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"
Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House.

BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassination of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "W" File

Nothing relevant.

When Castro Heard the News

TAB H

Havana

It was around 1:30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We were having lunch in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magnificent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dorticós, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up the phone and I heard him say: "*Como? Un atentado?*" ("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone and exclaimed in a loud voice "*Herido? Muy gravemente*" ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times the words: "*Es una mala noticia.*" ("This is bad news.") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call with further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in American society and that this deed could equally well have been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The second call came through: it was hoped they would be able to announce that the United States President was still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is already re-elected." He pronounced these words with satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had held on a previous evening and which had turned into an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become a victim of the United States this would simply enhance his radius of influence in Latin America as well as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a leader would have to arise in the United States capable of understanding the explosive realities of Latin America and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again, you can tell him that I'm willing to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was held on November 19.

Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came in, Vallero would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: President Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question . . . all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a rebroadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly,

otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four! This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in another) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such methods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, because so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He repeated the remark several times: "What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes decency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if you write all those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy's policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a *granja de pueblo* (state farm), where he had been engaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.

"Didn't I Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be my turn next." But not yet. The next word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people's minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will all soon blow over. There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long."

We arrived at the *granja de pueblo,* where the farmers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commentator followed another; the remarks became increasingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where he could telephone President Dorticós. On the way he had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most important of all: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, saw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to sleep.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been reduced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. "After all," he added, "there are perhaps some people in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions "HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. . . ." I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John F. Kennedy.

At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba and the United States along the same lines as those between Finland and the Russians? How was the transition made from the humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me

once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, I awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. In that very seductive city of Havana to which we returned in the evening, where the luminous signboards with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emotion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of resentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rapprochement. After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian friends during his lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apologizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

JEAN DANIEL

ROMANS

"Robert Frost wrote 50 years ago, 'nothing is true except as a man or men adhere to it – to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it.' We need this spirit even more than money or institutions or agreements."

– JOHN F. KENNEDY, November 18, 1963

By Saturday night, even the television seemed worn out by attempt and failure and ceased to comment and gave over to a succession of photographs of the columns and the windows and the corners of the White House and of the shadows of the great Lincoln head in Springfield and to a voice reciting "Oh, Captain, My Captain." It is to be, then, the grand style. But the ship has not weathered every storm; Mr. Kennedy is not Abraham Lincoln; not because he is more or less, but because he is a remembered physical presence and Mr. Lincoln an image of the plastic arts. One's own time is personal, not historical. Just how long will it be before many of us will want to read a book about the day Mr. Kennedy was shot?

The news of the President's assassination was given by a taxi driver to three gentlemen as they left a hotel on Arlington Street in Boston. They turned right around and hurried back inside to attend to their investments. Packed with students and businessmen a shuttle plane from Boston to Washington waited for permission to take off when the captain came on the intercom: "Folks, up here on the flight deck we've been listening to the news and the President is dead." There was only time to hear one woman say, "How dreadful" before three men went back to discussing plan specifications. A college student reading *Agamemnon* p[illegible] no visible attention. One of his notes read, "love-in-[illegible]e." The plane took off, the stewardess collected the money and started to serve drinks. Then the captain was back again. They had been listening to more news, that is trying to listen to news because their real job was to hear flight control. There had been a gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was killed; the police had taken a man in [illegible]ie theater. Vice President Johnson was now the President. The talk of business went on through this, and stopped only when the captain again interrupted to say that the new President had been sworn in aboard an aircraft. A few laughed.

They ask too much of us when they ask us to act up to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent people. And yet some of us always complained that Mr. Kennedy did not seem quite emotionally committed enough. But now someone remembered with special affection a moment late in the 1960 campaign. Mr. Kennedy was in a motorcade and the Democratic governor who was with him said how wonderful it was to feel the love with which these crowds pressed forward to feel the touch of their candidate. "Oh, dry up," Mr. Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace in him that he used only the real in emotion and abstained from fabricating the expected. He had too much respect for the grand style to counterfeit it; how much truer to him might we have been if we had come down in scale and if the many of us who must have remembered the lines from *Cymbeline* had thought them proper to speak

"Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious winter's rages,
Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home art thou

Y2

Flash from Dallas

Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the presidential party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news—sketchy as it was at first—to the world. United Press International's Merriman Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32–33 his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result of Smith's first efforts—the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately clacked out of hundreds of UPI machines in newsrooms, radio and television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over the world.

```
DETECTIVES WERE THERE AND THEY "ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE BRIFF-
CASE) FOR SOMETHING."
   THE CASE WAS OPENED AND AN ENVELOPE WAS FOUND CONTAINING 44 $100
BILLS, THE WITNESS SAID. THE STATE HAD SAID IT WOULD PRODUCE THAT
PIECE OF EVIDENCE BUT IT HAD NOT LISTED IT AS ONE "OF THE SEVEN
LINKS." THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT CAROL'S
DEATH AFTER A SAVAGE BLUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER HOME WAS THE
RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED         MOREDA1234PCS
```

At 12:34 the Teletype was supplying copy on a Minneapolis murder trial.

```
UPI A7N DA
          PRECEDE KENNEDY
   DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
MOTORCADE TODAY IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
                                        JT1234PCS..
```

The Dallas bureau, alerted by Smith over radiotelephone from the press car as it careered toward the hospital, sends out the first sparse news.

```
UPI A8N HX
2ND ADD 2ND LEAD  THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST
BUOS HO
UPHOLD
DA IT YRS  NX
```

Minneapolis starts to add more details on the murder trial. The New York bureau, knowing that ace reporter Smith is covering the President's trip, tells all bureaus to "uphold"—get off the wire. "Dallas, it's yours."

```
UPI A8N AJ
DAY
   CORRECTE
BUOS UPHOLD--NX
```

Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is quickly squelched by the New York bureau.

```
UPI A8N DA
          URGENT
   1ST ADD SHOTS, DALLAS (A7N) XXX DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
   NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.
   THE INCIDENT OCCURRED NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON MAIN
STREET, JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE
THE PRESIDENT WAS TO MA

                    FLASH

FLASH

     KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
                                   PERHAPS SERIOUSLY
   PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET
                                        JT1239PCS
```

The Dallas operator begins sending the rest of Smith's account from the press car.

At the hospital, Smith sees the President's limp body in the car and races to a telephone. At 12:39, nine minutes after the shooting, the grave news flashes over the wire.

UPI 9N
BULLETIN
1ST LEAD SHOOTING
DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV. JOHN B. CONNALLY OF TEXAS WERE CUTDOWN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY TOURED DOWNTOWN DALLAS IN AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY.
MOREJT1241PCS

Now reporter Smith is dictating a story ready for printing.

UPI A10N DA
1ST ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS (9N DALLAS XX TODAY.
THE PRESIDENT, HIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE, WAS RUSHED TO PARKLAND HOSPITAL. THE GOVERNOR ALSO WAS TAKEN TO PARKLAND.
CLINT HILL, A SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY, SAID "HE'S DEAD," AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR OF A WHITE HOUSE TOURING CAR, THE FAMOUS "BUBBLETOP" FROM WASHINGTON. HE WAS RUSHED TO AN EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL.
OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM.
THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A PARK IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HEAR
MORE 144PES

Smith rolls on, swiftly and fluently, adding fresh details as "pandemonium" breaks out in the corridor outside his telephone niche.

UPI A11N DA
2ND ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING (9N DALLAS) XXX DALLAS.
REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE HEARD WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE BURST OF GUNFIRE.
SECRET SERVICE AGENTS IN A FOLLOW-UP CAR QUICKLY UNLIMBERED THEIR AUTOMATIC RIFLES.
THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAR WAS DOWN.
THEY DREW THEIR PISTOLS, BUT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.
THE PRESIDENT WAS SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE DOWN. CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT.
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT
MORE 145PES

Searching his mind for impressions of the shooting, Smith adds all he can remember to the story. The shaken wire operator stumbles in the second line.

UPI A12N DA

IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY WAS HIT, BUT BULLET WOUNDS IN CONNALLY'S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE, INDICATING THE GUNFIRE MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON.
THERE WERE THREE LOUD BURSTS.
DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL.

MORE 146PES

As yet nothing is known of the sniper, what kind of weapon he used, or where the shots came from.

UPIA13N DA

Ambassador Hernandez Armas apologizes with President Dorticos for having been late in calling him, but because of an interruption on the line, he has not done so until now. He adds that "I spoke with this ... and did not add anything important to what I have already informed and which I ... verbally. And with respect to the concrete point which you asked me about, ... that there was no offer of any kind". Dorticos: "no...I wasn't asking about an offer". Hernandez Armas: "ah, I had understood that with the confusion of the..." Dorticos: "no, I was refeering as to whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had given money to the man...that American...understand?" Hernandez Armas: "ah, no, no, no, not at any moment". Dorticos: "nothing of that?" Hernandez Armas: "No, no, that nothing absolutely was given to her...rather they (enderezar - straightened out?) the interrogation...." Dorticos: "then we can go along, the version of your information?" Hernandez Armas: "yes, Sr. Presidente, of course". Dorticos: "then nothing more of importance?" Hernandez Armas: "No, nothing important...anyway, I am going to submit soon a draft of all the details, because there are other details of minor importance, and others of none at all, but contained in the statement.... and I have asked her to make me a draft as prolific as possible and to submit it at the first opportunity".

COPIES OF SPANISH LANGUAGE TRANSCRIPTS AND SOME ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEXICO CITY STATION FILES

11/26/63
1839

Any cable ... Observed — Refer to Clark
Ext 281

RE
ROM

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 27, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

Rosen, Sullivan, Tavel, Trotter, Tele. Room, Holmes, Gandy

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

John F

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a.m. He said he had just completed talking on the telephone with Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State. Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as the investigation of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department felt this should be coordinated and directed by the FBI. State took the position that the President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity outside of the United States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the Ambassador in Mexico is concerned, Johnson believed he should be kept informed of any pertinent developments but that the Ambassador should not be running the investigation.

As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thing he would want would be for the FBI to take Agents away from their investigative duties to prepare reports. He requested, however, that if there were any pertinent developments he be orally briefed.

I have done so & will continue. C.A.E.

With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson, Katzenbach said he had been asked whether the State Department should make a formal inquiry of the Soviet Government for information concerning Oswald and his wife, particularly as to their activities in Russia. He asked that this question be considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most important.

In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we did not ask the Soviets for information there would be no answer should the question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had made no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place any reliance on anything the Soviets said.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

REC-18 62-109060-1493

After conferring with Messrs. Belmont and Sullivan, the

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

RECEIVED FROM XEROX FEB 27 1976

DEC 10 1963 FBI

25 DEC 9 1963

CAE:vap (8)

following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points raised by Mr. Katzenbach:

1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government, we believe this undesirable. Such a formal request from the United States will enable the Russians to put out an official statement entirely favorable to them. The United States will have to accept this, since it is in response to our formal request, and we won't be in a position to disprove it. The State Department has responsibility here and we should not dictate the position they are to take, but our views should be stated.

2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico, it is recommended Katzenbach be informed that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have jurisdiction in dealing with foreign governments and in getting investigative results and intelligence coverage abroad; that while we are cooperating fully with State and CIA in Mexico, the responsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA.

If approved, Katzenbach will be so advised. — Done 2[25]pm S. 11/27/63

O.K. The Ambassador in Mexico is acting like a Sherlock Holmes as indicated in the wires received this morning.
H

HARVEY EX 1 R371
6/25/75
9KJ

SECRET

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~[illegible]~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~of~~ code and cipher materials and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as ~~3. Background:~~ needed.

RECEIVED [illegible]
JUN 24 1975
CIA

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

Classified by 007789
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine

SECRET

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: ~~#~~ QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ ~~#~~ sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ~~September~~ October 1960,

SECRET

3

QJWIN annual salary: $7,200
Travel + ops expenses for
QJWIN + other agents & agent candidates: 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates: 2,000
Travel of staff employees
engaged in ZRRIFLE activity: 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses: 1,000
$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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CIA

SECRET

4

1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (+ effect on DDP) and experiences w/KGB (Crosup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Sirague now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. — DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips

d. No PA's (except for search), or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

RECEIVED
JUN 24 1975
CIA

f. No use of ~~ampho~~ any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Mankel) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

5

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: KUTUBE/D search; this established (e.g., Rome),
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person, singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, e.g., Sicilians, those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved—selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged + backdated. Should look like a CE file.

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

SECRET

freedom to travel [6]

Legal; operational + ethical → morale problems. [Khokhlov case]

1) Maximum $\overset{\text{single not secure enough.}}{\text{security}}$ + within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Guise of Lowside objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of

5) case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Ofenin) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

SECRET

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne + stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sele~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~Too~~ Danger of standbys.

Sid G. - 25/1 - Exec Cautions
(— "The Magic button" 8
Narcotics Bureau
"for a living" - RIS 201 cover.
Caution - Bankruptcy - no Stars
eyes - Jim A. / Contradistinct
not a TSD problem / from U-2 /

3) Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &
a confession of weakness. —
- El Benefactor → assumptions -
(Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Helpful
Elect R&D - Memo.

"Translating machines" - TLE
basic sounds project. -
phenoms - (4 mnths CB)

Commit - Fear

Anathesia —

26/1 — AS — Fanfani-DCI - Matter -
no file Review -
~~Press~~ Never mention
word assassination

1. Select properofficer to run —
2. Place & cover Mary 2
3. Security Rules B-WKH-AS-3
4. Thumb lines Sid - Reserv.
5 Last Resort - Brakes - Substitute - who next

9

6. no other agencies (
7. no projects or papers
except for cover.
8. Principal agent - [illegible] (Mankel)? -
AF - Project Chief LCH -
[illegible] 1500 - from [illegible] -
mark spot rqm - [illegible] AF
project - [illegible]
9. Disposal -
10. Targets who & where -
must know before
we can spot -

11. Case officering
12. Cover file - create to prove
RIS or old-it. - nonsov
13. Had dangers of RIS counter
action & monitor if they
are blamed -
FdJ list - Remember

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Otis Pike, Chairman
House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Pike:

Congratulations on your Committee's great service to the American electorate in removing some of the mask of secrecy from the domestic covert operations and funding of the CIA. Secrecy protected counterproductive and indefensible covert operations for twenty-seven years. The light of exposure and cleansing is now enhancing our country's security. The publishing of your excellent report over CIA and White House objections is an act of courage the electorate will soon appreciate.

Reliance, however, by any Congressional committee on handouts from the CIA itself, is like an investigative reporter compiling his story from government press releases. Neither is doing the job its employer paid it to do.

Finding the hidden CIA budgets for three or four times the billions of dollars admitted to the electorate is a commendable achievement. But what would your investigators have achieved if a law was already in force imposing criminal penalties upon CIA employees who leaked information to you? The CIA proposed secrecy law is a blackmail weapon.

Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its own. It enjoys no effective control over spending of funds hidden in the budgets of non-CIA departments and agencies. If it surrenders to the doctrine of secrecy it is powerless indeed. To strengthen Congress' power I offer you my own counterintelligence service in place. The sources have been carefully tested and accumulated since 1949.

The problem is not leaking intelligence out of Committee; it is leaking independent intelligence into it. Starting exactly one year ago today I launched penetration efforts with a 19 page report addressed to "Chairman and Members, Select Committees on Intelligence Operations. I hand delivered this report to every committee member's office. My wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person delivered to.

On June 25, 1975 Edward Roeder III of your staff receipted for 103 pages of counterintelligence on CIA. This represented a distillation of a quarter century of intelligence gathering. CIA control of the Watergate breakin and coverup and CIA's investigation of my penetration of their secrets is covered. The application to the U.S. Attorney and three U. S. Special Prosecutors requesting investigation and prosecution of murder of American citizens within the U.S.A. is in your files. Nevertheless, none of this intelligence leaked to recognition or investigation within the executive departments or your Committee.

On July 30, 1975 Emily Sheketoff of your staff receipted for a one page notification distributed to chairman and members that Anne P. Commanduras, an employee of CIA's domestic assassination office, had been murdered in her apartment house swimming pool by CIA assassin Eugene Hale Brading.

I now enjoy the additional intelligence that Commanduras was executed with a CIA dart gun such as that displayed to news cameras by a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The intelligence weapon fires a sliver coated with shellfish toxin that kills within seconds, dissolves and leaves no mark. The CIA preserved their shellfish toxin supply in direct contravention of an order of the President. Your Committee filed this report without action along with over 200 additional counterintelligence. Is this secrecy that protects national security?

Congressman Pike, you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly hidden in another budget. Will you go for more? Then examine the State Department, Treasury Department, Justice Department, White House and Congress appropriations. All of these support personnel accepting orders for covert domestic operations from CIA.

You have uncovered CIA operations in the media. Investigate police departments throughout the nation funded by LEAA that are responsive to CIA orders. In the Fairfax County, Virginia, police department alone a CIA assassin has twice employed the badge of the department as cover to gain entrance to domiciles to perform executions.

I again commend your Committee for resisting the pressure for secrecy in publishing your report. I deplore your resistance to the leaking of intelligence into your Committee. The latter confines your Committee's intelligence to official and unofficial leaking channels of the CIA. Please concede that there are other citizens as concerned for the security of America as you are.

I respectfully request opportunity to confer with you, Congressman Pike, or with your capable, diligent and honest staff chief, A. Searle Field. I want to assist your Committee in recommending remedial legislation based upon 27 years of defining the problem.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

Encl: Letters to Senator Abraham Ribicoff and to Senator Frank Church.

REQUEST TO TESTIFY ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CIA — PENETRATION OF NON-INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF GOV'T AND COUNTER-PENETRATION BY SOVIET KGB. — AEH

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 8, 1976

Mr. Amos E. Heacock
~~4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708~~ 2334 Hill Pl.
~~Hyattsville, Maryland 20781~~ Falls Church, Va. 22043
TEL. (703) 534-3975

Dear Mr. Heacock:

Thank you for writing to me regarding your knowledge of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that you have discussed these questions at length with members of the Committee staff.

On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. The legislation which was before us concerned only the establishment of a new congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA itself. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Furthermore, we were under instructions from the Senate to report out a formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March 1.

I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you have made because, if true, they represent grave examples of corruption and criminality. It is my hope and intent that the new committee created by the legislation we are considering, once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the resources to explore the kind of issues which you raise.

I assure you that the entirety of the information you have submitted to my committee will be made available to the new Congressional oversight committee.

I am sure you understand the constraints on the Government Operations Committee which prevent us from undertaking the investigations you suggest, but I shall forward the material you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of S. Res. 400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure.

Sincerely,

Abe Ribicoff

Abe Ribicoff

Enclosures (2)

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Ribicoff:

Destiny has chosen you the second time in seven years to chair a committee with capability of establishing legislative remedies to prevent domestic and foreign assassinations, huge corruption within military supply streams, multi billion dollar currency manipulation and massive intervention of the CIA in domestic covert operations.

On or about March 6, 1969 you were the acting chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee that heard Cornelius Hawkridge, my witness, describe a multi billion dollar currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam. Carmine Bellino, staff investigator, prevented Hawkridge from also testifying about truck convoys of stolen military arms and supplies that he observed heading toward the Cambodia border. The "fence" for these stolen arms was the fabulous Soviet KGB agent Jacques Yang, described by staff in your hearings to be a mere Vietnamese commissary clerk. The organized crime vendors of the stolen goods reached into your Committee in Carmine Bellino to protect their lucrative racket. Hawkridge later wrote you a letter covering this deficiency in testimony. He pointed out the sale of arms generated funds used in currency manipulation.

I aided the crippled Hawkridge aboard his flight at Seattle. Your Committee provided an ambulance to meet him for it was less than two months since he survived an assassination attempt that killed his wife. The Soviet KGB let a contract with organized crime's CIA assassination facilities to kill them. The KGB considered Hawkridge a defector. William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, CIA alias William Harvey and double agent for KGB fingered Hawkridge and his wife Angela, a "baby sitter" agent for West German and CIA intelligence. In the contrived truck-car "accident" Hawkridge was crippled for life.

I met with CIA's Harvey as Boxley in November, 1968, in New Orleans pursuant to my counterintelligence investigations. Harvey, witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee, has admitted his role as organizer of the ZR/RIFLE Executive Action assassination capability and his contacts with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana of organized crime to implement that capability. Harvey incorrectly jumped to the conclusion for the KGB that Hawkridge was a cooperative source of much of my accurate counterintelligence on KGB.

Hawkridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a Treasury official. The official prevailed upon Senator John McClellan, then

Chairman of your Committee, to conduct it. He first exposed the famous "Prysumeen" account in a New York bank. It was used to convert South Vietnamese piasters to dollars, most of which ended up in three banks in the shiekdom of Dubai on the Persian Gulf.

My further investigation beyond the Committee probe, sabotaged by Bellino, established the dollars were used to requisition gold ingots from the U. S. Treasury at $35 per ounce. These were remelted to convenient "taels" or wafers of gold for black market trading for Indochina currencies again at huge discounts. The conspirators enjoyed government facilities for converting piasters to dollars at fantastically unrealistic official exchange rates. The exchange provided huge profits to conspirators and huge losses to the Treasury.

This inflation machine is still at work, though at a reduced rate since the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The entrepreneurs seek greener pastures where new wars destabilize currencies. Perhaps Angola? Hawkridge's real name is Cornel Solyom. His intelligence activities for a decade were traced in a 64 page report in the possession of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and your Committee.

Senator Ribicoff, had the activities of CIA-Crime double agent Carmine Bellino and Hawkridge's testimony been exposed in the public record in 1969, the trauma for you, for your Committee, for the Congress and for the American electorate would have been mercifully softened. Bellino went on to become Chief Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee. He covered up the sources of $1,050,000 of so-called political donor funds I have traced. He went on to instruct CIA agent Alexander Butterfield in the White House to reveal the existence of the President's tapes, thereby insuring his downfall.

A file of my letters to Senator Henry Jackson in 1969 were sent by him to your Committee. The intelligence was suppressed by Bellino. Although your Committee published eight volumes of hearings in this investigation, Hawkridge's vital testimony was deleted. My intelligence was disregarded.

The legislative remedies now being proposed to counter corruption of our intelligence services can only be made adequate by exposing to public view the depth of the problem of secrecy. I am alarmed at demands for secrecy to support CIA covert operations such as those that led our country into the most counterproductive covert operation in our nation's history -- the war in Vietnam. Did the secrecy imposed by Bellino within your Committee advance the security of the United States? Or did it insure the greatest humiliation of our foreign policy and our armed forces since the birth of our republic 200 years ago?

I am alarmed that criminal penalties are being proposed for public servants whose conscience impels them to notify Congress and the public of irresponsible actions of men infected with the arrogance of power. I

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate,
Russell Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20510

Ref: My letter 11/20/74 & encl. to Sen. Weiker forwarded & acknowledged your letter 4/7/75; your acknowledgement data 5/5/75; my letter 7/11/75.

Dear Senator Church:

I commend the diligent efforts of you, the members and the staff in producing and especially in publishing the Committee's report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders."

Nevertheless, I must advise you that over 200 pages of counterintelligence on domestic and foreign assassinations of the CIA I have provided or made available to staff and members has been disregarded or deliberately withheld from members.

Consequently, as members are preparing to sign a final report, it is timely to list some of the disastrous errors of the interim report. The errors are the result of intentional misrepresentation and deceit of the Congress and the American electorate by the CIA, its directors and employees.

(1) The ZR/RIFLE Executive Action program begun in 1960, headed by William Harvey, was designed as a domestic assassination capability.

(2) Under the direct planning and implementation of Harvey, a number of domestic and foreign assassinations were executed.

(3) Harvey's real name is William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, alias W. J. Wood. His assassinations in USA I have already reported.

(4) Among foreign assassinations with participation by Wood's domestic team members on foreign duty are those of Lumumba and Trujillo.

(5) Orders passed by CIA for execution, rather than exiling or kidnapping, caused the deaths of Ngo Diem, Ngo Nhu and Rene Schneider.

(6) CIA gave the code name WJ/WIN to the organized crime assassination consultant employed to insure the killing of Patrice Lumumba. His real name is Michael Genovese, alias Victor Resignio, son of Vito Genovese, boss of bosses of the Mafia in Atlanta federal prison until he died. Genovese enjoyed assassination authority independent of CIA directors delegated by Meyer Lansky, boss of the American international crime syndicate then. Neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy conferred assassination authority upon CIA.

(7) Genovese, as Victor Resignio, directed an arms and supplies diversion and currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam in 1966-67 that cost the Treasury $51.8 billion, Executive Departments' total, not mine.

(8) Wood's crime team member that aided Genovese to assure Lumumba's death was code named WI/ROGUE. He is Frank Sturgis, Watergate burglar.

(9) Sheffield Edwards, witness produced by CIA as its Director of Security, was a spurious substitution to deceive the Committee and the American electorate. Recruited from organized crime, CIA coached him to appear as the Edwards or Colonel Edwards who directed the early alleged attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

The real Edwards who collaborated with organized crime's hit man John Rosselli, his boss Sam Giancana and Robert Maheu, agent of Howard Hughes, oil tool billionaire, was E. Howard Hunt, Watergate burglar. Edwards was Hunt's CIA name. The CIA poisoned Sheffield Edwards after his appearance to prevent his recall and possible exposure as a fraud.

(10) John Rosselli accepted assassination orders from mob leader Giancana who accepted orders in turn from Meyer Lansky.

(11) Committee witness Rosselli was the hit man who shot Giancana with a special assassination weapon developed by CIA. He led the kidnapping and execution of James Hoffa, one time Teamsters' president -- even as your hearings progressed.

(12) Witness Robert Mahue executed the orders of Howard Hughes in contacting Rosselli to implement a domestic assassination capability through organized crime. Hughes issued orders to assassinate Premier Ngo Diem through Richard G. Danner, alias Gil Danner.

Danner precipitated the Hughes order to bug Laurence O'Brien's telephone in the Watergate complex by being caught fowarding a $100,000 payment on President Nixon's San Clemente and Key Biscayne homes for Hughes to the President's friend, Bebe Rebozo. Hughes suspected a plot by defector Maheu and O'Brien to blow the election for Nixon. "Gil" Danner was manager of the International Club in Saigon, owned by the U. S. Embassy. He represented Hughes' interest in the $51.8 billion racket managed by Michael Genovese.

(13) CIA in 1949 established a Domestic Intelligence Division for covert action within the White House, the Executive Departments, Congress, political parties and the media.

(14) The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was used as authorization for CIA to implement domestic covert actions through funding and personnel of domestic agencies of government. The Intelligence Directorate of CIA is cover for domestic covert actions in the agency itself.

I am sure you will agree that had your staff investigated and confirmed my counterintelligence during the year it has been available to you, the legislative remedies recommended by your preliminary report wuld have been found unacceptably weak by Committee, Congress and the American electorate. Please permit me to meet and serve you with counterintelligence input.

Respectfully submitted, Amos E. Heacock

Encl: Letters to Sen. Ribicoff & Rep. Pike

Amos E. Heacock, 4410 Oglethorpe, Hyattsville, 20781, telephone 864-5353.

am alarmed that no witness had pointed a finger of blame at the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It is the Magna Charta of CIA's Domestic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for CIA. It effectively repealed CIA's restriction to foreign operations intended by Congress to prevent a police state.

The 1949 act authorized CIA to conceal huge portions of its budget and personnel within the budgets and personnel roster of domestic agencies of government. These especially include employees on Capitol Hill, in the White House, in the Department of Justice, in the Federal Aviation Administration and in the Civil Aeronautics Board. Until the act is repealed Congress will remain part of the problem, not part of the solution.

When Cornelius and Angela Hawkridge were hit by the CIA's domestic assassins on January 10, 1969 my anger overrode my caution. I wrote all fifteen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 23, 1969. I demanded that Hawkridge be heard by the Senate. Although I received no replies, this forced Carmine Bellino's hand and Hawkridge was subpoenaed. The recipients referred some letters to your Committee.

Six months earlier my letter of August 14, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the Industrial State." It concluded with the startling premise I am now prepared to prove to the Senate:

> "It is my firm prediction that when the Foreign Relations Committees get to the bottom of the CIA's conspiracy to usurp Congress' foreign policy authority they will also have solved the conspiracies behind the continuing assassinations of the industrial state."

I rely upon your fairness for opportunity to refute the claims of William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify and to aid your Committee to draft legislation that will effectively prevent abuses of power by the government's intelligence agencies.

As an Air Force officer before, during and after World War II, I am concerned, as I know you are, that our country's security will be protected. I will testify for more effective legitimate intelligence and counterintelligence services. Perhaps the most effective testimony I can give is that which will establish that the CIA has been thoroughly infiltrated and corrupted by double agents who owe their primary loyalty to the Soviet KGB.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

Encl: Letters to
Senator Frank Church
and Congressman
Otis Pike.

2/4/64 Memo King to Sanchez: Requirements for Amlash

① Latin Americans in guerilla training in Cuba?

② Number of training schools in Cuba?

③ Are they training Africans, and if so, where?

④ Training for officers in charge?

⑤ Direction ~~for~~ of the training session

⑥ Do they instruct foreigners and are the foreigners doing the training?

⑦ Under whose auspices do they operate? How are they selected? What funds are used for the operations and how are they developed?

Staff Notes

- COPY -

(Original copy cannot be reproduced)

~~SECRET~~

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. HKH-1385

SUBJECT: Assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico Solved

DATE OF INFO: 28-29 November 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 29 November 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 30 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official (B)
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence Service) are reported to have identified definitely the assassins of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, former chief of SIM killed on 28 October 1956 at the Montmartre nightclub. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents interrogated Dr. Armando CARDENAS Aranguren,[1] instructor of pathology at the University of Habana, and succeeded in obtaining an admission from CARDENAS that Juan Pedro CARBO Servia and Rolando CUBELAS Secades[2] had sought refuge at his house after the assassination of BLANCO Rico and had remained there approximately three or four days. CARDENAS stated during interrogation that CARBO had arrived at his house carrying a sub-machine gun. On the basis of CARDENAS' admissions, SIM officials are convinced that CARBO and CUBELAS were the ones who killed BLANCO Rico.

2. Implication of CARDENAS and CUBELAS resulted from the interception of a cable by SIM sent from Miami, Florida, by a friend of CUBELAS to Virginia SECADES,[3] mother of CUBELAS, in Habana. On 27 November 1956 Virginia SECADES was arrested by SIM and taken to SIM headquarters for questioning concerning her son's participation in the assassination of BLANCO Rico. SIM agents were unable to obtain any information from SECADES concerning her son's role in the killing but succeeded in learning that CARDENAS was a close friend of her son. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents picked up CARDENAS, who, under pressure, admitted that he was a homosexual, that CUBELAS was his intimate friend, and that he had hidden CUBELAS and CARBO in his home for about four days. These admissions were made at SIM headquarters in the presence of Colonel Irenaldo GARCIA Baez, deputy chief of SIM, Lt. Col. Marcelo TABERNILLA, who was wounded during the shooting of BLANCO Rico, and other high SIM officials.

3. Interrogation of CARDENAS failed to reveal the destination of CARBO and CUBELAS after they left the home of CARDENAS. On the basis of the intercepted cable, dated 23 November 1956, however, SIM officials believe that CARBO and CUBELAS fled to the United States by ship, since both possessed visas to the United States which were still valid.[4] CARBO and CUBELAS are believed to be in Miami at the present time.

FROM

AUG 15 1975

CIA

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- C O P Y -

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~~S E C R E T~~

REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 2

DATE 30 November 1956

4. SIM has transmitted the results of interrogation of SECADES and CARDENAS to President Fulgencio BATISTA, but the latter's reaction to these new developments is not known. Further action by the Cuban authorities is complicated by the fact that the Government's main witness, CARDENAS, is of dubious reliability, because of his homosexuality. CARDENAS is also reported to be the doctor of the family of Santiago VERDEJA Neyra, Minister of Defense, who vouched for him when he was arrested by SIM.

Field Comments:

1. Office files contain no previous record of CARDENAS in connection with anti-BATISTA activities. A Dr. Armando CARDENAS was listed in Hoy (defunct newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party), issue of 22 April 1949, as one of the persons who sent greetings to the World Congress of Peace Partisans, scheduled to begin in Paris on 20 April 1949.

2. Both CARBO and CUBELAS have been the subjects in the past of denunciations and arrests by the Cuban authorities as a result of their anti-BATISTA activities. They were accused in August 1955 by Colonel Orlando PIEDRA, chief of the Department of Investigations, of having fled from the police from the site of an arms cache. In February 1956 CUBELAS was arrested and tried on charges of participating in student disorders, according to articles which appeared in local newspapers on 15 March 1956 and 1 April 1956. CARBO was denounced by the Cuban police as one of BLANCO Rico's killers immediately after the shooting incident at the Montmartre nightclub.

3. Office files contain no previous record of Virginia SECADES. Habana newspapers of 29 November 1956 carried an item in which the University of Habana Student Federation protested against the detention of Virginia SECADES by SIM.

4. Files of the Consular Section, United States Embassy, Habana, revealed that CARBO was issued a tourist visa on 3 June 1954 and that CUBELAS received a similar visa on 15 October 1954. The files do not indicate whether these visas were valid for a single entry or multiple entries, but they could still be valid, on the basis of the dates of issue.

FROM

AUG 5 1975

CIA

5. Police officials announced immediately after the assassination of BLANCO Rico that they had information as to the identity of the two assassins, naming CARBO but not his accomplice, and that they were on the trail of the latter. The police have failed to find the killers, however, and reportedly, under pressure from President BATISTA and General Francisco TABERNILLA, Chief of Staff, Cuban Armed Forces, SIM and the police have been making desperate efforts to solve the BLANCO Rico killing. It is

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DATE 30 November 1956

possible that CARDENAS may have been forced by SIM interrogators to make statements implicating CARBO and CUBELAS which were not altogether true.

6. The local press and radio reported on 29 and 30 November 1956 that United States authorities were looking in New Orleans for two Cubans who were suspected of being the killers of BLANCO Rico. They were identified by name as Rolando CUBELAS Secades and Guillermo GARCIA Riestra. The latter, while a student at the University of Habana, was accused of having participated in an attempt against the life of Rolando MASFERRER in September 1949, according to office files.

7. Avance, Habana afternoon newspaper, published the official SIM version of CARDENAS' arrest on 30 November 1956; other newspapers carried it subsequently. It contained substantially the same information as reported above, but it also implicated among others, former president Carlos PRIO Socarras in the assassination of BLANCO Rico, alleging that PRIO had helped CARBO and CUBELAS to escape from Cuba.

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- C O P Y -

SECRET

18 March 1965

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Proposal to Exploit L-1 and Jose Rebellon in AN Operation

1. It is proposed that at the next meeting with U-25 we pass a message as follows:

"A big comandante or capitan who used to be a leader of the university students opened a numbered (secret) account in Switzerland through Colombian Suarez (my successor). He was traveling in Europe at that time, roughly December 1964-January 1965. The deposit was in the amount of $10,000."

The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both L-1 and Jose Rebellon. Both are past presidents of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.

2. Subject proposal has taken the following information into consideration.

L-1:

a. ~~The record:~~ The file shows that since April 1959 and repeatedly since then L-1 has threatened to eliminate CASTRO, but has not done so. He also was reportedly on the verge several times of defecting but never did. There are numerous reports of varying credibility that he has been and is a Castro agent. His character is such that he has been described in a report as "a probable thief, a possible user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave man." Various reports indicate that he is a heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person ~~with such~~ traits could resonably be believed to be involved in irregular financial transactions.

rec'd 28 Aug 65

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b. Favorable factors (from OPS standpoint): In the summer of 1962 L-1 gave W-1 $500 in Helsinki to be deposited for L-1 in a European bank "for a rainy day." In March 1961 L-1 showed great sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that he might shoot any official so involved.

c. Conclusion: ~~While it cannot be~~ discounted that L-1 ~~may be a Castro agent, it may~~ be that he has been sincere ~~in~~ his dealings with CIA Resolution of doubts through an POLYGRAPH interview has been impossible since L-1 hit the ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably CIA'S interest in L-1 is to see him carry out his mission to eliminate CASTRO The above proposal may actually stimulate the desired action. If L-1 is questioned by the regime in connection with this charge, and should the investigation involve a certain amount of harassment and unpleasantness, he might well reach the conclusion that the time to take matters into his own hands (which he has threatened to do for several years) has at last arrived.

If L-1 is a Castro agent and Castro should be aware of L-1 's relationship with CIA Castro might conclude that L-1 received the money from CIA banked it without reporting it, and was in fact working with CIA against Castro. (At the recent meetings in Paris L-1 asked us for $10,000. We did not give him this sum, though W-1 gave him $7,000.)

If for any reason the regime should do away with L-1 , his alleged sympathizers in the Armed Forces might feel they must react at once to save their own skins. Given the tense political situation in Cuba today, this is not out of the question and certainly this proposal could split the regime more.

and how is he going to get out of jail to do so?

which we had once told him he could have

L-1 himself told B-1 that the last thing any of his friends would do would be to take him on this contract

~~SECRET~~

Jose Rebellon

Rebellon is a non-controversial good target for inclusion in this OPS play for the following reasons:

a. He is close to Castro, as well as to L-1, and has a Communist background.

b. He is familiar with the $80,000 account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has been authorized by Castro to draw on that fund for purchases related to Castro's pet projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro's own official fund.

As with L-1, any action by the regime against Rebellon might widen splits in Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness and tensions in interpersonal relationships that we desire.

SECRET

10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Elder

VIA: SA/DDO

SUBJECT: SSC Request

REFERENCE: RS 76-0083/A (14 January 1976)

REC... ROM
FEB 11 1976
CIA

1. Re question number 1 of reference: Attachment "A" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City, Mexico, during the period 1 September 1963 through 31 December 1963 and who are still on duty. Attachment "B" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City during this same period but are now retired or no longer on duty. It is understood that these attachments will be retained in the Headquarters building for use by the Committee Staff.

2. Re question number 3(a) of reference: For your background, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) was a Cuban student exile entity founded in September 1960 as an anti-Communist revolutionary organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime. The parent organization of the DRE was the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a revolutionary organization of Cuban students opposed to the Batista regime which actively joined the Castro forces by organizing a guerrilla movement which contributed greatly to the collapse of the Batista regime. The Castro government, themselves of student origin, recognized the DR power and by-passed them politically by forming the new regime without their participation. The original DR became Communist controlled and directed. While the Agency had no role in the founding, the DRE was an entity used by the CIA as a unilateral asset in pursuing U.S. policy objectives. CIA support to the DRE ceased on 30 September 1966 and formally terminated on 1 January 1967. At that time DRE files were reviewed and material dealing with CIA support and operations were either destroyed or turned over the JMWAVE Station. The DRE was expected to continue as an organizational entity and continue its activities independent of CIA.

3. The DRE files of both Station JMWAVE and Headquarters that are available have been reviewed and Lee Harvey Oswald's name does not appear in these files. WAVE cable 8049 (in 66782) of 22 November 1963, states in the third sentence, "according AMSPELL files, Oswald", undoubtedly refers to the DRE files maintained in the DRE office in Miami, Florida.

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These entity files were independent of the JMWAVE Station files. Had Station JMWAVE referred to its files in WAVE 8049 the cable would have been worded, "according AMSPELL Station files." The file of AMHINT-53, a former executive of the DRE, has also been reviewed and no reference to Oswald was found. The file number which appears on WAVE 8049 is no longer in use and the contents of this former file were transferred into Oswald's and other 201 files by the CI Staff. A tape of the radio debate cited in WAVE 8049 is included in the Oswald 201 held by the CI Staff.

4. Re question number 3(b) of reference: We have been unable to determine if Station JMWAVE was instructed to review its files for information on Oswald. For many years the CI Staff has been the focal point for the collation of any and all information concerning Oswald and if the JMWAVE files on any Cuban groups contained information on Oswald such information should be reflected in Oswald 201 file.

Raymond A. Warren

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

Attachments:
A & B as stated

REC'D FROM
FEB 11 1976
CIA

26/11/63
05:24

Hernandez Armas: "Listen, I have your confidential (report) 125, about the Sra. Duran case; and I want to ask you for some declarations on this; you can tell me in detail". He adds "listen...that's true...of blackmail, what you say here in the confidential (report), the Federals of that country wanted Sra. Silvia Duran to say something, that they had some interest in, and had offered some money to the American? (Oswald). Hernandez Armas replied that "no, no, nothing about money, no". Dorticos continued speaking, "and they tried to detain her, to oblige her to make a statement". Hernandez says that "she was detained, and was questioned with respect to this visit and the request for a visa, and then she said that she had requested the visa, had filled out the documents and the reply of our government had been negative, not granting the visa". Dorticos asked if "you spoke with her". Hernandez said that yes, "I could talk to her yesterday and I immediately sent the report". Dorticos: "understand? if all this is true, better that it be known; if she is being ~~held (arrested)~~ DETAINED by those people, better too." Hernandez: I was saying that she was detained Saturday afternoon, and freed in the early morning, and yesterday was when I found her and could talk with her, she referred me (? me refirió) and I took advantage of the fact that a plane was about to leave with our mail. Dorticos: yes, yes, you sent that, I already know what you sent...do you know what happened? that the paper that I have here, and don't tell me that ~~this~~ that is what happened? Hernandez: What I have just told you besides the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it that they asked you? Hernandez: They asked her concretely about whether she knew

this individual; if she had gone to the Consulate; if she had personal relations, and even if she had intimate relations with him...she denied all that, only....Dorticos: intimate relations with ~~hm~~ him? Hernandez: Yes; she denied all that and said that it was a case like any other, of the many of the hundreds of cases that come to request visas at the Consulate, and if she remembered in detail of this case it was because this man had an incident with our Consul...he had an incident in which our Consul AZCUE, rebuked him and practially threw him out of the Consulate. Dorticos: and why does she have BRUISES (hematomas), did they treat her badly? Hernandez: well, yes, yes. Dorticos: what did they do to her? Hernandez: She has a few BRUISES on the arms, because she says they squeezed her arms during the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it...as she told you about what was done. Hernandez: In this way (Presidente): they went to her house and took her to the station, to the offices of Federal Police and interrogated her to the extreme

I was telling you about. Dorticos: and the maltreatment, how was it? Hernandez: At the time of interrogation, trying to impress her so that she would tell all she had to say, that she knew, and then was when they took her by the arms and shook her. Dorticos: listen, Joaquin and did they aske her some other question about money? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely, it seems....Dorticos: did they try to get a statement from her? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely from what she told me, they limited themselves principally to try to find out what relations she had had and her husband with this individual. Dorticos: and they spoke of money? Hernandez: no, no, she has not told me anything about money, they did not talk to her about that, that is, she has not told me that they spoke to her about that. Dorticos: Mirabal ~~passed~~ SAID to a friend something about that. Hernandez: eeh? well, I asked her if there had been some interest, if they had questioned her on other points, if there had been something else, and she did not speak about that. Dorticos: At any rate, question her some more, investigate more and call me here. Hernandez: Good, Presidente, I will call you immediately.

FIDEL CASTRO SAYS HE KNEW OF OSWALD THREAT TO KILL JFK

By COMER CLARK

"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him.

"I might have been able to — but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect."

These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time — I was told — he wanted to work for us.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someo[illegible] [illegible]ught to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said — and this was exactly how it was reported to me — 'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

"This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated.

"The two visits occurred close together," Prime Minister Castro told me. "I didn't take them seriously."

My hard-won interview took place in the middle of a cheering, jostling mob on the sidewalk of La Rampa, the main "show street" of Cuba's capital, Havana.

Castro had arrived unexpectedly to inspect progress on the building of a Cuban pavilion, erected with those of other Communist countries to mark the July 26 celebration of Castro's rebellion against the Batista regime.

And also to mark the meeting in Havana of Castro's rebel Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) conference, due to open on July 31.

Although millions of words have been written claiming that Fidel Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination, no newsman has been able to secure a personal interview with the Cuban prime minister for his views on the slaying of the U.S. President.

To shed more light on the most dramatic event of the 20th Century, The ENQUIRER sent Comer Clark to Havana for a face-to-face meeting with Castro.

And here, for readers of The ENQUIRER, is the exclusive story of the dramatic interview with Castro.

I had applied to the Cuban embassy in London during April-May for permission to go to Cuba to interview the island's prime minister.

Although a British subject does not need a visa to enter Cuba, approval by the Cubans for the entr[illegible] necessary.

Oth[illegible]wise, the incoming visitor risks being turned away at Havana airport. The approval came at the end of June and was telephoned to me by Santiago Diaz, of the Cuban consulate in London, who deals with entry inquiries. Diaz told me that permission to visit Cuba had been "cleared" (though I was unable to learn what specific checks on my eligibility had been made).



REPORTER: Comer Clark's questions netted new facts.

There are only three legal ways to enter Cuba by air. From Mexico City, from Prague, Czechoslovakia, or from Madrid, Spain. So I flew to Madrid and entered Cuba by airliner on July 9.

In Havana, I immediately applied to the Ministry of External Relations for an appointment to see Prime Minister Castro.

In London, I'd been assured an interview would not be too difficult to obtain. But Senor Laurencio Cordoso, who dealt with foreign press queries was not quite as optimistic as that.

"You know, there are the annual celebrations of the rising against Batista," he said. "And then the meeting of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity.

PRIME MINISTER of Cuba, Fidel Castro, was addressing admiring crowd when ENQUIRER reporter drew surprising statements from him in unexpected rapid-fire interview.

"The Prime Minister is bound to be very busy. You will have to be patient."

While waiting for permission to interview the prime minister, I was taken on official visits to Cienfuegos Bay to watch the construction of a massive sugar processing and storage plant. And then I went to Trinidad, one of the oldest towns in Cuba.

I noticed that the windows of many Trinidad shops were barren of goods.

For example, in the former Woolworth store on the main street, the entire window facing the street was empty.

The only things that filled many otherwise empty windows were pictures and photographs of Fidel Castro and propaganda posters. Many shops are simply shut, because of a shortage of consumer goods.

Soviet help in construction schemes was obvious — particularly at Cienfuegos Bay. Some old American machines were still in use, but much of the new construction equipment was either Russian or Japanese.

Inspection tours, however, weren't what I had come for. I kept asking about the Castro interview — and kept being told I'd have to be patient.

Many early-bird delegates to the OLAS conference started to arrive now. Waiters, public servants and others began pinning on OLAS buttons. With all this activity, I began to feel my waiting and hoping

(Continued on next page)

Oct. 15, 1967

...It's Possible That I Could Have Saved Him, Says Fidel

I was at a restaurant on La Rampa, and was there on the evening of July 15 when there was the sudden sound of cheers in the street.

Many people hurried from the restaurant, and I moved in the general direction of the crowd.

There were shouts of "Fidel! Fidel!"

Castro had, indeed, arrived.

Many of Castro's public appearances are made without prior warning. Partly, this seems to be for security reasons. But, also, because it is regarded as "in accordance with the spirit of the rebellion." Sudden, dramatic moves — spurning protocol.

I pushed into the cheering crowd as Castro, in his familiar "fatigue" uniform of olive green and a sweat-cap, acknowledged the cheers and looked admiringly at the ... pavilion.

He spoke several times rapidly in Spanish.

As I pushed through the mob toward him, ... gripped me.

I had my Press card in my hand and ... it, saying (in English) that I'd like to see the prime minister when he could spare time to see me. I hoped some nearby official would be able to translate my request to Castro.

But apparently Castro himself heard my ... voice above the background of the mob noise.

The bearded prime minister — who speaks and understands English well — turned around flamboyantly and, raising his ..., called to me in a friendly way: "Where do you come from, senor? Don't you think we're having a great celebration?"

I called out that I was a British newspaperman and had been trying to get an appointment to see him. Again, I waved my Press card.

"What's wrong with right now?" he asked in obvious good humor and plainly happy to be putting on a show for the crowd.

"Prime Minister," I said, "it's been suggested several times that there was some Cuban involvement or link with the assassination of American President Kennedy.

"Could you tell me if there is any truth at all in that?"

Castro looked straight at me, thought for a few seconds and then made the dramatic statement, quoted at the start of this article, that he'd had reports of Lee Oswald's visits to Cuba's Mexico City embassy but hadn't believed the threat serious.

"How did you form that view?" I asked.

Castro replied: "Well, there were two calls in two weeks. I later learned he stayed at the embassy about 15 minutes each time. He gave the name Lee Oswald each time.

"The calls were reported to Havana, as a matter of course, under the authority of our ambassador in Mexico, Senor Joaquim Hernandez."

I asked: "Did the ambassador himself see Oswald?"

Castro replied: "No, he was seen by an aide. ... an aide."

He went on: "Let me be clear. I just didn't believe that he (Oswald) meant this. I thought that he ... have been some sort of wild man. Or maybe ... after money.

"It seemed that to kill the head of a state ... stupid. Just pointless. As far as Cuba was concerned, the policy of the American government would go on, anyway."

I asked Castro, frankly: "Did you have any ... of warning the American government ... Oswald?"

Castro replied, spreading his hands: "We don't — didn't — have any relations with the American government, anyway.

"If I'd taken it seriously, I might have informed the United Nations or some other official agency ... But who would have believed me? People ... have said Oswald was just mad. Or that I'd ... mad."

He suddenly asked: "What is your name, anyway?" I told him.

"Well, Mr. Clark," said the Prime Minister, "I thought the visits might be something to do with the American CIA — whether anything eventually happened or not."

Cries from the crowd began to divert Castro's attention from me. I desperately asked if by "anything happened" he meant an assassination of President Kennedy.

"Well, it crossed my mind. But I didn't give much thought to it," he said.

"Then, too, after such a plot had been found out, we would be blamed — for something we had nothing to do with.

"It could have been used as an excuse for another invasion try. In any case, people would have tried to put it at my door."

Castro started to make his way to the edge of the sidewalk.

As he did so, he added: "I was not responsible for Kennedy's death. I will tell you that.

"I think he was killed by U.S. Fascists — right wing elements who disagreed with him."

Then he started speaking again in Spanish with those immediately around him, turned and said goodbye to the crowd, climbed into his car and was driven away.

It had been an unexpected and shocking interview under odd and difficult circumstances. If he could be taken at his word, Castro had shed new light on the Kennedy assassination mystery. I hoped to learn even more at the formal interview, which was still pending.

On July 17 I was telephoned at my hotel by Senor Cordoso, who had tried to arrange the formal interview.

Cordoso said: "I am glad you had the chance of meeting the Prime Minister. You were very fortunate."

I agreed and asked when my longer interview would be granted.

But Cordoso explained he'd been told by the Prime Minister's office that Castro would be heavily engaged with the anniversary celebrations and meetings with OLAS visitors.

"He has a lot of pressing engagements — those and other things," Cordoso said. "I can't see any chance of another personal interview at all in the near future."

This was the final decision, and I decided to make arrangements to leave Cuba. I flew to Mexico City, where I called at the high-walled Cuban embassy to see if I could learn more about Oswald's two visits there.

The grilled double gates were opened by a gatekeeper to allow in some official-looking diplomatic car.

I quickly showed him my Press credentials, and asked if I could see anyone of authority inside the embassy.

But the gatekeeper replied in halting English: "No, no Press. It is impossible."

The wall of silence had been lowered on the Oswald situation, except for that one revealing moment with Castro himself on the sidewalk in Havana.



HIT CUBA HARD: President John F. Kennedy is shown in November 1962 as he told newsmen that Russia had agreed to remove weapons from Cuba.

DIDN'T HELP: Castro admitted he had heard of the assassination threat but gave vague reasons for not reporting it to the United Nations.

LEE OSWALD
NOW LINKED TO CUBA



INTRIGUE: Cuban Embassy in Mexico City was visited twice by Oswald before assassination.

RUSSIAN

...mbassy of the USSR
...S. A., Washington
... Section
... Reznichenko

...wald, M. N.

...nce and, therefore, by this
...f replies (sic) to my appeals
... the USSR and residence in
...the expediting of this matter

...fully,

... O[illegible]d

...—Continued

FROM: LEE H. OSWALD, P.O. BOX 6225, DALLAS, TEXAS
MARINA NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, SOVIET CITIZEN

TO: CONSULAR DIVISION
EMBASSY U.S.S.R.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOV. 9, 1963

Dear sirs:

This is to inform you of recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostin in the Embassy Of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico.

I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinily because of my mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States.

I had not planned to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet Embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business.

Of corse the Soviet embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unprepared, the Cuban consulate was guilty of a gross breach of regulations, I am glad he has since been replaced.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is not now interested in my activities in the progressive organization "Fair Play For Cuba Committee", of which I was secretary in New Orleans (state Louisiana) since I no longer reside in that state. However, the F.B.I. has visted us here in Dallas, Texas, on November 1st. Agent James P. Hasty warned me that if I engaged in F.P.C.C. activities in Texas the F.B.I. will again take an "interrest" in me.

This agent also "suggested" to Marina Nichilayeva that she could remain in the United States under F.B.I. "protection", that is, she could defect from the Soviet Uion, of couse, I and my wife strongly protested these tactics by the notorious F.B.I..

Please inform us of the arrival of our Soviet entrance visa's as soon as they come.

Also, this is to inform you of the birth on October 20, 1963 of a DAUGHTER, AUDREY MARINA OSWALD in DALLAS, TEXAS, to my wife.

Respectfully,

[signature]

Commission Exhibit 15

TOP SECRET

R2125 R

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jim Johnston, Paul Wallach

FROM: Dan Dwyer

DATE: January 21, 1976

SUBJ: CIA Briefing with Raymond Rocca Regarding Oswald

Early in our investigation of CIA's handling of the Oswald case, Raymond Rocca briefed Wallach, Dwyer and Greissing on November 11 and 13, 1975. Some of Rocco's comments merit consideration in light of our present knowledge of the case.

1. Opening of 201

Rocca explained that Oswald's 201 was opened by Betty Egerter from a list of American defectors 1958-1960 from the State Department.

2. Status of 201, 11/22/63

Rocca explained that on November 22, 1963 all documents in the Oswald 201 were originated by other agencies; Mexico City cable traffic was not included in the 201 because it was routed through a compartmentalized channel and therefore would not be circulated via the 201.

3. Oswald's Defection to USSR

With regard to Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Rocca said Oswald would have been of interest to the military and the FBI and that CIA was only interested in the "information" aspect of the case. Rocca could not cite any example of a U.S. citizen defecting on behalf of any interest of the U.S. government.

With regard to the "Hoover" memorandum of June 3, 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter could be using Oswald's birth certificate, Rocca believed Hoover would not have generated it. Rocca suggested someone at the Bureau who was familiar with Soviet technique of using birth certificates for illegals -- Larry McWilliams, Brannigan or Cregar -- would have authored the memo. (Rocca could never establish if, in fact, Oswald took his birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union.) Rocca commented that the Bureau memo, sent to State and ONI, should have been forwarded to CIA by State, but never was.

In Rocca's determination, Oswald was the only American defector who was allowed to stay in Russia following a suicide attempt. Rocca said that Oswald would have been subjected to one or two assessments by the KGB.

TOP SECRET

Rocca referred to an SB study, directed by Lee Wigren and conducted by Virginia Valpi which compared the Oswald case to other U.S. defectors and their wives. SB concluded Oswald was not given special handling by the KGB. Rocca maintains Oswald was given special treatment. He believes Oswald's relationship with the "Red Cross" (from which Oswald received financial assistance) and the Red Cross' relationship with the KGB should be clarified.

Rocca also finds it peculiar that Marina married Oswald since Marina's uncle was KGB. Rocca said that Oswald was the only defector who married someone with a KGB connection of that kind. Rocca said that the CIA developed this information after the assassination.

Rocca described Minsk as "not an unsensitive section" of Russia and added that Oswald was the only American defector in Minsk, a white Russian area.

Rocca commented on Oswald's surprise visit to the American Embassy in Moscow by saying that "people don't do that kind of thing in Russia."

Rocca believes Oswald's Soviet diary is bona fide. Rocca admitted that although there are perceptible changes in the quality of Oswald's written material, Oswalds' mentality seemed conducive to periods of attention to thoroughness and detail.

4. Alleged Debriefing of Oswald

Rocca did not have any knowledge of an alleged debriefing of Oswald in New York City by the DCD. Rocca said that if a debriefing report existed, it would have been distributed in OO series (overt operations) of the DDI (now DDO). Rocca also noted that a debriefing report would not have been filed in the Oswald 201. Rocca noted that a Dr. Froyn (phonetic) supervised DDI records. Rocca also said that Traveler's Aid was a legitimate charitable organization which had no ties with the CIA.

5. Oswald and Mexico City

Rocca said that Chief, WH could clarify aspects of technical operations on Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Rocca said that David Phillips organized the technical surveillance.

Although the Cuban Embassy was officially closed on September 28, Rocca found nothing unusual about Oswald's visit there and meeting Silvi Duran, Cuban consulate employee.

Rocca emphasized that Oswald's activities in Mexico City were the responsibility of the FBI.

6. Possible Oswald-Cuban Connections

Rocca described document gaps in the materials that the Russian and Cuban governments forwarded to the WC via diplomatic channels. He described these areas as "open and relevant."

Rocca drew attention to Oswald's Marine duty in California in 1958. Basing most of his analysis on testimony of DelGado, Oswald's sergeant in California, Rocca maintained that Oswald had made contact with the Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Los Angeles. Rocca said that DelGado had to release Oswald from guard duty because someone from Los Angeles reinitiated contact while Oswald was on duty.

Rocca placed specific emphasis on Castro's"impromptu "comments to Harker at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963. Rocca viewed Castro's comments as a "message" to American leaders and said it was a "very important signpost," Rocca added that the Mexico City Station brought Castro's comments to Headquarter's attention on 11/25/63. Rocca also viewed Castro's comments in terms of Oswald's possible perception of them, since New Orleans Times Picayune ran the Harker article on September 9, 1963. (This is the line Slawson adopted: could Oswald have read the piece?)

In regard to the Castro comments (unfortunately my notes are sketchy here) Rocca refers to a 10/24/63 cable, memo, or letter from "Des to Paris." He then refers to an 11/5/63 memo for the record and said "man never heard from again." Rocca should be asked to clarify these references.

Rocca briefly outlined Cuban-Russian relations in the early 1960s. he described 1961 as the "seed time" between Cuba and the USSR. Rocca said that following the missile crisis, the KGB and DGI began a "preliminary relationship." Rocca mentioned Srotoff (phonetic) and Alexiev (sic) as being KGB principals involved. Rocca said that when Castro visited Moscow in June-July 1963, Alexiev and Leonoff served as liaison between Kruschev and Castro. Rocca referred to an escalation of Alpha-66 activity (sporadic revolutionary attacks on Cuban ports, vessels, etc.) in July-August 1963. Rocca places Castro's "warning" of September 7, 1963 in the context of these activities.

Rocca said that Oswald's activities for the FPCC in New Orleans were apparently self-motivated. Rocca added, however, that V. T. Lee, national chairman of the FPCC, visited Cuba in 1964. Rocca noted that (fnu) Hernandez handled Lee's case and that Hernandez' office was next to Azcue's, who, according to Duran, argued with Oswald at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. According to Rocca, Hernandez was mentioned in penetration reports from Guatemala where Hernandez was running two DGI agents. Rocca outlined these relationships briefly to demonstrate DGI-FPCC connections. Rocca concluded that the Warren Commission should have paid more attention to the DGI. Rocca also mentioned that the CIA picked up a DGI defector named Mugg in April or May of 1964, who was handled by WH Division.

7. Oswald, New Orleans, Garrison Case

Rocca said that the CI/R and A stayed on top of the Garrison case and "summarized overt developments." Rocca identified the analyst for the Garrison material as Donald Pratt. Rocca said that by NSA intercepts and associated relationships, the CIA believed Garrison was operating (unwittingly) under KGB manipulation. (Rocca briefly described Soviet technique of misinformation. He recalled an interview that Drew Pearson had with Kruschev in Cairo in 1964 or 1965. Kruschev told Pearson that his "gut feeling" was that American right-wing extremists and capitalists were responsible for the President's assassination. Rocca said this typified KGB disinformation.)

Rocca characterized Oreste Pena's allegations as "absolute fabrication." Rocca said CIA files revealed that Clay Shaw was a contact of the DCD until 1956.

Rocca said that he was never informed in 1962 or 1963 about a revolutionary training camp around Lake Pontchartrain. He believes that the CIA did not know of its existence. Rocca said there is evidence that messages from the Lake Pontchartrain camp were going to a drop in Mexico City.

8. GPFLOOR Period

GPFLOOR was the crypt used to describe the investigation conducted by CIA following the President's assassination (11/23-1/12-15/63.) The Mexico City aspect of GPFLOOR was controlled by WH: J. C. King, Chief; Jack Whiten, Desk Chief, and Win Scott, COS, Mexico City. Rocca said that Whiten would report Mexico City developments to Helms who would then inform McCone.

9. End of GPFLOOR: Warren Commission

With the formation of the Warren Commission, the GPFLOOR period ended. Rocca explained that Helms served as the major liaison between the CIA and WC. Rocca served as chief of research for matters of interest to the WC -- mostly concerning Oswald's defection to Russia. Rocca's staff included: Thomas Hall, Arthur Dooley and Paul Hartman. Hall conducted research on Soviet service in DDO. Dooley followed all Bureau developments forwarded to CIA. Hartman was responsible for exploration of overt references and Soviet service." Additionally, Hartman researched DeMohrenschildt's relationship to the Oswalds.

Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca had no contact with Helms. Rocca explained that he had some liaison with Slawson of the WC staff. Rocca said that any negotiation between the CIA and WC was conducted by Helms, Dulles, and Rankin. Rocca said he had no knowledge of any CIA assassination attempts against Castro.

Rocca emphasized that the FBI was the investigative arm for the Warren Commission. Rocca said that Sam Papich, Dick O'Niell (sic) and Jim Hunt were the Bureau personnel involved with the WC.

Rocca said that additional research in CI was conducted by David Murphy and Bagley, Chief and Deputy Chief of CI/SB. Rocca said that Lee Wigren and Virginia Valpi were also involved in Soviet R&A.

10. Rockefeller Commission Inquiry

Rocca served as CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission in regard to Warren Commission allegations. Belin and Robert Olsen were involved in the investigation. Belin wanted Rocca to review documentation regarding the photo of the unidentified individual in Mexico City. Belin told Rocca that the Warren Commission was not clued in on Cuban emigreeissues and Operation MONGOOSE. Rocca developed the impression that the Rockefeller Commission was looking into CIA's operations aimed at Castro. Belin asked Rocca for the Castro comments of September 7, 1963. Belin was not aware of the statements during the Warren Commission. (Slawson, however, was but only at the conclusion of the WC.)

Rocca also said that Belin is writing another book on Oswald and the President's assassination.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 24 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Item 15 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓ orig + att → admin
cy → Wallach
cy → Blue
Tissue → Chron

VI-C-5-D31

1976 FEB 27 AM 11:41
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

62-116395

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

February 19, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to various materials contained in FBI files.

Item 15 of referenced letter requested access to materials pertaining to FBI contacts or interviews of Loran Eugene Hall from January, 1963, through December, 1975. Material responsive to Item 15 has been assembled and is available for review by SSC Staff members in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building.

SSC Staff member Paul Wallach advised on February 10, 1976, that the portion of referenced request concerning Item 14 is withdrawn.

I then got a call from Bundy on October 2nd, and he said that -- Chase, I think his name was. Peter Chase, one of his assistants -- is the person to be in touch with, and to keep him apprised of all developments.

I later again got a word from Jean Daniel, the French correspondent who had come back from Havanna saying Cuba seemed ripe for a conversation. So this also came from another source, a Greek town planner named Doxiati, who said that Castro was very much interested in some kind of normalization relation, but that Che Guevera and Raul were opposed.

October 21st, I got a call again from Bundy's office asking me what was new. I said, well the ball is now, in the Cuban's court.

On the 28th, I saw Lochuga again at the UN who said that Havanna didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now, but he would be glad to maintain continuous contact with me anyway.

The 4th of November I briefed Stevenson on these developments and meanwhile, Miss Howard had been on the phone with Rene Valao who was Fidel Castro's aide at that point, and who was one of the so-called pro-Americans in the group and who suggested that I get in touch with him by telephone.

I then briefed Bundy on this on the 5th of November Bundy told me that the President was more in favor of pushing towards an opening toward Cuba than was the State Department, the idea being -- well, getting them out of the Soviet fold and

perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal.

Chase then said Bundy wanted a chronological memo about the entire thing. I might say I have forgotten one point. When I first told Adlai Stevenson about this demarche or approach by the Cubans he said he liked it, but, and I quote, he said the CIA, unfortunately, is still in charge of Cuba. But he said -- he still offered to take it up with the White House.

Anyway, we're now on November 12th, and I went to Miss Howard's apartment where she said he had set up a phone call to Havanna with Valao. We never could get through the bad connections, but she had spoken to him before I arrived and he had suggested that I come to Marianao from Key West and talk directly with Fidel Castro, because they wanted to avoid going through Havanna.

Bundy called me the same day to say that the White House favored preliminary talks with Valao at the UN but not down in Cuba and told me to tell Valao this. I finally reached Valao on the telephone on November the 14th and delivered a message about his coming here. He said -- and that we wanted to discuss agenda.

He said he would send instructions to LaChuga and that he would -- or rather Castro, through him, to LaChuga, that they should discuss an agenda with me. He was very cordial on the telephone.

we referred to our talk in '59 and he said another talk might be possible and useful at this time, and that was the first real indication. At this point, I said I'm no longer a private citizen but a government official and we agreed that the current situation was different, at the same time, things were a bit abnormal and he said the Cubans were very much annoyed at the exile rate, the CIA rate on Cuba, as well as the freezing of their assets.

The next step was my visit to Washington on September 24th when I came down to see Robert Kennedy who was then Attorney General. His position was -- I showed him the memoranda, which I had prepared on what had happened up to that point. He said that a trip to Cuba which is what LaChuga had suggested would be rather risky, said it was bound to leak and said it might result in some kind of Congressional investigation or something. Anyway, it might be a problem. But he did think the matter was worth pursuing through UN channels, and he would be talking to Averell Harriman and Bundy about it.

At that point, LaChuga said he would be making a very violently anti-American speech on November 7th and not to worry too much about it, so Stevenson asked me to help prepare a speech in reply. On the 27th of September, I saw Lochuga again, told him I could not accept any invitation to come to Cuba, but I would be glad to keep in touch with him and he could talk with anyone who wanted to come up and he said he would notify Havanna.

I reported this to Bundy on the 19th of November -- by the way, my call to Valao was the 18th -- he said that after their agenda had been received, the President wanted to see me at the White House and decide what to say and whether to go or what we should do next. That was the 19th of November, three days before the assassination.

On the 29th of November, LaChuga had seen Miss Howard and he wondered where things stood now. I passed the word to him that I didn't know, but that until we were told differently that we would continue our conversation.

On the 2nd of December he confirmed getting a letter from Valao and he wanted to know if things had changed again. He said he was authorized to talk to me in general terms.

I called the White House, Chase in this case, to say that the ball was now in our court.

On December 4th, LaChuga again looked me up at the UN, said he now had a letter directly from Castro approving the detailed talks and an agenda. Again, I informed Chase.

He said the decision would take some time now because all our policies were under review.

This went on. I kept seeing LaChuga and LaChuga would say he was waiting for an answer, and I kept saying well the door isn't closed, I just don't know.

On the 17th of December the President, this time President Johnson, came to the Waldorf to meet with the delegation at

Stevenson's apartment and told me that he had read my Cuban memo recapitulating the events or the discussions in the fall with interest and that was that. And I then was in Washington. Averell Harriman asked me about the Cuban project. I said I didn't know, that it was lying down in Chase's office in the White House and that he told me he'd get back to me after the holidays.

Well, that ended my diary in '63. I then went to Kenya as Ambassador in February of '64. However I do recall that some time in January I again called Chase and I said, well, if this thing is going to be continued I would suggest either John Case or someone on that mission. He said, well, it doesn't look as though it's going to be continued now because it's an election year, or whatever the reason was, and anyway we'll keep it in mind but that it was a dead issue.

The interesting thing, I think in terms of your investigation is that whatever was going on in terms of assassination plots, certainly there seemed to be two tracks, because it seems hard for me to believe that the Executive would be approving this type of negotiation while other covert operations were happening, although it could conceivably have happened.

The Chairman. If it did happen, what we are in search of is an explanation.

I think your testimony is helpful. Certain inferences can at least be drawn. But it is very helpful.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Research

MAR 8 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an attachment which is responsive to a letter dated February 12, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Steven Blackhurst

STEVEN BLACKHURST
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RECEIVED FROM
MAR 9 1976
FBI

ICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 12, 1976, which requests delivery of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, which memorandum is contained in the "Official and Confidential Files" (O & C) and which was made available for access on February 12, 1976, to an SSC Staff Member.

A copy of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, is attached in compliance with the above request. One excision has been made by reason of privacy.

Instant memorandum also serves to confirm a conversation on February 20, 1976, between Mr. Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Counsel, and Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, a pertinent portion of which conversation was relayed by Mr. Blackhurst to Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff. Mr. Blackhurst reported that during the above conversation Mr. Wallach gave assurances that should the SSC decide to use the attached memorandum or any portions thereof, the material used will not be identified as having been maintained in Mr. Hoover's O & C files.

In addition to the above, referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976, also requested delivery of all material in the O & C files pertaining to a number of specifically identified items relating to the Warren Commission and to this Bureau's investigations of both the Oswald matter and the assassination of President Kennedy. A thorough review of the special indices relating to material contained in the O & C files failed to indicate that any documents contained in these O & C files, other than the attached memorandum, would be responsive to the items listed in referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Original

Page one

Document Routing Sheet

Date Received	Received From	Classification	R #
3/11/76	CIA	Confidential	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr. to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/attach. 1 pg re: Oswald file

Copies to:	Date		Date

Original to: Research

Date: 3/12

Filed: VI-C

Research Document Routing Sheet

Page three

Date Received	Received From	Classification	R #
3/11/76	CIA	Confid	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/ pg attach. re: Oswald file

Copies to:	Date		Date

Original to:	Date	Filed:
Research	3/12	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 25, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: JACK RUBY;
LEE HARVEY OSWALD - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

At 9:20 A.M. this date an individual identifying himself only as Mr. Miller, 1125 14th Street, Northwest, contacted the Bureau and advised that he was a close friend of Ruby. In addition he identified Clint Murchison and Tommy Webb as being friends of Ruby. Miller declined to furnish additional information but agreed to interview. Washington Field Office was immediately advised and an Agent dispatched in order to get full details concerning the above.

Press vigorously. I would surmise it is Clint Murchison, Jr. not Sr.

1 - Mr. DeLoach

HAS:cfs
(7)

REC-25 44-24016-117

EX-114

22 NOV 29 1963

FEB 6 1978

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

DEC 4 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-23

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal Division. The file was about one-half inch thick, was marked "#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET." It contained documents relating to the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

The documents in this file indicated the following items of interest:

1. The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to March 1, 1963.

2. IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified information she had obtained from Giancana.

3. Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General) to U.S. Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.

4. Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA - The file contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962. (We have a copy of this from CIA.)

RMC:clb

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. <u>Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of April 24, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti - Wiretap Case - Sam Giancana</u> - This memo recommends prosecution in this case would be against national interest. It contains no mention of assassination.

6. The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re Las Vegas case. They did not mention assassination.

7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961, relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically outlined facts of the Balletti matter.

8. FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12, 1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.

9. There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961 of participants in the Las Vegas incident.

10. <u>Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22, 1961</u>, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an interview with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject: "Arthur James Balletti, et al."]

11. <u>FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu</u>. It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if Giancana or McGuire were leaking information.

12. There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.

13. <u>Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI, Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications</u> transmitted a report of an FBI agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas. This report contains the details of the arrest. (This document is the last entry in this Criminal Division file on the Las Vegas Incident.)

14. Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investigative work in Las Vegas. Maheu declined to name the attorney.

Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview on April 18, 1961 [after the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information. (Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he undertook for CIA.)

to eliminate a break for big investors.

pected to improve the measure's image in the eyes of House liberals, who have been fearful that the committee might report out a "rich man's bill."

The crucial vote in the hair-breadth decision was understood to have been cast by Rep. Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.), who was absent when the committee deadlocked 12 to 12.

Youngsters stand in front of the newly completed James W. Johnson School at 1420 S. Albany and watch as the last of [illegible] mobile classrooms is moved away. Portable schoolrooms were moved to Delano School, 3937 W. Wilcox, where they'll be used until a new wing is completed there. In an interview Thursday Schools Supt. Benjamin C. Willis defended the flexibility of the mobile units, saying they are being requested in some areas in spite of protests directed against their use at 73d and Lowe. Stories and other pictures on Page 3. (Sun-Times Photo by Howard Lyon)

Chicago Sun-Times
16 August 1963

Hellins #1

CIA Sought Giancana Help For Cuba Spying

By Sandy Smith
Sun-Times Correspondent

Castro forces kidnap 19 refugees in the Bahamas while U.S. fliers watch helplessly, Page 2.

WASHINGTON—A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times.

EXCLUSIVE

It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government officials said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959.

What the CIA accomplished—if anything—by negotiating with the 53-year-old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter.

One thing, however, is certain:

For several months in late 1959 and early 1960, Giancana, a big shot on gangland's "Commission" and in its La Cosa Nostra murder-and-terror society, became what his fellow gangsters abhor and would act swiftly to exterminate—an agent for the U.S. government.

The CIA wasn't talking about the case here on Thursday.

But Justice Department sources expressed belief that Giancana never did any spying at all for the CIA.

Giancana, according to these sources, merely pretended to go along with the CIA in the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed—or at least affected—by his ruse of co-operation with another government agency.

If this was Giancana's motive, his scheme was a failure. For a probe by the Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation of Giancana's crime syndicate in Chicago led directly to the exposure of the La Cosa Nostra ("our cause") brotherhood and the Commission.

With his connections in Cuba, Giancana declared he would be able to sneak intelligence out of the island for the CIA.

A high government source gave The Sun-Times this account of how Giancana stepped into the role of a government agent:

The CIA made its first contact with Giancana in 1959.

The Chicago gang boss then was embittered because the Commission, in traditional gang bipartisanship, had dollars backing both sides in the Cuban revolt.

The Commission was said to have given financial backing to Castro—only to have him shut down the gambling casinos.

And the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, reportedly fled Cuba with millions he received from Commission hoodlums.

In his dickering with the CIA, Giancana reputedly boasted that he had contacts with

Turn to Page 2

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF

Reveal CIA Sought Giancana's Aid

Continued from Page 1

anti-Castro factions and was ready to use his contacts for the CIA.

Justice Department officials say now that Giancana was just talking. He might have had some "contacts," but he never produced anything of value for the CIA, the officials said.

The CIA was said to have dumped Giancana as a possible source of Cuban intelligence some time in 1960, long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

An equally bizarre episode months later gave the Justice Department its first clue to Giancana's negotiations with the CIA.

The figures in this incident were a male night-club entertainer and Giancana's girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, one of the singing McGuire sisters.

At the time, in Giancana's opinion, the entertainer was overly attentive to Miss McGuire.

At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961, sheriff's police seized a prowler in the entertainer's hotel suite. For hours, the intruder refused to identify himself or say he was rifling the entertainer's rooms.

Persistent questioning by sheriff's deputies, according to federal authorities, led to an admission by the prowler that he was on the payroll of a private detective agency in Florida.

Florida authorities sought an explanation of the incident from the operator of the detective agency. At first, the operator refused to discuss the matter. Finally, however, he told investigators to get in touch with the CIA.

The inquiry then shifted from Florida to Washington and revealed Giancana's negotiations with CIA, it was disclosed.

Government sources reported Thursday that the private investigator's mission in the Las Vegas suite of the entertainer was another riddle of Giancana's caper with the CIA. Neither the CIA nor the Florida detective agency ever has offered an explanation of what the investigator was doing in the hotel suite, the sources said.

Sign First Trade Pact

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanganyika (AP) — Tanganyika and the Soviet Union have signed their first trade agreement. The African nation will exchange sisal, cotton, hides, skins, tobacco and coffee for Soviet metal, tools, vehicles, road equipment, cameras, fishing boats, planes and other things.

Fifth Buddhist Burns Self

HUE, South Viet Nam (AP) —A 71-year-old Buddhist monk burned himself to death in his ceremonial robes inside Hue's biggest pagoda early Friday.

He was the fifth to burn to death in the mounting Buddhist campaign against the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, a Roman Catholic.

His self-immolation in the courtyard of the Tu Dam pagoda brought immediate martial law to Hue, which lies 40 miles north of Saigon and is the ancient capital of Viet Nam.

He was the third to burn this week. A 17-year-old novice monk committed suicide Tuesday and a middle-age nun took her life in Ninh Hoa Thursday.

Reliable informants said the nun, Dieu Hien, set fire to herself in the market place of Ninh Hoa, a coastal village 200 miles northeast of Saigon. She was the first woman fire-suicide.

Informants at Ninh Hoa said government authorities had taken the nun's body in a move aimed at preventing a mass demonstration at her funeral.

They followed the same tactic with the body of a novice monk who immolated himself early Tuesday near the central Vietnamese religious center of Hue.

It had an opposite effect.

Tar-Feathers 'Torture' Bared As Hoax

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A woman tarred and feathered and apparently left to die in a flaming house told a bizarre story Thursday that her "torture" actually was part of a hoax to stir up a racial incident.



owner of the house which was set afire, Henry Lewis, attempted to inspire a racial incident that would pressure his neighbors in a right-of-way dispute.

Offic[illegible] said Mrs. Harwell and the Lewises were arrested

Mrs. Smith, a baby-sitter, admitted setting fire to the house, authorities said. She and the Lewis couple faced charges of arson and conspiracy, detectives said.

According to Mrs. Harwell,

JOB #____

Selected

See

C-XI-1

ox # 6 of 10

iscellaneous John McCone Papers

hai Pilots

aterial used at NSC Exec. Committee Meeting 29 March 63

rge envelop of miscellaneous papers

riefing Memoranda-1962

esident Briefing 22 Dec 1964

"I" File 1962

"" File 1962

K ile 1962

ar East Trip 2-14 June 1962

urcell Panel 1963 & 64

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02298

see No

JOB #

No

x 4 of 10

[N]otes for DCI and Weekend Reading June-Dec 1963

[B]riefing Memoranda 1962

[S]tate Cables for DCI Raborn 1966

[T]ask Force Report on Free Europe Committee and Radio Liberty Committee. 12 Mar 65

[V]ol. I, II, III & IV of Annexes to Report to the PFIAB on Intelligence Community [A]ctivities relating to Cuban Arms Build-up. 14 April-14 Oct 1962.

02239

ER 72-B-431
Copies #9+10

OK

2-8-72

Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan.

opy #1	retained in Executive Registry.
opy #2	Retained in O/IG. - RITTER 11-15-72
opy #3 thru #7	Records Center
opy #8	DDP retained.
opy #9	PPB Retained.
opy #10	D/DCI/NIPE retained.
opy #11	Records Center
opy #12	DDS&T retained.
opy #13 thru #16	Records Center
op: 17	PPB retained.
opy #18 thru#26	Records Center.

all, Executive Registry retired 19 copies of the Long-Range Plan.
so three bound books of Working Papers and one bound book of Working Plan Committee eeting minutes.
r. Bye destroyed all loose working papers.

David L. Bye
David L. Bye
Chief, Executive Registry

02300

Job #___

OK

Box # 8 of 10

8-12/1 Meetings with the President-25 Oct 61-31 July 62	#1
8-12/1 Meetings with the President 31 July 62-29 Nov 62	#2
Meetings with the President 1 Jan 63-31 March 63	#1
Memoranda on Meetings with the President 1 Apr 63-1 July 63	#2
Meetings with the President 1 July 63 - 12 Nov 63	#3
Meetings with President Johnson 23 Nov 63 - 31 Dec 63	
Meetings with the President 1 Jan-2 April 1964	#1
Meetings with the President 1964 3 April-20 May	#2
Meetings with the President 21 May 64-5 Oct 64	#3
Meetings with the President 6 Oct 64	#4
Meetings with the President Jan-28 April 65	#1

All

02301

OK

JOB # 72-B-431

c # 1 of 10

All

3 Committee January-December 1963 ✓

3 Committee January-December 1964 ✓

unter-Insurgency July-December 1962

unter-Insurgency January-June 1962

Checked generally - nothing relating to Cuba

ecial Group CI-1965

ecial Gr. up CI - 1964

rono 1962

Spot checked.

02302

Job #___

OK

complete

Memoranda for Record:

1 March-28 April 65

January-28 Feb 1965

November-31 Dec 64

11 Sept-31 Oct 64

6 April 64-8 July 64

9 July-11 Aug 64

12 Aug - 10 Sept 64

1 Jan-11 Feb 64

27 Nov-31 Dec 63

23 July 63-26 Nov 63

5 June 63-20 July 63

15 April - 4 June 63

1 Jan 63-9 Feb 63

9 Sept - 31 Dec 62

7 April 62-21 Aug 62

29 Nov 61-5 April 62

JOB #____

OK

N/ M

ox # 3 of 10

Vietnam	August 1963
Vietnam	September 1963
Vietnam	October 1963
Vietnam	November 1963
Vietnam	December 1963
January	January 1964
Vietnam	February 1964
Vietnam	March 1964
Vietnam	April 1964
Vietnam	May 1964
Vietnam	June 1964
Vietnam	July 1964
Vietnam	August 1964
Vietnam	September 1964
Vietnam	November 1964
Vietnam	January 1965
Vietnam	February 1965
Vietnam	March 1965

LA-DCI Notes 1-2 June

DE_TA Trip

NODIS---LOR----McCone Eyes Only

DEFOLIATION

02304

JOB #_____

Selected see OK

Box # 7 of 10

NRO 1963 thru 1965 (also includes one 6 Sept 61 ltr to DCI frmDefense re Management of NRO)

CYPRUS 1964 material on Cyprus & the DCI trip in Sept 1964

Binder containing excerpts frm the National Security Act of 1947; the Organization of USIB; Summary of NSCID's & charts & regs on Organizaton of CIA.

Summary Reports Chiefs of Station, WH Division, presented at Conference-Panama(29 Jan-1 Feb 1962)

White House-1962 & 1963(containes correspondence to, from and of interest to the White House.)Also included autographed picture of the CIB wich appeared in the newspaper & compromised the code words. Autographed to McCone frm McGeo Bundy.

Duropean Trip-10 thru 17 February 1963 (John McCone/DCI)

Memoranda of Record on DCI Trip to Europe-17 thru 29 Sept 1964

Memoranda on DCI's European trip-January 1964

Panama Conference-29 Jan-2 Feb 1962.

Memos for the Reocrd EA/DCI for 1964 & 65

DCI's 1962 Far Eastern Trip

Caribbean Survey Group (1961 and 1962-mainly on Cuba)

DCI Letters of appreciation for hospitality extended him on his Far East Trip-1962

DCI's Disucssions with Government Officials during his European trip in 1964 also containes some background papers on trip.

Envelop containing FBI report on Dr. Martin Luther King. 18 Oct 1963

DCI Speech File (1962, 63 & 64)

Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba-1964

CUBA-Background Material-1962

02305

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

... to DCI from DDCI-September 1962 on Cuba Situation

Job #____

ox #5 of 10

Selected ✓ See

[Domin]ican Republic-1965

[C]uba Package

[E]xecutive Registry File "John McCone 1962

[C]ommittee of Principals

[L]aos 1962

[C]uba 1964

[B]ook-Bay of Pigs

[N]uclear Papers

[M]cCone Speeches 7 June 63 - 25 May 64.

[M]cCone Speeches 8 June 64 - 11 March 65

[C]uba 1962

[C]uba Prisoner Exchange #1- Aug 62

[St]ate Eyes only Cables

[E]xecutive Registry DCI File 1963

[D]epartment of Defense 1954 - 1964

02306

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-22

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassination, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971. According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963. Basically these files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.

Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several entries in these files respecting allegations by people who claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination. One claimed to have been a CIA agent. There are also many letters from assassination "nuts." Other documents relate to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.

One document is an FBI report, dated February 2, 1972, stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963. Kleist was not a State Department employee. He appeared to be a free-lance magazine writer.

MC:clb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

C2856

that before looking at the FBI as to possible "leaks," he should carefully examine his own house. I told him I was quite thoroughly familiar with the way Guthman and Rosenthal dealt with the press and that as he well knew the wire service people stayed constantly in Guthman's private office. I told him it was quite obvious to me how the AP had learned that the report had been sent over to the Department.

Katzenbach reiterated that he had no complaints against the FBI. He stated again that the purpose of his call was to tell me about Senator Russell's feelings.

He added that he had another reason for calling and that was to determine if we could give him any ideas as to how Warren Olney could be dropped as Chief Counsel of the Presidential Commission. I told Katzenbach of our feelings concerning Olney. He stated that he was presently working through Congressman Hale Boggs and he thought he was going to be successful in getting Olney's name removed from consideration. He told me that Boggs was very sympathetic.

Katzenbach mentioned that Waggoner Carr, the Texas State Attorney General, would like very much to see the Director on Friday, 12-6-63. I asked him what for. He stated that Carr had no particular motive in mind other than to indicate to the press later on that he had discussed matters with the Director. I told him I could see no percentage in the Director's seeing Carr, that we were the investigative agency and that Carr's dealings should be with the Department and the Presidential Commission. Katzenbach indicated that the White House might think otherwise. He stated that the President was most anxious for Carr to be given attention in Washington inasmuch as Carr was running for office next year. I told Katzenbach I knew this, however, I still felt that the Director should not be injected into this matter. Katzenbach stated he would attempt to disuade Carr from seeing the Director, however, Carr was quite persistent.

ACTION:

In view of the close friendship which Carr obviously has with the President, the Director may desire to just shake hands with Carr without sitting down and discussing facts concerning our report.

If he calls I will see him. H.

RECEIVED FROM H.

FEB 13 1976

FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

SECRET

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/650,097

SUBJECT 1. ATTEMPTS OF FIDEL CASTRO TO COUNTERACT COMMUNIST PLANS TO CONTROL CUBAN GOVERNMENT.
2. MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHROW CASTRO.

DATE DISTR. 2 MAY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. MARCH 1962

REFERENCES IN 28109

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (20 APRIL 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. FIDEL CASTRO CALLED ON A GROUP OF ARMY COMMANDERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE OUSTER OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE ON 26 MARCH 1962 AND TOLD THEM THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN CUBA. THE ARMY OFFICERS CONTACTED BY CASTRO WERE ROLANDO CUBELA, JOSE MARIA DE LA AGUILERA, FELIPE GUERRA MATOS, JUAN ALMEIDA, JORGE SERGUERA RIVERI, PEDRO MIRET PRIETO. CASTRO ASKED THEM TO BACK HIM UP, AS HE INTENDED TO REGAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THEY AGREED.

2. AT THE TIME OF ESCALANTE'S OUSTER CASTRO ALSO ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF A COMMUNIST LEADER IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO AN AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE IN ORIENTE PROVINCE. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE LEADER TRANSFERRED).

3. CASTRO ALSO ORDERED A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF FELIX TORRES, COMMUNIST LEADER IN LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. CASTRO TOLD THE ARMY COMMANDERS WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO		FBI

INS

INFORMATION REPORT

... FROM

AUG 15 1975

CIA

SECRET

201-252234

"IF NECESSARY I WILL HAVE TORRES SHOT IN THE CENTRAL PARK OF SANTA CLARA".

4. CASTRO MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS ARMY CONFIDANTS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT DEVIATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE, HE WOULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT LAZARO PENA, BLAS ROCA, AND OTHER COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT BE OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP.

5. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ARMY LEADERS AGREED TO BACK UP CASTRO, THEY HAVE IN MIND A PLAN WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL, RAUL CASTRO, AND CHE GUEVARA AT SOME PROPITIOUS MOMENT AND THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES. THESE MEN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A PLAN WILL SUCCEED, AS THEY ARE IN CHARGE OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIA TROOPS IN CUBA. THE ARMY LEADERS SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND THEY REALIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, BUT ALSO A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF CUBA, ARE FED UP WITH CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: *SOURCE* SAID THAT THE SABOTAGE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE CITY AND PROVINCE OF HABANA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS GROUP OF ARMY LEADERS. HE BASED HIS OPINION IN PART ON THE FACT THAT DE LA [illegible] ERA IS A LEADER OF THE BANK WORKERS' UNION, AND THE NEW CUBAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING IN HABANA WAS THE RECENT OBJECT OF SABOTAGE BY BURNING.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rose
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Rogge
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines
1 - Mohr
1 - De Loach

Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 26, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

While at the offices of the President's Commission on other matters, J. Lee Rankin requested Malley to stop by his office. Mr. Rankin advised that he desired to make it known that the Bureau had been of tremendous help to the President's Commission, that an extremely large volume of work had been produced by the Bureau and that the Bureau had been most cooperative in handling all requests which had been made by the President's Commission.

He commented that recently there had been quite an increase in the number of requests and there was a possibility that there would be many more additional requests. Mr. Rankin stated this was not intended as a criticism of the Bureau's work but instead was the following through of the Commission's desire to complete the Commission's record and leave no unanswered questions.

In this regard, Mr. Rankin went on to say that the Bureau, in conducting its investigation, had an extremely difficult and enormous task to perform and that he as well as other members of the Commission staff had been amazed at the amount of detailed information which had been developed by the Bureau in its investigation. He commented that the Commission in performing its tasks was of necessity making a most minute study of the Bureau's work as well as that of other Government agencies with the idea of picking the investigation to pieces to the extreme degree so that wherever it was possible to clarify any item, this could be handled while the Commission was in existence.

Mr. Rankin advised that in connection with the letter which had just recently been transmitted to the Bureau requesting an explanation concerning information relative to Special Agent James P. Hosty's name being omitted from a report prepared in the Dallas Office (report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling dated 12/23/63), he wanted the Bureau to know the following:

Enclosure sent 2-27-64

REC- 53

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Lenihan

1 - 62-109060
1 - 105-82555
1 - 44-24016

XEROX 1964

62-109090 - 11

JRM:RUL:mdd
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum A. Rosen to A. H. Belmont
Re: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

The Commission had noted in reviewing the notebook in question that Agent Hosty's name appeared in the book along with the office telephone number and a license number. It had been noted that this information did not appear in the Dallas investigative report and members of the Commission wondered why this item did not appear. Mr. Rankin stated that prior to any question being raised concerning this item, the Bureau in one of its letters to the Commission (dated 1/27/64) set forth full information for the Commission's information explaining the appearance of Agent Hosty's name in the Oswald notebook. As a result of this information being furnished by the Bureau, the members of the Commission were fully aware that there had been no effort on the part of the Bureau not to make this information available. Mr. Rankin stated that after some discussion concerning this item, the members of the Commission directed Mr. Rankin to request the Bureau for an explanation so that the record of the Commission would show the exact circumstances by which this item was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63 by Special Agent Gemberling.

ACTION:

Attached is a letter to J. Lee Rankin setting forth the reasons why Agent Hosty's name was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63. We are enclosing for the Commission affidavits from Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling and John T. Kesler wherein they set forth their explanations in handling the Hosty entry in Oswald's address book. Both affidavits are excellent and should satisfy the Commission that our handling of the Hosty entry was sound.

Rel

Walt

WCS

If there had been proper supervision here much of the correspondence from Commission requesting clarification & additional investigation would have been avoided. Notwithstanding Rankin's statements the [illegible] record is not one reflecting any credit to the Bureau [illegible]. H

REC

FEB 1

FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0412
13 May 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attention: Mr. E. Greissing

Dear Mr. Miller:

As requested by Mr. Greissing, transmitted herewith is a copy of a 1 May 1967 memorandum numbered 502 and captioned "Claimed Agency Affiliation by Conspiracy Case Figures". This document was recently released by the Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

Sincerely,

Seymour R. Bolten
Chief, Review Staff

Attachment:
As Stated

RECEIVED
MAY 14 1976

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

TO: COS

EXT.:

DIST: COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: (P-8593)
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

NUMBER

				INITIALS	DTG.
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY		
	ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING

TO: COS

EXT.:

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

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CHRONO (DUMMY)

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RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

TO: COS

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CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION

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OUTGOING

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that suddenly he had realized that the United States had [illegible] that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it; that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs). HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

RECEIVED FROM

JAN 28 1976

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that suddenly he had realized that the United States had [illegible] that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it: that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs). HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

RECEIVED FROM

3-

HF: Okay; he asks where she is going to stay now, and LUISA comments that now she plans to move tonight to the house of the doctor (female). HF asks if they know everything now, and LUISA says yes, but doesn't know how the thing is, or if they will have to stay in the embassy, however believes that today it will not be possible, because everyone has gone to the airport and the embassy has no car, however, possibly tomorrow morning instead of going to the study circle, she will move. HF: Then he will call her tomorrow. LUISA: To try the embassy or at the house, since if they will not stay at the embassy, she will go home where she will be at about 10. HF accepts.

Soviet Embassy.- 15-60-55.-
27 Sept 63.-

L34-M8.-T128-
0900-2114 hrs.

395- (1605) IN.- OV. - From the Cuban Consulate- Says that there is an American here who has requested a transit visa for Cuba because he is going to the USSR. OV. - Wants to know with whom he (American) spoke at the Soviet Embassy becuase she (OV) had sent him over to them thinking that if the Soviets approved the visa then the Cubans would give him one without anymore processing - only advising the Emmigration of Cuba. OV - wants to know with whom he (American) spoke since he himself doen't know either and he was told that there were no problems. IV. - asks that OV. wait a minute. 404— 410 OV is SILVIA DURAN of the Cuban Consulate and explains the same to the other IV. This one tells her to leave her name and number so ~~as~~ he can call her. SILEIA gives it to him along with the tel, num. 11-28-47.- Silvia says as a personal thing that she has moved and that she has not advised about her changesof address and will not receive the Bulletin and she can advise them now. IV. asks that she call KOUKHARENKO in order to change the address, and then asks for the name of the Cultural Attache. SILVIA says it is TERESA PROENZA whose number is 14-13-26. IV. thanks her.-- 435--

EMBAJADA RUSA.- [illegible]-55.-
27 septiembre 63.-
/6:05 [illegible]

395- Entrada.- MF del Consulado de Cuba, dice que esta allí

.. un ciudadado Americano que fue a solicitar una visa para C
on Tránsito porque va para la URSS y entonces quiere saber co
quien habia hablado porque ella lo mandó con ellos de la Emba
da rusa diciendole que si ellos lo hacian o aceptaban la visa
que entonces ellos los cubanos tambien se la daban sin mas -
tramitos nadamas avisando a Emigración en Cuba, y quiere sabe
con quien habló porque el dice que no sabe tampoco con que -
persona y que le dijeron que si que no tenia problema. HD le
pide espere un momento. 40[illegible]-- 410-- MF es SILVIA DURAN del
Consulado de Cuba y explica lo mismo a otro HD. Este le dice
que le deje su telefono y su nombre para que despues le llame
SILVIA se lo proporciona asi como el telefono 11-28-47.- Y que
aprovecha como cosa personal de que ella se cambio de domicili
y no ha podido avisar para que le envien el boletin y que aho
se la puede dar. HD le pide que llame a KOUKHARENKO para que l
de su cambio, y pide le de el nombre de la Consejero o Agregac
Cultual. SILVIA dice que se llama TERESA PROENZA y lo llaman
al 14-13-26. HD que gracias.-- 435--

Attachment b:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1605 hours on 27 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy saying there was an America citizen at the Cuban Embassy requesting a Cuban visa in transit to the USSR. She was asked to leave her telephone number (11-28-47).

27 Sept

..3.-L35-M22.-

IV - inside voice.

OV - outside voice.

288- Out to 14-13-26.- (1625 hrs.)- (Cuban Embassy) IV. - asks the number of the Cuban Consul. OV. - It's --11-28-47.-- 294--

295- Out to 11-28-47.-(1626 hrs)- IV asks SILVIA if the American has been there. SILIVA: says yes, he is here now. IV.- According to the letters that he showed from the Consulate in Washington he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have not received the answer from Washington concerning his problem and considering the processing it will take 4 to 5 months. Without that permission of the USSR they have to request. and better still the visa can't be given here without asking Washington. But according to this man, he belongs to an organization in favor of Cuba and he has said that the Cubans can't give him a visa without the Russian visa and I don't know what to do with him. I have to wait for the answer from Washington. SILVIA - We have to wait also because his problem is that he knows no one in Cuba and it's dificult to obtain a visa in these conditions. He expected to process the visa. He knew it would take long to process the Russian visa and would wait for it in Cuba and leave from there for the USSR. IV. - The thing is that if his wife is now in Washington she will receive the visa for returing to Russia. She will receive the visa in Washington and having the visa she can sent it to any place for example here or any other place but right now she doesn't have it. SILVIA - Naturally, and we can't give him a letter of recommendation because we don't know if his visa will be approved. IV. - We will only give the visa according to indications (intructions) SILVIA. - Then that is what I will put in my plans. IV.- We can't give him a letter of recommendation either becuase we don't know him. Please pardon the bother. SILVIA .- No bother and thank you very much.--
--331--

EMBAJADA [illegible] -
27 Septiem[illegible]

27 Sept 1963
1626 hrs

Sali[illegible] - [illegible] ID pregunta a SILVIA que
295- [illegible] que si, que allí [illegible]
si ha ido allí ese americano [illegible] dol consulado en -
ID que según las cartas que [illegible] para estar allá mucho tiempo
Washington el quiere ir a la [illegible] no se ha recibido la
con su esposa que es rusa, pero todavia no se ha recibido la
contestación de Washington [illegible] a su problema, pero eso
según los trámites ocupan un [illegible] cuatro o cinco meses pero sin
tener eso permiso de la URSS deben de preguntar y mas bien no
se lo puede depachar aquí el visado sin preguntarle a Washington
pero según este señor le mostró una carta en que es un miembro
de una organización en favor de Cuba y ha dicho que ellos los
Cubanos no pueden darle el visado sin el visado ruso y ahora . .
ID no sabe que hacer con el, porque deben de esperar la contes-
tación de Washington. SILVIA que ellos tambien, porque el pro-
blema de el, es que el no conoce a nadie en Cuba y entonces si
es asi es muy dificil que le den la visa, porque el pensaba
tramitar su visa, porque como el ya sabia que se iba a tardar
mucho en esperar el visado ruso en Cuba y ya de allá irse a
la URSS. ID que la cosa es que si su esposa está ahorita en
Washington va a recibir ahorita el visado o el permiso de la
URSS para regresar a la patria, ella va a recibir su visado en
Washington pero teniendo ese visado ella podrian comunicarle
a cualquier lugar ese permiso por ejemplo aqui o en cualquier
otra parte lo puede recibir, pero ahorita no las tienen. SILVIA
que claro y que tampoco se le puede dar una carta porque no
saben si su visa será aprovada. ID que ellos solo daran el visa
do según las indicaciones. SILVIA que entonces eso pondrá en su
planilla. ID que tampoco se le puede dar ninguna carta de ---
recomendación porque no se le conoce y que perdone por la . . .
. . molestia. SILVIA que no hay cuidado y que muchas gracias.---
--- 331---

Attachment c:

A telephone call to the Cuban Embassy made at
1626 hours on 27 September 1963 by an unidentified

28 Sept 1963

208- IN - OV. from the Cuban Consulate - says that there is an American there in the Consulate who had been at the Soviet Embassy. IV. Wait a minute. 213-- OV. Is SILVIA DURAN and speaks English with someone outside--and comments in Spanish that they installed a telephone for APARICIO and takes down the number as 14-12-99--- 230-- SILVIA informs (them) of the American and says she will call.-- 232--235-- OV.- speaks in Russian. IV.- speaks in English.-- BOTH CONTINUE IN ENGLISH.--244 --1151 hrs.-

208- X Entrada.- HF del consulado de Cuba, quien dice que alli en su consulado esta un americano norteamericano que estuvo alli en la Embajada Rusa. HM que espere un momento. 223-- HF es -- SILVIA DURAN y habla INGLES con alguna persona Fuera -- y come en español que le pusieron telefono a APARICIO y lo apunta qu es el 14-12-99 --- 231-- SILVIA le dice sobre el ciudadadano norteamericano y que les va a hablar.--- 232--- 235--- HF habla RUSO. HD le habla en INGLES.--- SIGUEN LOS DOS EN INGLES.---244 --- 1151 hrs.-

Lienvoy

28 SET. 1963

15 60 55

208. /Please see the Spanish transcription/. MO while waiting speaks in English/to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak Russian? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russia I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minu MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

Lib: Sustrunk

50-5-10-

[illegible] dice que alli [illegible] que entro alli [illegible] 23-- [illegible]

205- [illegible] en la [illegible] persona fuera-- y comenta SILVIA [illegible] y lo apunta que en español que [illegible] sobre el ciudadadano es el 14-12-22---- [illegible] 232-- 235-- MF habla

8 OCT 1963

56055

norteamericano [illegible] LOS DOS EN INGLES.--244-- RUSO. MO lo habla [illegible] INGLES [illegible] -- 1151 hrs.--

206. /Please see [illegible] Spanish [illegible]/. MO while waiting speaks in English to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak [illegible]? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russian/ I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want?

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

Attachment d:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1151 hours on 28 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy who puts on an unidentified norteamerican man who tells the Soviet that he was just at their Embassy and wants to give them his address. The Soviet tells him to return to the embassy with the address.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-69-57

1 October 63

L26-M26-T129

1031 - 2002

hours man outside
man outside

45. In at 1031, MO talks to MI, in broken Russian.

MO: Hellow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-[illegible]

1 Octobor 63

45. In at 1031. MO talks to MI, in brokon Russian.

MO: Hollow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a tolegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

Attachment a:

A telephone call to the Soviet Military Attache at 1031 hours on 1 October 1963 by an unidentified man speaking broken Russian who asked about a telegram which they were to send to Washington. Unidentified man said he was at the Soviet Embassy "last Saturday". Soviet told him to call 15-60-55.

128. Out to 15-12-64 at 0955? OBYEDKOV talks to OBRUBOV.

OBY: VOLODYA, come here as fast as you can.

OBR: Alright.

135. (previously transcribed)

140. (previously transcribed)

man outside

151. In at ~~168~~ (?) MO / the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/ speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your plac last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the nam of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they havenŧt received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothir has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

249. (previously transcribed)

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, 15-60-55

1 October 63

In at 1035 hours MO/the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anthing new? But I don't remember the name of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

Attachment f:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy at 1035 hours on 1 October 1963 by the same man who called previously (28 September 63) and spoke broken Russian. He said his name was Lee OSWALD and wanted to know if they had heard anything. Soviet said no.

TAB J

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

* * *

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

* * *

TAB L

Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Daniel

A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.

Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the reactions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Kennedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

President Kennedy received me at the White House on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual custom, came to look for me himself so that he could escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to explain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be very strictly organized. As we passed through the small room where his secretary was working, we caught a glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window on her way to the private garden of the White House. The President called her back to introduce me.

It was still Indian summer in Washington. The weather was very warm, and both the President and Mrs. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhancing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity of entering these august chambers. The President (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, almost, I would say, completely expressionless) invited me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair opposite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief telephone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion, like someone who has at last found solace in indifference after having long been exasperated and fascinated. John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart of a matter quickly, ~~and~~ make decisions even more rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khrushchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him, Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Oddly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had *made up his mind* not to worry about them any more. According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly calculated to create a flourishing friendship between two great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incomprehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension with the United States. It would seem that only through this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with conciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between the United States and France. On the subject of Germany, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of "independence," he told me what has since become public

knowledge. He added, however, that France had a strange way of manifesting its independence, particularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing." But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: "It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidely the strangest great man of our time."

Relations with Cuba

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. Had the ideas set forth in that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of *Newsweek*] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

"Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this 'will to independence' around President de Gaulle."

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

"I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we created, built and manufactured the Castro movement out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is one of the most, if not *the most*, important problems in American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."

After a silence during which he was able to note my surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one, and has become international – that is, it has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and not a sociologist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through his fault – either his 'will to independence', his madness or Communism – the world was on the verge of nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don't know whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it." A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin America are not going to attain justice and progress that way, I mean through Communist subversion. They won't get there by going from economic oppression to a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced a few years ago. The United States now has the possibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we alone have this power – on the essential condition that Communism does not take over there."

Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate that the interview was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two quick questions. The first: Could the United States tolerate economic collectivism? He answered: "What about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito three days ago, and our discussions were most posi-

Mike Madigan
Chron File

January 29, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may recall, in June of last year alleged organized crime leader Sam Giancana was killed. At that time, this Committee had taken steps to contact Mr. Giancana for the purpose of obtaining his testimony on our assassinations inquiry then under way. However, we had not yet succeeded in contacting Mr. Giancana or anyone on his behalf.

Shortly after Mr. Giancana's death, Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff met with Mr. William Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, and members of Mr. Lynch's staff to inform them of the Committee's actions taken to contact Mr. Giancana, and its interest with respect to determining whether there was any relationship between the Committee's desire to examine Mr. Giancana and his murder. Mr. Lynch informed Mr. Epstein at that time that there was no indication of any such relationship and assured him that in the event any such indication was discovered, the Committee would be immediately informed.

The Committee has received no further information from the Department about this matter since last June. For the purposes of completing our record on this subject, I would appreciate it if you would inform the Committee whether the Department has received any additional information about this subject since the above-described meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

MM/do

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 30, 1975

Subj: Committee Contact with Sam Giancana

To my knowledge the Committee's first contact with Sam Giancana occurred on June 9, 1974, when Patrick Shea of the Committee staff received a telephone communication from Robert Bennett, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, Texas. It is my information from talking to Mr. Shea that Mr. Bennett called the Committee to advise that Sam Giancana was admitted to the Methodist Hospital, which was located at 6515 Bertner Street in Houston, Texas. Mr. Bennett's information was that Giancana was admitted to Room 402 of the Hospital under the care of a Dr. Debakey. Mr. Bennett also advised that Giancana was there for a gall bladder removal operation. I believe, although I am not positive, that Bennett also advised that Giancana was then under surveillance. My recollection at this time is not clear as to whether Bennett advised as to which agency or organization had Giancana under surveillance, but my impression is that it was not the F.B.I.

At about the time of this communication from Bennett, I, as Committee Counsel, had been attempting to locate Mr. Giancana.

I had discussed his possible testimony before the Committee with Chief Counsel, Fritz Schwarz, and Staff Director, William Miller. It is my recollection that we agreed that I should attempt to contact Giancana for the purposes of interviewing him in order to determine whether he would have sufficient information to warrant an appearance before the Committee as a whole. It is my memory that we did decide that he was of sufficient importance to be interviewed by the Staff, i.e., for me to interview him.

During this same period of time, I discussed with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller whether we should consider issuing a subpoena for Mr. Giancana while he was in the hospital. I made this suggestion because of an impression I had that Giancana was difficult to locate. I should add that I see absolutely nothing prejudicial or improper or discourteous in the issuing of a subpoena, but rather regard a subpoena as a valid method of obtaining testimony before a Congressional Committee. In any event, my discussion with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller resulted in a decision to have me contact Mr. Giancana over the telephone and offer him an opportunity to appear before the Committee voluntarily and to have me interview him if he so agreed. If he did not agree, we would then take it before the Com-

mittee as to whether a subpoena should be issued for Mr. Giancana. Because of the events that followed we never reached the point of bringing before the Committee the question of whether Giancana should be subpoenaed to testify.

After the initial phone call from Bennett to Shea, I telephoned Bennett on two different occasions. My telephone contact with Bennett was for the purpose of our locating Giancana and a telephone number at which I could reach him. Bennett initially indicated to me, as described earlier in this memorandum, that Giancana was in the hospital. My recollection is that on my second telephone call with Bennett, he informed me that Giancana was now out of the hospital and staying at the Warwick Hotel. Finally, I recall calling the Methodist Hospital in Houston and asking to speak to Mr. Giancana. I recall that the hospital authorities indicated that they had no such person by that name in the hospital. I do not recall the precise date of this telephone communication to the hospital. It is my recollection that the name used by Giancana was Doc Brown. I am uncertain whether Bennett told me Giancana was using "Doc Brown" at both the hospital and the hotel, but I believe he said that the alias was used at the hospital. Bennett advised that Giancana had been visited by several relatives and gave me the names of a couple of persons

who he thought were Giancana's sons-in-law. The only name I remember is that of Tisci.

In either the second or possibly a third conversation with Bennett, he told me that Giancana had now checked out of the hotel and was either on his way back to his home in Oak Park, Illinois, or with his daughter in California. He provided me with the telephone number of the daughter in California and suggested I obtain Giancana's home number from the information directory in Illinois.

The telephone conversations with Bennett occurred, to the best of my recollection, during the week of June 16, 1975. It is possible, however, that the first conversation occurred later in the week of June 9. It is my recollection that my second telephone conversation with Bennett occurred on Thursday June 19. In any event, I am certain that I attempted to contact Giancana by telephone on Thursday, June 19. I was unable to get anyone to answer the telephone in California and did not have an opportunity to attempt to obtain the Illinois number. I learned Friday, June 20 that Giancana had been shot and killed in his home in Oak Park, Illinois on the evening of June 19.

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence

agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

Register
COUNTY'S WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
EDITION
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion started. But when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Hous-

Related Story Page A5

ton, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvania

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

2

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalacin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Lovien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there."

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.

MEMORANDUM

TO: FRITZ AND BILL

FROM: MIKE EPSTEIN

DATE: JUNE 20, 1975

SUBJECT: GIANCANA

I expect that no one will write off the alleged Giancana murder as a "third-rate homicide," and that it will grow and grow and grow. It is clearly the most volatile media issue of the season.

Given the barest outlines of what allegedly happened, and taking them at face value, we have a responsibility to take action under 18 U.S. Code, Section 1505:

> Whoever ... by ... force ... endeavors to ... impede any witness ... in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by ... any committee of either House ... or
>
> Whoever ... by ... force ... obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to ... obstruct, or impede ... the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by ... any committee of either House ...
>
> Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

In short, if Giancana was a "witness" (which status he might have achieved by mere location contacts made by staff) and he was killed to prevent his appearance; or indeed even if he wasn't yet a "witness" but this was a "message" to all witnesses to keep quiet (e.g. Roselli and Maheu), there is a violation of law which <u>we</u> might have the responsibility to investigate.

Beyond what our responsibility is, it seems clear to me that most extreme possibilities of what might actually have happened dictate that we come up with a well-reasoned position and plan -- after careful, deliberate, intensive

consideration of all avenues of approach, pitfalls, suspected motives, etc. Most important of all, it seems to me, is our acceptance of the fact that maybe we don't even have anyone on our staff with sufficient experience, sophistication, background, and investigative maturity to deal with this situation.

As a first step, I urge your decision to convene a planning session to decide what the second step will be.

I can't emphasize enough the need for well-thought-out planning here. Who knows where this will lead? And at a minimum, some months from now, Senator Church may be asked, "What did you do the day after you learned that Giancana had been killed?"

My stream of consciousness on kinds of things to consider would include: What our public statement on this should or should not be, security for other witnesses, immediate contact with other key witnesses (to reassure them), secrecy of witness lists and immunity applications, secrecy of place, time and even fact of interview, meetings with Justice organized crime section, Chicago strike force, local law enforcement people in Oak Park and Illinois, obtaining all FBI investigative reports (they're in it per tonight's Star), getting background on all law enforcement officials in Illinois who will be involved (whom do you trust?), is this a diversion which we're being sucked into, how do we avoid that (hire someone just for this), how do we show we care so other witnesses (known or unknown) won't dry up, etc. etc. etc.

NOTE: Mike can be reached after 6:45 tonight at (802) 863-2652.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Mike Madigan
FROM: Ed Greissing
DATE: August 13, 1976
SUBJECT: Mention of Carlos Marcello in the 4/23/76 transcript of John Rosselli.

On April 23, 1976 during Mr. Rosselli's appearance before the Schweiker-Hart Subcommittee, we took the opportunity to question him about any information he might possess regarding the New Orleans Mafia Chieftan, Carlos Marcello.

Our interest in Marcello developed from 1) the allegation that Marcello was tangentially involved with both Clay Shaw and David Ferrie; the fact that Marcello was deported by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and that the assassination of President Kennedy was a possible retaliation,

In my telephone conversation with Jim Johnston, 8/13/76, he could think of no other reasons why we questioned Rosselli about Marcello. If you would like to talk to Jim about this matter, his telephone number is 780-6203.

Ref to Troff. or X

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 23, 1975

Subj: Additional Roselli Questions

Inquire when in the discussions between Roselli and the CIA did any suggestion appear with regard to both Che Guevera and Rauol Castro, in addition to the discussions involving Fidel only.

Query whether Roselli has heard the term "ZRRIFLE" --- note Helms to Harvey memorandum of 12 February 1962, giving approval for use of unvouchered funds.

Harvey - How long after Boy/Page

I.G. Report references first delivery of the pills in early 1961. Second delivery of the pills in early 1962 -- inquire re: Roselli's date recollection.

Jake Esterline had possession of the cigars already treated with poison in March through August 1960 in Florida. Esterline apparently destroyed them before he left in June of 1961 -- Roselli's knowledge of Esterline or the cigars?

Roselli's knowledge of thallium salts operation to put in Castro's shoes when left outside hotel room on trip?

ok but no break

I.G. Report indicates First Phase from August 1960 through April 1961 and Second Phase from April 1962 through February 1963.

Q to R — H

Inspector General's Report states that Maheu was instructed to tell Roselli that Maheu represented businesses (Wall Street) who had interests in Cuba and who wanted to eliminate Castro and were willing to pay $150,000.

Roselli -- Trafficante's gambling interests in Cuba -- interest in killing Castro?

I.G. Report indicates "first meeting" to be 14 September 1960 in New York City, with Maheu, Roselli and O'Connell present.

R

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana and that Giancana was to arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba -- meeting for Roselli/Maheu/Giancana meeting in Fountainbleu Hotel in Florida week of 25 September 1960. I. G. Report indicates that Giancana told Maheu that he had a man (Trafficante) to serve as a courier going back and forth between Miami and Cuba.

R

I.G. Report indicates conversation in Roselli's presence wherein Giancana tells Maheu that Giancana is opposed to the use of guns -- no chance of escape?

R

Roselli named inside man in Cuba as Juan Orta -- then in Prime Minister's office in Havana.

I.G. Report indicates Dr. Gunn's notation of delivery of the first batch of pills to be 10 February 1961? Roselli timing?

R vs before Bay of Pigs? — how far

R

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli's man, Orta, had "easy access" to Castro, and that he was involved in a "rake-off on gambling profits."

I.G. Report has Roselli giving the pills to Trafficante, rather than directly to the Cuban? NO

Did Harvey actually tell Roselli to cut off the project slowly so as to avoid creating hard feelings on the part of the Cubans in the latter part of 1962? NO

I.G. Report in "Second Phase" indicates Roselli telling O'Connell that Trafficante knew a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who could take over the job from Orta. Report indicates this man's name is Varona, and that Trafficante probably knew Varona in his efforts to take over gambling once Castro was out.

Does Roselli know Edward Moss and the Cellini's offer of money to Varona to be used against Castro?

I.G. Report indicates that Trafficante told Varona that he (Trafficante) had clients who would pay big money to get rid of Castro -- Roselli's knowledge of this -- time frame March/April 1961 -- figures mentioned from various witnesses are (1) $50,000 (2) $25,000 (3) $10,00 plus $1,000 worth of communications equipment. NOTE: O'Connell's testimony of $50,000 being taken to Florida and put in a safe deposit box to be paid C.O.D. upon accomplishment of Castro mission.

I.G. Report has Harvey taking over in February 1961 but only of the "executive action capability." The Report indicates 15 November 1961 as date Harvey says Bissell told him to include Cuba in ZRRIFLE program, and to take over syndicate connection --- Roselli's knowledge of either of these dates? NOTE: Are ZRRIFLE and Castro assassination plans synonymous?

I.G. Report gives 8 and 9 April 1962 in New York City as the meeting place for the first introduction of Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli. NOTE: O'Connell feels that Harvey met Roselli prior to this meeting -- meeting took place at -- Savoy Plaza/Savoy Hilton Hotel where Roselli stayed -- dinner at the Elk Room -- drinks at the Copacabana -- table across from Phyllis MacGuire with Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace performing -- seats changed so that Roselli would not be seen by MacGuire -- Roselli's recollection?

June of 1963 Harvey left for Rome.

April 18, 1962 -- Dr. Treichler's records showing delivery of four pills to "OC."

September 1961, last casino in Havana closed.

I.G. Report references Roselli's having a man known as "Maceo" or "Garcia - Gomez" and "Goday". The report describes him as a Cuban who spoke Italian -- Roselli's recollection? -- time frame?

The I.G. Report has April 1962 as the time period for the delivery of the rental truck with the rifles, etc. -- Roselli's recollection of what was inside? -- Rifles with telescopic sites for assassination purposes? Communications equipment -- what type? <u>NOTE</u>: Roselli's recollection regarding joint surveillance by Harvey and Shackley in one car and O'Connell and Roselli in another car?

May 1962 I.G. Report indicates that Roselli reports to Harvey that the pills are in Cuba -- references to all calls to Roselli going to the Friars Club and Roselli's calls going to Harvey's home number -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1962 -- I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that Varona had sent a three-man team into Cuba and that the pills were "inside."

September 1962 -- I.G. Report references Roselli meeting Harvey in Miami on 7 and 11 September. Roselli tells Harvey that a second three-man team was sent in by Varona -- a team of militia to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard -- that the first team is already inside and safe? --- Roselli's recollection of facts?

January 1963. I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that "militia team" prepared for take-off -- and that they never did? -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1963. I.G. Report reference last meeting between Roselli and Harvey -- Roselli met by Harvey at Dulles Airport -- Roselli stayed at home of friend of Harvey's -- Harvey's home closed up per overseas trip -- Harvey called by FBI having seen Roselli/Harvey at restaurant -- FBI had Roselli under surveillance -- Roselli's recollection of facts? -- Time period?

I.G. Report indicates that Maheu put in contact with Giancana for tap through Roselli -- Roselli's advance knowledge?

* * *

O'Connell's Testimony

O'Connell's recollection is that Orta's man would not go through with it and that the pills were returned to O'Connell by Roselli. O'Connell's recollection then is that the second plan was a call from Roselli and Maheu indicating the use of a chef. The pills were sent down and again returned when this plot failed.

O'Connell is unclear which of the aforementioned schemes took place before the Bay of Pigs. He indicates, however, the use of Varona to be after the Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell has the first introduction of Roselli and Harvey as being in the Miami airport.

O'Connell's testimony is that he received a call from Maheu who said that Giancana was upset about Phyllis MacGuire seeing

Dan Rowan. Maheu said that he had been requested to place a tap for Giancana and that Giancana might "stop helping" on the assassination plot if this tap was not placed. O'Connell checked with Edwards and received the go-ahead. O'Connell indicates that Maheu was authorized to pay for DuBois out of the month given him on the assassination plan.

O'Connell states that he recalls November 1960 as the time period of the delivery of the pills for Roselli through Trafficante?

O'Connell recollection that "chef" incident after Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell states that Varona's price was $50,000 -- $10,000 worth of communications equipment in addition.

O'Connell introduced by Roselli to Varona as "Mr. Olds."

* * *

Harvey Testimony

Harvey places the fall of 1961 as the time period in which ZRRIFLE was to be applied to Cuba.

Harvey reference to pressure from the Kennedys to topple the Castro regime clandestinely and not by means of any attack. Roselli's hearsay knowledge of this?

Harvey states that he recalls firearms in the truck, possibly "sniper-scope rifles."

Harvey states that as soon as the missile crisis was over, i.e., late 1962, he indicated to Roselli that he wanted the project cut off, although gradually so as not to create hard feelings.

Roselli's knowledge of Greenspun's safe -- break-in in 1971 -- 1967 meeting between Greenspun, Garrison, Roselli, etc.?

I.G. Report reference to "air contamination" in early 1960 efforts -- Roselli hearsay knowledge?

E. B. Williams' knowledge re Maheu/Roselli/Greenspun meetings in 1967?

Roselli knowledge re Angell Luis Castillo (U.S. in 1968) and Jerry Henning (training of Cuban teams)?

Roselli knowledge of explosives along with guns valued at $5,000 -- U-Haul truck delivery -- surveillance by Chief JMWAVE?

Late 1962-Early 1963 -- Roselli knowledge of skin-diving suit implemented with poisons?

##

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing you today on behalf of the Select Committee about the recent death of Samuel Giancana. As you are no doubt aware, his name has been raised in the context of allegations concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's possible involvement in so-called political assassinations.

Based on information available to the Committee, it was obvious that he might be knowledgeable about the political assassination matter. Although Mr. Giancana had not actually been subpoenaed to testify by this Committee, he had been approached by members of the staff for a possible interview. Since this might involve violation of federal statutes pertaining to obstruction of a Congressional Committee investigation, the Select Committee is requesting that you instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep it fully informed of all information coming to the Bureau's attention pertaining to Mr. Giancana's death. In making this request, the Committee is not conceding its right to conduct its own investigation of this matter. However, it is acting in the spirit of cooperation on a question of mutual concern to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. Therefore, we request 24-hour-a-day protection by the United States Marshall Service for the following witnesses which the Committee has subpoenaed, intends to subpoena, has interviewed, or intends to interview:

(Alternative paragraph:

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. We would like to discuss with members of your staff the necessity for special arrangements by the United States Marshall Service to ensure the safety of witnesses who have or might have to contact with the Committee pertaining to these matters.)


THE MAFIA ORGANIZATIO
TAMPA, FLORIDA AREA
NEW YORK
VINCENZO MANGANO
(MISSING SINCE 1951)
ALFONSO DIECIDUE
(DECEASED)
1947
NEW YORK
JOSEPH PROFACI
(DECEASED, 1962)
SANTO TRAFFICANTE, SR.
(DECEASED 1954)
ELDER
2 SALVATORE SCAGLIONE
@ "SAM"
A 11 C
B 3,15 D 13
ELDER
3 GAETANO
@ "JOE"
B 2,15
TOP MAN
[redacted]
1
4 FRANK DIECIDUE
FBI #784739 B
C 9
D 2,5
7 ANGELO BEDAMI
FBI #1849088
A 8,9,19 C
D 2,9
6 AUGUSTINE PRIMO LAZZARA
TAMPA PD #41671
A C 8
B 1,4,5,7 D 10,13
8 CIRO BEDAMI
FBI #865273 A
A 7,9,19 C
B 8,9 D 2,11
9 JOE BEDAMI
FBI #82699 A
A 7,8,19 C 4
B 8 D 2,11
10 PHILIP PIAZZA
COSTA LONGO
AMY"
D 2,18
18 DOMENICK FURCI
@ "NICK"
FBI #318519 B
A C
B 6 D 11
15 ANGIELO LO SC
@ "FANO"
NON MEMBER ASSOCIA

EXHIBIT No.

N THE

LEGEND

- **A** INTER - FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
- **B** CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
- **C** COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
- **D** CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
  - 1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1D SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
  - 2 GAMBLING
  - 3 SHYLOCKING
  - 4 LABOR RACKETEERING
  - 5 COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
  - 6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
  - 7 COUNTERFEITING
  - 8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
  - 9 BOOTLEGGING
  - 10 BRIBERY
  - 11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
  - 12 TAX EVASION
  - 13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
  - 14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
  - 15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
  - 16 HIJACKING
  - 17 CONTEMPT
  - 18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
- **00** CHART REFERENCE NUMBER



LEGEND

- **A** INTER-FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
- **B** CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
- **C** COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
- **D** CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
  - 1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
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

ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION 17, 88TH CONGRESS

PART 2

OCTOBER 10, 11, 15, AND 16, 1963

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. And then Sergeant de la Llana, will you identify yourself, please, sir?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Jack de la Llana, Tampa Police Department. I have been with the police department for 9 years, and attached to the homicide division for 4 years before starting the criminal intelligence unit of the Tampa Police Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had previous police service?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. My first experience was 9 years ago, when I started first with the force.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief Brown, do you have a statement, a prepared statement?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I do, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a copy of it before me, and I see it has several pages. Do you wish to read all of it?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would like to read it to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, then, you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Neil G. Brown, chief of the Police Department of the city of Tampa, Fla.

I have been a member of the Tampa Police Department for the past 16 years, and I have been chief of the department for the past 4 years. Prior to my appointment as chief, I served as inspector of detectives. I am a graduate of the National Police Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a member of the Tampa Bay Area Chiefs of Police Association and of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

With me here today is Sgt. Jack de la Llana who, at my direction, formed our department's first criminal intelligence unit in February of 1962, and has been its director since that time. Sergeant de la Llana also holds the important post of chairman of the Florida Intelligence Unit, a statewide agency which coordinates information amongst intelligence units in cities throughout the State of Florida.

In addition to Sergeant de la Llana, whose diligent work and knowledge of criminal operations has provided much of the foundation for my statement to you, I feel fortunate in being accompanied also by Sgt. William Branch of the intelligence division of the Orlando Police Department. Sergeant Branch is presently attending the National Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been a member of the Orlando Police Department since 1951, and a detective sergeant since 1956. He is particularly familiar with organized gambling operations in the central Florida area, and I believe his presentation of that situation will be of material value to this inquiry.

I feel privileged to be able to testify before you today. I believe that the facts I can present here about organized crime operations in Tampa will help you and the American public realize the seriousness of this problem, and our Nation's emergent need for further Federal legislation to combat an evil that has clearly expanded beyond the powers of municipal law enforcement to contain, suppress and eliminate it.

Tampa has a large and respected Italian population, who are considered in all respects to be an asset to our community. Unfortunately, a small percentage of this group of citizens have achieved

a notoriety greatly disproportionate to their numbers, because of their continuous activity in criminal and racketeering enterprises. The people of our city refer to this group as "the Sicilian underworld" or "the Mafia."

Our growing concern with this criminal group was crystallized in 1956 when a Hillsborough County grand jury was empaneled in Tampa to investigate and determine the truth of allegations that the Mafia was then operating in Tampa. The pertinent part of that grand jury's report stated:

> * * * there are some individuals who believe that a Mafia or Black Hand exists and operates in this community, but they are in the minority. * * * The evidence presented, the volume of written material examined, and witnesses interviews point to the existence in this community of an organized crime element whose methods of operation are similar to the pattern of the Sicilian Mafia as we understand it. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, let me ask you, prior to this development before the grand jury, before the grand jury made this finding, were you the law enforcement officials or in the police department?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you suspicious that such an organization existed in your city?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, yes; law enforcement has been aware that this has been there.

The CHAIRMAN. There was something, you felt confident, but you were unable to bring it out in concrete proof; is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had been trying to combat it without being able to get it out in the open?

Mr. BROWN. That is exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Mr. BROWN (reading):

> * * * our records indicate that the vast majority of our unsolved crimes stem from underworld activity involving persons of Sicilian or Italian ancestry * * *

The CHAIRMAN. We had some startling information here the other day from the Chicago chief of police with respect to some 976 murders, gangland style, that had been committed over a period of years, and only 2 of them had been solved. That is, officially solved by court determination or court action.

Mr. BROWN. That is typical.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ratio in your community, if you can give us some idea about it?

Mr. BROWN. I will bring that out in my statement, but it is just like Chicago.

The CHAIRMAN. Something along that line?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That struck me as one of the most frightening developments of information that I have heard regarding crime. I just couldn't believe that 976 murders, and apparently just murder in the first-degree fashion, could be committed in an area like Metropolitan Chicago over a period of years, and only 2 of them could be solved. It thoroughly demonstrates to me the great menace and the danger of organized mobs committing crime.

You say: "Well, they probably killed each other pretty much." That may be true, but they kill each other because of the extortionate

operations that they are engaged in, to the detriment of the public at large, and to the detriment of innocent people who can't help themselves. It focuses and emphasizes how serious this menace is.

Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. Brown. Notwithstanding these findings, the grand jury concluded that there was no national or local Mafia in Tampa. I would like to submit as exhibit 1 a certified copy of the report of the grand jury dated March 30, 1956.

The Chairman. Very well, this report of the grand jury will be received and it may be made exhibit No. 44, and exhibit 1 to this witness' testimony.

I may later direct it be printed, but as of now we will just let it be filed as an exhibit for reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. Brown. It seems likely to me that the grand jury failed to acknowledge without qualification the presence of the Mafia in Tampa because it sought a pattern of Mafia operations similar to the historical Sicilian tradition of primitive and direct extortion, rather than the sophisticated and polished control of rackets that now characterize that organization.

The Chairman. I take it from that last statement that you feel that they have considerably improved their technique.

Mr. Brown. Very much so.

The Chairman. Of crime operations.

Mr. Brown. Very much.

Senator Muskie. May I ask a question, Chief, there?

As I understand what you have just testified relative to the grand jury's report, they acknowledged that there was some evidence of the existence of Sicilian Mafia in the community, but apparently felt that evidence was not conclusive; is that a correct summary?

Mr. Brown. That is correct; yes, Senator. The Tampa Police Department, however, has long been aware that many criminals in our area have local reputations as Mafiosi. My staff and I have made a careful evaluation of those reputations, based upon personal knowledge, criminal records, surveillance reports, personal histories, familial relationships, statistical analyses, reports from confidential informants, information from Federal and local law-enforcement agencies, and other customary police intelligence sources.

It is our considered conclusion that the Mafia exists in Tampa, that it controls most illegal gambling in Tampa and central Florida, and that its members have interstate and international ties to other Mafia groups.

The organization of the Mafia in the Tampa area is best understood from a chart we have formulated which I submit to this subcommittee as our exhibit No. 2.

Senator Muskie. Before we get to that, Chief, may I ask another question? The grand jury to which you referred sat in 1956, am I correct?

Mr. Brown. That is correct, sir.

Senator Muskie. That is 7 years ago. Do you think you have accumulated additional evidence as to the existence of the Mafia in Tampa which would justify a new reference to the grand jury?

Mr. Brown. Yes; I believe so.

Senator MUSKIE. Are you planning that?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. This chart may be received as exhibit No. 45 and we will direct it be printed in the record if it can be, as far as it can be. The title of it is "The Mafia Organization in the Tampa, Fla., Area."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" for reference and faces this page.)

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the operations of this organized group are not confined just to the city limits of Tampa, but they are in the area?

Mr. BROWN. By all means; the entire area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. This chart is now a part of the record and, if you wish to comment about it, we will proceed with your statement.

Mr. BROWN. The chart is keyed to show only the criminal, business, and familial interrelationships and activities of the persons named, although other criteria figured in our categorization of these persons. Of course, this chart cannot be considered as a definitive "table of organization" of the Tampa Mafia, because it is but a simplified representation of an organization that is in a constant state of flux, and about which we know we still have many things to learn.

However, I believe it is completely accurate in showing that Santo Trafficante is the boss of this criminal group. Indeed, it is to Santo Trafficante that Tampa owes the dubious distinction of having been represented at the notorious crime convention at Apalachin, N.Y., in November 1957.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice you designate or refer to this group as the Mafia. Would you say that it is the same group that has been referred to by the famous witness, Joe Valachi?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he calls it Cosa Nostra or the Mafia makes no difference. This is the organized crime group to which you referred?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, Senator; this is the group.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question there?

Under this group, there is another group which you describe as nonmember associates and employees. Is that intended to suggest that the people who are so described know nothing about the identity of their employers and the organization of which they are a part?

Mr. BROWN. Senator, that is a part of the insulation of the group. They have many employees, and as we go into the statement, to show how in this gambling operation the seller is non-Sicilian in most cases, and he reports to another member up the ladder, and so on up. Many of these people are nonmembers of the Mafia as it is.

Senator MUSKIE. Do they know they are engaged in criminal activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. They know they are a part of a criminal organization?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. But they are not members?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What do they need to do to become members in the Tampa area?

Mr. BROWN. Well, I think I can clarify that later on in the statement, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante, Jr., was born in Tampa on November 14, 1914. He was one of five brothers. He maintains residence today in Tampa and in Miami. He previously lived in Havana, Cuba, where he owned and operated gambling casinos under the Battista regime. When Fidel Castro took over, Trafficante's gambling operations were stopped. He was expelled from Cuba and returned to the United States. He inherited the control of the numbers racket in central Florida which his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., who died in 1954, and he continues to head this operation.

Testimony in the 1958 hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field identified Santo Trafficante, Jr., in the operation of the Sans Souci gambling casino in Havana. That testimony stated that Trafficante took over the Sans Souci from the Mannarino brothers in Pittsburgh, Pa. Gabriel Mannarino was a fellow delegate with Santo Trafficante, Jr., to the Apalachin crime convention in 1957.

Additional testimony named Trafficante, Jr., as the key figure in the Mafia in Tampa, stating, as the Tampa police had long known, that he succeeded his father as the major racketeer in the city.

Other information substantiated by our files reveals that Trafficante is an associate of such notorious criminals as Meyer Lansky, Joseph Bonanno, Sam Giancana, Aniello Dellacroce, Joseph Stassi, Sam Mannarino, Joseph Arcuri, and of Joseph Riccobono, also known as Staten Island Joe, who had been closely allied with the elder Trafficante, and was also discovered at the Apalachin meeting.

When Joseph Profaci's daughter Carmella married Anthony Tocco, son of Detroit mobster William "Black Bill" Tocco, in Brooklyn on June 4, 1955, one of the guests at the reception in the Hotel Commodore in New York was Santo Trafficante, Jr. Among those who also attended were 13 other persons who later attended the Apalachin conference, as well as other notorious Mafia figures, such as Frank Livorsi, Thomas and John Dioguardi, Tony and Albert Anastasia, and Thomas "Three Finger Brown" Lucchese.

There have been at least two known attempts on the life of Santo Trafficante: On January 2, 1953, he was shotgunned in a car on the streets of Tampa, receiving wounds in the arm. Later, in Cuba, four American mobsters who intended to kill Trafficante were told by Cuban police that they would have to do it on American soil.

Trafficante has been arrested in Tampa several times for investigation, because of our knowledge that he was deeply involved in gambling, even though we have not yet been able to obtain the quantum of proof necessary to a successful prosecution. He has also been picked up by the police for questioning about the gangland slayings of Rene Nunez, Angelo Giglio, and Joe Antinori.

Trafficante was a suspect in the Albert Anastasia murder on October 25, 1957, in New York because he had appeared in New York just before the murder. He was considered a likely suspect because there had been reports that Anastasia was then attempting to move

in on Trafficante's gambling operations in Cuba. Trafficante, using the alias "B. Hill," stayed with Anastasia in the latter's hotel suite, on the night of October 24, 1957, and moved out approximately 1 hour after Anastasia's murder in a nearby barber shop.

The Department's evaluation of Trafficante as the boss of the Mafia organization in Tampa was confirmed, of course, by the positive identification of the "Louis Santos of Havana, Cuba," apprehended at the Apalachin conference in November of 1957, as Santo Trafficante, Jr., of Tampa, Fla.

Furthermore, we have witnessed and documented many visits of out-of-town racketeers with Santo Trafficante and his fellow hoodlums of the Tampa area. These visitors give further indications that Trafficante is associated with Mafia members in other cities. For example, Louis Coticchia of Chicago, also known as Lou Brady, has been frequently seen visiting Trafficante and on one occasion they were seen boarding a plane together, heading for Miami.

Other known outside racketeers who have visited in Tampa with Trafficante gang members are John Joseph Vitale, Salvatore Lopiccolo, and Anthony Giardano, all known racketeers from St. Louis, Mo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I think at the present time, in interest of continuity, so that the record will read properly, Sergeant de la Llana has a statement with regard to a courier operation within the Mafia. In the interest of time, I am not going to ask him to read it, but I would like to have it introduced in the record.

Do you have that?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, I do.

Mr. O'DONNELL. How many pages does it consist of?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is five pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Give a better description of it and tell us what it is.

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is with reference to Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, and his visits to Tampa on various occasions, which first came to our attention on April 13, 1962. This subject has a long criminal record. I have an FBI record which I will also submit into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the FBI record be received and made exhibit No. 46 for reference.

(Document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 46" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your statement, is that a summary statement that you have made and prepared for the record?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be received and printed in the record, either at this point or immediately following the prepared statement of the witness now testifying.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF SGT. JACK DE LA LLANA

One of the clear ties of the Trafficante organization with other criminal groups is reflected by the contacts with Trafficante made by a man who appears to act as a courier for the Mafia. Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, FBI No. 1427493, first came to the attention of our Department on April 13, 1962, when we observed him, in Tampa, in the company of Augustine Primo Lazzara and Frank Diecidue, two of the men on our Mafia chart. Because of this and other contacts made by Coticchia, our intelligent unit developed the following information about him which I think is of interest to this committee in giving a profile

of a hoodlum who is entrusted by the Mafia to act as a courier for them between the various groups.

Coticchia was born on February 25, 1920, in Cincinnati, Ohio. When he was arrested a couple of years ago, he gave as his occupation "industrial financier." He is presently reported to be interested in the operation of a company offering wired music in the Chicago area known as Symphonaire Sound Systems, Inc.

His criminal record shows that he was first arrested in 1936 in Ohio for robbery. In 1937 he was arrested in Miami, Fla., for investigation of a "shakedown." He was held for 4 days and released without charges. He was arrested again in Hot Springs, Ark., in 1938 for investigation and released with the understanding that he would leave the city.

In 1938, in Cleveland, Coticchia was arrested and charged with assault with intent to commit rape. He was convicted and received 1 to 15 years, of which he served 4 years, being released in 1941. He was arrested in 1942 in Los Angeles, Calif., on a warrant issued in Baltimore for grand theft. He was tried in Baltimore for receiving stolen goods and received 5 years in prison.

Coticchia was again arrested in Dallas, Tex., in 1961, by the U.S. marshals for violation of and for conspiring to violate the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, which case is still pending in the Southern District Court of New York. His last arrest known to us was on January 4, 1963, when he was arrested in Tampa for investigation of grand larceny. He was released due to insufficient evidence.

Coticchia worked as a "pit boss" in gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nev., and Havana, Cuba. He was involved in a scandal in 1960 in which mobsters attempted to take over a nationwide bail bond business.

Coticchia has been in and out of Tampa since our first observation of him and on every occasion he is in direct contact with Trafficante and Diecidue. On December 31, 1962, he purchased a new automobile in Tampa, paying the dealer $3,625.95 in cash. He then registered the car under the name of Jane Campbell. He remained in Tampa several days and was in constant contact with Trafficante and Diecidue.

On January 4, 1963, Coticchia was arrested in Tampa on suspicion of grand larceny and at the time of his arrest he had $1,775 in cash on his person. He had papers on him that showed he had resided previously at the Aloha Motel in Miami under the name Luiz Paulino Bailey from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He also had a paper with a list of gambling equipment and the name "Empress Lines, Ltd., Nassau—via *Wappen Von Hamburg*—German boat loading pier No. 3."

An investigation revealed this equipment had been shipped airfreight from Las Vegas to Nassau and placed in a German vessel, the *Wappen Von Hamburg*, which sails between Nassau and Miami. This equipment included 50 one-arm bandits, or slot machines, and was valued in excess of $65,000. The information received was that this vessel was to travel between Miami and Nassau as a floating gambling casino.

After Coticchia's arrest in Tampa, the telephone calls were checked at the motel. It showed that he had made several calls to Trafficante, Diecidue, and other associates of Trafficante. He had also made a long-distance call to Sonny's Restaurant in Miami Beach, which is owned by Thomas Altamura, FBI No. 511563, a Mafia member and another associate of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

I would like to submit for the record Coticchia's FBI record, and a photograph of him taken by my department when he was arrested in Tampa on January 4, 1963.

Another example of the Trafficante group's connections with Mafia figures in other parts of the Nation is: John Joseph Vitale, FBI No. 793259, of St. Louis, Mo. Vitale is well known to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and is reputed to be the Mafia leader in that area. He has a record of 13 arrests and a conviction for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act for which he received a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment. He has been arrested as a fence and is believed to deal in anything in which there is a large percentage of profit.

Police authorities consider him among the most dangerous of Mafia principals in the St. Louis area, and he is known to have underworld connections throughout the country. He appeared twice before the Senate Rackets Committee (August 19, 1958, and February 11, 1959) and each time refused to answer any questions, invoking the fifth amendment.

On April 17, 1963, Vitale flew from St. Louis to Tampa, using the name "Jack Howard." He visited the Diecidues for 4 hours and then flew back to St. Louis

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using the same alias. We alerted the St. Louis police and upon Vitale's arrival there, he was interviewed by detectives of that city. He declared that he had traveled to Tampa to settle a debt of the Lombardo Produce Co., of St. Louis, Mo., to the Diecidue Bros. of Tampa.

To me it does not seem probable that Vitale would go to the expense and trouble of flying to Tampa and returning the same day in order to settle a debt between two produce companies with which he has no known connections. More significantly, his use of an alias to run this errand, too, points out his own doubts that he was engaged in a legitimate errand.

These two examples, Coticchia's and Vitale's, indicate to us the interstate connections of the Trafficante organization, and point up the need for attacking the Mafia group on a national basis.

Mr. O'DONNELL. All right, we will continue.

Mr. BROWN. Some of Trafficante's men shown here on our chart gave sworn testimony before the Hillsborough County solicitor in 1953 concerning gambling in Tampa. They admitted that they had long been engaged in illegal gambling activities. They were forced to testify or face jail terms for contempt of court, because they had been granted immunity from prosecution for such crimes. Among those who testified were Frank Diecidue, Augustine Primo Lazzara, Nick Scaglione, Henry Trafficante, and James C. Longo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Are any of these individuals on the chart that you have introduced as exhibit 2?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, they are all on the chart.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante has himself been caught up in a typical Mafia technique of seeking to preserve and protect its illegal enterprises by the corruption of law enforcement and other public officials. This incident substantiated our intelligence that Trafficante was deeply involved in gambling operations, and it showed that he had major interests in gambling outside the city of Tampa.

The case was initiated in 1954 by a veteran St. Petersburg police officer, Detective Sgt. Harry Dietrich, who had obtained evidence of the operation of the Trafficante bolita ring. Bolita is a numbers racket of considerable importance in Florida, involving weekly payoffs based upon information taken from radio reports of the weekly Cuban lottery.

An attempt was made to bribe Sergeant Dietrich to ignore the operation of the ring. He was given a new car, a television set, some suits of clothing, and cash. Sergeant Dietrich accepted the bribes with the full knowledge and orders of his superiors, to whom he had immediately reported the initial bribery attempt.

As a result of his work, Santo Trafficante and his brother Henry were arrested. Both were charged with bribery and were convicted.

The CHAIRMAN. When did this occur?

Mr. BROWN. This was in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same man that is now operating, and he is the boss?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Each received a prison sentence of 5 years. Santo Trafficante's conviction was later reversed in a higher court. His brother served his term and was recently released. Both brothers were subsequently indicted by the Federal Government for tax law violations.

We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned or controlled by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate, nor any other property,

real or personal. His house, automobile, and all his other possessions are held in the names of others. However, we do not believe him to be destitute, for his control of gambling in the central Florida area alone must net him huge amounts of money. His operations there show, also, a characteristic Mafia method of utilizing non-Sicilian associates where it serves its criminal objectives.

Sergeant Branch, who has for the past 7 years been investigating gambling and other organized criminal activities in the Orlando area, will describe the Mafia's control, through the Harlan Blackburn organization, of lottery operations in central Florida. We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Branch is here with you?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

On the lower right-hand side of our chart we have depicted that group of Trafficante associates.

Sergeant Branch will here testify about the Blackburn group.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRANCH. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BRANCH

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify yourself for the record?

Mr. BRANCH. I am a sergeant with the Orlando Police Department attached to the intelligence division, and I have been with them since 1951. I have been working in this type of work since 1956, with the cooperation of the Federal and State agencies in our area.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It appears to be four or five pages. Do you wish to read it?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

In the central Florida area the main gambling activity is known as bolita or Cuba. Bolita is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn daily. Cuba is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn weekly. Bettors can place bets on any number from 1 to 100 and receive a 60-to-1 return if they win. The Cuba winning number is the last two digits from the Cuban national lottery number which is five digits and is broadcast over a Havana radio station each Saturday shortly after 2 p.m.

The public is contacted by "peddlers" or "sellers," who receive a commission of 15 percent of their sales. "Pickup" men, who take the bets from the sellers to the "checkup houses," receive 20 percent of what they collect. Employees such as checkup men, adding machine operators, and supervisors above this position usually receive salaries for their duties.

Lottery operations in central Florida prior to 1948 were dominated first by Charlie Wall of Tampa and then by Sam Warren, an Orlando native. In that year Harlan Blackburn, FBI No. 1026922, a convicted felon, came into Orlando and began taking over bolita and Cuba gambling.

This man is on the chart also.

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Blackburn was born in Sand Lake, Fla., on April 13, 1919. In 1935, he was convicted of forging a U.S. Government check, for which he served 4½ years in prison. In 1943, he was sentenced to 2 years in the Florida State prison for cattle theft. He was again arrested in March 1956 for operating a lottery in Polk County, Fla., and received a 5-year prison sentence, but was released in 1959.

Senator MUSKIE. Did you say Mr. Blackburn was on the chart?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir. He is listed in the lower right-hand corner.

Senator MUSKIE. It is not on this chart?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; not on that one.

Senator MUSKIE. Blackburn is not a member of the Mafia, as such?

Mr. BRANCH. He is a subordinate that works under their direction; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he the same as Sam Warren?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; he is not. Sam Warren is dead.

He was then incarcerated for 60 days in Polk County for an earlier conviction of conspiracy to violate the lottery laws of Florida. He was most recently arrested on November 5, 1962, for failure to buy a Federal wagering tax stamp. He is presently out on bail awaiting trial.

Blackburn supervises the five lottery bankers who control central Florida gambling. These bankers are Rudy Mach, Joe Wheeler, Clyde F. Lee, Cecil Merritt, and Ralph Strawder. Mach has in his operation Don Mach, Dan Fussell, Buddy Parron, Glen Brechen, Tommy Berry, and Clifford Bell; Joe Wheeler has Max Reid, Mary Carden, and Phil Riffe; Clyde F. Lee has Jesse Joyner, Vasco Joyner, Mathew Smith, Macon Tribue, Julia Ciphon, Hoy Anderson, and Katherine Bradshaw; Cecil Merritt has Clayton Thomas, Sonny Brown, and George Solomon; and Ralph Strawder has Benny White, William Harrell, and Elvin Carroll.

With the exception of Carden, Riffe, Harrell, White, and Ciphon, all of these persons have criminal records and arrests for gambling and other crimes.

I have here copies of their FBI records and submit them for the subcommittee's record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be received in bulk as exhibit No. 47 for reference only.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BRANCH. These five exceptions have been connected with this operation for a number of years, however, and their names and amounts of gross and net collections appear in much of the evidence that we have secured from checkup houses. We have also sworn testimony from witnesses that these persons have been engaged in illegal gambling.

Senator MUSKIE. What is the size of their take?

Mr. BRANCH. I have that further along in my statement, sir.

The lottery operation of the Blackburn group extends from Orange County into all of central Florida and into the southern State of Georgia.

From 1948 until the latter part of 1953, our department established that Santo Trafficante, Jr., and his brother, Henry, personally were visiting Orlando and supervising the checkup houses that were conducting the lottery.

It has also been obvious to us that the Trafficante organization has controlled the Blackburn operation for at least the last 10 years. From our examination of seized records, and from the fact that in all raids on the checkup houses we have arrested persons having close family ties with the Trafficante organization who were acting as auditors for his interests. In addition, there has been heavy telephone toll traffic between the Trafficantes in Tampa and the Blackburn group in Orlando.

When Blackburn was arrested in 1953, a memorandum was found containing telephone numbers of Augustine Primo Lazzara, Salvatore J. Lorenzo, J. M. Cacciatore—uncle of Santo Trafficante, Jr.—and Santo Trafficante, Jr., and of the Nebraska and Flamingo Bars, both owned by the Trafficante family.

In 1957 a search of a gambling house in Orange County by a State officer, with the assistance of the Orlando Police, resulted in the arrest of several persons. One of these was Lorenzo and another person by the name of Leto, from Tampa. They both gave sworn statements at that time to the county solicitor that they were working for Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In November 1961, another raid was conducted by agents of the Internal Revenue Service in conjunction with the Orlando Police Department on a house in Orange County. There were six persons arrested, and among those were Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore. These two were cousins of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In July 1963, a raid on a gambling house in Sanford, Fla., by the IRS agents, with the assistance of the Orlando Police Department, established that it was another operation of Harlan Blackburn's, supervised by Clyde Lee. In the records seized there was the phone number of Trafficante's cousin, John Favata Cacciatore, and the phone number of the printing establishment employing Stefano Scaglione, who is also on the chart.

During the past 12 years that we know of at least three murders that have been due to fights for control of lottery operations in the Orlando area.

The fantastic amount of money taken in by these lottery operations has been repeatedly established by our raids of these gambling houses. For example, the raid in 1957 in Orange County, where Frank Ferreri and Sam Lorenzo were arrested, disclosed that the house was doing a gross business of $100,000 per week.

Senator MUSKIE. What were they paying out?

Mr. BRANCH. The profit on this operation runs about 50 percent. The November 1961 raid in Orange County where Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore, cousins of Santo Trafficante, were arrested revealed that operation was doing a conservatively estimated gross of $160,000 per week.

The CHAIRMAN. With the same ratio of half applying there?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. When you say "net profit," this means after deductions of the commission which totaled 35 percent?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. And the prizes.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

The commission and also the prizes and what other operating expenses they may have such as automobiles, rent, telephone bills.

The latest raid, in July of this year, indicated a gross revenue of $250,000 per week.

From those figures——

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that raid?

Mr. BRANCH. That was in Sanford, Fla., just 17 miles north of Orlando. These figures are established by the Internal Revenue agents and auditors.

From these figures, it is easy to see why the Mafia has moved so heavily into lottery gambling in central Florida and why gambling revenues are universally acknowledged to be the "lifeblood" of organized crime.

Any additional legislation that this subcommittee can promote to further restrict and inhibit gambling will, in our opinion, be a substantial blow to organized crime.

Senator MUSKIE. Did they actually pay off on those lotteries or was it dishonest in that respect, too?

Mr. BRANCH. Usually they pay off.

They don't pay off when we pull a raid on them or arrest them. They stop at that. But they are in operation the next week.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they do not pay off for that day?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; they don't.

The CHAIRMAN. It is unfortunate for the fellow that won, who cannot get his winnings.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If the law enforcement is pretty vigilant, I would be afraid to place a bet under those circumstances.

All right, Chief, if you will, you may proceed.

Stand by, Sergeant, as we may want to ask you some questions.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF NEIL G. BROWN—Resumed

Mr. BROWN. To understand the crime network Trafficante operates it is necessary to examine the modern era of crime in Tampa, which dates from the early 1920's. Its most violent episodes were between 1937 and 1945, when the Sicilian underworld was attempting to move in on all illegal gambling in Tampa. This period in the history of our city was referred to as "the era of blood."

Senator MUSKIE. Who coined that phrase, the gang or the newspapers?

Mr. BROWN. I think it was the newspapers, Senator.

During the 1920's, before the Sicilian underworld moved into the rackets to any great extent, one of our most notorious residents, Charles M. Wall, started his rise to become the acknowledged boss of most of the illegal gambling in the Tampa and central area of the State of Florida. He styled himself "dean of the underworld," and in 1953 he admitted to a Hillsborough County solicitor that he had made his living from illegal gambling. During 1945, Wall forfeited his leadership by entering into a partnership with Santo Trafficante, Sr.

The elder Trafficante was born in Sicily in 1886. He came to Tampa in 1904 and became a naturalized citizen in 1925. In 1950, he was one of the missing witnesses in the Kefauver crime hearings held in Tampa. He died on August 11, 1954. Police records do not show any arrest for Santo Trafficante, Sr.

In 1952, Wall declared that he was retiring, although he did not

state what he was retiring from. In April 1955, Wall's body was found in his home. He had been brutally beaten and his throat had been slashed. We have never discovered who the murderers were, nor have we determined their motive. Perhaps Wall was murdered because the killers learned he had admitted that he was Trafficante's partner in illegal gambling, and that he disclosed confidential facts about the Mafia.

In 1960, Sergeant de la Llana obtained—from a confidential source of known reliability—an astounding report about the Mafia and its operation in Tampa. The report had been obtained from Charles Wall in 1945, approximately 6 months after Trafficante, Senior, had made himself a partner in Walls' gambling enterprises.

Wall declared that from 1920 through 1945 he controlled gambling in Tampa and in the Florida counties of Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Hernando, Polk, and Orange. His rival for control of the gambling rackets was the local Mafia organization. This was headed, he said, by Santo Trafficante, Sr., the Diecidue brothers, James Lumia, Ignacio Antinori and Salvatore Italiano. Antinori was murdered on October 22, 1940; Lumia was murdered on June 5, 1950; and Italiano fled to Mexico in 1951.

Wall admitted that he had good reasons for going along with Trafficante, Senior, in 1945; previously the Mafia group had made three attempts on his life; the first was in 1937 as Wall was leaving a bank on the main street in Tampa; the second try occurred as Wall was leaving the garage behind his house; the third, in 1940, happened a few blocks from his house. In the third attempt, a truck passed the automobile in which Wall was riding and then stopped abruptly in front of the car. James DeSimone and Nicola Impostato, FBI No. 2716692, each armed with a shotgun, stepped from the truck and fired at Wall and his chauffeur. Both escaped with slight injuries. DeSimone and Impostato were known Mafia killers from Kansas City, Mo. They were staying with the Antinori family at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Wall still living?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; he was killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Later killed?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These three attempts failed but later he was killed?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Wall declared that the Mafia tried to make the public believe that the organization no longer existed in this country and that Mafia members pointed to the end of terrorism among Italian groups as evidence that the Mafia was gone from the underworld scene. Wall believed, however, that the organization had merely changed its type of operation. He said that other racketeers had once used the Mafia to monopolize rackets in major American cities. They had educated the Mafia so well in the process that the Sicilians had taken over the rackets themselves. Wall stated that the Mafia learned to consider extortion from Italian businessmen a "nickel-and-dime" business. They had discovered that public officials could be corrupted by bribery and that they could organize to take over the major rackets in the United States.

Wall declared that the Mafia was not dying out, but "was bigger and better than ever." He said that his partner, the elder Trafficante, had told him that there were some 10,000 active Mafia members in the United States. Wall stated that the Mafia leader in Tampa was

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Santo Trafficante, Sr., and that he was well informed on the activities of the organization in the United States, in Sicily, and in other countries of the world. Trafficante had told him, Wall said, that the Mafia in the United States was directed by a local board in every city having a sizable Sicilian population. There was a national board, headed by Joseph Profaci in New York City, which was composed of the heads of the major local boards. Trafficante is reported to have said that Frank Costello, Vincent Mangano, and Joe Massie were influential members of the national board, and that Frank Nitti and Lucky Luciano were former members.

According to Wall's account, the Mafia was composed of two distinct groups, an "inner circle" and an "outer circle." The general rule was that only natives of Sicily were admitted to the "inner circle," while American-born Italians were recruited into the "outer circle." Wall was told it was possible for a member to be transferred from "outer" to "inner" status when he performed an act of special merit, even though he had been born in the United States. The restrictions were not due to lack of trust by native Italians toward those of American birth, but because the "inner circle" usually took the major part of the proceeds of the Mafia's illegal activities and, therefore, preferred to keep the membership of the "inner circle" as small as possible.

Senator MUSKIE. Would you say that this chart represents the inner circle, Chief?

Mr. BROWN. At the very top portion, Senator, would be the inner circle.

Below that——

Senator MUSKIE. By the "top portion," do you mean——

Mr. BROWN. I would include in that that the three top men would be in the inner circle and those below that would be in the outer circle.

The CHAIRMAN. Those would only be in the inner circle so far as the Tampa area is concerned?

Mr. BROWN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the inner circle overall?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; this is just in the inner circle in the Tampa area.

The CHAIRMAN. But that gives an indication of how the overall organization is set up.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have it in here, but I may have missed it, but who was Wall talking to when he gave all this information?

Mr. BROWN. That was a confidential informant.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Very well.

(At this point Senator Javits entered the hearing room.)

Mr. BROWN. Wall believed the influential Mafia members in Tampa from 1930 through 1945 were: Santo Trafficante, Sr., Salvatore Italiano, James Lumia, and the Diecidue family—Alfonso, Antonio, Thomas, and Frank. The Diecidues and their in-laws opposed the leadership of Trafficante in the Tampa organization. Trafficante told Wall that Vincent Mangano, of the national board, supported the Diecidues but that he, Trafficante, was able to stay in power because he had Joseph Profaci's friendship.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question here?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. You refer to the national board. I do not recall any point in this hearing where there was this kind of a direct refer-

ence to a national organization in the Mafia. Was it referred to as such?

Mr. Brown. This is the information as Wall has reported that it consisted of a national board.

Senator Muskie. Do you know who he identified as members of the national board?

Mr. Brown. Well, Joe Profaci and Vincent Mangano were two of the members of the national board.

The Chairman. They are shown to be leaders of families, both of them.

Senator Muskie. But those same people are leaders of families in New York as testified by Valachi.

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. So it is your impression that the heads of the New York families made up a national board that had jurisdiction over Tampa, among other places?

Mr. Brown. That is correct; yes, sir.

Wall declared that there were approximately 40 members of the Mafia living in the Tampa area and he believed that Trafficante's share of proceeds of their gambling operation was being divided with other members of the Mafia.

Information in our files from another confidential source confirms Wall's statement. In addition it reveals that Antonio Diecidue made annual trips to Miami for the purpose of renting a house for Vincent Mangano, who came down from New York every year to spend 2 or 3 months in Miami. This source stated that many important members of the Mafia visited Mangano in Florida, but that Trafficante never appeared.

Senator Muskie. May I ask another question on the national board? Was it your impression that the national board members shared in the proceeds of the criminal activities in Tampa?

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir; they had a percentage.

Senator Muskie. Have you any idea what that percentage was?

Mr. Brown. No, sir; I have no idea.

The gray shadings on our chart depict the influence of each of these men. To me, it appears to be no small coincidence that in Tampa the Diecidue family lost stature from at least the early 1950's when Vincent Mangano disappeared; nor that Trafficante, Jr., the Profaci man, was in the immediate vicinity, when Albert Anastasia was murdered in 1957.

Sergeant de la Llana's intelligence unit has prepared summaries of the men in Trafficante's organization, along with a commentary of relevant facts about each of them. So that our information may be available not only to the subcommittee, but to all police units to whom your reports are so valuable, I wish to submit these summaries and commentary for the record, as our exhibit 3a through t; and exhibit 4.

The Chairman. The summary to which you have referred may be received as exhibit 48——

Mr. O'Donnell. Chief, as I understand it, these are summations, very brief summations, of the 19 individuals that are on the chart insofar as their criminal activity, their mode of business, their criminal history, et cetera; is that correct?

Mr. Brown. That is correct.

The Chairman. It may be received as exhibit No. 48.

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(The documents referred to marked "Exhibit No. 48" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You make reference to another exhibit. What is it?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you explain the other exhibit? Go into a little detail as to the various murders that you have on your exhibit 4, which will be a different exhibit in our hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair get this straight first.

The summary that he referred to has been made exhibit 48.

That is what you referred to as "our exhibit 3a"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say "through t; and exhibit 4." What is exhibit 4, your exhibit 4?

Mr. BROWN. Exhibit 4 is a brief summation on each of the subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your exhibit 3?

Mr. BROWN. They are arrest records of each of the individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Exhibit 48 is the arrest records.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your exhibit 4 is a brief summary of each person on the chart?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is of his records and activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 49 for reference.

(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 49" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now the record is straight.

You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Our department has always found it a most difficult task to obtain evidence sufficient for successful prosecution of Mafia members, because the witnesses who might offer such evidence have always been reluctant to do so. The paramount reason, of course, is their fear of Mafia reprisals, since it is common knowledge in Tampa that the Mafia does not hesitate to use murder for such reprisals and the relative infrequency with which such professional murders are successfully prosecuted.

We have categorized certain homicides in the Tampa area, from 1928 to the present, as "gangland slayings." An examination of the circumstances of some of these murders emphasizes how the Mafia uses murder to discipline its membership, to revenge itself against violators of its code and to otherwise eliminate opposition to its criminal activities and goals. Of the 23 homicides on the list, only 1 has been solved. A ratio of less than 5 percent of solution—and that particular murder was cleared up because it apparently resulted from an argument, although it is possible that the slayer deliberately provoked the argument. It was not, therefore, a typical gangland slaying, although the killer and the victim were both underworld figures.

In startling contrast to the number of unsolved gangland slayings, an examination of all other Tampa homicides from 1958 through 1962 shows that we have had 145 murders and that only 4 are presently unsolved, a solution ratio of better than 97 percent. From 1960 through 1962, all 83 homicides in our city were solved.

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The CHAIRMAN. What period is covered by the 23 gangland slayings that you make reference to?

Mr. BROWN. From 1928 through the present day.

The CHAIRMAN. In a period of about 30 years.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you identify them as gangland slayings as distinguished from the usual homicide cases that you have?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On those, according to your testimony, it has been impossible—or you have been unsuccessful, at least, in solving any of them except the one that appeared so obvious, and it would not possibly come within the category of "gangland slayings"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have included it as being the only one that was solved.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What are the characteristics of the gangland slayings that makes it so difficult to solve them as contrasted with your excellent record in other homicides?

Mr. BROWN. Of course, primarily it is because of witnesses who are reluctant to give the law enforcement any information whatsoever. In some of our killings—I recall one where we had nine witnesses in the room and nobody actually saw the murder or knew anything was going on.

Senator MUSKIE. So this fact has a direct bearing upon the question of immunity statutes, for example.

Mr. BROWN. That is right. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This, in other words, emphasizes the rigid discipline, the code of underworld law, that cannot be violated without suffering the penalty of death.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the nine who were in the room when the murder was committed, possibly every one of them knew what happened.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I would doubt that somebody did not know it. But, anyway, they know that the penalty for them talking would be death.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if they were inclined to, and I do not mean to say they were inclined to, even if one of them were inclined to talk, he knows what the penalty would be. And that makes it difficult. That is why you have the trouble in the gangland slayings, the silence, the threat, the intimidation of a death sentence, of their being executed by their underworld government if they talk.

Mr. BROWN. That is true.

Senator MUSKIE. Then, Chief, just to nail that point down, they seem to be more than concerned and clearly are more concerned for themselves and for their allies than they are about immunity against prosecution.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; that is true. They are afraid for their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. I have had these gangland slayings listed, with a few pertinent comments about each, and submit to the subcommittee this list as our exhibit 5.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received and be made exhibit No. 50.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 50" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

(At this point Senator Javits withdrew from the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. With few exceptions, those murders well reflect Joseph Valachi's testimony that Mafia members do live by violence and die by violence.

At least two of the unsolved murders on our list—that of Gus Perez in 1936 and of Joe "Pelusa" Diaz in 1958—were, in my opinion, directly attributable to the Mafia's knowledge or belief that the victims had given to legal authorities evidence incriminating Mafia members. A third murder—of Carl Carramusa, in 1945—taking place in Chicago, involved some Tampa Mafiosi, and is of particular interest in illustrating the Mafia zeal for vengeance against a member who violates its rules. It is of further significance, too, in demonstrating the difficulty of protecting witnesses against the Mafia—and is underlining Attorney General Kennedy's request for additional funds for that purpose, which request I strongly endorse.

The Carramusa case developed in Kansas City, Mo., with certain aspects related to the Mafia organization in Tampa. The principal figure in the case was Carl Carramusa, known as a minor member of the Mafia and a front man for the Mafia's narcotics traffic operation in Kansas City.

Carramusa was indicted in 1942 for conspiring to violate the Federal narcotic laws. His codefendants were Joseph DeLuca, Nicola Impastato, Paul Antinori, Joe Antinori, Charles Gerrgimina, Louis Ventola, Patsy Ventola, Charles Tiabi, Samuel Pernice, and Fellipo Fernice. Tampa's Mafia organization was one of the sources of supply for the Kansas City group, and at that time the narcotics trade in Tampa was headed by Paul Antinori and Joseph Antinori, who had inherited the narcotics leadership from their father, Ignazio Antinori. The elder Antinori had been murdered a few years before in a narcotics deal. All of the defendants in the Kansas City case were prosecuted successfully, primarily because Carramusa violated the cardinal Mafia code of l'omerta, or silence, testifying openly against them at their trial. After the trial, Carramusa went into hiding in Chicago with his wife and family, changing his name and beginning a new life under new circumstances.

Three years later, in June of 1945, while he was seated in his automobile, Carramusa's head was blown off by a shotgun blast. James Lumia, an associate of the Antinoris, was a suspect in this killing, but was himself murdered at Tampa in June of 1950. A prime suspect was the same Nicola Impastato, who had some years before attempted to kill Charles Wall.

In Tampa we have suffered also the frustration I know that many of my police colleagues in other cities have experienced—the deliberate recanting at trial of the original statements of complaining or key witnesses, because of their fear of Mafia reprisal. A clear instance of this frustration of law enforcement effort involved three of the ranking members of the Tampa Mafia.

One day in 1953, one Joe Castellano went to the Italian Club in Tampa to play cards with a group of friends. During the course of the evening, he talked to Salvatore Scaglione privately. Scaglione asked Castellano if he wanted to make a profit on a "hot load" of whisky. Castellano said he was interested, and they agreed to meet later that night.

At the meeting, Scaglione was accompanied by Joe Mistretta and Angelo LoScalzo. Castellano got into the front seat of a car provided by the others, and the four men drove to a thickly wooded area outside of Tampa city limits. Castellano was then attacked with a hammer, being hit repeatedly on the head. He managed to get out of the car, although he was badly hurt. He broke loose from his elderly assailants and ran away. He stumbled into a nearby house and asked to be taken to the constable's house, where he gave a statement about the incident, naming the three as his assailants. He swore to the county solicitor that he had no idea why he was beaten. Scaglione, Mistretta, and LoScalzo were arrested and charged with assault with intent to murder.

Joe Castellano disappeared for a period of time. After he was found, the case went to trial. Castellano changed his story completely and testified that he had injured himself while hunting on the night of the attack. The predictable result, of course, was a verdict for the defendants of "not guilty."

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO FIGHT ORGANIZED CRIME

I believe firmly that it is almost impossible for the Police Department of the City of Tampa, or any other municipality, to cope effectively with the activities of a national or international crime syndicate such as these hearings show exists in the United States. One of the main problems is that the most dedicated, well-trained, and well-staffed police force is almost always limited legally and financially to the territorial boundaries of its municipality. For example, the Tampa Police Department is obviously interested in and informed about the activities of Santo Trafficante. However, in the past the department was unable to do anything about Trafficante's operations in pre-Castro Cuba; it has no jurisdiction or control of his illegal affairs in Miami and elsewhere in central Florida. The department could only record that he attended the Apalachin meeting in November of 1957, but it could do nothing about this obvious evidence that he was a high-ranking member of a national crime syndicate.

In the light of our experience with the Mafia in our own city's underworld, I submit for this subcommittee's consideration some suggestions for Federal legislation which I believe would certainly help local law enforcement agencies to fight organized crime more effectively.

1. More ample funds must be obtained by local agencies to recruit high caliber police personnel and to retain superior personnel having the experience and capabilities to understand, investigate, and prosecute organized criminal conspiracies. Because of the demonstrated interstate nature of organized crime, Federal legislation similar to

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that ... Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. "... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting

some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power, according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

SECRET

[redacted] delivered $10000 to

O'C in Fla

— Richard Scully Cain
AKA / Richard Scalzetti

CIA says no rel.

used ase under "contract clearance" since '63

Giancana driver?

— Jan '59 full of gambling
casinos

SECRET

1st Meet.

I surprised to be approached by CIA

I person in Cuba
business interests

Cover whatever to see him

- how
- where
- when

SECRET

GIANCANA file (Meyer Lansky's gambling casino in Havana)

Trafficante

— gaming casinos under Batista

— father died in 54 — inherited rackets

— intimate of Carlos Marcello

— T introduced in circa Sept 60 as "Joe"

— 1st attempt T delivered poison pills to "agent who had access to Castro" = failure

— T suggested another candidate

— ~~Sam~~ nominated Juan Orta → Cuban receiving kickbacks from gambling interests still had access to Castro

T gave pills to ↗

— Dr Anthony Varona Cuban exile

SECRET

Atlanta Briefing

T – met w/ Roselli ~ July of this year

T calls be made – contacts – travels etc

Rptr – desc. – first lead – told about ? → concern over rpt in Fla?

followup interview after Roselli i.e. Roselli talking – T know etc

Dick – CIA memo – Bill Lynch

Who are called after T got his call etc

T travels LA / Chicago etc –
Name of LA guy

perjury involving alleged contribution to political organization in return for impairment of Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and judicial proceedings were not entitled to continuance or change of venue on ground that, though pretrial publicity was nationwide, exposure varied in certain sections of the country. U. S. v. Mitchell, D.C.N.Y.1973, 372 F.Supp. 1239, appeal dismissed 485 F.2d 1290.

§ 1511. Obstruction of State or local law enforcement

(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if—

(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy;

(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, appointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and

(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.

(b) As used in this section—

(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which—

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.

(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels, or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(c) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax under paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, if no part of the gross receipts derived from such activity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, member, or employee of such organization, except as compensation for actual expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity.

(d) Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title VIII, § 802(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 936.

References in Text. Paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to section 501(c) (3) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Congressional Statement of Findings. Section 801 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: "The Congress finds that illegal gambling involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities thereof."

Priority of State Laws. Section 811 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: "No provision of this title [enacting this section and section 1955 of this title, amending section 2516 of this title and enacting material set out as notes under this section and section 1955 of this title] indicates an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of a State or possession, or a political subdivision of a State or possession, on the same subject matter, or to relieve any person of any obligation imposed by any law of any State or possession, or political subdivision of a State or possession."

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 91-452, see 1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4007.

Index to Notes

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, c. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, c. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology. 80th Congress House Report No. 304.

References in Text. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in the text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

1962 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

Legislative History: For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see 1962 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2567.

Notes of Decisions

Library references

Obstructing Justice ⟹7, 21.
C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 5, 22.

1. Constitutionality

Former section 241a of this title [now this section] providing that whoever "corruptly" endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede any witness in proceeding, etc. was not unconstitutional for failure to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt contrary to U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5 and 6. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

2. Generally

This section covers any activity which would influence or intimidate witness who might be called to testify and is not limited to witness who has been called to testify with defendant's knowledge. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

3. Proceedings within section

The submission to the Naturalization Service of an application to file a petition for naturalization cannot, in a legal sense, have pendency throughout the entire United States within meaning of this section creating a criminal offense against one who corruptly attempts to obstruct or impede the due and proper administration of law, under which such a proceeding is had before a department or agency of the United States. Taran v. U. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.

In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede due and proper administration of law in relation to a naturalization proceeding allegedly pending before Immigration Service, based on a false statement allegedly made in defendant's application for pardon regarding other arrests and convictions against him, naturalization proceeding was not pending in 1951 before the Service when the defendant made the application for pardon, nor when pardon was obtained by him, so as to authorize conviction, where at the time of charged offense the Service had no application in its hands, in that it regarded the naturalization application as not having been entitled to be submitted and returned it to defendant, and defendant subsequently submitted a new application in 1955 having no relation to what was done in 1951. Id.

"Proceeding" within this section includes any investigation which is directed by formal order of Securities and Exchange Commission and at which designated officer takes testimony under oath. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

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sion Notes

2 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 sub- ted the catchline "Obstruction of edings before departments, agen- and committees" for "Influencing or ing witness before agencies and nittees" and punished the willful re- al, concealment, destruction, mutila- alteration or falsification of docu- s which were the subject of a de- d under the Antitrust Civil Process if done with the intent to prevent pliance with a civil investigative de- d.

gislative History: For legislative his- and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p.

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Proceeding" within this section in- des any investigation which is directed formal order of Securities and Ex- nge Commission and at which desig- ed officer takes testimony under oath. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

4. Witness within section

One whom defendant knew was prob- able witness before Senate Committee and who intended to testify was a "wit- ness" though not under subpoena when defendant gave him false story to tell when and if he testified, for purposes of prosecutions for subornation of perjury and corruptly influencing witness to give false and perjurious information to Sen- ate Committee investigators. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal.1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed. 2d 795.

5. Indictment or information

Indictment charging that defendant un- lawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, ob- struct and impede due and proper exer- cise of power of inquiry by certain spe- cific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain un- ion invoice or record, which bore rea- sonable relation to subject matter of in- quiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, suf- ficiently charged an offense under this section dealing with influencing or in- juring witness before agencies and com- mittees. U. S. v. Presser, D.C.Ohio 1960, 187 F.Supp. 64.

Indictment charging that defendant un- lawfully, wilfully and knowingly did cor- ruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and par- tially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union in- voice or record, which bore reasonable re- lation to subject matter of inquiry of Sen- ate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground that doctrine of res judicata applied because of prior indict- ment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee. Id.

Indictment charging that defendant un- lawfully, wilfully and knowingly did cor- ruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and par- tially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memoran- dum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject mat- ter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground of double jeopardy, because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee, since same facts would not prove each case. Id.

An indictment for conspiracy to vio- late criminal code by subornation of per- jury in proceeding before the Federal Petroleum Board was not subject to crit- icism that it was too vague, contradic- tory, duplicitous, uncertain and indefnite. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

6. Evidence

The "two witness rule" was not appli- cable in showing that defendant violated this section proscribing obstruction of justice by influencing witness to give false testimony and information to Sen- ate Committee and its investigators, and testimony of one person alone was suffi- cient to convict. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal. 1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.

Testimony of one person alone is suffi- cient to convict defendant for obstructing justice in influencing witness to give false testimony to Senate Committee and to give false and perjurious information to committee investigators. Id.

Evidence sustained convictions under counts charging corruptly inducing wit- ness to testify falsely and corruptly in- fluencing him to give false and perjurious information to investigators of Senate Committee. Id.

7. Questions for jury

Whether defendant charged with ob- struction of justice in Securities and Ex- change Commission's investigation by in- ducing person to testify falsely that he had purchased certain securities through firm of which defendant was head and had resold securities to that firm knew that witness would be asked to testify under oath was jury question. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, cer- tiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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AMENDMENTS

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CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

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Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

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SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

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§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

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Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

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Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.